Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 194 Bom
Judgement Date : 6 January, 2021
1-CRI-REVN-ST-2085-2020.doc
Shailaja
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION [STAMP] NO.2085 OF 2020
1. Janardhan Madhavrao Udmale ]
Age: 67 years, Occ: Retired, ]
Currently r/at Flat No.9, Regancy ]
Heritage, D. Prabhag, Near ]
Kalewadi Fata, Wakad, Pune - 27. ]
2. Krushnath Vishnu Yadav ]
Age: 62 years, Occ: Retired, ]
Currently r/at Shree Bungalow, ]
Opp. Abhinav Pharmacy College, ]
Narhegaon, Pune - 411 041. ]
3. Baburao Bhau Shinde ]
Age: 67 years, Occ: Retired, ]
Currently r/at. At Post Pokhale, ]
Taluka. Panhala, Dist. Kolhapur, ]
4. Prakash Bhagwatrao Desai, ]
Age: 71 years, Occ: Retired, ]
R/at. B/1/513, Plot No.21, ]
Rushabh Sneh, Nalavade Colony, ]
Samratnagar, Rajarampuri, ]
Kolhapur - 416 008. ]
5. Jamil Ahmed Hiraji Shaikh, ]
Age: 68 years, Occ: Retired, ]
R/at. Aisha Empire, B-306, ]
Handewadi Road, Hadapsar- ]
411 028. ]
6. Shekhappa Annu Koli ]
Age: 58 years, Occ: Retired, ]
R/at. At Post Jat, Taluka-Jat, ]
District: Sangli. ] Applicants
[Accused No.1 to 6]
Shailaja S. Digitally signed by Shailaja
1 of 25
S. Halkude
Halkude Date: 2021.01.07 15:12:32
+0530
1-CRI-REVN-ST-2085-2020.doc
Versus
The State of Maharashtra ]
(Through Sr. Inspector of Police), ]
Anti Corruption Bureau, Satara. ] Respondent
.....
Mr. Abhijeet Desai a/w Kuldip Pawar, for Applicants.
Ms. S.V. Sonavane, A.P.P, for Respondent-State.
.....
CORAM : PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN, J.
RESERVED ON : 14th December, 2020.
PRONOUNCED ON : 6th JANUARY, 2021.
[Through Video Conferencing]
P.C.
1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the
consent of the learned Counsel for the applicants and the learned
A.P.P.
2. Learned A.P.P waives service on behalf of respondent-
State.
3. Challenge in this revision application is to an order dated
1st July, 2020 below Exhibit 32 in Special Case A.C.B No.8 of 2013
passed by the learned Special Judge Satara under the provisions of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'Act') rejecting an
application of discharge. The applicants are being prosecuted of
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the offence punishable under sections 13(1) (d) and 13 (2) of the
Act as well as under sections 465, 468, 471, 201 r/w section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code (for short 'I.P.C').
4. Facts germane for disposal of the revision application are
as follows;
The Maharashtra State Regional Transport Committee
vide it's letter No. Rap/Astha/UR/610 proposed to appoint Bus
Drivers in accordance with G.R. No.52/80 on 16 th February, 2004.
Two Regional Selection Committees were formed for selection and
recruitment of Drivers in Satara District. The Committees were
formed on 8th June, 2004. Applicant No.1-Janardhan Udmale was
the President of the first Committee whereas applicants No.2-
Krushnath Vishnu Yadav and applicant No.3-Baburao Bhau Shinde
were the committee members. The second committee was headed
by applicant No.4-Prakash Bhagwatrao Desai whereas applicants
No.5-Jamil Ahmed Hiraji Shaikh and 6-Shekhappa Annu Koli
were its members. The work assigned to those committees was for
the purpose of recruitment of Bus Drivers in Maharashtra State
Regional Transport Corporation (for short 'MSTRC') for Satara
District.
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On 16th May, 2007, Superintendent of Police, Anti
Corruption Bureau Satara issued a letter to the first informant Shri
U.B Afale, Police Inspector, Anti Corruption Bureau Satara. On the
basis of the said letter, an F.I.R bearing C.R. No.60 of 2007 was
registered against applicants No.1 to 6 for the offences punishable
under sections 13 (1) (d) and 13 (1) (2) of the Act at Satara Police
Station. There were allegations of overwriting in Annexure-B
forms and it has further been alleged that the applicants used
unsigned Annexure-B forms as genuine documents while assigning
the marks to the candidates. There were allegations of
miscalculations of the marks also.
On 5th August, 2008, Administrative Director made a written
representation to the State Government that there was no
commission of any illegal act while conducting driving test and,
therefore, requested the State Government to withdraw the
complaint registered against the applicants. The State
Government, therefore, rejected the permission under section 19
(1) (c) of the Act to prosecute the applicants, meaning thereby, the
sanction under section 19 (1) (c) of the Act was rejected by the
Deputy Chairman and Director of MSRTC. On 25th November,
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2010, Deputy Superintendent, Anti Corruption Bureau, Satara
submitted an application to the Special Court, inter alia, praying
for release of the applicants under section 169 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and for an order of grant of "A" Summary". By an
order dated 13th December, 2010, "A" Summary report was
accepted by the learned Judge. Thereafter, a fresh sanction under
section 19 (1) (c) was accorded by the Competent Authority on 6 th
February, 2012. After completion of the investigation, a charge-
sheet bearing No.18 of 2013 came to be filed in the Court of
Sessions, Satara. The applicants moved an application under
section 227 of the Cr. P.C seeking their discharge from the offence
before the Sessions Judge on 24 th February, 2016. The respondent
filed it's reply on 10th February, 2017. The learned Special Judge,
by the impugned order, rejected the application for discharge filed
by the applicants and, therefore, the applicants are before this
Court.
5. I heard Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the applicants at
length as well as Ms. Sonawane, the learned A.P.P. I have also
meticulously gone through the record as well as the order
impugned.
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6. Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the applicants would
argue that there is absolutely no material on record, much less,
any evidence of monetary transaction or obtaining any pecuniary
advantage or valuable things by any of the applicants from the
candidates whose driving tests were conducted by them. In short,
he contends that there is no iota of evidence attracting the
ingredients of sections 13 (1) (d) and 13 (1) (2) of the Act. Mr.
Desai submits that only allegations against the applicants are that
there are over writings and miscalculations which are only due to
the fact that the applicants were giving marks in a moving bus
while conducting the driving test of the candidates which,
according to him is quite natural.
7. Mr. Desai would also argue that earlier sanction was
refused by the Competent Authority pursuant to which even 'A'
Summary report has been filed which was accepted by the
Competent Authority and, therefore, this is a fit case of discharge.
While assailing the impugned order, Mr. Desai contends that the
learned Special Judge has not at all discussed anything qua section
19 of the Act though the learned Judge admits that earlier, the
sanction was refused. Nothing came to be recovered during the
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house search of the applicants. There is no statement indicating
their complicity in the alleged act of indulging into corrupt or
illegal means. None of the applicants had abused their position as
public servant and thereby, obtained anything for themselves or for
any other person or gained any pecuniary advantage.
8. In support of his contention, Mr. Desai has placed
reliance upon the following judgments;
(a) C.K. Jaffer Shariff Vs. State (through A.C.B), (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 205;
(b) Deepak Surana and others. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 12 Supreme Court Cases 380;
(c) Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 Supreme Court Cases 186;
(d) Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of U.P and others, (2011) 11 Supreme Court Cases 331.
9. The learned A.P.P while countering submissions of Mr.
Desai vehemently urged to reject the revision application by
contending that not only there are deliberate over writings and
erasions but also miscalculations of the marks given to the drivers,
meaning thereby, those who were less skillful came to be recruited
by allocating more marks whereas those were kept on the waiting
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list or not recruited despite securing more marks. The learned
A.P.P drew my attention to a document dated 2 nd July, 2010 which
is the first order refusing sanction to prosecute the applicants.
Subsequent sanction was accorded in respect of applicant No.2 -
Krushnath Vishnu Yadav and applicant No.6-Shekhappa Annu Koli
as they were in service. It is contended that there was a mass scale
scam and corruption in recruitment of the drivers. She asserted
that the sanction dated 6 th February, 2012 was in existence at the
time of passing the impugned order. It is submitted that out of six
applicants, five were in service when the first sanction was refused
on 15th October, 2009. Applicant No.4 was not in service as he was
retired on 31st October, 2007.
10. In support of her submission, the learned A.P.P has
placed reliance on a judgment in the case of Station House Officer
CBI/ACB/Bangalore Vs. B.A. Srinivasan and another, (2020) 2
Supreme Court Cases 153. The legal position on the point of
discharge is well settled. What is required to be seen is as to
whether there exists a prima facie case. At the stage of framing
charge existence of sufficient ground for presuming that accused
has committed an offence is to be seen. The object of sections 227
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and 228 of the Cr. P.C is restricted only to the extent of satisfying
the Court that the accusation is not false or frivolous. It is not
expected that there should be strict proof while evaluating the
material placed on record. The Court is also not expected to see
whether case would end into conviction or acquittal. After having
considered the documents and material placed on record by the
prosecution, if it is prima facie noticed that an offence is a
probable consequence, a charge can be framed. It is equally
important to note that probative value of the evidence tendered on
record cannot be gone into as has been tried to be shown by Mr.
Desai, learned Counsel for the applicants.
11. As per the complaint, 227 vacant posts of Junior
Drivers were to be filled up for which two committees were
constituted. In all, 2489 applications were received till 31 st May,
2004. Out of those applications, 1485 candidates were called and
after scrutiny of their documents, 1025 candidates were found
eligible for the test. First Committee headed by applicant No.1 was
assigned with 483 candidates for scrutiny. Out of those
candidates, 331 found eligible. 94 candidates were found
ineligible and 58 candidates remained absent.
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12. Second committee was constituted on 15 th June, 2004
comprising with applicants No.4 to 6. This Committee declared
another 360 candidates eligible. Reports of both committees were
submitted. In all, 691 candidates were successful. Their driving
tests were conducted from 28th July, 2004 to 31st July, 2004. On
the basis of the marks given, 170 candidates were selected finally
and 17 candidates were kept on waiting list.
13. Senior Security Officer of MSRTC, Solapur, namely
G.D. Gaikwad had conducted an enquiry in respect of
malpractices/corruption in the selection. During the enquiry, it
had come on record that there were erasions and over writings in
the marks given to some of the candidates and, therefore, an F.I.R
came to be registered by Uday Afale, then A.C.B, Satara.
14. Deputy Chairman and Director of MSRTC being
Competent Authority, refused sanction under section 19 (1) (c) of
the Act by his communication dated 15th October, 2009. A perusal
of the said communication, inter alia, reveals that prima facie
there was no material or evidence on record that the applicants
had indulged in any corrupt or illegal means or have obtained for
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themselves or for any other persons any valuable thing or gained
any pecuniary advantage. Consequently, an application under
section 169 of Cr. P.C was moved by Deputy Superintendent,
Satara before the learned Judge seeking 'A' Summary report which
subsequently came to be granted by the Special Court.
15. It is pertinent to note that thereafter on 6 th February,
2012, Deputy Chairman had again scrutinized all the papers and
documents including the mark list shown in annexure 'B'
indicating several alterations, erasions and over writings in the
marks of the candidates. It appears that subsequently there was
due and proper application of mind by the Competent Authority. It
was noticed that the applicants Janardhan Udmale, Baburao
Shinde, Prakash Desai and Jamil Shaikh had, since retired from
the service were not 'public servants' and, therefore, no sanction
was accorded to prosecute them. Sanction was accorded qua
applicant No.2- Krushnath Yadav and applicant No.6 - Shekhappa
Koli in view of section 19 (1) (c) of the Act. It is pertinent to note
that the Deputy Superintendent ACB Satara moved an application
on 19th May, 2012 before the Special Court, Satara seeking
permission to file a charge-sheet against the applicants and for
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further investigation. The learned Special Court granted such
permission. It appears that the said order has not been challenged
by the applicants till date. After four years, the applicants have
preferred an application for discharge. It appears from the record
that the Committee headed by Mr. Janardhan Udamale took
driving test of 483 candidates, out of which 331 candidates were
eligible. It was noticed that there were erasions in the marks and
errors in the calculation in respect of 17 candidates. Out of those
17 candidates, 7 candidates were finally selected, thereby
facilitating pecuniary advantages/benefits to them and ultimately
causing loss to other candidates.
16. The second committee was headed by applicant No.4-
Prakash Desai. The committee took driving tests in respect of 542
candidates. Out of them, 350 candidates were found eligible and
166 were found ineligible. 16 candidates were absent. It was
noticed that the Committee had miscalculated the errors and
marks in respect of 51 candidates. Out of those 51 candidates, 15
candidates were finally selected who were less eligible. Thus,
prima facie, the material on record reveals that due to such
miscalculations and erasions, some advantage had been gained by
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the candidates who were not eligible above those who were
eligible as they could not secure the job opportunity. As has been
stated, wherever there were over writings or erasions, those parts
have neither been countersigned nor any endorsement to that
effect has been made. Moreover, both committees failed in
producing the marks gained by each of the candidates. It is a
matter of record that even in the departmental enquiry, applicant
No.1 -Janardhan Udmale and applicant No.4-Prakash Desai were
found guilty.
17. Statements of some of the candidates would prima
facie reveal the irregularities and miscalculations alleged to have
been committed by the applicants. The statement of one Dipak
Hanmant Jadhav reveals that he had applied for the post of Driver
in the year 2004 pursuant to an advertisement in the newspaper.
He belongs to scheduled caste category. His driving test was
conducted along with 25 to 30 other members on Satara Dahiwadi
Road. He drove bus about 5 to 6 kilometers. There were three
officers at that time. Two of them were sitting behind the driving
seat and one officer was sitting to his left side. Janardhan Udmale
and Krushnath Yadav were persons who conducted the driving
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test. He came to know that there were erasions and over writings
in the marks given in annexure 'B' as well as there were
miscalculations in the marks. He noticed the said miscalculations
as well as erasions. It reveals from his statement that due to such
over writings and miscalculations by the applicants, one Shamkant
Tukaram Ballal, Dilip Baburao Bhopate and Amarsingh Rajaram
Bhosale were finally selected from the category of scheduled caste.
They were benefited, however, he was kept in waiting list and
thereby, suffered loss. His statement further reveals that due to
such erasions, there was increase in the marks of Amarsinh
Bhosale in annexure 'B' from 64 to 66. Whereas, this witness had
secured 63 marks in the driving test. He secured 23 marks in the
personal interview; whereas Bhosale secured 19 marks. Even
then, due to the erasions and miscalculations in annexure 'B',
instead of him, Bhosale was selected and was appointed as Driver
in MSRTC. This witness being in the waiting list could not be
selected in 2004 but due to such acts of the applicants, was
appointed in the month of October, 2006 by which his
appointment was delayed by two years.
18. Similar is the statement of Rajendra Shankar Chavan,
Dilip Baburao Bhopate and Shayamkant Tukaram Ballal. Prima
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facie, there is material on record indicating forgery for the purpose
of cheating as well as using a forged document as genuine against
the applicants apart from criminal misconduct in view of the Act.
19. Mr. Desai, the learned Counsel has not commented
upon the miscalculations of the marks given to the candidates.
Nevertheless, miscalculations in the marks cannot and should not
be an excuse of a moving bus. Meaning thereby, no sane man will
accept that as the marks were written in a moving bus, there were
miscalculations. Apart from that, nothing has been said as to why
individual marks to each of the candidates have not been
furnished. It is equally important to note that wherever there are
over writings or erasions those have not been initialed which gives
rise to a reasonable doubt. Of course, these are all prima facie
observations limited for the purpose of framing charge and should
not be construed as observations on merits.
20. Mr. Desai has placed reliance on a judgment in case of
C.K. Jaffer Shariff Vs. State, (Through C.B.I), (2013) 1 Supreme
Court Cases 205. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court is that in an offence under section 13 (1) (d) of the
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Prevention of Corruption Act, dishonest intention is the gist which
is implicit in the words used i.e corrupt or illegal means and abuse
of position as a public servant. Relevant portion of the judgment
reads thus;
"The only allegation against the appellant is that he had prevailed upon RITES and IRCON to take the four employees in question on "deputation" for the sole purpose of sending them to London in connection with the medical treatment of the appellant. It is also alleged that neither RITES nor IRCON had any pending business in London and that none of the four persons had performed any duty pertaining to RITES or IRCON while they were in London; yet the to and fro air fare of all the four persons was paid by the above two public sector undertakings. On the said basis it has been alleged that the accused-appellant had abused his office and caused pecuniary loss to the two public Sector undertakings by arranging the visits of the four persons in question to London without any public interest.
The appellant besides working as the Minister of Railways was the Head of the two public sector undertakings in question at the relevant time. It also appears from the materials on record that the four persons while in London had assisted the appellant in performing certain tasks connected with the discharge of duties as a Minister. It is difficult to visualise as to how in the light of the above facts, demonstrated by the materials revealed in the course of investigation, the appellant can be construed to have adopted corrupt or illegal means or to have abused his position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any of the aforesaid four persons. If the statements of the witnesses examined under
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Section 161 of CrPC show that the aforesaid four persons had performed certain tasks to assist the Minister in the discharge of his public duties, however insignificant such tasks may have been, no question of obtaining any pecuniary advantage by any corrupt or illegal means or by abuse of the position of the appellant as a public servant can arise. As a minister, it was for the appellant to decide on the number and identity of the officials and supporting staff who should accompany him to London if it was anticipated that he would be required to perform his official duties while in London. If in the process, the rules or norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of the appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) is implicit in the words used i.e corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant".
21. The facts in the said case and the one before this Court
are quite different. Dishonest intention of the applicants is
apparent from the face of the record as has been stated
hereinabove and, therefore, this cannot be a case of discharge as
prima facie there are strong circumstances against the applicants.
22. In case of Deepak Surana and others Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 12 Supreme Court Cases 380, Special
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Judge has discharged the appellant from the offence under section
13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) and section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
The High Court reversed the Special Judge's order discharging the
appellant from the charges of corruption and, therefore, the
appellant approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant
portion of this judgment reads thus;
" In the present case, the agreements relied upon by the prosecution do not bear the signatures of the Appellants. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 01.10.2011 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur in Criminal Revision No.649 of 2008. The High Court was pleased to set aside the order passed by the Special Court discharging the present appellants of the charges levelled against them. The High Court had directed to release certain land from acquisition. Soon thereafter agreement to sell land was executed. The basic allegations in this FIR dated 31.03.1998 were to the effect that a conspiracy was hatched between certain public servants including the then Ministers, Additional Secretary and the owners of the land. The object of that conspiracy was stated to be conferring undue advantage upon the owners of the land. The FIR alleged commission of offences punishable under sections 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2), Section 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
Held, while allowing the appeals;
(1) The question here is whether the Appellants could be said to be involved in the conspiracy. The agreements in question were not even recovered from the custody of the Appellants
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and were recovered from the vendors themselves. The agreements being unilateral and not bearing the signatures of the Appellants, mere execution of such agreements cannot be considered as a relevant circumstance against the Appellants. There is nothing on record to indicate that the consideration mentioned in the agreement could be traced to the Appellants, nor is there any statement by any of the witnesses suggesting even proximity or meeting of minds between the Appellants and any of the other accused. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the Special Judge was quite correct. The High Court was not justified in setting aside the order passed by the Special Judge. In our considered view, the material on record completely falls short of and cannot justify framing of charges against the Appellants".
23. On the basis of the facts before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, it was found that there was no material on record justifying
framing of the charge as it is apparent that the agreements in
question were unilateral under signatures of the appellants.
However, in the case at hand, un-disputedly, the two committees
comprising the applicants had conducted tests and awarded marks
in which there are miscalculations as well as over writings which
raise a very strong suspicion with regard to an offence with which
they have been charge-sheeted. The ratio can be distinguished
accordingly.
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24. In case of Najappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14
Supreme Court Cases 186 on the point of sanction under section
19 (1) of the Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus;
"(1) The present appeal must succeed on the short ground that in the absence of a valid previous sanction required under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the Trial Court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence alleged against the Appellant.
(2) Section 19 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is couched in mandatory terms and forbids courts from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 against public servants except with the previous sanction of the competent authority enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Sub-section 1 of Section
19. The provision contained in sub-section (1) would operate in absolute terms but for the presence of Sub- section (3) to Section 19. The language employed in Sub-section (1) of Section 19 admits of no equivocation and operates as a complete and absolute bar to any court taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act against a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. A similar bar to taking of cognizance was contained in Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
(3) The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the Court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of Clauses
(a), (b) and (c) to Section 19 (1). The question regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at
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any stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid the court can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for prosecution in accordance with law. If the Trial Court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non-
est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution.
(4) Effect of Sub-section (3) to Section 19 starts with a non-obstante clause. Also relevant to the same aspect would be Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which we have extracted earlier. It was argued on behalf of the State with considerable tenacity worthy of a better cause, that in terms of Section 19 (3), any error, omission or irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution of an accused was of no consequence so long as there was no failure of justice resulting from such error, omission or irregularity. It was contended that in terms of explanation to Section 4, "error includes competence of the authority to grant sanction". The argument is on the face of it attractive but does not stand closer scrutiny. A careful reading of sub-section (3) to Section 19 would show that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the sanction order suffers from an error, omission or irregularity, unless of course the court before whom such finding, sentence or order is challenged in appeal or revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice has occurred by reason of such error, omission or irregularity. Sub-section 3, in other words, simply forbids interference with an order passed by Special Judge in appeal, confirmation or revisional proceedings on the ground that the sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the appellate or
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revisional court finds that failure of justice has occurred by such invalidity. What is noteworthy is that Sub-section (3) has no application to proceedings before the Special Judge, who is free to pass an order discharging the accused, if he is of the opinion that a valid order sanctioning prosecution of the accused had not been produced as required under section 19 (1), sub suection (3) postulates a prohibition against a higher court reversing an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of any defect, omission or irregularity in the order of sanction. It does not forbid a Special Judge from passing an order of whatever stage of the proceedings holding that the prosecution is not maintainable for want of a valid order sanctioning the same. The language employed in sub- section (3) is clear and unambiguous. This is sufficiently evident even from the language employed in Sub-section (4) according to which the appellate or the revisional Court shall, while examining whether the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction had occasioned in any failure of justice, have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an early stage. Suffice it to say, that a conjoint reading of Sub-sections 19 (3) and (4) leaves no manner of doubt that the said provisions envisage a challenge to the validity of the order of sanction or the validity of the proceedings including finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge in appeal or revision before a higher Court and not before the Special Judge trying the accused. The rationals underlying the provision obviously is that if the trial has proceeded to conclusion and resulted in a finding or sentence, the same should not be lightly interfered with by the Appellate or the revisional court simply because there was some omission, error or irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution under Section 19 (1). Failure of justice is, what the appellate or revisional Court would in such cases look for. And while examining whether any such failure had indeed taken place, the Court concerned would also keep in mind whether the objection touching the
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error, omission or irregularity in the sanction could or should have been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings meaning thereby whether the same could and should have been raised at the trial stage instead of being urged in appeal or revision".
(emphasis supplied)
25. The position of law is quite clear that the Competent
Authority can accord a fresh sanction for prosecution in
accordance with law which has been done in the case at hand. The
Competent Authority, as already discussed hereinabove, accorded
sanction in respect of the applicants Krushnath Yadav and
Shekhappa Koli, however, did not grant sanction in respect of rest
of the applicants since they were not public servants at the time of
granting sanction. It is not the case of the applicants that
cognizance of the offence has been taken by the Special Judge
sans previous valid sanction by the Competent Authority.
26. On the other hand, the learned A.P.P has relied upon a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Station House
Officer, CBI/ACB/Banglore Vs. B.A. Srinivasan and another, (2020)
2 Supreme Court Cases, 153. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court is that the protection under section 19 of the Act is
available to a public servant only till he is in employment and no
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sanction thereunder is necessary after a public servant has
demitted office or public servant is retired from the service. In the
case at hand, the Competent Authority in terms of an order dated
6th February, 2012 had rightly accorded sanction to prosecute the
applicants Krushnath Vishnu Yadav and Shekhappa Koli as they
were public servants and had not granted sanction in respect of
rest of the applicants as they had already demitted their office.
27. Having taken into consideration the material placed on
record as well as in light of the observations made hereinabove, no
interference is warranted in the impugned order. Needless to add
that the observations hereinabove are only for the purpose of
framing a charge and shall not be construed as observations,
commenting upon the merits of the case.
28. The revision application is thus devoid of merits and,
therefore, stands rejected. The learned Special Judge, Satara is
directed to dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible without
granting unnecessary adjournments. The applicant shall co-
operate in expediting the trial. Rule is discharged.
24 of 25 1-CRI-REVN-ST-2085-2020.doc
29. This order will be digitally signed by the Personal
Assistant of this Court. All concerned shall act on production by
fax or e-mail of a digitally signed copy of this order.
[PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN, J.]
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