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The State Of Mah vs Shamkant @ Dhanraj Waman Patil And ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 7638 Bom

Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 7638 Bom
Judgement Date : 28 September, 2017

Bombay High Court
The State Of Mah vs Shamkant @ Dhanraj Waman Patil And ... on 28 September, 2017
Bench: S.P. Deshmukh
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                        BENCH AT AURANGABAD


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 63 OF 2008


The State of Maharashtra,
Through Police Station Officer, 
Dhule Taluka Police Station Officer,
Tq. and Dist. Dhule                       APPELLANT
                                       (Prosecution)

       VERSUS

1.     Shamkant @ Dhanraj Waman Patil,
       Age : 35 years, 

2.     Waman Rajaram Patil,
       Age : 65 years, 

3.     Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil,
       Age : 60 years, 

4.     Jeejabrao Waman Patil,
       Age : 22 years,
       All resident of Vinchur,
       Tq. and Dist. Dhule                                 RESPONDENTS 
                                                        (Orig. Accused)


                           ----
Mr.P.G. Borade, A.P.P. for the appellant/State/Prosecution 
Mr. B.R. Warma, Advocate for the respondents
                           ----


                                       CORAM : SUNIL P. DESHMUKH AND
                                               SANGITRAO S. PATIL, JJ.


                         RESERVED ON  : 21th SEPTEMBER, 2017
                         PRONOUNCED ON : 28th SEPTEMBER, 2017




     ::: Uploaded on - 28/09/2017                    ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2017 01:52:18 :::
                                     2                       criapl63-2008

JUDGMENT (PER : SANGITRAO S. PATIL, J.):

The State/Prosecution has challenged the

judgment and order dated 31.10.2006 passed in Sessions

Case No.58 of 2005 by the learned 2nd Adhoc Sessions

Judge, Dhule, whereby the respondents came to be

acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 498-

A, 302, 342 and 406 read with section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code, ("IPC" for short).

2. The deceased Sunita was the wife of respondent

No.1. Their marriage was performed prior to about 5

years of the incident. Respondent No.2 is the father,

respondent No.3 is the mother, while respondent No.4 is

the brother of respondent No.1.

3. The case of the prosecution, in short, is that

the deceased Sunita was being ill-treated by the

respondents because she did not conceive child.

Ultimately, on 10.04.2005 at about 10.00 a.m., when the

deceased Sunita was in the house, the respondents closed

the door thereof from inside. Respondent Nos. 1 and 4

tied the deceased Sunita with a rope, respondent No.4

poured kerosene on her person and respondent Nos.2 set

3 criapl63-2008

her on fire by lighting a match stick. The deceased

Sunita raised shouts. The neighbours gathered near the

house of the respondents. One Vishwas Namdeo Patil -

Police Patil of village Vinchur, took the deceased

Sunita to Civil Hospital at Dhule and admitted her there

for treatment.

4. The statement of the deceased Sunita was

recorded by ASI Wagh in the hospital, which was treated

as the First Information Report ("FIR" for short). On

the basis of that FIR Crime No. 131 of 2005 came to be

registered against the respondents for the offences

punishable under Sections 307, 498-A, 342 and 504 of the

IPC against the respondents. On the same day, her

statement was recorded by the Special Executive

Magistrate - Sardar Ajam Mansuri. Investigation

followed, the spot panchanama was prepared. A plastic

can of kerosene, one match box with brunt sticks, pieces

of blanket and burnt pieces of petticoat of the deceased

Sunita came to be seized from the house of the

respondents. The seized articles were sent to the

Chemical Analyst for analysis and report. Sunita died in

the hospital on 15.04.2005. Therefore, the offence under

4 criapl63-2008

Section 302 of the IPC came to be substituted for the

under Section 307 of the IPC. Postmortem of the body of

the deceased Sunita was conducted. The Medical Officers

noticed that she had sustained 90% of burns. They opined

that she died of "septicemia due to thermal burns".

Statements of witnesses were recorded. After completion

of the investigation, the respondents came to be

prosecuted for the above mentioned offences.

5. The learned Trial Judge framed charge against

the respondents for the said offences vide Exh.8 and

explained the contents to them in vernacular. The

respondents pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

Their defence is that of total denial and false

implication. Respondent No.1 filed written statement

when he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, wherein he stated that on 10.05.2004

at about 8.00 a.m. Respondent Nos. 2, 4 and himself had

gone to their agricultural land for doing agricultural

work. They received a message at about 11.00 a.m. that

Sunita got burnt. They immediately went back to their

house. They came to know that Police Patil namely

Vishwas Namdeo Patil had taken the deceased Sunita to

5 criapl63-2008

the Civil Hospital at Dhule. Then they went there to see

her. They tried to ask her as to how she got burnt, but

she was not in a position to speak. He then stated that

at the time of the incident, respondent No.3 and the

deceased Sunita only were in the house. He denied that

he ever illtreated the deceased Sunita on any count.

6. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to

prove the guilt of the respondents. The learned Trial

Judge scrutinized the said evidence and came to hold

that the prosecution failed to establish guilt of the

respondents for the above-mentioned offences. The

learned Trial Judge, therefore, acquitted the

respondents.

7. The learned A.P.P. submits that there is

sufficient evidence on record to show that the deceased

Sunita was being subjected to cruelty by the respondents

on the ground that she could not conceive any child. She

was severely beaten by respondent No.1 in the year 2003.

Therefore, a criminal case was instituted against him.

Respondent No.1 entered into an amicable settlement and

assured in writing to treat the deceased Sunita properly

and therefore, she resumed cohabitation with him, in the

6 criapl63-2008

month of August, 2004. However, she was again subjected

to cruelty. He submits that the father of the deceased

Sunita, viz:- Subhash (PW2), has produced the written

undertaking given by respondent No.1 on a stamped paper

(Exh.37). The evidence of Subhash (PW2) coupled with the

said written undertaking shows as to how the deceased

Sunita was being ill-treated at her matrimonial house.

He then submits that there are two written dying

declarations (Exhs.44 and 48) recorded by ASI Wagh (PW4)

and the Special Executive Magistrate- Sardar Ajam

Mansuri (PW5) respectively, which are quite consistent

in respect of the role played by the respondents, at the

time of incident. These dying declarations have been

recorded by these witnesses after getting it verified

from the Medical Officer that the deceased Sunita was

conscious and in a fit state of mind to give statement.

These dying declarations were made voluntarily. They are

truthful. They create a great confidence. The medical

evidence also supports the case of the prosecution. The

chemical analysis report shows traces of kerosene on the

burnt piece of rope as well as the pieces of Saari and

Petticoat of the deceased Sunita. According to him, the

dying declarations of the deceased coupled with the

7 criapl63-2008

medical evidence clearly show that her death was

homicidal and the respondents only were responsible

therefor. He, further submits that the oral dying

declarations of the deceased Sunita given before Subhash

(PW2) and Bhatu (PW6) also show involvement of the

respondents in the incident of burning the deceased

Sunita. According to him, the learned Trial Judge did

not appreciate the evidence properly and correctly. The

learned Trial Judge wrongly acquitted the respondents.

8. on the other hand, the learned counsel for the

respondents submits that the Police Patil Vishwas Namdeo

Patil was the first person who visit the house of the

respondents after the incident. He tried to extinguish

fire that was on the person of the deceased Sunita and

took her to the Civil Hospital at Dhule. He was the best

witness to state as to who were inside the house at the

time of the incident and what was stated by the deceased

Sunita immediately after the incident. However, this

witness is not examined by the prosecution. He then

submits that when the deceased Sunita was admitted in

the Civil Hospital, Dhule, Dr. Shinde (PW7) recorded in

the case papers the history of the incident that was

8 criapl63-2008

narrated by her. According to him, it was the first

dying declaration of the deceased Sunita. In that dying

declaration she did not whisper about the presence of

respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 at the time of the incident.

According to him, after the father and uncle, i.e.

Subhash (PW2) and Bhatu (PW6) respectively, met the

deceased Sunita in the Civil Hospital, they tutored her

and made her to involve all the respondents in the

incident. According to him, the inconsistent dying

declarations of the deceased Sunita, therefore, cannot

be believed. He submits that there is no sufficient and

cogent evidence on record to connect the respondents

with incident in question. According to him, the view

taken by the learned Trial Judge is quite a possible

view, it cannot be interfered with lightly in the appeal

against the judgment of acquittal. He prays that the

appeal may be dismissed.

9. The prosecution is mainly depending on the

dying declarations of the deceased Sunita. The learned

counsel for the respondents cited an unreported judgment

in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Raghunath

Ramchandra Sable, Criminal Appeal No.154 of 1996,

9 criapl63-2008

decided by this Court on 29.06.2015, wherein there is a

reference of para 24 of the judgment in the case of

Tukaram Padhen and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra,

All.M.R. (Cri) 2754, which reads as under:-

"24. When the Court is called upon to appreciate the evidence of written dying declaration, the Court has to be extremely cautious and examine with meticulous care the evidence regarding recording of the dying declaration. Merely because witnesses came forward and depose about the recording of the dying declaration, it should not impel the Court to immediately accept the dying declaration. It has to be remembered that the declarant is not available for cross examination and, therefore, the prosecution must prove, apart from the truthfulness of the contents, the factum of the recording of the dying declaration as well as the fact that the declarant was in a fit mental condition to give the statement. Once suspicious circumstances are found in the evidence, the Court should be extremely slow in placing implicit reliance on the dying declaration. It is to be remembered that the conviction can be recorded on the dying declaration alone if the court finds that the dying declaration to be wholly

10 criapl63-2008

reliable. It is, therefore, necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence and place reliance on the dying declaration only if the evidence in respect of the recording of the dying declaration is of "sterling" quality. If there are suspicious circumstances the Court should reject the dying declaration and look for other evidences if it is available. Mechanical acceptance of the dying declaration dehors a meticulous scrutiny of the evidence relating to the recording of the dying declaration must be deprecated. In the present case as we have pointed out in the light of circumstances stated by us, we do not find the dying declarations to be pieces of evidence which would inspire the confidence of the Court for implicit acceptance. The aforesaid dying declarations, therefore, will have to be left out of consideration."

10. Keeping in mind the above mentioned

observations, we proceed to scrutinize the dying

declarations of the deceased Sunita.

11. The first dying declaration (Exh.44) has been

recorded by ASI Wagh (PW4) (Exh.43). He deposes that he

recorded the dying declaration (Exh.44) of the deceased

11 criapl63-2008

Sunita as per her version, after getting it verified

from the Dr.Shinde (PW7) (Exh.54) that she was conscious

and able to give statement. He states that he obtained

left thumb mark of the deceased Sunita on that dying

declaration after reading over the contents thereof to

her and after she accepted the said contents to be true.

After recording that dying declaration also he obtained

opinion of Dr. Shinde (PW7) that she was conscious and

able to give statement. Dr. Shinde (PW7) (Exh.47)

supports the evidence of ASI Wagh (PW4). From the

endorsements made by Dr. Shinde (PW7), it will be clear

that it was recorded between 1.45 p.m. and 2.10 p.m. on

10.04.2005. The said dying declaration was treated as

the FIR. In that dying declaration she states that she

was being ill-treated by the respondents on the ground

that she could not conceive any child. She was bearing

that illtreatment with the hope that she would conceive

a child. She then states that on 10.04.2005 at about

10.00 a.m. when she was in the house, the respondents

closed the door of the house from inside. Respondent

Nos.1 and 4 tied her by means of a rope, respondent No.3

poured kerosene on her person and respondent No.2 set

her ablaze by igniting a match stick. She raised shouts.

12 criapl63-2008

The neighbours gathered there. One Vishwas Namdeo Desale

took her to the Civil Hospital at Dhule and admitted her

there.

12. The second dying declaration (Exh.48) has been

recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate - Sardar

Ajam Mansuri (PW5), between 2.20 p.m. and 2.40 p.m. on

10.04.2005. He states that he got it confirmed from Dr.

Shinde (PW7) that the deceased Sunita was conscious and

able to give statement prior to and after recording her

statement (Exh.48). Dr. Shinde (PW7) also supports this

fact. Then he recorded the dying declaration (Exh.48) as

per the say of the deceased Sunita, read over the

contents of thereof to her, she admitted them to be

correct and then he obtained her left thumb mark

thereon. The said dying declaration is consistent with

the dying declaration (Exh.44) in all material

particulars.

13. Subhash (PW2) and Bhatu (PW6) state that after

reciving the message about admission of the deceased

Sunita in the Civil Hospital at Dhule, they rushed to

see her in the said hospital. On being asked by them,

the deceased Sunita narrated before them that respondent

13 criapl63-2008

Nos.1 and 4 tied her hands with a rope, respondent No.3

poured kerosene on her person and respondent No.2 set

her on fire by igniting a match stick inside their

house. Thus, these are oral dying declarations of the

deceased Sunita, which are consisent with her dying

declarations at Exhs. 44 and 48.

14. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed

out to the evidence of Dr. Shinde (PW7), who being the

Casualty Medical Officer in the Civil Hospital at Dhule

on 10.04.2005, admitted the deceased Sunita in that

hospital on being brought by Vishwas Patil. He states

that he recorded history of the injuries as narrated by

the deceased Sunita and obtained her thumb mark thereon.

He produced the case papers (Exh.56), wherein this

statement made by the deceased Sunita has been recorded.

The said statement shows that her mother-in-law poured

kerosene on her body and set her on fire on 10.04.2005

at 10.30 a.m. It has been reiterated by him in his

cross-examination that the deceased Sunita had stated

that she got burnt because her mother-in-law (i.e.

respondent No.3) poured kerosene on her person and set

her on fire by means of match stick on 10.04.2005 at

14 criapl63-2008

about 10.30 a.m. The learned counsel for the respondents

submits that this is the dying declaration of the

deceased Sunita recorded first in point of time. The

dying declarations (Exhs.44 and 48) as well as the oral

dying declarations disclosed through the evidence of

Subhash (PW2) and Bhatu (PW6) are not consistent with

this dying declaration which was recorded by Dr. Shinde

(PW7). Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for

the respondents, the learned Trial Judge has rightly

discarded the dying declarations of the deceased Sunita.

15. It may be noted that the dying declaration of

the deceased Sunita recorded by Dr.Shinde (PW7) has

surfaced in his cross-examination. It has come in his

cross-examination that at the time of giving history,

(as recorded in the case papers Exh.56), the deceased

Sunita was conscious. There is nothing on record to show

that the said dying declaration was given by the

deceased Sunita at the instance of anybody else. As

such, it was made voluntarily without being influenced

by any other persons, and when she was conscious. The

said dying declaration has remained unchallenged. From

the written statement Exh.64 of respondent no.1, it is

15 criapl63-2008

clear that at the time of the incident respondent No.3

and the deceased Sunita only were inside the house where

the incident took place. This statement fully

corroborates the dying declaration of the deceased

recorded by Dr. Shinde (PW7). Respondent No.3 alone

being present at the time of incident, she alone was in

a position to explain the circumstances in which the

deceased Sunita, got burnt, which were within her

special knowledge. In view of Section 106 of the Indian

Evidence Act, she was under an obligation to explain

those circumstances which were within her special

knowledge. Respondent No. 3 totally failed to explain as

to how the deceased Sunita sustained burns. If that be

so, her dying declaration recorded by Dr. Shinde (PW7)

will have to be accepted as truthful. The said dying

declaration creates a great confidence. We do not find

any reason to discard it.

16. From the evidence of Subhash (PW2) it seems

that he received a message about admission of the

deceased Sunita in the Hospital at 12.30 p.m. After

receiving the message he went to the Civil Hospital at

Dhule along with his relatives. Bhatu (PW6) is the

16 criapl63-2008

cousin of Subhash (PW2). He states that after receiving

that message he reached the Civil Hospital at Dhule at

1.00 p.m. on 10.04.2005. In all probabilities, Subhash

(PW2) also must have reached there at the same time. The

dying declaration (Exh.44) was recorded between 1.45

p.m. and 2.10 p.m. Prior to that both of these witnesses

met the deceased Sunita. There is every possibility of

their tutoring her to involve respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4

also in the incident in question and accordingly, it

seems that she gave dying declarations Exh.44 and

Exh.48, which are not consistent with her dying

declaration that was recorded by Dr. Shinde (PW7). There

is no evidence on record to establish presence of

respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 at the time of the incident.

In the circumstances, we are not inclined to rely on the

dying declarations Exh.44 and Exh.48 as also her oral

dying declarations coming through the evidence of

Subhash (PW2) and Bhatu (PW6).

17. Dr. Pathak (PW1) (Exh.29) and one Dr. H.C.

Patil conducted postmortem of the body of the deceased

Sunita on 15.04.2005 between 9.15 a.m and 10.15 a.m.

They found septicemia due to deeper thermal burns on her

17 criapl63-2008

body. They found that she had sustained burns to the

extent of 90% on various parts of her body. The said

burns were anti-mortem. They opined the said burns were

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause

death. According to them, the death of Sunita was caused

due to "septicemia due to thermal burns". Dr. Pathak

(PW1) states in his cross-examination that septicemia

may be caused by accidental, homicidal or suicidal

burns. However, this version would be of no help to the

respondents, since they have not come with the case that

Sunita sustained accidentally or that she committed

suicide. The dying declaration of the deceased Sunita

recorded by Dr. Shinde (PW7) coupled with the evidence

of Dr. Pathak (PW1) clearly shows that the death of the

Sunita was homicidal.

18. The incident took place inside the matrimonial

house of the deceased Sunita. Consequently, there was no

question of there being any eye witness. In all

probabilities, the Police Patil of the village namely

Vishwas Patil also must have gone to the spot of the

incident much after the deceased Sunita got burnt. He

simply took the deceased Sunita to the Civil Hospital at

18 criapl63-2008

Dhule and admitted her there. In our view, non

examination of the said person as a witness would not

have any adverse effect on the case of the prosecution.

19. The prosecution established beyond reasonable

doubt that respondent No. 3 poured kerosene on the

person of the deceased Sunita and set her ablaze. The

deceased Sunita sustained 90% of burns on various parts

of her body causing her septicemia, to which she

succumbed on 15.04.2005. The act of respondent No. 3 of

pouring kerosene on the person of the deceased Sunita

and setting her on fire clearly establishes her

intention to cause death of Sunita. The prosecution has

proved beyond reasonable doubt that respondent No.3

committed murder of the deceased Sunita, made punishable

under Section 302 of the IPC.

20. As far as the offences under Section 498-A,

342, 506 of the IPC are concerned, there is nothing

against the respondents in the dying declaration of the

deceased Sunita, recorded by Dr. Shinde (PW7). The

evidence of Subhash (PW2) and Bhatu (PW6) in respect of

the alleged illtreatment meted out to the deceased

Sunita by the respondents is hearsay and is not

19 criapl63-2008

admissible to establish the offence under Section 498-A

of the IPC. Under such circumstances, we hold that the

prosecution failed to prove guilt of the respondents for

the offences under sections 498-A, 342 and 406 of the

IPC.

21. As far as respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 are

concerned, there is no positive and dependable evidence

on record to connect them with the homicidal death of

the deceased Sunita. They have been rightly acquitted by

the learned Trial Judge. Their acquittal needs no

interference.

22. The learned counsel for the respondents relied

on the observations in para 12 of the judgment in the

case of Muralidhar alias Gidda and another Vs. State of

Karanataka, 2014 [4] Mh.L.J.(Cri.)353, in support of his

contention that the acquittal of the accused cannot be

lightly converted into conviction. The material portion

of the observations from the para 12 of the said

judgment is as under:

"It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the

20 criapl63-2008

appellate Court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate Court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate Court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial Court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate Court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate Court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate Court on re-appreciation and reevaluation of the evidence is inclined to

21 criapl63-2008

take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate Court in the judgment of the trial Court."

23. As stated above, there is no dispute that

respondent No.3 was the only person, besides the

deceased Sunita, present in the house at the time of

the incident. The dying declaration of the deceased

Sunita recorded by Dr. Shinde (PW7) has not at all been

challenged by respondent No.3. On the contrary, it is

got confirmed in the cross-examination of Dr.Shinde

(PW7). The said dying declaration is voluntary and

truthful. It creates a great confidence. Respondent No.3

has not shown any other reason for sustaining burns by

the deceased Sunita. With this strong evidence on

record, the learned Trial Judge committed grave error in

acquitting even respondent No.3 of the offence

punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The conclusion

drawn by the learned Trial Judge that respondent no.3

cannot be held guilty for committing murder of Sunita is

palpably wrong and against the evidence on record. The

22 criapl63-2008

judgment of acquittal is illegal and perverse so far as

respondent No.3 is concerned. In the circumstances,

respondent No.3 would not be entitled to get any benefit

of the observations referred to above made in the case

of Murlidhar @ Gidda (supra). The wrongful acquittal of

respondent No.3 will have to be set aside in exercise of

the appellate powers of this Court.

24. The judgment in the case of Tukaram Padhen and

Ors. (supra), does not highlight any legal proposition

which would be helpful to respondent No.3 to establish

her innocence. The said judgment is based on the facts,

which are quite distinguishable from the facts of the

present case. Thus, it would not be of any assistance to

respondent No.3.

25. The prosecution established beyond reasonable

doubt that respondent No.3 committed murder of the

deceased Sunita made punishable under Section 302 of the

IPC. She is liable to be punished for the said offence.

The learned Counsel for respondent no.3 submits that

looking to the age of respondent No.3, which is more

than 67 years, leniency may be shown to her in

inflicting punishment. In our view, looking at the facts

23 criapl63-2008

of the case, it cannot be said that this is a rarest of

rare case in which the ultimate punishment of death is

called for. Respondent No.3 is, therefore, liable to be

punished with imprisonment for life. Besides that she is

liable to be punished with fine also. In our view, she

should pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-. If the fine amount is

recovered, it should be paid to the father of the

deceased Sunita namely Subhash Dalpat Patil as

compensation. The impugned judgment and order will have

to be quashed and set aside partly and appeal will have

to be allowed partly. We, therefore, pass the following

order:-

O R D E R

(i) The Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.

(ii) The impugned judgment and order acquitting

respondent No.3 - Kamalbai, are quashed and

set aside.

(iii) Respondent No.3 namely - Sau. Kamalbai Waman

Patil is convicted for the offence punishable

under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and

sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and

24 criapl63-2008

to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- (Twenty Five

Thousand), in default, to suffer rigorous

imprisonment for one year.

(iv) Set-off be given to respondent No.3 in respect

of the period during which she was in jail in

connection with this case.

(v) If the fine amount is recovered, it be paid to

Subhash Dalpat Patil, resident of Kalmadu,

Taluka Chalisgaon, District Jalgaon as

compensation.

(vi) The appeal against respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4

is dismissed. Their acquittal is confirmed.

(vii) The bail bonds of respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4

are cancelled. They are set at liberty.

(viii) Respondent No.3 shall surrender to her bail

bonds by appearing before the Trial Judge

within one week from today, for suffering the

sentence of imprisonment.

(ix) In case respondent No.3 fails to appear before

the Trial Court within one week from today,

25 criapl63-2008

the Trial Court shall issue coercive process

to secure her presence.

(x) The appeal is disposed off accordingly.



  

        [SANGITRAO S. PATIL]                [SUNIL P. DESHMUKH]
                JUDGE                               JUDGE




sam/criapl63-2008





 

 
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