Kanhaiya S/O Moti Harde, R/O ... vs State Of Mah. Thr P.So. P.S. ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 193 Bom

 Judgment                                    1                     judgmentapeal 292.19.odt




                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
                            NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

                               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 292/2019

          Kanhaiya S/o Moti Harde,
          Aged about 28 years,
          Occ. Labour, R/o. Khamari,
          Tah. Mohadi, Dist. Bhandara.

                                                                        .... APPELLANT



                                       // VERSUS //


 1.       State of Maharashtra,
          through Police Station Officer,
          Police Station Andhalgoan,
          Tah. Mohadi, Dist. Bhandara.

 2.       Ku. Budhawari d/o. Amol Jangle,
          Aged about 28 years, Occ. Labour,
          R/o. Khamari, Tah. Mohadi,
          Dist. Bhandara



                                                                    .... RESPONDENTS
 ___________________________________________________________________
 Shri Amol G. Hunge, Advocate for appellant.
 Ms. H. N. Jaipurkar, A. P. P. for respondent No.1.
 Shri V. S. Bapat, Advocate for respondent No. 2.
 ___________________________________________________________________

                                      CORAM : VINAY JOSHI, J.

 CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT ON                          :    17.12 .2020
 JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON                          :     06.01.2021




::: Uploaded on - 06/01/2021                          ::: Downloaded on - 06/02/2021 22:06:17 :::
  Judgment                              2                  judgmentapeal 292.19.odt




 JUDGMENT

Heard.

2. By this appeal, appellant/accused Kanhaiya Harde is

challenging the judgment and order dated 27.02.2019 passed by the

learned Special Judge (under POCSO Act), Bhandara, thereby

convicted appellant (accused) of the offence punishable under Sections

376(2)(i)(n), 363 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 read with

Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

(short 'POCSO Act') and for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)

(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989 (short 'SC and ST Act'). By resorting the

provision of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the Trial Court has awarded

punishment for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO

Act instead of Section 376(2)(i)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. Though

the different term of sentence has been imposed under rest of the

offences, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed for the offences

punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act was to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for 10 years and a total fine of Rs. 52,000/- with

stipulation of default has been imposed.

Judgment 3 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

3. Facts leading to the prosecution and resultant conviction of

accused are as under:-

(a) According to the case of prosecution, the victim (PW1) of

the crime was a school going girl taking education in 9 th standard at

relevant time. She was residing along with her parents at village

Kharmari (Budh), Tah. Mohadi, Dist. Bhandara. Her date of birth was

03.06.1999, meaning thereby she was 16 years of age at the time of

occurrence.

(b) The accused - Kanhaiya was resident of the same village.

On 16.09.2014, victim attended school in early hours and then in the

afternoon around 02.00 p.m. she went outside to answer natures call.

At that time, the accused arrived and on the point of knife asked her to

sit on his motorcycle. She initially resisted but due to fear,

accompanied him on his motorcycle upto Nagpur.

(c) On the same day in the evening around 08.00 p.m., they

reached Nagpur where victim was taken to a room. Both of them

stayed for ten days where accused had committed repeated sexual

intercourse with her.

  Judgment                                  4                  judgmentapeal 292.19.odt




 (d)               Thereafter, the accused brought victim by train to village

Khamari where the accused was staying. He took her to his house,

however his family members refused to accept, hence both of them

stayed in their cattle shade for two days. During that period, accused

had committed forcible sexual intercourse with her.

(e) Thereafter, accused took her in rented house where both of

them stayed for 10 to 12 days. During said period also she was

subjected to forcible sexual intercourse.

(f) Thereafter, accused went to village Khusavri, Tah. Mohadi,

but he did not return. The victim made phone call to the accused but

he did not respond. Since accused never returned for two days, victim

returned to her parental house.

(g) After return to her house, the victim girl has informed the

things to her parents. She stated that the accused by giving promise to

marry and under compulsion had committed repetitive sexual

intercourse with her. On 06.01.2015, victim went to the Police Station

along with her parents and lodged report (Exh. 25).

Judgment 5 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

4. On the basis of report regarding commission of cognizable

offence, the Police registered Crime No. 1/2015 for the offence

punishable under Sections 363, 366(A) 376(2)(i)(n),201, 417, 506 of

the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 of the POCSO Act, and

Section 3(1)(xii) of the SC and ST Act. Since the offence was

registered under the provisions of SC and ST Act, investigation was

handed over to the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Bhandara. During

course of investigation, victim girl was sent for medical examination,

Panchanama of the scene of offence was drawn, knife and motorcycle

used in commission of crime were seized, clothes of victim girl were

seized, her caste certificate was collected and necessary samples were

collected for chemical analysis. After completion of investigation, final

report has been submitted in the Special Court. The defence of

accused was of total denial. The prosecution has examined as many as

14 witnesses to establish the guilt of the accused. Moreover,

prosecution relied on several documents to substantiate its case.

5. After hearing the parties, the Trial Court by the impugned

judgment and order, came to the conclusion that the victim was a child

at relevant time. It is held that accused had committed rape

amounting to penetrative sexual assault on her at various places and

Judgment 6 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

that is how he had committed the offence of rape and repetitive

penetrative sexual intercourse punishable under Section 376 of the

Indian Penal Code and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Accordingly,

accused came to be convicted and sentenced as indicated above.

6. Heard Shri Hunge, learned counsel for accused. He has

vehemently argued that the prosecution evidence is totally inadequate

to establish the age of victim. He has strongly criticized the birth

certificate produced by prosecution during course of evidence. There is

variance in the name of mother of child as well as the place of birth has

not been recorded hence the document cannot be believed at all. He

would submit that neither source of information for recording date of

birth has been brought on record nor parents of victim girl led evidence

about her date of birth. According to him, in absence of link evidence,

the birth certificate cannot be relied at all. Beside that, he would

submit that the evidence of victim is totally unreliable and

unacceptable. According to him at the most it was a case of consensual

sex with major girl.

7. As against this, Ms. Jaipurkar, learned Additional Public

Prosecutor argued that the age of victim was duly established by

tendering birth certificate which is having presumptive value. She

Judgment 7 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

would submit that the victim has specifically stated that under threat,

she was compelled to succumb her body to the accused against her

wishes. Since the medical examination was after prolonged delay,

medical evidence would hardly be available and cannot be expected.

In short, the prosecution evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of

the accused and therefore, judgment and order of conviction calls no

interference. Shri V. S. Bapat, learned counsel for victim girl has

tendered written notes of arguments in support of the conviction.

8. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned

counsel for the parties and also perused record, written notes of

arguments, and various reported decisions cited by defence.

9. For the purpose of quick appreciation, it can be

recapitulated that victim girl was allegedly kidnapped by accused on

16.09.2014 on the point of knife. She was taken at various places

where the accused had committed forcible sexual intercourse. Finally,

as accused left her alone, she returned to her house and lodged report.

10. The charge is for committing the offence of rape

punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code along with

offence of repetitive sexual assault punishable under Section 6 of the

Judgment 8 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

POCSO Act. The age of victim is crucial aspect of the case, since if

prosecution fails to establish that victim was below 18 years of age then

the charge under the POCSO Act would not stand. True, the charge for

rape would stand against a female of whatsoever age, but there is

further requirement that the act must be against her will and without

her consent. I am coming to said aspect in latter part of judgment.

11. So far as the occurrence is concerned, the prosecution is

mainly banking upon the evidence of victim. It is her evidence that on

the day of occurrence while she went to answer natures call, accused

accosted her, on the point of knife made her to sit on motorcycle and

took away. Accused kept her in one small room for ten days at Nagpur

where he committed forcible sexual intercourse. Thereafter, accused

took her to village Khamari at his house. The parents of accused

disowned them hence both of them stayed in cattle shade for two days

where again there was sexual intercourse. She deposed that then

accused took her to rented room where they stayed for 10 to 12 days

where the story of sexual assault was repeated. Precisely, it is her

evidence that for near about one month, they stayed at various places

where she was sexually assaulted.

Judgment 9 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

12. At the first blush, the entire evidence of victim itself

discloses that there was no force or compulsion. This is so because she

had ample opportunity for obtaining public recourse but she did not.

Certain evidence reaffirms her voluntariness in the entire occurrence.

To name few, on the day of occurrence she had traveled on motorcycle

with accused for near about six hours. Certainly, on public road, she

had ample opportunity to expose the things, but she did not. Then at

Nagpur, she stayed for ten days in rented house where also she could

have informed to others for rescue or could have run away. It is not

her evidence that she was kept under confinement or under strict vigil.

It is her evidence that when the parents of accused disallowed them,

they stayed in the cattle shade. Certainly, it was open premises from

where she could have easily escaped. Thereafter, also she stayed in

rented room for 10 to 12 days at another place where also she had

ample opportunity.

13. Pertinent to note that lastly, the accused went to village

Khutsawari leaving her alone. At that time, the victim girl herself had

telephonincally contacted accused, still he did not return. The entire

story discloses that absolutely there was no force or compulsion, rather

she was willing to stay with accused therefore, she called accused to

Judgment 10 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

come back but when he did not, having no option, she went to her

parents and lodged report. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt

that the entire occurrence was voluntary one. It reveals that the victim

at her own will and desire left her parents' house and stayed with

accused at different places. Sometime, they also worked as labour

which denotes that she was very much interested to live with accused

and therefore, it is not a case of forcible sexual intercourse at all.

14. Coming to the core issue which is about the age of victim,

the prosecution is heavily and solely relying on the birth certificate of

victim girl (Exh. 29) showing her date of birth as 03.06.1999. On the

basis of said birth certificate, it is tried to impress that this being public

document, it is decisive to establish her age. No doubt, if the birth

certificate is believed, then on the day of occurrence, victim was below

18 years of age, meaning thereby she was 'child' within the meaning of

Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act as well as in that case her consent

would be of no significance she being minor.

15. Though prosecution has examined in all 14 witnesses, on

the point of date of birth none of them is of use. The victim stated her

date of birth as 30.07.1999, however her parents have not supported

her case. The victim's father has not been examined. Though victim's

Judgment 11 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

mother (PW11) Hemin Jangale has been examined, her evidence is

totally silent about date of birth or age of victim. Neither school record

nor any other document to corroborate the evidence of date of birth

has been tendered. In absence of other material, the isolated

document of date of birth requires strict scrutiny. The Trial Court has

not seriously dealt with the issue of date of birth which was rather

important aspect of the case. The Trial Court (Para 36 of the

judgment) has simply believed on the date of birth certificate by stating

that it being a public document, bares presumptive value. Besides that,

the Trial Court has not considered the pros and cons, credibility and

reliability of such isolated document. Certainly, the said task has to be

undertaken in the appeal to satisfy the judicial mind.

16. The learned counsel for defence strongly criticized the

judgment of Trial Court, by submitting that it utterly failed to

appreciate birth certificate in its proper perspective. He would submit

that, without getting assured about correctness and genuineness of the

sole document, the Trial Court failed in relying the same. In support of

said contention, the defence relied on several decisions of this Court

and the Supreme Court.

Judgment 12 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

17. The first reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme

Court in case of Alamelu & Anr. Vs. State represented by Inspector of

Police, 2011 ALL MR (Cri) 1278 (S.C.) . In said case, it has been ruled

that the date of birth noted on transfer certificate cannot be relied in

absence of examination of father who has recorded her date of birth. It

is observed that though such document is admissible under Section 35

of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a

document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age in

absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded.

18. In case at hand, the Investigating Agency has merely

produced the date of birth certificate obtained during the course of

evidence. Neither any witness is examined nor even Investigating

Officer has deposed as to when and how he has obtained said

certificate. Merely because the document (Exh. 29) was proved being

public document, it does not mean that the contents of document were

also proved. Needless to say that mere exhibiting a document would

not tantamount to the proof of all the contents or the correctness of the

date of birth stated in the document. Neither mother of victim girl

uttered a single word about date of birth of victim nor father has been

Judgment 13 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

examined to state who has given information for recording her date of

birth.

19. Learned defence counsel submitted that in cases under the

POCSO Act, heavy burden lies on the prosecution to establish that the

victim was a 'child' within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO

Act. So also, it is submitted that a birth certificate issued by the

Grampanchayat produced at belated stage cannot be relied. In this

regard, reliance has been placed on the decision in case of Ravi

Anandrao Gurpude Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 1509 .

The Division Bench of this Court has expressed that though the

document of birth is having its presumptive value, it is not safe to rely

for various reasons as set of in para 11 of the judgment. The reasons

are that the date of birth of siblings were not stated, no explanation

about late procurement of birth certificate, difference in name of the

victim, first time disclosing the date of birth in evidence etc. In the

instant case also there are similar features. First Information Report

(Exh. 25) is totally silent about the date of birth of victim. The tainted

birth certificate was issued on 27.11.2018 i.e. one day prior to the

commencement of prosecution evidence. Strikingly the name of

mother of child as mentioned in birth certificate is different. As per

Judgment 14 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

birth certificate (Exh. 29) mother's name is mentioned as "Memibai"

whilst the name of mother i.e. PW 11 is Hemin. Moreover, the place of

birth has not been mentioned in the certificate nor registration number

has been stated. Thus, there are several reasons which puts Court on

guard while accepting the evidence of such isolated document.

20. Learned counsel for defence argued that in absence of

source of information for recording date of birth, the evidence of birth

certificate cannot be relied. To uphold said proposition, he relied on

the decision of this Court in case of Dilip S/o Bhaiyyasingh Tekan Vs

State of Maharashtra, 2018 ALL MR (Cri) 5092. In said case, the

Division Bench of this Court has discarded the evidence of birth

certificate on the ground that there was nothing to show as to what

was the source of said certificate. Learned counsel for defence by

placing reliance on the decision of this Court in case of Pramod

Dattatraya Jadhav Vs. The State of Maharashtra, 2019 ALL MR (Cri)

1742 would submit that in absence of link evidence to demonstrate

that birth certificate relates to the victim, the birth certificate would not

be of any assistance.

21. Taking into consideration all above decisions, it is apparent

that in absence of link evidence or source for information, the isolated

Judgment 15 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

evidence may be admissible under the Evidence Act, but cannot be

relied. Herein undoubtedly the birth certificate was seized in isolation

without any explanation. The legal position is not in dispute that mere

production and marking of document as exhibit cannot be held to be

due proof of its contents. There is no whisper in the First Information

Report about the birth date of victim, though she stated her date of

birth during the course of evidence. The victim has stated her birth

date first time during the course of evidence. The birth certificate

issued by the Grampanchayat, Khamari is not free from doubt,

particularly there was difference in name of mother of child whilst the

registration number has not been mentioned. The evidence of the

Investigating Officer is totally silent about collection of birth certificate.

The Investigating Officer was well aware that the age of victim was

mostly a decisive factor in such type of case, however no reliable

evidence has been collected. The Trial Court in casual manner closed

the chapter by merely stating that the certificate is public document.

Undoubtedly, the tainted birth certificate (Exh. 29) is not free from

doubt and therefore, it cannot be relied to base a conviction.

22. Reverting back, as discussed above, I hold that the

prosecution evidence failed to establish that the accused had forcibly

Judgment 16 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

committed rape or penetrative sexual assault on the victim girl. On the

contrary, the entire story discloses that the victim was totally

consenting party. She had stayed with accused at various places.

Despite having ample opportunity, she never ran away which reaffirms

her volition of mind. Since prosecution failed to establish that victim

was below 18 years of age i.e. 'child' within the meaning of Section

2(d) of the POCSO Act, the case under special Act would not stand.

Inasmuch as failure of prosecution to establish that victim was below

18 years, would also exclude the culpability from the charge of

kidnapping and rape since it was consensual act.

23. The above discussion also leads me to hold that the act

being voluntary, it cannot be held that the accused has committed the

act, only because the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste, therefore,

conviction under Section 3(1)(xii) would also fail.

24. In the result, it cannot be said that the sexual intercourse

between the accused and victim was amounting to rape or penetrative

sexual assault. The accused is well entitled for benefit of doubt. The

above discussion leads me to hold that the impugned judgment and

order of conviction would not sustain and as such the appeal deserves

to be allowed and hereby allowed accordingly.

Judgment 17 judgmentapeal 292.19.odt

25. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and

resultant sentence dated 27.02.2019 passed by the Special Judge

(under POCSO Act), Bhandara in Special Cri. (Child) Case No.

17/2015 is quashed and set aside. Accused - Kanhaiya S/o Moti Harde

is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian

Penal Code as well as under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section

3(1)(xii) of the SC and ST Act. Accused - Kanhaiya S/o Moti Harde be

set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.

26. Fine amount if deposited, be refunded to the accused.

27. Muddemal property be dealt with in accordance with law.

28. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.

JUDGE Gohane.