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Parashram Karbhari Autade ... vs Ranjana Nanasaheb Walunj
2021 Latest Caselaw 11623 Bom

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 11623 Bom
Judgement Date : 24 August, 2021

Bombay High Court
Parashram Karbhari Autade ... vs Ranjana Nanasaheb Walunj on 24 August, 2021
Bench: V. V. Kankanwadi
               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                          BENCH AT AURANGABAD


                      SECOND APPEAL NO.510 OF 2019
                                  WITH
                   CIVIL APPLICATION NO.10659 OF 2019
                             IN SA/510/2019

                          PARASHRAM KARBHARI AUTADE
                              THROUGH GPA HOLDER
                         ASHISH SURESH @ SAVKAR DAUND
                                    VERSUS
                           RANJANA NANASAHEB WALUNJ

                                       .....
                    Advocate for Appellant : Mr. V. D. Salunke
                   Advocate for Respondent : Mr. N. V. Gaware
                                       .....

                                     CORAM :     SMT.VIBHA KANKANWADI, J.
                                     DATE :      24-08-2021

ORDER :

1. Present appeal has been filed by the original defendant

challenging the concurrent Judgment and decree passed by the Courts

below. Present respondent/original plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit

No.93 of 2012 before Joint Civil Judge Senior Divsiion, Shrirampur,

district Ahmednagar, for redemption of mortgage. The said suit came

to be decreed on 09-04-2015. The original defendant challenged the

said Judgment and decree by filing Regular Civil Appeal No.21 of 2015.

The said appeal was heard and dismissed by learned District Judge-1,

Shrirampur, District Ahmednagar, on 05-04-2019. Hence, this second

2 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

appeal.

2. Heard leaned Advocate Mr. V. D. Salunke for appellant and

learned Advocate Mr. N. V. Gaware for respondent.

3. It has been vehemently submitted on behalf of the plaintiff

that both the Courts below have not considered the facts and

evidence on record. The registered deed dated 02-12-2002 Exhibit

49 though titled as mortgage deed, yet in fact it was a conditional

sale with repurchase. The nomenclature of the document cannot be

the only criteria to consider the nature of the transaction. The

evidence adduced by the plaintiff has been taken as gospel truth

whereas the evidence adduced by the defendant has been brushed

aside without any sound reasons. In fact, the First Appellate Court

has not considered the entire evidence properly, points are also not

sufficiently determined. Another fact that has not been properly

considered is that the time of the essence of the contract as per the

contents of Exhibit 49. Plaintiff had not taken steps for

reconveyance within five years period and, therefore, it ought to

have been considered by both the Courts as to whether the said

transaction had become absolute sale considering the wordings in

the deed itself as has been laid down in Chunchun Jha vs. Ebadat

3 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

Ali, reported in AIR 1954 (SC) 345. Another fact that has not been

considered is that the said property was belonging to Waman

Namdeo Dond who had given consent to execute deed dated 02-12-

2002 Exhibit 49. He expired leaving behind his widow. The widow

was not party to the suit for redemption and, therefore, the suit was

suffering from non-joinder of necessary parties. Another fact which

was important was that the document was executed on 02-12-2002,

the reconveyance was to be got done within five years i.e. up till

2007, however, the suit was filed in the year 2012. It was beyond

the period of three years and, therefore, the substantial legal

question in respect of Limitation Act is arising in this case. Though

the issue was framed by the Trial Court and also point was framed in

that respect by the First Appellate court, yet they have not

considered it in proper perspective. They have wrongly presumed

that since the document is mortgage deed, limitation of 30 years

would be applicable. Therefore, in view of Ishwar Dass Jain (dead

through LRs. vs. Soham Lal (dead) by L.Rs., reported in AIR 2000

Supreme Court 426, and Bhusawal Borough Municipality vs.

Amalgamated Electricity Company Limited, reported in 1966 AIR

(SC) 1652, the appeal deserves to be admitted by framing

substantial questions of law.

4 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

4. Per contra, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent

supported the reasons given by both the Courts below and

submitted that when the dispute has been considered in respect of

all the points raised, oral as well as documentary evidence has been

considered so also the law points involved then it cannot lead to

substantial questions of law. Exhibit 49 was the registered

document. No doubt nomenclature also showed that it is a

mortgage deed, yet even the contents also repeatedly conveyed that

the parties had the intention to enter into the transaction of

mortgage. Even in the oral evidence of the defendant he has stated

that after the document was executed, there was discussion

regarding purchase of the property and the plaintiff was saying that

she want to execute the sale deed after that document was

executed. That means, the transaction was different from the

transaction as alleged by the defendant. The witness examined by

the defendant also says that the amount of Rs.2,50,000/- was the

amount for mortgage. Hence, both the Courts have correctly held

that the transaction was mortgaged and, therefore, limitation was 30

years to get the mortgage redeemed.

5. If both the Courts below have considered the documentary as

5 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

well as oral evidence as well as the law points have also been

considered properly then definitely it will not lead to substantial

questions of law. Reliance can be placed on the Full Bench decision

of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. vs.

Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1962

Supreme Court 1314 (1), wherein it has been held that,

"It is well settled that the construction of a document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the rights of parties necessarily raises a question of law. The roper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law."

6. When the document Exhibit 49 is admittedly executed, it would

6 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

be necessary to see whether the party had the intention to enter

into the transaction of mortgage or it was a sale with condition to

repurchase. Definitely, how such document is to be interpreted has

been well settled in the decision of Chunchun Jha vs. Ebadat Ali

(Supra) wherein it has been held that :-

"The intention of the party has to be gathered from the documents itself along with the surrounding circumstances. Where a document has to be construed, the intention must be gathered, in the first place, from the document itself. It the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of the words which they used. If however, there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended. The rule of law on this subject is one dictated by commonsence; that prima facie an absolute conveyance, containing nothing to show that the relation of debtor and creditor is to exit between the parties, does not cease to be an absolute conveyance and become a mortgage merely because the vendor stipulates that he shall have a right to repurchase. If the sale and agreement to repurchase

7 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

are embodied in separate documents then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. But the converse does not hold good, that is to say the mere fact that there is only one document does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale. If the condition of repurchase is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale, then it is a matter for construction which was meant. The legislature has made a clear cut classification and excluded transaction embodied in more that one document from the category of mortgages, therefore it is reasonable to suppose that persons who, after the amendment, choose not, to use two documents, do not intend the transaction to be a sale, unless they displace that presumption by clear and express words; and if the conditions of Section 58 (o) are fulfilled, then we are of opinion that the deed should be construed as a mortgage."

7. If we consider Exhibit 49 then it can be seen that it was

executed by the plaintiff with consent of Waman Namdeo Dond.

Now it has been tried to be contended that the said Waman Dond

expired leaving behind his widow and then he is contending that the

suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The learned Trial

Judge has correctly considered that the defendant himself had

8 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

suggested the P.W.2 Nanasaheb Waghuji Walunj that plaintiff had

purchased 2 H 9 R land out of Gut No.126 i.e. the suit property from

her father on 03-10-2001 for the consideration of Rs.3,90,000/- and

the suit property is part of that land. The said fact put to him in

cross-examination on behalf of the defendant has been admitted by

the witness of the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, when

defendant knows it very well that the suit property was owned by

the plaintiff then it does not lie in the mouth of defendant now to

challenge the transaction itself or take objection regarding the suit

on the basis of non-joinder of necessary parties. This point can also

be considered from another angle. Admittedly the plaintiff is the

daughter of the said Waman. After Waman, the property would

devolve on his heirs. Apart from plaintiff, as per the contention of

the defendant, only widow is the legal heir left by Waman. Mortgage

can be got redeemed by any of the legal heirs and it is not

necessary then that all the sharers would be necessary party to such

suit. Such redemption would be for and on behalf of the entire

family.

8. Coming to the document Exhibit 49 it can be seen that on the

day of execution of the said document, the plaintiff had already

9 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

received amount of Rs.2,50,000/- by way of loan. It is stated that

that amount has been taken in part for agriculture and to mitigate

hand loan. That means, this amount of Rs.2,50,000/- was given as

loan. Thus, it creates the relationship of creditor and debtor

between the parties to the document. The land was put in

possession of the defendant, and further it is stated as a term that

defendant would be entitled to make improvement in the Well as the

water is less and at the time when the time to redeem would come

plaintiff would mitigate that amount. It appears that the defendant

is harping upon following term in the document :-

"oj uewn tehu rqEgkal vktjksth xgk.kLo#ih cksyhus 'krZ [kjsnh nsowu rh xgk.kLo#ih ofgokVhlkBh rqeps rkC;kr fnysyh vkgs- lnj tehuhr vlysY;k fofgjhl ik.kh viqjs vkgs- iq<s rqEgh fofgjhlkBh dkgh lq/kkj.kk dsY;kl R;k [kpkZph jDde tehu lksMqu ?ksrsosGh eh rqEgkal nsbZy-

---------

vktiklwu 5 os o"khZ gaxke'khj cksyhus rqeph jDde rqEgkal ijr nsoqu tehu lksMqu ek>s rkC;kr ?ksbZy- rqeph jDde rqEgkal ijr fnY;k[ksjht tehuhpk rkck ijr

ekx.kkj ukgh."

9. Thus, it reads that the plaintiff would pay the amount and

definitely it has to be related to Rs.2,50,000/- within a period of five

years and she would read the land, till the amount is given she will

not claim possession of the land. This term cannot be interpreted as

10 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

defendant intends to convey that it is a condition to repurchase.

There is absolutely no recital that if the plaintiff fails to repay that

amount within the period of five years then the said document would

be considered as sale deed. That means, there was no clause of

forfeiture enumerated in the document itself. The defendant cannot

put another interpretation which is not there in the document.

10. If we consider the oral evidence of the defendant and his

witness also then it can be seen that they are accepting that the

amount of Rs.2,50,000/- was given to the plaintiff as a loan and the

witness is clearly admitting that it was a document of mortgage.

Both the Courts, therefore, after assessing the oral as well as

documentary evidence on record and also on the basis of the

principles laid down in Chunchun Jha vs. Ebadat Ali (Supra) have

rightly considered that the Exhibit 49 was the transaction of

mortgage.

11. Since the transaction was mortgage then for its redemption

the limitation would be 30 years and not the 3 years as claimed by

the appellant/original defendant.

12. Since the substantial questions of law are not arising, the ratio

11 SA 510-2019, CA 10659-2019

laid down in Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs vs. Sohan Lal

(dead) by L.Rs. (Supra) and Bhusawal Borough Municipality vs.

Amalgamated Electricity Company Limited (Supra), will not be

helpful to the appellant.

13. Recently in Kirpa Ram (since deceased through L.Rs.) and

Others vs. Surendra Deo Gaur and Others, reported in 2021 (3)

Mh.L.J. 250, by the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it

has been held that,

"High Court is not obliged to frame substantial question of law when it finds no error in findings recorded by the First Appellate court. Formulation or reformulation of the same in terms of proviso arises only if there are some questions of law and not otherwise."

Since the substantial questions of law as contemplated under

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not arising in this

case, the second appeal stands dismissed. Pending Civil Application

also stands disposed of.

(SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI) JUDGE

vjg/-

 
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