Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 10410 Bom
Judgement Date : 5 August, 2021
(1)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
SECOND APPEAL NO.604 OF 2011
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO.605 OF 2011
SHAIKH AMBIR SK SHAHABUDDIN
THROUGH GPA - ASHABEE W/O SK.AMBIR = APPELLANT/s
(Orig.Defendants)
VERSUS
ASADULLAKHA NASRULLAKHA AND ANR. = RESPONDENTS
(Orig.Plaintiffs)
-----
Advocate for Appellants : Mr. M M Joshi,
Mr.S S Kazi, Adv. For Resp.Nos. 1 & 2.
--------
CORAM : SMT.VIBHA KANKANWADI,J.
RESERVED ON : 27/07/2021 PRONOUNCED ON : 05/08/2021 PER COURT :-
1. Heard learned Counsel appearing for respective
parties.
2. Since both these appeals are between the same
parties and in respect of same subject matter, and both the
Courts below have given common judgment and, therefore,
here also, the appeals are heard and dealt with together and
decided by this common reasoning/order.
3. Appellants in Second Appeal No.604/201 were
original defendants in the suit filed by the respondents
herein, bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 256/2015 before
learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Paithan,District
Aurangabad, which came to be decreed on 31.8.1999 and
the said decree was confirmed by learned Additional District
Judge, Aurangabad in RCA No. 310/1999 on 5.1.2003.
4. The appellant in Second Appeal No.605/2011 was
original plaintiff who had filed Regular Civil Suit No.
249/1995 before the same Judge for declaration, possession
and cancellation of sale-deed, which came to be dismissed
on 31.8.1999 and the said decree has been confirmed in
Regular Civil Appeal No. 307/1999 by the same Judge on
5.1.2003.
5. Learned Advocate appearing for the appellants in
both the matters submitted that both the Courts below have
not considered the facts and the findings properly. The
transaction between (for the sake of convenience, the
parties are addressed by their nomenclature before this
Court) the appellants and the respondents, was that of
mortgage and they never intended to have a sale-deed, i.e.
out and out sale, on 14.8.1981. In order to prove that the
document was mortgaged, the plaintiffs have examined the
witnesses who were present before the concerned
authorities at the time of registration of the sale-deed.
Though there was a written document; yet the plaintiffs
were entitled to lead oral evidence and there was no bar
under Section 92(1) of the Evidence Act to lead evidence.
He relied on the decision in the case of Smt. Gangabai
Rambilas Gilda Vs. Smt. Chabubai Pukhrarji Gandhi - AIR
1982 SC 20, wherein, it has been held, -
"The bar imposed by sub-section (1) of section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub- section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the
document, was entered into between the parties."
6. The same ratio has been laid down in the case of
K. Bhaskaran Nair Vs. Habeeb Mohammed and Ors. - AIR
2002 Kerala 308.
7. Both the parties failed to consider that even in
1981 when the document was executed, the land,
admeasuring 13 acres and 34 gunthas, i.e. 5 hectares and
60 Ares, could not have been sold only for Rs.2,000/-.
Therefore, taking into consideration the extrinsic evidence,
both the Courts below ought to have come to the conclusion
that real nature of the transaction was mortgage.
. Further reliance has been placed on the decision
in the case of Gangadhar Ramchandra Gaikwad Vs.
Rambhau Santu Ushir & Anr. - 2007 (1) Bom.C.R. 517, on
the point that a document has to be read as a whole to find
out whether the document is deed of sale or conditional
mortgage? He also pointed out that the learned First
Appellate Court has not complied with order 41 Rule 31 of
CPC and when so many issues were framed and answered
by the learned Trial Judge; the first Appellate Court has
framed only one issue, as to whether the sale-deed dated
14.8.1981 is a mortgage by a conditional sale? Further
reliance is place on the ratio laid down in Khatunbi wd/o
Mohammad Sayeed and Ors.. Vs. Aminabai wd/o of
Mohammed Sabir - 2006 (6) Mh.L.J. 579 and similar view
has been taken in Dwarika Prasad Marwari Vs. Sudarshan
Pd.Chaudhary and Ors. - AIR 1984 Patna 274; and Vishwas
Balu and Ors. Vs. Ghasiram Ramratan Jajum and Ors. - AIR
1975 Bom. 278. The oral evidence was not at all considered
by the Courts below and, therefore, the judgment is
vitiated. Substantial questions of law are arising in these
appeals, requiring admission of the Second Appeals.
8. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Waheed holding
for Advocate Mr. Kazi, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 and
2, supported the reasons given by both the Courts below
and submitted that the present appellants failed to prove
that there was existence of relationship as creditor and
debtor between the respondents and the appellants
respectively. It can be seen that the nature of the
transaction was mortgage or conditional sale. Further, the
original plaintiffs/present appellants, in their suit had not
even examined the original plaintiff, but only General Power
of Attorney was examined, who had no personal knowledge.
Evidence of such person could not have been considered.
No substantial questions of law are arising in this case.
9. It is not in dispute that a document was executed
on 14.8.1981, which is registered document and it is styled
as sale-deed between the present appellants and the
respondents. The appellants were executants whereas the
respondents were executors. The suit property was
admeasuring 5 hectares and 60 Ares from Gut No.22. The
plaintiff had come with a case that the real nature of the
transaction was mortgage. When the appellants themselves
had gone before the Court, asking for the relief that the
defendants therein are liable to deliver the possession of the
suit land to them, then, in fact, half of the subject matter,
i.e. the dispute, was over. It was only to be shown by the
present respondents in their own suit as to whether the
defendants in their suit were obstructing their possession
over the suit land? Another fact to be considered is, that
immediately after the execution of that document, mutation
entries were taken and the present appellants had not
challenged those entries. Both the Courts below have
rightly considered that there was no evidence to show that
the relationship between the present appellants and the
respondents was that of debtor and creditor, which is a sine
qua non for a mortgage transaction. Even if we accept that
the appellants were entitled to lead oral evidence and, there
could not have been bar under Section 92 of the Evidence
Act; yet whatever evidence has been produced by the
plaintiff, it cannot beyond the document. If the parties had
no intention to execute the sale-deed, then the terms would
have been different. It could have been specifically stated
the other terms of the transaction, i.e. when the advance
amount is required to be repaid; in what manner etc. The
evidence of the plaintiff also appears to be silent on this
point. Therefore, even consideration of the oral evidence
would give the same result. There is absolutely no
reasonable ground shown by the present appellant as to
why he had not entered into the witness box to support his
claim. He has examined his wife, who was the General
Power of Attorney. But it can be seen that her presence
was not on record when the sale-deed was executed. The
sale-deed mentions that it is absolute sale and no stipulation
for refund of the amount was mentioned. There was no
separate document also entered into between the parties to
show that the real intention was different. Even the recital
regarding handing over of possession has been taken and,
as aforesaid, the suit was for recovery of possession also.
That means, on the day the document was executed, the
plaintiff parted with the possession of the suit property. If
he was supposed to get the loan of Rs.2,000/- only then for
how many months or years, he could have allowed the
defendant to cultivate the land is a question. The document
was executed on 14.8.1981 and the suit for declaration,
cancellation and possession was filed by the plaintiff on
4.12.1995. The defendant, only on the basis of loan
amount of consideration or meager amount of consideration,
cannot get the sale-deed cancelled or come with a case that
the real nature of the transaction was different when he
had, in fact, parted with possession of the property.
Therefore, taking into consideration the appreciation of
evidence, which is already there, showing that there was no
relationship of debtor and creditor between the appellants
and the respondents, the conduct also does not support the
contention that the real transaction was mortgage in nature.
No substantial questions of law are arising in this case.
10. As regards the alleged non-compliance of Order
41 Rule 33 of CPC is concerned, it is to be noted that the
basic point regarding the transaction, in question, was
framed by the learned Trial Judge and he has also
considered the other evidence on record which may not
have been firstly formulated in the form of points. All the
points involved in the appeals were considered by the
learned First Appellate Court and, therefore, only on the
basis of the contention that there is non-compliance of order
41 Rule 33 of CPC, the appeals cannot be admitted.
11. Both the Courts below have properly appreciated
the evidence and the legal points involved in the appeals
have been addressed and finding has been given and,
therefore, when no substantial questions of law is arising, in
view of the decision in the case of Kirpa Ram (Deceased)
Through L.Rs. And Ors. Vs. Surendra Deo Gaur and Ors. -
(2021) 3 Mah.L.J. 250, both the appeals, filed under Section
100 of CPC, deserve to be dismissed at the admission stage
and accordingly they are dismissed. Pending Civil
Application, if any, stands disposed of.
(SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI) JUDGE
BDV
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!