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Piramal Enterprises Limited vs Additional ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 9984 Bom

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 9984 Bom
Judgement Date : 30 July, 2021

Bombay High Court
Piramal Enterprises Limited vs Additional ... on 30 July, 2021
Bench: S.P. Deshmukh, Abhay Ahuja
                                    1               WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

                     WRIT PETITION (L) NO.11040 OF 2021

Piramal Enterprises Limited,                              ]
having its address at Piramal Antana                      ]
Agastya Corporate Park, Kamani Junction                   ]
Kurla, Mumbai - 400 070.                                  ]    ... Petitioner

                    Versus

1. Additional/joint/Deputy/Assistant                      ]
   Commissioner of Income-tax/Income-tax Officer          ]
   National e-Assessment Centre,                          ]
   having address at Room No.401, 2nd Floor, E-Ramp,      ]
   Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, Delhi 110 003,               ]
   Email id : [email protected]       ]
   and [email protected]           ]

2. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax,                     ]
   Circle 8(2)(1), Mumbai,                                ]
   having address at Room No.624, 6th Floor,              ]
   Aaykar Bhavan, Maharshi Karve Road, Mumbai,            ]
   Maharashtra - 400020.                                  ]
   Email id : [email protected]           ]

3. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-8,                ]
   having address at Room No.611, 6th Floor,              ]
   Aaykar Bhavan, Maharshi Karve Road, Mumbai,            ]
   Maharashtra - 400020.                                  ]
   Email id : [email protected]               ]

4. Central Board of Direct Taxes,                         ]
   North Block, New Delhi.                                ]

5. Union of India,                                        ]
   through the Secretary, Department of Revenue,          ]
   Ministry of Finance, Government of India,              ]
   North Block, New Delhi - 110 001.                      ]... Respondents

Mr. Percy Pardiwala, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Madhur Agarwal i/b Ms.
Priyanka Bore for Petitioner.
Mr. Sham Walve for Respondents.


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                           CORAM :-
                              SUNIL P. DESHMUKH &
                              ABHAY AHUJA, JJ.

RESERVED ON :- 12 JULY, 2021 PRONOUNCED ON :- 30 JULY, 2021 (THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING)

ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : SUNIL P. DESHMUKH, J.) :-

1. The petitioner - a registered company - is before the court

aggrieved by the draft assessment order dated 22/04/2021 (for the

assessment year 2017-18) under Faceless Assessment System / e-

Assessment.

2. Petitioner carries on various businesses including

pharmaceuticals comprising manufacturing pharmaceutical formulations

as well as trading in pharmaceutical goods. It purchases raw material for

manufacturing its formulations as well as purchases goods for trading.

3. The petitioner had filed its original return of income for the

assessment year 2017-18 in November 2017 declaring NIL income. The

petitioner has filed a revised return of income in March 2019 for said

assessment year electronically in the prescribed fixed format.

4. According to petitioner, in its profit and loss account, it

breaks up expenditure in broad categories viz; cost of material consumed,

purchase of stock in trade and change in inventory of finished goods,

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3 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

work in progress and stock in trade. Its details are disclosed in schedule

to profit and loss account. In the balance-sheet, inventory (closing stock)

comprises the items raw material, work in progress, finished goods, stock

in trade and spares and is given in consolidated figures.

5. It is referred to that petitioner has tendered and uploaded

profit and loss account and balance-sheet by filling up relevant columns of

the format of return of income. Columns in the return of income are pre-

determined and inflexible and since it provided for only one column for

purchase, it was not possible for petitioner to show purchases of raw

material and purchases of trading goods separately. There is no column

to show opening and closing stocks of stock in trade. In the

circumstances, in the profit and loss account, as there are no sufficient

columns to give details of transactions, the petitioner had made

disclosures in certain columns and schedule to annual accounts.

6. The petitioner submits that the aforesaid disclosures are

made for understanding as to the amount shown in profit and loss

account of income tax return tallies with annual accounts. It is being

submitted that such a method of disclosure in return of income does not,

in any way, affect the income declared or the correctness of amount

declared in the profit and loss account or the return of income. Since the

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return of income comprises fixed line items, the petitioner had to make

the disclosures as aforesaid in particular form which practice it has been

following from the beginning of filing of return of income electronically.

The petitioner discloses all types of inventories (closing stocks) as is

disclosed in annual accounts, in the balance-sheet.

7. It is referred to, it is considered that there is substantial

difference between the value of receipts from services in the service tax

return received from CBEC and the values disclosed in income-tax return.

It is contended that while the petitioner had sought material to

understand the basis of respondent no.1 coming to such consideration,

the respondent no.1 had not furnished any material / information and

arbitrarily addition was made.

8. It is stated petitioner had also filed along with return transfer

pricing audit report in Form 3-CEB showing international transactions

entered into and their arm's length price. It is submitted that the

transactions of granting corporate guarantee in respect of borrowing of

Associate Enterprises ('AE'), the petitioner had charged the transaction @

0.75% or 0.50% of the guarantee amount. The petitioner has made suo-

motu adjustment @ 0.25% for certain guarantees given for the

performance of AEs as being the arm's length price of the international

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transactions. The transfer pricing officer under his order dated

29/01/2021, proposed adjustment of Rs.23.62 crore rejecting submission

of petitioner with respect computation of arm's length price and

computed corporate guarantee and performance guarantee @ 1.68% and

accordingly proposed the adjustment.

9. The petitioner's case was selected for scrutiny assessment and

during the course of submissions, petitioner wanted to opt out of e-

proceedings and to have physical submission but its case was transferred

to e-proceedings / faceless assessment.

10. The petitioner also refers to that during course of assessment

proceeding, various show-cause notices were issued from time to time

seeking details and the petitioner had filed its replies with submissions

with respect to issues sought to be raised.

11. Petitioner states, it received a purported draft assessment

order in the form of a show-cause notice dated 25/03/2021 stating that

certain additions are proposed to be made while completing assessment,

purporting to give opportunity to show cause, up to 26/03/2021.

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12. The notice, inter alia, also states that the petitioner may file

response in writing and may also file request for personal hearing through

video conferencing. The notice proposed to disallow a sum of Rs.167.57

crore under section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, 'IT Act')

and an amount of Rs.430.35 crore based on difference of turnover

disclosed by the petitioner and information received from CBEC, addition

to value of closing stock as there being difference between value of

closing stock, in the profit and loss account, in the income tax return and

in the balance-sheet, addition with respect to opening stock as the

opening stock in the profit and loss account in the income tax return is

more than the closing stock disclosed in the income tax return of earlier

year and transfer price adjustment of Rs.23.62 crore.

13. In its letter dated 26/03/2021, the petitioner asked for time

up to 09/04/2021 as a day's time was not sufficient with respect to issues

raised in the proposed draft assessment order. On 28/03/2021, the

petitioner submitted a letter seeking hearing through virtual conferencing

in the assessment proceedings for AY 2017-18. The petitioner refers to

that it filed responses to notice on 07/04/2021 and 08/04/2021 giving

explanation, particulars and details with respect to the issues.

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14. The petitioner received a draft assessment order dated

22/04/2021 under section 144C(1) read with 143(3) of the IT Act

disallowing sum of Rs.167.57 crore under section 14A of the Act, adding

Rs.362.72 crore to income rejecting submissions of the petitioner stating

that burden was on petitioner to reconcile the data with the service tax

returns holding that request of the petitioner for further time for

reconciliation is not justifiable, adding a sum of Rs.343.10 crore on

account of closing stock, with addition of Rs.810.33 crore on account of

opening stock and transfer pricing addition of Rs.23.62 crore.

15. The petitioner is, thus, before the court contending that

impugned draft assessment order dated 22/04/2021 by respondent no. 1

for assessment year 2017-18 is ex-facie illegal, untenable, unsustainable,

unreasonable and contrary to the provisions of the IT Act and infringes

petitioner's rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India,

invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

16. The revenue has filed its reply through Deputy Commissioner

of Income Tax, Circle 8(2)(1), Mumbai, wherein it has been referred to

that the case of petitioner for Assessment Year (AY) 2017-18 had been

selected for complete scrutiny and verification, as according to Computer

Assisted Scrutiny Scheme (CASS), various aspects had cropped up on

account of issues referred to in the reply.

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17. It is contended that adjustment of Rs.23.62 crore was based

on transfer pricing officer's order under section 92CA(3) before which the

petitioner had been issued notices from time to time and the petitioner's

submissions were duly considered and are incorporated in transfer pricing

order.

18. It has been referred to that in CASS, additional income in

respect of closing stock has been properly made having regard to the

differences of values appearing in profit and loss account and balance

sheet. Similar is the case of the opening stock, as there have been

differences in the opening stock of the current year which should have

been generally the same, as the closing stock of the preceding year. It is

sought to be submitted that after satisfaction, there has been disallowance

under section 14A of the Act r/w Rule 8D in the draft assessment order.

The assessee had failed to furnish computation as per rule 8D and instead

had furnished scientific working of disallowance which is less than

expenses already debited in profit and loss account for earning exempt

income, as such, 1% of investment less expenses had been added to total

income.

19. It is contended that a show cause notice issued on

25.03.2021 to the petitioner. However, pursuant to the same, there had

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9 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

been no compliance on 26.03.2021. On 28.03.2021, the petitioner had

sought an adjournment and submitted response on 07.04.2021 urging to

explain specific points through video conferencing and had also filed

response on 08.04.2021. All responses and replies filed in response to the

notice were duly considered and examined and accordingly, draft

assessment order was passed under section 144C(1) r/w 143(3) on

22.04.2021 and assessee had been given 30 days time from the date of

receipt of draft assessment order to file its acceptance of variations made

to the total income or to file objections, if any, as per the provisions of

section 144C(2). Draft assessment order passed on 22.04.2021 is valid

and in accordance with law.

20. It is contended that assessee will be given principles of

natural justice before passing final assessment order after filing objection

to variations in total income under section 144C(2) of the Income Tax

Act.

21. Mr. Percy Pardiwala, learned senior advocate for petitioner,

submits that impugned order is passed in contravention in principles of

natural justice and contends that opportunity of personal hearing is an

essential requisite before passing an order prejudicing interest of the

assessee. He submits that petitioner had requested for personal hearing

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10 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

in response to the notice dated 25/03/2021, inter alia, through video

conferencing. He submits that despite requests, on many occasions for

hearing, physical as well as through video conferencing, the same have

not been heeded and / or attended to and directly order detrimental to

the interest of the petitioner has been passed.

22. Mr. Pardiwala submits that respondent no.1 has failed to

appreciate the response to the show-cause notice-cum-draft assessment

order dated 25/03/2021 on the issues on which additions to income have

been made in impugned draft assessment order dated 22/04/2021. He

submits that the impugned order is devoid of proper reasoning and does

not take into account the submissions and its underlying purport.

23. He submits that respondent no.1 has made additions to

income in excess of Rs.1,000 crores with respect to opening stock and

closing stock without appreciating the case of petitioner that there have

been no incorrect disclosures. He submits that respondent no.1 has failed

to appreciate that balance-sheet in the annual accounts disclosing correct

figures of opening stock and closing stock and the income tax return are

cumulative which do not change the amount of income chargeable to tax.

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                                       11                WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


24. He goes on to submit that an Assessing Officer cannot

proceed to make disallowance under section 14A by applying Rule 8D of

Income Tax Rules without recording subjective satisfaction. Despite

scientific working apportioning the cost to the tune of Rs.3,26,18,604/-

been given, respondent no.1 has proceeded to disallow Rs.167 crore

under Rule 8D. He submits that this is completely arbitrary and irrational

and is contrary to binding principles laid down by superior courts. The

order is without application of mind.

25. He submits that addition of Rs.362.72 crore is on the basis of

alleged information received from CBEC of the sales tax returns of the

petitioner. The petitioner has given details of sales tax returns filed by it

which show that petitioner had rendered services to the extent of

Rs.272.41 crore. The basis for computing Rs.567.76 crore by respondent

no.1, despite being sought, yet has not been given to the petitioner. He

submits that reconciliation was not possible unless the petitioner is given

proper and relevant information.

26. He submits that this court as well as other High Courts have

consistently taken a view that 0.5% is a reasonable arm's length price for

determination of guarantee fees and as such, finding of respondent no.1

that corporate guarantee fees should be computed at 1.68% is contrary to

the decisions of high courts and earlier decision in petitioner's own case.

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                                       12                WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


27. Mr. Pardiwala, during course of his submissions, has taken us

through the provisions of sections 144B and 144C. From the provisions of

section 144B(1), he submits that relevant in present controversy would be

the provisions from section 144B(1)(xvi) whereunder National Faceless

Assessment Centre ('NFAC') shall, if the draft assessment order prejudicial

to the interest of the assessee is proposed, issue a show-cause notice as to

why proposed variation should not be made giving an option to the

assessee to ask for personal hearing according to sub-clause (b) of clause

(xiv) of sub-clause(1) of section 144B.

28. He submits, after receipt of show-cause notice, assessee is

supposed to furnish response as referred to in sub clause (xxii) within

specified time, inter alia, requesting opportunity for personal hearing. In

case, no response is furnished, the NFAC can proceed with the draft

assessment order / final draft assessment order as referred to in clause

(xxiii)(a)[A], [B]. However, if response is furnished and request for

hearing is made, NFAC, under clause 144B(1)(xxiii)(b) has to assign

responsibility to the Assessment Unit. After considering the response and

after giving opportunity of being heard, Assessment Unit shall send

revised draft assessment order to NFAC. He submits that after receipt of

the revised draft assessment order, NFAC shall, in case of variation in the

revised draft assessment order is prejudicial to the interest of the assessee

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13 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

in comparison to the draft assessment order or final draft assessment

order, follow the procedure under sub-clause (b) of clause (xvi) of sub-

section (1) of section 144B.

29. He submits that in the present scenario, an opportunity of

hearing as is available and allowed pursuant to section 144B(xvi)(b) is

getting lost.

30. He submits that as in e-assessment system / faceless

assessment system, information given in fixed format of the department

appears to be taken into account and the particulars given provided

schedules and appendices do not appear to have been appreciated,

hearing is eminently imperative as there are several issues which would

be required to be addressed to and explained. There are certain aspects

which can be peculiarly explained and understood during oral

submissions and thus a hearing is a must which is allowed in the scheme,

however, is not afforded and is wanting in the present case.

31. Mr. Pardiwala purports to refer to and rely, for aforesaid

proposition, on a decision rendered by Delhi High Court in the case of

Moser Baer India Ltd. Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax,

reported in [2009] 176 Taxman 473 (Delhi). This case concerns

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determination, by Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) pursuant to section

92BA, of arm's length price of international transaction without granting

opportunity of personal hearing to the assessee. He submits that in said

case, the importance of personal hearing has been discussed with quite

some elaboration. He points out that in aforesaid decision, judgments in

the case of Travancore Rayon Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in AIR

1971 862 (7) and in the case of Indian Transformers Ltd. Vs. Asstt.

Collector reported in 1983 (14) ELT 2293, by Supreme Court and Kerala

High Court respectively are considered showing that oral hearing is a

must on account of complexities involved in determination of arm's length

price. He draws attention to paragraphs 6.1 and 7.3 from said judgment

in Moser Baer (Supra), reading, thus :-

"6.1 As regard the objection taken by the respondent, with respect, to the maintainability of the writ petition, it is our view that, in the event, we were to hold that the impugned order(s) of the TPO were passed in breach of the principles of natural justice and hence, a nullity in the eye of law, the writ petition would be a proper remedy. See observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. (1988) 8 SCC 1.

7.3 Keeping in mind the test as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei (supra), we have no doubt in our minds that the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 92CA cast a duty in no uncertain terms on the TPO to afford an opportunity of an oral hearing. This is clearly so in view of the fact that as courts have carved out this important

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safeguard in favour of the aggrieved parties even where the statute is silent, unless there is exclusion of such a right by way of an explicit provision or by necessary implication. In the present case, however, given the words of the statute, we have no doubt that the grant of oral hearing by the TPO is mandatory. The reason for coming to such conclusion, apart from the clear wordings of Sub-section (3) of Section 92CA, is that, apart from the civil consequences, that, the determination of ALP would have on the assessee, any adjustment by the Assessing Officer to the ALP determined, by the assessee based on the determination by the TPO under Sub-section (3) of Section 92CA, would result in imposition of penalty under Section 271(1 )(c) read with explanation 7 of the Act. The Assessing Officer, after the amendment brought about by virtue of Finance Act, 2007, has no choice but to proceed to compute total income of the assessee under Sub-section (4) of Section 92C in "conformity" with the ALP determined by the TPO. In view of the consequences which result from the determination of the ALP by the TPO, which are undoubtedly severe, there can be no doubt that an oral hearing is a must."

32. He submits that there is strong possibility of a submission

from the other side about an opportunity of hearing been available with

Dispute Resolution Panel. Yet, according to him, the same would not

dispense with hearing by the authority which is to determine the income

assessible to tax according to procedure when the statutory scheme makes

provisions for the same.

33. Mr. Pardiwalla submits that there is no distinction under the

scheme between the eligible assessee and other assessee so far as

opportunity of hearing is concerned in the scheme under section 144B.

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34. Mr. Pardiwalla cites a few decisions from Delhi High Court

viz;

(a) Sanjay Aggarwal Vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre,

Delhi, reported in [2021] 127 taxmann.com 637 (Delhi) wherein, taking

into account provisions in clauses under section 144B(1) for faceless

assessment, it has been observed to the effect that a look at relevant

provisions would give a sense as to why legislature has provided personal

hearing in the matter in a case where variation is proposed in the orders

of draft assessment, final draft assessment or revised draft assessment.

Opportunity is made available to assessee by serving a notice calling upon

him to show-cause and assessee or his representative is allowed to request

for personal hearing to present oral submissions on its case before income

tax authorities in any unit. Taking stock of the situation, Delhi High Court

had concluded that it was incumbent on the revenue to accord personal

hearing to the petitioner and its lack would result in setting aside

impugned order. In aforesaid case, it appears that a show-cause notice-

cum-draft assessment order had been issued on 13/04/2021 and

thereafter the petitioner had responded to making several requests for

personal hearing which were not heeded and the notice culminated into a

draft assessment order notice dated 22/04/2021 and the petitioner

contended that impugned order had been passed without affording

personal hearing to the petitioner.

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      (b)      In Lemon Tree Hotels Limited Vs. National Faceless

Assessment Centre, Delhi & Anr in W.P.(C ) 5427/2021 (Delhi High

Court), petitioner's case was that upon show-cause notice-cum-draft

assessment order dated 13/03/2021, several replies were furnished and

having regard to the complexity in the matter, a request for personal

hearing was also made. It is observed in paragraph 7 of the decision,

after taking into account section 144B(7)(vii) and clause (xii) sub-clause

(h), prima facie once an assessee requests for a personal hearing, the

officer in-charge, under the provisions of clause (viii) of section 144B(7),

would have to ordinarily grant personal hearing.

(c) In the case of Satia Industries Limited Vs. National Faceless

Assessment Centre, Delhi in W.P.(C ) 5587/2021 & CM APPL.17382/2021

(Delhi High Court), it has been considered that since an adverse view was

taken, and petitioner's income got varied, provisions of section 144B(7)

get triggered, and that such an aspect had received attention in the

judgment dated 27/05/2021 in the matter of Ritnand Balved Education

Foundation (Umbrella Organization of Amity Group of Institutions) Vs.

National Faceless Assessment Centre & Ors., in W.P.(C ) 5537/2021 (Delhi

High Court), wherein the high court has observed that impugned

assessment order and consequential notices of demand and penalty were

flawed being in contravention of provisions of section 144B(7)(vii) of the

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Income Tax Act and the standard operation procedure (SOP) for personal

hearing through video conferencing under the faceless assessment

scheme, 2019 issued by the CBDT under Circular dated 23/11/2020. It

has been also observed that since statute itself makes provision for

personal hearing, the respondent revenue cannot veer away from the

same. As such, impugned assessment had been set aside directing

granting of personal hearing to the petitioner or its representative via

video conferencing with the concerned officer with a prior notice therefor.

(d) In YCD Industries Vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre,

Delhi, reported in [2021] 127 taxmann.com 606 (Delhi) , the High Court

has observed as under :-

"16.1. The statute [i.e. Section 144B(1)(xiv), (xv), (xvi)b and (xxii)] provides for issuance of a show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order, and an opportunity to the petitioner/assessee to respond to the same where income of the assessee is varied by the respondent/revenue. Admittedly, the petitioner's income was varied to its prejudice with the addition of Rs.90,25,535/-. As a matter of fact, had the show cause notice cum draft assessment been served on the petitioner, its authorised representative could have requested for a personal hearing in the matter. The respondent/revenue, to our minds, could not have side-stepped such safeguards put in place by the legislature.

16.2 The justification proffered by Mr. Bhatia that notices were issued prior to the passing of the impugned assessment order, does not impress us. This submission flies in the face of the schematic design of the statute."

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      (e)      Similar was a case in RKKR Foundation Vs. National Faceless

Assessment Centre, Delhi, reported in [2021] 127 taxmann.com 643

(Delhi).

35. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pardiwala lays stress on

judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Sahara India

(Firm) Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central-I, reported in [2008] 169

Taxman 328 (SC) with a view to bring under focus necessity and

importance of having opportunity of pre-decisional hearing to an assessee

even in the absence of any express provision and requirement of following

principles of natural justice and their reading into the provisions. The

decision has been rendered by three judge bench of Supreme Court, in

view of order passed by a two judge bench of said court where the

division bench had found it necessary, since it could not align itself with

another two judge bench decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Vs. Dy. CIT

reported in [2006] 157 Taxman 168. Rajesh Kumar (supra), ruled that an

assessee should have an opportunity of pre-decisional hearing before

issuing directions under section 142(2A) of the Income Tax Act. The

three judge bench, in paragraphs 12 and 19, has observed, thus :-

"12. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCC 664, R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three- Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of "natural justice". Referring to several decisions, his Lordship observed thus :

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"Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle - as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application - seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post- decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre- decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre- decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise."

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                                        21                 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


19. Again in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India a question arose whether in the absence of a provision for giving the concerned parties an opportunity of being heard before an order is passed under the provisions of Section 269UD of the Act, for purchase by the Central Government of an immovable property agreed to be sold on an agreement to sell, an opportunity of being heard before such an order could be passed should be given or not. Relying on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha case (supra) and Olga Tellis (supra) it was held that :

"Although Chapter XX-C does not contain any express provision for the affected parties being given an opportunity to be heard before an order for purchase is made under Section 269UD, not to read the requirement of such an opportunity would be to give too literal and strict an interpretation to the provisions of Chapter XX-C and in the words of Judge Learned Hand of the United States of America "to make a fortress out of the dictionary." Again, there is no express provision in Chapter XX-C barring the giving of a show cause notice or reasonable opportunity to show cause nor is there anything in the language of Chapter XX-C which could lead to such an implication. The observance of principles of natural justice is the pragmatic requirement of fair play in action. In our view, therefore, the requirement of an opportunity to show cause being given before an order for purchase by the Central Government is made by an appropriate authority under Section 269UD must be read into the provisions of Chapter XX-C. There is nothing in the language of Section 269UD or any other provision in the said Chapter which would negate such an opportunity being given. Moreover, if such a requirement were not read into the provisions of the said Chapter, they would be seriously open to challenge on the ground of violations of the provisions of Article 14 on the ground of non-

compliance with principles of natural justice. The

URS 21 of 34

22 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

provision that when an order for purchase is made under Section 269UD reasons must be recorded in writing is no substitute for a provision requiring a reasonable opportunity of being heard before such an order is made."

And in paragraph 24, it has been concluded;

"24. The upshot of the entire discussion is that the exercise of power under Section 142(2A) of the Act leads to serious civil consequences and, therefore, even in the absence of express provision for affording an opportunity of pre-decisional hearing to an assessee and in the absence of any express provision in Section 142(2A) barring the giving of reasonable opportunity to an assessee, the requirement of observance of principles of natural justice is to be read into the said provision. Accordingly, we reiterate the view expressed in Rajesh Kumar's case (supra)."

36. Mr. Pardiwalla has also pointed out that this court has

followed said decision in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income-

tax Vs. Vilson Particle Board Industries Ltd., reported in [2020] 116

taxmann.com 12 (Bombay).

37. He then refers to a decision of this court in the case of Sahara

Hospitality Limited Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in [2012]

25 Taxmann.com 299 (Bombay). Said decision has been rendered in the

context of section 127 - power to transfer cases - under the Income Tax

Act. After referring to various citations, it has been considered by the

court, the Supreme Court had held that a reasonable opportunity should

URS 22 of 34

23 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

be given to assessee wherever it is possible to do so. The conspectus, the

court had considered, led to that the word 'may' in section 127 should be

read as 'shall' and had observed that requirement of giving an assessee a

reasonable opportunity of being heard wherever it is possible to do so is

mandatory and the discretion of authority is only as to what is a

reasonable opportunity in a given case.

38. He submits that although there have been written responses

and submissions explaining situation, the impugned draft assessment

order does not take the same into account in proper perspective and does

not give reasons for disagreement with the response.

39. He submits that the impugned order is completely contrary to

the principles of natural justice and contrary to law and urges to set aside

impugned notices and the impugned order and that there is no equally

efficacious remedy against the impugned notices and the impugned order.

40. He, therefore, submits that the writ petition be allowed, the

order be set aside and the matter be sent back to the position as had been

obtaining before 22/04/2021 and to pass an appropriate draft assessment

order after hearing the petitioner.

URS                                                                           23 of 34





                                        24                WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


41. Mr. Sham Walve, learned Counsel appearing for the revenue

defending the impugned order, reiterates the submissions in the reply and

strenuously contends that there is substantial difference between the

values of gross receipts from services shown in service tax return received

from CBEC and values disclosed in income tax return which are

significantly less in income tax return. While assessee was asked to

reconcile the difference between the two, it was expected that the

assessee would reconcile figures with its own books of accounts, the

assessee - company has failed to do the same. Assessee's submission that

services received will not form part of revenue, being an expense had

been accepted.

42. He submits that it is basic that opening stock should match

with the closing stock of preceding year and closing stock is derived on

the basis of opening stock, purchases and consumption of the stock, that

should be matched with the inventories in the balance sheet. It is

incorrect to say that due to inflexibility of the software, the petitioner has

put incorrect figures. The additions are based on facts, submissions and

documents available on record.

43. He submits that transfer pricing is a highly fact based process.

The rates fixed for another assessee cannot be adopted. The transfer

URS 24 of 34

25 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

pricing officer has followed decisions while benchmarking transaction of

corporate guarantee restricting adjustment in the matter to 1.68%.

44. Mr. Walve contends that the allegation about opportunity of

personal hearing through video conferencing not being given is not

correct and proper and the assessee would have opportunity of personal

hearing through video conferencing after filing objections to variations in

total income under section 144C(2) and before passing final assessment

order.

45. Mr. Walve submits that instead of approaching the High Court

under the writ petition, the assessee ought to have filed its objections to

the variations with the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) and urges this

court not to indulge into request by petitioner.

46. It is contended that the draft assessment order is valid, as per

law and is legal and thus, the writ petition is opposed with request to

dismiss the same.

47. Sum and substance of the submissions on behalf of petitioner

is that personal hearing in the present matter is essential to properly

appreciate the nature and manner in which the transactions are carried

URS 25 of 34

26 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

out and intricacies of the same can be better explained and brought forth

as well as misconstruction by the authorities can be sorted out with

proper understanding of the matter. In personal hearing and by oral

submissions various aspects, operations/workings which could not be

properly appreciated though inscribed under the responses can be

resolved. In many a case, it would be possible to appreciate unrealised

aspects during hearing and can be effectively explained. According to

petitioner, this is precisely the reason as to why personal hearing is

included.

48. Perusal of provisions of section 144-B(1), would envince,

National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC), shall serve a notice on an

assessee u/s. 143(2) of IT Act and asessee may file response within a

period of fifteen days to NFAC and in the events referred to in clause (iii)

(a), (b) or (c), NFAC is to intimate the assesee about that assessment

would be completed according to procedure u/s.144-B(1). It is an

indication of intention to give prominence to the procedure under section

144-B(1).

49. Under sub-section (1) of section 144B, it appears to be

prescribed that upon completion of process from clauses (i) to (xiii), the

Assessment Unit (AU) is supposed to make a draft assessment order

URS 26 of 34

27 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

(DAO), after taking into account all relevant material available on record

or to the best judgment in case of the matter falling under sub-clause

(xiii) wherein the AU is intimated about failure of response from the

assessee.

50. Clause (xvi) of section 144-B(1) would show that, NFAC on

examination of DAO would decide on further course of action to be taken,

viz; NFAC may finalise assessment in accord with DAO if there is no

variation prejudicial to interest of the assessee is proposed as per sub

clause (a) OR in case variation prejudicial to the interest of assessee is

proposed, would provide opportunity to the assessee by serving a notice

to show cause according to sub-clause (b) OR under sub-clause (c) decide

to assign any DAO to a Review Unit (RU), whether prejudicial to interest

of assessee or not.

If the matter is referred to RU, the process according to

clauses (xvii) to (xx) is to take place culminating into, a final draft

assessment order (FDAO) by an Assessment Unit.

51. When draft assessment order (DAO) or final draft assessment

order (FDAO) is prejudicial to the interest of the assessee, it entails an

opportunity to show-cause pursuant to sub-clause (b) of clause (xvi),

giving option under clause (xxii) to assessee of furnishing response to

NFAC.

URS                                                                          27 of 34





                                       28                WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


52. Procedure as contained in clause (xxiii) is to be followed in

the cases where DAO or FDAO is prejudicial to the interest of assessee

after notice has been served on the assessee.

53. It would be seen that, up to clause (xxii) there is no

segregation or distinction in treatment to be given to assessees bifurcating

them into two categories viz; 'eligible assessee' and 'others' (other than

eligible assessee).

54. Sub-clause (a) of clause (xxiii) prescribes courses to be

adopted by NFAC in the case of non-response to show cause notice by an

assessee. Clause (xxiii) purports to treat the assessees according to their

categorization under sub-clause (a), items (A) or (B). Clause (xxiii), sub

clause (a), item (A) prescribes, in the case DAO or FDAO proposes

variation prejudicial to an eligible assessee, to forward DAO or FDAO to

the eligible assessee and in the case of others, pursuant item (B) NFAC

may finalize DAO or FDAO and serve a copy of assessment order on the

assessee.

55. Sub-clause (b) of clause (xxiii), appears to obligate NFAC,

irrespective of categorization appearing under sub-clause (a) of clause

(xxiii), where response from an assessee is received, to send the same to

the AU.

URS                                                                           28 of 34





                                      29                WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


56. If there is response to show-cause notice, sub clause (b) of

clause (xxiii) comes into operation pursuant to which matter goes to the

AO and hearing assumes significance and is meaningful and the provision

of sub-section (7) clause (vii) would come into play. In case of response

after show-cause notice, the matter would go back to the AU and pursuant

to clause (xxiv) the AU is supposed to take into account response of the

assessee and then a revised DAO (RDAO) emerges for further treatment in

accordance with clause (xxv).

57. It appears that under clause (xv) sub-clause (a) item (A)

contemplates similar treatment to an eligible assessee as in item (A)

under clause (a) of clause (xxiii) and the matter has to be forwarded to

the assessee in case variations proposed in the case of eligible assessee are

not prejudicial to the interest in comparison to DAO or FDAO and in case

of other assessees under item (B) of sub-clause (a) of clause (xxv), similar

treatment as accorded under item (B) of sub-clause (a) of clause (xxiii) is

given if the RDAO is not prejudicial in comparison to DAO or FDAO.

However, in case of variations irrespective of whether assessee is eligible

assessee or other, are prejudicial to the interest of assessee in comparison

to DAO or FDAO, there is a further provision for opportunity to the

assessee by serving notice, to receive treatment mutatis mutandis in

accordance with clauses (xxii), (xxiv) and (xxv).

URS                                                                          29 of 34





                                            30                 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


58. Sub-section (7) of section 144B for the purpose of faceless

assessment under clause (vii) provides that in case where variation is

proposed in draft assessment order, an opportunity is to be provided to

the assesee by serving a notice to show-cause and the assessee or his

representative can request for personal hearing so as to make his oral

submissions or to present his case before the income-tax authorities in any

unit. Further sub-section (7) provides under clause (ix) for hearing

through video conferencing or video telephone including use of any

telecommunication application software which support video

conferencing or video telephone.

59. Sub section (7), clause (vii) stipulates as under :-

"(7) For the purpose of faceless assessment -

(i) .....

(ii) .....

(iii) .....

(iv) .....

(v) .....

(vi) .....

(vii) in a case where a variation is proposed in the draft assessment order or final draft assessment order or revised draft assessment order, and an opportunity is provided to the assessee by serving a notice calling upon him to show cause as to why the assessment should not be completed as per the such draft or final draft or revised draft assessment order, the assessee or his authorised representative, as the case may be, may request for personal hering so as to make his oral submissions or present his case before the income-tax authority in any unit;"

URS                                                                                 30 of 34





                                     31                 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


60. Plainly reading aforesaid provision would show that

whenever assessee requests for personal hearing so as to make oral

submissions or to present case, it is before income-tax authority in any

unit. Sub-section (7), clause (viii) shows that request for personal

hearing is to be approved by the authorities referred to therein upon its

opinion that the request is covered by sub-clause (h) of clause (xii).

Clause (xii) empowers authorities with prior approval of the Board to lay

down the standards, procedures and processes for effective functioning of

National Faceless Assessment Centre and others, inter alia, circumstances

in which personal hearing referred to in clause (vii) shall be approved.

61. Legislature is not unwary of situations arising, requiring

personal hearing and oral submissions and thus, has provided for the

same under the faceless assessment scheme under section 144B. It

emerges that where response is given by the assessee to show-cause

notice, the process under sub-section (7) would follow.

62. Learned senior counsel Mr. Pardiwala, during the course of

hearing, had drawn attention to 'Standard Operating Procedure' ( SOP )

for Assessment Unit under Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019' under

Circular F.No.PR.CCIT/SOP/2020-21 dated 19.11.2020 providing for,

under its clause T, that reasonable time is to be given to an assessee to

URS 31 of 34

32 WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt

comply with principles of natural justice. He had also referred to Circular

F. No. PR. CCIT/NCAC/SOP/2020-21 dated 23.11.2020 to contend that

personal hearing is to be allowed when there is response to DAO.

63. Principles of natural justice firmly run through fabric of

section 144B(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Whenever DAO, FDAO is

prejudicial to the interest of assessee or RDAO is prejudicial to the interest

of assessee in comparison to DAO or FDAO, upon a response to show-

cause notice, personal hearing for oral submissions or to present its case

before income tax authority is strongly entwined in the provisions on a

request from an assessee unless it is absurd, strategised and/or intended

to protract assessment etc. It would also emerge from various decisions,

referred to above, ordinarily, such a request would not be declined.

Judgments cited on behalf of petitioner referred to

hereinbefore give exposition on significance and importance of principles

of natural justice.

64. Section 144-B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 captioned

'Faceless Assessment' commences vide its sub-section (1) with a non-

obstante clause and compulsively requires assessment u/ss 143(3) and

144 shall be by prescribed procedure contained in sub-section (1) of

section 144-B in the cases referred to in sub-section (2) thereof.

URS                                                                           32 of 34





                                       33               WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


65. Sub-section (9) of section 144B declares that assessment

made under section 143(3) or under section 144(4) referable to sub-

section (2) other than sub-section (8) on or after 1 st day of April, 2021

shall be non est if such assessment is not made in accordance with the

procedure laid down under section 144B. There is a telling / pronounced

rigour, to follow the procedure under section 144B, lest the assessment

would be non est.

66. Going by the provisions under section 144B, when hearing

has been envisioned and incorporated, it is imperative to observe

principles of natural justice as stipulated.

67. In the present matter, it is not disputed that show-cause

notice had been issued to the petitioner on 25/03/2021 to which the

petitioner has responded to from time to time vide letters dated 26 th

March, 2021, 28th March, 2021 requesting for personal hearing and by

sending responses dated 7th and 8th April, 2021. There is nothing to

reflect upon that after receipt of response to show-cause-notice dated 26 th

March, 2021, 28th March, 2021, 7th and 8th April, 2021, prescribed

procedure has been followed. The petitioner appears to be losing out on

an opportunity as would be available to it under clause (xxiii)(b) read

with sub section (7) sub-clause (vii).

URS                                                                          33 of 34





                                      34                   WPL 11040-21 - Judgment.odt


68. In the circumstances, when an assessee approaches with

response to show cause notice, the request made by an assessee, as

referred to in clause (vii) of sub section 7 of section 144B, would have to

be taken into account and it would not be proper, looking at the

prescribed procedure with strong undercurrent to have hearing on a

request after notice, to say that petitioner would have opportunity

pursuant to section 144C in the present matter, would intercept operation

of the scheme contained under section 144B.

69. Foregoing discussion leads to that impugned draft assessment

order dated 22.04.2021 is unsustainable. The petition is allowed in terms

of prayer clause (a) leaving it open to the authorities to carry forward the

process in accordance with section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by

giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

(ABHAY AHUJA, J.)                              (SUNIL P. DESHMUKH, J.)




URS                                                                             34 of 34





 

 
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