Bombay High Court
Ashokkumar Uttamchand Bogawat vs Dinkar Sakharam Bhingardive Lrs. ... on 5 January, 2018
Bench: V.K. Jadhav
1
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
APPELLATE SIDE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 2254 OF 1993
Ashokkumar Uttamchand Bogawat,
Age : 46 yrs, Occ: Business & Agri.,
R/o. Khist Galli, Dist: Ahmednagar. ... PETITIONER
(Original Plaintiff)
V E R S U S
1) Dinkar Sakharam Bhingardive
(Deceased) through his L.Rs.
1-A) Vithabai Dinkar Bhingardive,
Age: 54 yrs, Occ: Household,
1-B) Ambadas Dinkar Bhingardive,
Age : 29 yrs, Occ: Service,
1-C) Shankar Dinkar Bhingardive,
Age : 25 yrs, Occ: Education,
All resident of C.T.S. No.7549,
Station Road, Ahmednagar. ... RESPONDENTS
(Original Defendants)
...
Mr. V. S. Bedre, Advocate for Petitioner.
Court notice served on Respondent Nos.1-A to 1-C.
...
CORAM : V. K. JADHAV, J.
RESERVED ON : 23rd November, 2017.
PRONOUNCED ON: 05th January, 2018.
::: Uploaded on - 06/01/2018 ::: Downloaded on - 07/01/2018 02:08:37 :::
2
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
JUDGMENT:
. This writ petition is directed against the judgment and
decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Ahmednagar in
Regular Civil Appeal No.47 of 1989 dated 8th July, 1993, by confirming
the judgment and decree passed by the Joint Civil Judge Junior
Division, Ahmednagar in Regular Civil Suit No.731 of 1984 dated 15th
April, 1988.
2 Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are as
follows:
a) The Petitioner / original Plaintiff is the owner of
CTS No.7549 situated at Ahmednagar Station
Road out of which one tin shed room
admeasuring 15'x10' as described in the plaint
paragraph 1, situated on the eastern side of CTS
No.7549 is in occupation of the Respondent /
Defendant (tenant) on the monthly rent of
Rs.40/-. The tenancy commences from the first
day of English calender month and expires on the
last day of the month. The Petitioner / Plaintiff
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
contends that the rent upto the end of February
1984 paid by the Respondents / Defendants
(tenants) and accordingly, the Petitioner / Plaintiff
has issued the receipts. However, the
Respondent / tenant did not pay the rent since 1 st
March, 1984 onwards though the Petitioner /
Plaintiff had demanded the same. The
Petitioner / Plaintiff has therefore, issued a notice
dated 1st October, 1984 and terminated the
tenancy and demanded the arrears of rent and
possession of the suit premises. However, the
Respondent / tenant did not comply the notice. It
has been pleaded that the Defendant / tenant is a
defaulter for more than six months of the rent. It
has also been specifically pleaded that the
conduct of the Defendant is of such a nature
causing nuisance and annoyance to the adjoining
neighbours. It has also been specifically pleaded
that the Petitioner / Plaintiff requires the suit
premises reasonably and bona-fide for his use
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
and occupation and greater hardship will be
caused to Petitioner / Plaintiff if he is not put in
possession. Since the Respondent / Defendant
(tenant) did not comply the notice, the Petitioner /
Plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of rent,
possession and decree of eviction.
b) The Respondent / Defendant (tenant) strongly
resisted the suit by filing the written statement. It
has been contended that the Respondents /
Defendants were regularly paying monthly rent to
the father of the Petitioner / Plaintiff and the
father of the Petitioner / Plaintiff used to issue
receipts some times and some times was not
issuing the rent receipts. Initially, the rent for the
suit premises was Rs.35/- per month and it was
increased to Rs.40/- per month. It has also been
pleaded that the rent is excessive and exorbitant
and in fact, the rent of the suit premises is not
more than Rs.10/- per month. It has been
specifically denied that the Respondent /
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
Defendant did not pay the rent since 1st March,
1984 onwards. It has also been denied that the
conduct of the Defendant is causing nuisance
and annoyance to the adjoining neighbours. It
has also been denied that the Petitioner / Plaintiff
requires the suit premises reasonably and bona-
fide for his use and occupation and greater
hardship is likely to be caused to the Petitioner /
Plaintiff if he is not put in possession.
c) On the basis of rival pleadings of the parties to
the suit, the Trial Court has framed the issues
and accordingly, both the parties led their oral
and documentary evidence in support of their
rival contentions. The learned Judge of the Trial
Court has held that the Petitioner / Plaintiff has
failed to prove the conduct of the Defendant /
tenant as a nuisance and annoyance to the
adjoining neighbours and also held that the
Petitioner / Plaintiff failed to prove that he
requires the suit premises reasonably and bona-
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
fide for his use and occupation. The learned
Judge of the Trial Court also held that no greater
hardship will be caused to the Petitioner / Plaintiff
if he is not put in possession of the rented
premises. The learned Judge of the Trial Court
also held that as the Defendant / tenant did not
raise the dispute regarding the standard rent by
filing a separate application within a month from
the receipt of the notice, the Defendant cannot
raise the dispute regarding the standard rent in
his written statement. The learned Judge of the
Trial Court also held that the Petitioner / Plaintiff
failed to prove that the Defendant / tenant is
willful defaulter within the meaning of Section
(12)(3)(a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as the "Rent Act, 1947").
The learned Judge of the Trial Court by judgment
and decree dated 15th April, 1988 dismissed the
suit of the Plaintiff. Bing aggrieved by the
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court,
the Petitioner / Plaintiff has preferred Regular
Civil Appeal No.47 of 1989 and the learned
Additional District Judge, Ahmednagar, by
judgment and order dated 8th July, 1993
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
Hence, this writ petition.
3 The learned counsel for Petitioner / original Plaintiff
submits that both the Courts below have not correctly framed the
substantial question of law and procedure, which resulted into
manifest injustice to the Petitioner. Both the Courts below have
misinterpreted and misconstrued the provisions of the Rent Act, 1947.
The learned counsel submits that the Petitioner / Plaintiff has issued a
proper and valid legal notice to the Respondent / Defendant and the
same was received by them. It is an admitted fact that the
Respondent / Defendant has not tendered or paid the rents within
thirty days from the receipt of the notice sent by the Petitioner /
landlord. Thus, the Court has no discretion, but to pass the decree
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
under Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act, 1947. The learned counsel
submits that the Respondent / Defendant has not tendered the
amount of rent as demanded by the Plaintiff / landlord nor raised the
dispute under Section 11 of the Rent Act, 1947 and even they have
not filed an application for fixation of standard rent of the suit
premises. The Respondent / Defendant has given admission in the
cross-examination that they have not paid the rent to the Petitioner /
Plaintiff after 9th March, 1984. The learned counsel submits that both
the Courts below have erred in observing that the Respondent /
Defendant sent the money orders, however, the said money order
coupons are not proved nor exhibited by the Courts below. The
learned counsel submits that even the Defendants have not deposited
the rent in the Court regularly and as such, the Petitioner / Plaintiff is
entitled for the decree under Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act, 1947.
The learned counsel submits that the requirements of Section 12(3)(b)
of the Rent Act, 1947 have to be strictly complied with. The Court has
no discretion to accept the payment made otherwise then in
accordance with Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act, 1947. The learned
counsel submits that two conditions i.e. arrears will be deposited or
paid on the first day of hearing and thereafter, the rent must be paid or
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
tendered in the Court regularly till the suit and appeal, if any, decided,
the tenant will be entitled to protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the
Rent Act, 1947 on the ground that the entire amount due has been
paid before the judgment and therefore, there was a substantial
compliance of the provisions of Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act,
1947. The Court does not have any discretion to accept the payment,
which is made otherwise then in accordance with the requirements of
Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act, 1947.
4 The learned for the Petitioner in order to substantiate his
submissions placed his reliance on the following cases:
a) Jaypal Bandu Adake and another Vs. Basavali
Gurulingappa Mhalank and another, reported in,
1982 Mh.L.J. 512,
b) Harbanslal Jagmohandas and another Vs.
Prabhudas Shivlal, reported in, AIR 1976
Supreme Court 2005,
c) Ganpat Ladha Vs. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde,
reported in, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 955(1),
d) Mranalini B. Shah and another Vs. Bapalal
Mohanlal Shah, reported in, AIR 1980 Supreme
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
Court 954(1),
e) Bhaskar Bhagwant Shinde Vs. Sou. Vasudha
Mahdukar Kadam and another, reported in,
2005(3) Mh.L.J. 428,
f) Shivnath s/o Anandram Mundada (deceased)
through L.R.s Vs. Ramdayal Surajmal Rathi
(deceased) through L.Rs., reported in, 2011(3)
Mh.L.J. 860.
5 None present for Respondent Nos.1-A to 1-C.
6 The Petitioner / Plaintiff has instituted the suit for recovery
of due rent and possession of the suit premises. There is no dispute
that the Petitioner / Plaintiff is the owner of property bearing CTS
No.7549 out of which one room admeasuring 15'x10' having tin shed
as described in the plaint paragraph 1 given to the Defendant on
monthly rent and the tenancy commences from the first day of English
calender month and ends on the last day of the month. It is the
contention of the Defendant that the rent at present is excessive and
he claims for fixation of standard rent of the suit premises. It is also
an admitted fact that the Petitioner / Plaintiff has issued notice Exhibit
29 to the Defendant on 1st October, 1984 and the same was served
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
on the Defendant vide Exhibit 30. The Defendant has also replied to
this notice on 10th October, 1984 vide Exhibit 39. Admittedly, the
Defendant has failed to file the standard rent application within one
month from the receipt of the aforesaid notice as provided under
Section 11 (3) read with explanation (I) of Section 12 of the Rent Act,
1947.
7 Thus, the substantial question arises for consideration
whether in order to take the case out of the provisions of Section
12(3)(a) of the Rent Act, 1947, it is obligatory on the tenant to make
an application for fixation of standard rent under Section 11(3) of the
Rent Act, 1947 as required by the Explanation (I) to Section 12 of the
Rent Act, 1947, failing therein whether the tenant can claim the
protection of Section 12(1) of the Rent Act, 1947 by raising the
dispute about the standard rent in the written statement itself.
8 It is not out of place to mention here that the Trial Court
has framed issue No.1 as to what is the standard rent and though the
Trial Court has made the observations in paragraph 6 of the judgment
that a separate application is must for fixation of standard rent within
one month from the date of receipt of the notice, recorded the finding
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
to issue No.1 as does not survive and further recorded the finding to
issue No.2 in the negative and held that the Plaintiff fails to prove that
Defendant is willful defaulter within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of
the Rent Act, 1947.
9 In order to correctly appreciate the submissions made on
behalf of the Petitioner / Plaintiff, the relevant Section 12 and Section
11(3) of the Rent Act, 1947, are reproduced hereinbelow:
"12. No ejectment ordinarily to be made if
tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard
rent and permitted increases.
(1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery
of possession of any premises so long as the tenant
pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the
standard rent and permitted increases, if any and
observes and performs the other conditions of the
tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the
provisions of this Act.
(2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be
instituted by a landlord against tenant on the ground of
non-payment of the standard rent or permitted
increases due, until the expiration of one month next
after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent
or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant
in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
Property Act, 1882.
(3) (a) Where the rent is payable by the month
and there is no dispute regarding the amount of
standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent
increases are in arrears for a period of six months or
more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof
until the expiration of the period of one month after
notice referred to in sub-section (2), the Court shall
pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery
of possession.
(b) In any other case no decree for eviction shall
be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing
of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court
may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the
standard rent and permitted increases then due and
thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly
such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally
decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by
the Court.
(4) Pending the disposal of any such suit, the
Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the
tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards
payment of rent or permitted increase due to him as the
Court thinks fit.
Explanation I.- In any case where there is a
dispute as to the amount of standard rent of permitted
increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be
deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if,
before the expiry of the period of one month after notice
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application
to the Court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and
thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or
permitted increases specified in the order made by the
Court.
Explanation II.- For the purposes of sub-section
(2), reference to "standard rent" and "permitted
increase" shall include reference to "interim standard
rent" and "interim permitted increase" specified under
sub-section (3) or (4) of section 11.
Explanation III.- For the purposes of this section,
where a tenant has deducted any amount from the rent
due to the landlord under section 173C of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act for recovery or any water tax
or charges paid by him to the Commissioner, the tenant
shall be deemed to have paid the rent to the extent of
deductions so made by him."
... ... ...
11. Court may fix standard rent and permitted
increases in certain cases.
(1) ...
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) ...
(d) ...
(e) ...
(2) ...
(3) If any application for fixing the standard
rent or for determining the permitted increases is made
by a tenant who has received a notice from his landlord
under sub-section (2) of section 12, the Court shall
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
forthwith specify the amount of rent or permitted
increases which are to be deposited in Court by the
tenant, and make an order directing the tenant to
deposit such amount in Court or at the option of the
tenant make an order to pay to the landlord such
amount thereof as the Court may specify, pending the
final decision of the application. A copy of the order
shall be served upon the landlord. Out of any amount
deposited in Court, the Court may make an order for
payment of such reasonable sum to the landlord
towards payment of rent or increases due to him as it
thinks fit. If the tenant fails to deposit such amount or,
as the case may be, to pay such amount thereof to the
landlord, his application shall be dismissed.
(4) ...
(5) ...
(6) ..."
10 In view of the said provisions, if the rent is payable by
month and there are arrears of more than six months and the tenancy
is terminated by a notice, either the entire arrears of rent must be paid
within one month or if a dispute regarding standard rent has to be
raised, the tenant must apply within one month of the date of the
receipt of the notice under Section 11(3) of the Rent Act, 1947 and
obtain appropriate direction from the Court. If the tenant complies
with those directions, he must be deemed to be a person who is ready
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
and willing to pay. The question, therefore, arises whether any other
mode (third mode) is available for getting the protection of the Rent
Act, 1947 on the basis that the tenant is one who is ready and willing
to pay. In the instant case, the Respondents / tenants have raised a
dispute about the standard rent in reply to the notice vide Exhibit 39
and also in the written statement.
11 In the case Jaypal Bandu Adake and another Vs.
Basavali Gurulingappa Mhalank and another (supra) relied upon by
the learned counsel for Petitioner, the Division Bench of this Court
had an occasion to deal with this issue on a reference made by the
learned Single Judge. The questions referred relate to the
construction of the provision of Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act, 1947
and the determination of the correct ratio of two decisions of the
Supreme Court in Shah Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal Vs. Dalichand
Virchand Shroff, reported in, AIR 1968 SC 1109, and Harbanslal
Jagmohandas and another Vs. Prabhudas Shivlal (supra). In the
above cited case, the Division Bench of this Court made an
endeavour to find out and ascertain on reading of the aforesaid two
judgments of the Supreme Court that if a reply is given by a tenant to
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
the notice issued by the landlord under Section 12(2) of the Rent Act,
1947 and in that reply he had disputed the standard rent, that is a
permissible way of raising a dispute for the purposes of taking the
case out of the clutches of Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act, 1947. In
paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment, the Division Bench of this
Court has made the following observations:
"15. It is important to point out that in the other
appeal with which the Supreme Court was dealing and
which had come to the Supreme Court from the Gujarat
High Court, the view taken by the Gujarat High Court was
that the dispute as to standard rent was to be raised within
one month from the service of the notice on the tenant. It
appears that the finding in the Gujarat case was that after
the notice was given by the landlord on 6th December,
1966 to the tenant, a letter was alleged to have been sent
by the tenant on 16th February, 1967 though two earlier
letters mentioned in that letter were found to have been
fabricated. Referring to the decision of this Court the
Supreme Court observed as follows :
"The view of the Bombay High Court overlooks the
limitation of time within which a dispute is to be raised as to
standard rent. The view of the Bombay High Court is that
disputing within one month of the service of the notice
terminating the tenancy is one mode of raising a dispute
and there is another mode of raising the dispute at any
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
stage of the suit. The view of the Bombay High Court
nullifies the provisions contained in Section 12 and
Explanation thereto and confers a right on the tenant
where the legislation does not contemplate such a right."
Now, when the Supreme Court in the above quoted
paragraph did not approve of the view taken by this Court
that disputing the standard rent within one month of the
service of the notice is one mode of raising a dispute and
observed that this view nullifies the provisions contained in
section 12 and Explanation thereto, the Supreme Court
must be held to have positively taken the view that apart
from the mode referred to in the Explanation to section 12,
the tenant has no other mode in which the tenant can raise
a dispute about standard rent for the purposes of section
12(3)(a). When the Supreme Court observed that the view
of this Court nullifies the Explanation and overlooks the
limitation, it is obvious that the reference was to the
limitation of one month prescribed by Explanation I to
section 12. That Explanation in unmistakable terms
requires that in any case where there is a dispute as to
amount of standard rent or permitted increases
recoverable under the Act, the tenant shall be deemed to
be ready and willing to pay such amount if before the
expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in
sub-section (2) of section 12, he makes an application to
the Court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and
thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted
increases specified in the order made by the Court. When
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
the Supreme Court observed that the provisions of section
12 were being nullified, the reference was to the provisions
of section 12(1) and section 12(3)(a).
16. Section 12(1) disables a landlord from
recovering possession of any premises so long as the
tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of
standard rent and permitted increases and observes and
performs the other conditions of the tenancy so far as they
are consistent with the provisions of the Rent Act. In a
case where there is a dispute, the Legislature has provided
for a deeming fiction whereby a tenant can be considered
to be ready and willing to pay only if he acts in the manner
provided by Explanation I. Explanation I contemplates two
things. It firstly requires the tenant to make an application
for fixation of standard rent within the specified period,
namely, before the expiry of one month after the notice
under section 12(2) is received by him and the second
condition is that he has to pay or tender the amount of rent
or permitted increases specified in the order made by the
Court. Unless these two conditions are satisfied, it cannot
be said that the tenant is ready and willing to pay the
amount of standard rent as contemplated by section 12(3)
(a). The Explanation clearly provides for what the tenant is
to do where he wants to raise a dispute about the standard
rent before he can claim to be out of the rigour of section
12(3)(a) of the Rent Act."
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
12 Section 11(3) of the Rent Act, 1947 refers to an
application for fixation of standard rent by a tenant who has received
a notice from his landlord and when such application is made, there is
an obligation on the Court to specify the amount of rent or permitted
increases which are to be deposited in Court by the tenant and the
Court is further obliged to make an order directing the tenant to
deposit such amount in Court or at the option of the tenant to make an
order to pay to the landlord such amount thereof as the Court may
specify pending the final decision of the application. If the tenant fails
to deposit such amount or to pay such amount thereof to the landlord,
his application shall be dismissed. A tenant can only be considered to
be ready and willing to pay, if he makes an application to the Court
under sub-Section (3) of Section 11 of the Rent Act, 1947 and
thereafter, pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases
specified by the Court. In view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of Harbanslal Jagmohandas and another Vs.
Prabhudas Shivlal (supra), in order to escape from the consequences
mentioned in Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act, 1947, the tenant
should make an application under Section 11(3) of the Rent Act, 1947
within one moth of the service of the notice under Section 12(2) and
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
there is no other mode available. In the case of Harbanslal
Jagmohandas and another Vs. Prabhudas Shivlal (supra), the
Supreme Court points out that in order to avoid the operation of
Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act, 1947, the dispute with regard to
standard rent or permitted increases must be raised at the latest
before the expiry of one month from the date of service of notice
under Section 12(2) of the Rent Act, 1947 and it is not enough to
raise a dispute for the first time in written statement. It nullifies the
provisions contained in Section 12 and Explanation thereto and
confers a right on the tenant where the legislation does not
contemplate such a right.
13 In paragraph 32 of the judgment, the Division Bench of
this Court in the case of Jaypal Bandu Adake and another Vs.
Basavali Gurulingappa Mhalank and another (supra) has made the
following observations:
"32. On giving our anxious consideration to the
legal position as now settled by the decisions of the
Supreme Court, we are of the considered view that the
only way to prevent a decree for eviction being passed
under the provisions of section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act is
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
that the tenant must make an application raising a dispute
regarding standard rent and must ask for fixation of
standard rent under section 11(3) of the Rent Act as
required by Explanation I to section 12. There is no other
mode permissible for raising a dispute as to standard rent
for the purposes of section 12 of the Rent Act. By raising a
dispute with regard to standard rent by the tenant in a reply
to the demand notice before the expiry of one month
without making an application under section 11(3) read
with Explanation I to section 12, the Court will not be
prevented from passing a decree for eviction under the
provisions of section 12(3)(a). The fact that there was
some dispute about standard rent prior to the notice under
section 12(2) would also be immaterial and would not
affect the power of the Court to pass a decree under
section 12(3)(a) if the conditions referred to in section 12(3)
(a) are satisfied if no application has already been made
under section 11(1) of the Act. This will answer the first
two questions raised in the order of reference."
14 In view of the above, even if the tenant has raised the
dispute in reply to the demand notice without making any application
under Section 11(3) read with Explanation (I) to Section 12 of the
Rent Act, 1947, the Court is not prevented from passing a decree of
eviction under the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act,
1947. It appears that both the Courts below have not considered this
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
legal position. Both the Courts below have given weightage to the
admission given by the Petitioner / Plaintiff to the effect that the
Petitioner / Plaintiff has admitted in his cross-examination that the
Respondents / Defendants have sent the rent by money order. Both
the Courts below, however, ignored that the Petitioner / Plaintiff has
qualified his so-called admission by deposing that he has refused to
accept the money order as it was insufficient. Since the Defendants
have raised the dispute about the standard rent and thereafter, failed
to comply with the provisions of sub-Section (3) of Section 11 read
with Explanation (I) to Section 12 of the Rent Act, 1947, the rent
allegedly paid through money order loses its significance. There is no
record available to indicate that the Respondents / Defendants were
regular in depositing the rent in the Trial Court or even in the
Appellate Court. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be
allowed. Hence, the following order:
O R D E R
I. The writ petition is hereby allowed.
II. The judgment and decree passed by the
Additional District Judge, Ahmednagar in Regular
Writ Petition 2254 of 1993.odt
Civil Appeal No.47 of 1989 dated 8th July, 1993
and judgment and order passed by the Joint Civil
Judge Junior Division, Ahmednagar in Regular
Civil Suit No.731 of 1984 dated 15th April, 1988,
are hereby quashed and set aside.
III. The Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession
of the suit premises and also for a decree of
arrears of rent of Rs.396.60.
IV. The Plaintiff is also entitled to mesne profit from
the date of the decree alongwith the costs of the
suit and appeal. In the circumstances, there shall
be no order as to the costs of this writ petition.
V. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
[ V. K. JADHAV, J. ]
ndm
