Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 7213 Bom
Judgement Date : 15 September, 2017
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 1/13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR.
MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 243/2017
Rail India Technical and Economic Services
(RITES Ltd.),
(Scheduled - A Enterprises of Govt. of India)
Through it's General Manager,
RITES Bhavan, Kadbi Chowk, Nagpur. APPLICANT
.....VERSUS.....
The Director,
M/s. Ujjani Highways Pvt. Ltd.,
"Vidyadeep" 15/3, Manorama Ganj,
Indore (Madhya Pradesh) 452001. NON-APPLICANT
Shri Nitin P. Lambat, counsel for applicant.
Shri Rahul D. Dhande, counsel for non-applicant/respondent.
CORAM: S.B. SHUKRE, J.
DATE : SEPTEMBER 15, 2017.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
Heard.
2] Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith.
3] Heard finally by consent.
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 2/13
4] In the instant case, there is a serious dispute
regarding existence of arbitration clause in the
agreement dated 22/07/2014 executed between the
parties. By this agreement, the respondent engaged
consultancy services of the applicant for supervision of
road overbridge. A dispute arose between the parties
regarding payment of various bills raised by the
applicant for the consultancy services offered to and
availed of by the respondent. According to the applicant,
such dispute was arbitrable as per the arbitration clause
and also it issued a notice dated 16/08/2016 to the
respondent calling upon it to either make the payment of
the bills or refer the dispute for arbitration. However,
reply that was sent by the respondent to the applicant,
was in the negative. Therefore, this application has been
filed by the applicant and now dispute has been raised
by the respondent about existence of arbitration clause.
5] According to Shri Lambat, learned counsel for
applicant, arbitration clause, clause (10) of the
agreement dated 22/07/2014, is clear enough and it
makes dispute between the parties as arbitrable, which is
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 3/13
however, not agreed to by Shri Dhande, learned counsel
for the respondent. According to him, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in it's various cases has interpreted a
similar clause and held that, "The clause makes the
dispute as inarbitrable and therefore, only Civil Court will
have the jurisdiction". He has placed his reliance upon
the following cases.
(i) Eastern Coalfields Ltd. -Vs- Sanjay Transport Agency and another, 2009(8) Scale 720.
(ii) Northern Coalfields Ltd. -Vs- Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. and another, 2016(8) SCC 685.
(iii) Saipem Triune Engineering Pvt. Ltd. -Vs- Indian Oil Petronas Pvt. Ltd., 2011 DGLS (Del.) 4782.
(iv) Engineering Projects (India) Ltd. -Vs- Steel Authority of India Ltd., 2017 DGLS (Del.) 248.
6] As there has been a difference of opinion
between the parties regarding existence or otherwise of
the arbitration clause, it would be useful for us to
reproduce the arbitration clause contained in the
agreement dated 22/07/2014. It reads, thus :
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 4/13
10.0 Arbitration :
If at any time any question, dispute on difference whatsoever shall arise between the M/s. UHPL and the RITES Ltd. with regard to or in relation to or in connection with the offer, whether during the progress of the work or after its completion, the provisions of Govt. of India, Ministry of Industry, Department of Public Enterprises Notification No. 3/5/93-PMA, dt. 30/06/1993 or its amendments for arbitration shall be applicable. This is reproduced as below:
"IN THE EVENT OF ANY DISPUTE OR DIFFERENCE RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACTS, SUCH DISPUTE OR DIFFERENCE SHALL BE REFERRED BY EITHER PARTY TO THE ARBITRATION OF ONE OF THE ARBITRATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, INCHARGE OF THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES. THE ARBITRATION ACT, 1940, SHALL NOT BE APPLICABLE TO THE ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE. THE AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR SHALL BE BINDING UPON THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE, PROVIDED HOWEVER, ANY PARTY AGGRIEVED BY SUCH AWARD MAY MAKE A FURTHER REFERENCE FOR SETTING ASIDE OR REVISION OF THE AWARD TO THE LAW SECRETARY, DEPTT. OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, GOVT. OF INDIA. UPON SUCH REFERENCE THE DISPUTE SHALL BE DECIDED BY THE SECRETARY WHEN SO AUTHORISED BY THE LAW SECRETARY, WHOSE DECISION SHALL BIND PARTIES FINALLY AND CONCLUSIVELY. THE PARTIES IN THE DISPUTE WILL SHARE EQUALLY THE COST OF ARBITRATION AS INTIMATED BY THE ARBITRATOR."
7] Before we proceed to consider the meaning
and purport of the above referred arbitration clause, it
would be necessary, at this stage, to take a note of the
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 5/13
fact that the agreement dated 22/07/2014 has been
entered into between the applicant and the respondent
in the respective capacities as a public sector enterprise
and a private party.
8] A bare perusal of the above referred
arbitration clause would be enough for us to understand
that any dispute or question or difference arising
between the applicant and the respondent with regard to
or in relation to or in connection with the offering of the
consultancy services by the applicant to the respondent,
has to be perforce referred by either of the parties
to the arbitration of one of the Arbitrators in the
Department of Public Enterprises to be nominated by
Secretary to the Government of India, in-charge of the
Bureau of Public Enterprises. The arbitration clause, no
doubt, makes a reference to the provisions of
Department of Public Enterprises notification dated
30/06/1993 in terms that whenever a dispute in
connection with the contract or work orders arises
between the parties to this agreement, the provisions of
this notification shall be applicable, but at the same
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 6/13
time, this clause also specifically reproduces the
particular provisions of this notification which are made
applicable to the dispute arising between the parties
with regard to or in relation to or in connection with the
consultancy services offered by the applicant. So,
ultimately, what has to be seen in the present case, is not
the entire notification dated 30/06/1993, but it's
applicable provisions which are so specifically
reproduced or incorporated in the arbitration clause (10)
and I have already stated that this arbitration clause
(10) makes a dispute between the parties arising in
connection or in relation to the work orders as
arbitrable.
9] The notice dated 16/08/2016 sent by the
applicant to the respondent indicates that the dispute
was raised by the applicant with the respondent and a
demand was also made by the applicant for payment of
it's bills mentioned in the notice. It is also seen from this
notice that the applicant had made a request to the
respondent that in case the respondent failed to make
the payment, the applicant would invoke the arbitration
clause and take an appropriate legal action. This notice
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 7/13
was replied too, by sending a reply dated 08/09/2016 by
the respondent. In para no.8 of the reply, it was stated
that before any reference of the dispute was made to the
Arbitrator, it was necessary that both the parties consult
each other and decide the matter amicably. It was also
stated that if the matter could not be resolved in this
way, there would be a real arbitrable dispute warranting
its referral to the arbitration. So, even the reply given by
the respondent nowhere states that agreement does not
contain any arbitration clause, rather the reply admits of
its existence. The only rider placed in the reply was that
arbitration would be inevitable only when mutual
consultation failed. In the present case, it is not the
stand of the respondent that there was any attempt at
mutual consultation which failed eventually. It is also
not the case of the respondent that the applicant was
invited to mutual consultation, but the applicant refused
to submit himself to any consultation process. This
would mean that consultation process, which was to be
resorted to first, as contended by the respondent, failed
even before it began. Therefore, I am of the view that it
can be reasonably inferred that there has been a failure
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 8/13
of the mechanism provided for invoking the arbitration
clause and appointment of Arbitrator. As such this Court
will have to proceed in the matter in accordance with it's
power under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
10] Coming to the case laws relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondent, with due respect, I
may say that they would have no application to the facts
of the instant case.
11] In the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. -Vs-
Sanjay Transport Agency and another (supra), both
the parties were not Public Sector Enterprises or
Government Department. The arbitration clause in that
case provided for reference to arbitration of a dispute
which existed between the Departments of Public Sector
Enterprises inter-se or between the Public Sector
Enterprises and the Government Department. It did not
envisage reference of a dispute to an arbitration, which
was between a Public Sector Enterprise on the one hand
and a private party on the other hand. Therefore, the
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 9/13
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, the dispute in that
case would have to be decided by a Civil Court.
12] In the case of Northern Coalfields Ltd. -Vs-
Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. (supra), the rival
parties to the dispute were the Public Sector Enterprises.
There was also a settlement of the dispute between them
in terms of the permanent machinery for arbitration as
early as in the year 1993-94. The date on which the
dispute was referred to arbitration, the Committee on
Dispute (COD) was already set up, but it's permission
was not taken for reference of dispute for arbitration.
The award made by the Arbitrator was not accepted by
the appellant therein. The appellant therein filed a Civil
Suit No. 1709/2000 claiming a declaration that the
contracts were rendered null and void on account of the
breach of clause (3) of the contract and further
declaration that the respondent company was not
entitled to claim any relief under those contract nor was
respondent no.2 therein was entitled to do so and that
the so-called Arbitral award was vitiated on the face of
the record, and as such liable to be set aside. The plaint
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 10/13
of the suit was rejected by the High Court on the ground
that before the institution of the suit, permission from
the Committee of Dispute was not obtained. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that, although a direction given by
the Apex Court in the case of ONGC Group of cases was
made the basis by the High Court for rejecting the plaint,
the direction could not have been understood to mean as
though absence of permission of COD was a fatal defect,
which was not. At the most, the suit could not have been
proceeded for, so held the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
These facts are entirely different from the facts in this
case which are discussed earlier, and therefore, this case
would have no application to the facts of the instant
case.
13] In the case of Saipem Triune Engineering
Pvt. Ltd. -Vs- Indian Oil Petronas Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the
learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court relied upon the
portion of ratio of case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. -Vs-
Sanjay Transport Agency and another (supra) to
interpret Article-31 of the Format of agreement of
Project Management Services and accordingly, it
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 11/13
concluded that since one of the parties to the agreement
was a Private Company, no reliance could be placed
upon the arbitration clause, which provided for reference
of dispute to arbitration only when the dispute was
between the Public Sector Enterprises inter-se or in
between Government Department and Public Sector
Enterprises. In the present case there is an arbitration
clause specifically providing for reference of dispute
between the applicant and the respondent to the
arbitration and these facts being different from the facts
of the said case of Saipem Triune Engineering Pvt. Ltd.
-Vs- Indian Oil Petronas Pvt. Ltd. (supra), I do not
think that it would provide any useful assistance to the
defence of the respondent.
14] The case of Engineering Projects (India)
Ltd. -Vs- Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra), was
about a dispute which had arisen between two Public
Sector Enterprises, which is not a case here, and
therefore, this case, in my humble opinion, would not be
applicable to the facts of the present case.
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 12/13
15] In the result, I find that this application
deserves to be allowed and it is allowed accordingly.
16] The dispute between the parties shall be
referred to the arbitration.
17] Both the parties may suggest the name of a
Retired District Judge to be appointed as Arbitrator
which name is mutual acceptable. They may file a pursis
suggesting one or two name/s of a Retired District Judge
from the panel of Arbitrators to be appointed as
Arbitrator, within two weeks from the date of the order.
18] Both the parties shall deposit amount of
Rs.10,000/- each, as processing fees within two weeks
from the date of the order.
19] If the applicant fails to deposit amount of
Rs.10,000/- within the stipulated time, this reference
application shall stand dismissed without any reference
to this Court.
(Judgment) 1509 MCA 243-2017 13/13
20] If the respondent fails to deposit amount of
Rs.10,000/- within stipulated time, the respondent shall
be liable to pay penal interest at the rate of 2% per
month on the amount of Rs.10,000/-, which shall be
payable by the respondent to the applicant, upon
adjudication by the Arbitrator, irrespective of the result
of the arbitration.
21] No costs.
22] Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
JUDGE
Yenurkar
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