Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 7006 Bom
Judgement Date : 12 September, 2017
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.376 OF 2010
Sanjay Bapurao Sasne ... Appellant
versus
The State of Maharashtra ... Respondent
.......
• Mr.Priyal Gopaldas Sarda, for the Appellant.
• Ms. R.M. Gadhvi, APP for the State/Respondent.
CORAM : A.A. SAYED &
SARANG V. KOTWAL, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 31st AUGUST, 2017
PRONOUNCED ON : 12th SEPTEMBER, 2017
JUDGMENT (PER : SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.) :
1. The Appellant has preferred the present Appeal against
judgment and order dated 06/04/2010 in Sessions Case
No.09/09, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Ichalkaranji,
whereby the Appellant was convicted for commission of offence
punishable u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/-
and in default of payment of fine to suffer further rigorous
imprisonment for six months.
Nesarikar
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2. The prosecution case is that, the present Appellant was
having illicit relationship with one Savitri Chandrakant Londhe.
Savitri's husband had expired a few years ago and her son was
residing with his Uncle. Savitri was residing alone. On
20/12/2007 at about 11.00 p.m. the present Appellant
quarreled with Savitri. He was demanding that Savitri should
transfer her house in his name, and on her denial; getting
annoyed, he poured kerosene on her person and set her ablaze.
Thereafter he threw water on her person and fled away from the
spot. The said Savitri went to her sister-in-law's place. She was
taken to hospital by her relatives. According to the prosecution
case, her statement was recorded in the night, which was
treated as FIR. Initially the FIR was registered at Laxmipuri
Police Station vide C.R.No.00/07 and was transferred to Hupari
Police Station, Kolhapur, at about 03.05 p.m. on 21/12/2007
and crime was registered vide C.R.No.72/07 u/s 307, 504 of the
Indian Penal Code. On the next morning of the incident
again her statement was recorded by a Special Executive
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Magistrate in respect of the incident. Savitri survived for a few
days and ultimately on 26/12/2007 she succumbed to her
injuries because of the Septicemic shock. She had suffered 75%
superficial to deep burn injuries. After the death of the victim
section 302 of IPC was added.
3. The Appellant was arrested on the next day of the
incident i.e. on 21/12/2007. Various panchanamas and
statements of the witnesses were recorded and after the
investigation was over, charge-sheet was filed on 18/03/2008
before the 4th J.M.F.C. Ichalkaranji, Kolhapur. Thereafter the
case was committed to the Court of Sessions and was tried as
Sessions Case No.09/09 before the Additional Sessions Judge,
Ichalkaranji. The charge was framed against the Appellant on
30/09/2009 u/s 302 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. At the
conclusion of the trial the Appellant was acquitted from the
charge of commission of offence u/s 504 of IPC and was
convicted u/s 302 of IPC as mentioned earlier.
4 / 17 APEAL-376-10.odt
4. During the trial the prosecution examined 11
witnesses. P.W.1 Anil Bapusaheb Ghongade was the Pancha for
spot panchanama, which was carried out on 21/12/2007
between 15.30 p.m. to 16.15 p.m. in the house of the said
Savitri. During conduct of the spot panchanama the police
seized two burnt Sarees, a Can containing kerosene, a burnt
blouse, a small kerosene lamp, match box and pair of footwear.
However, the articles were not sent to C.A. and there are no C.A.
Reports assisting the prosecution against the accused in the
present case.
5. P.W.2 Sunil Chandrakant Londhe was the son of the
deceased. P.W.3 Maruti Doulat Londhe was the brother-in-law
of the deceased. P.W.5 Subhadra Maruti Londhe was the sister-
in-law of the deceased. P.W.7 Rajesh Shankar Rathod was P.W.2
Sunil's friend. All these witnesses did not support the
prosecution case. They were examined on two aspects i.e. past
illicit relationship between the Appellant and the deceased and
the oral Dying Declaration she was supposed to have made
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while being taken to hospital in their presence. However, none
of these witnesses has supported the prosecution case and they
were declared hostile.
6. P.W.8 Dr.Vinod Vijay Paradeshi had conducted the
Post Mortem examination on the deceased and had found 75%
burn injuries on her body. The cause of death was given by him
as death due to Septicemic shock after 75% burn injuries, which
were superficial to deep. P.W.10 Balwant Krishna Hajare, P.H.C.
was attached to Laxmipuri Police Station, Kolhapur and had
taken down entry in the station diary in respect of information
received by him in respect of aforesaid crime. P.W.11 Rajendra
Mahadev Todkar, API was the Investigating Officer.
7. The prosecution case however rests on the evidence of
three important witnesses i.e. P.W.4 Sharad Vasantrao Patil who
was a Special Executive Magistrate and who had recorded her
Dying Declaration between 11.15 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. on
21/12/2007, which was produced in evidence vide Ex.23. P.W.6
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Assistant PSI Dundappa Balappa Chigari had recorded the Dying
Declaration on 21/12/2007 between 03.15 a.m. to 04.15 a.m. in
the hospital in presence of the Medical Officer, which was
exhibited vide Ex.27. P.W.9 Dr. Sudhakar Ganapati Dhekale was
the Medical Officer, who was present in the C.P.R. Hospital,
Kolhapur, where the deceased was admitted in night between
20/12/2007 and 21/12/2007 and who had first treated the
deceased. He has produced the medical papers vide Ex.43,
wherein he had mentioned the history given by the deceased to
him at 01.45 a.m. on 21/12/2007.
8. In all these three Dying Declarations, the deceased has
clearly implicated the present Appellant as the person who had
thrown kerosene on her and set her ablaze.
9. We have heard Mr.Priyal Sarda, the learned Counsel
for the Appellant and Ms.R.M. Gadhvi, the learned APP for the
State. With their assistance we have read the evidence and have
perused the record and proceedings.
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10. Mr.Sarda submitted that none of the three written
Dying Declarations was reliable and the minimum necessary
precautions which were required to be taken while recording the
Dying Declarations were not taken. He submitted that since both
the thumbs were burnt, it was not possible that thumb
impression could show ridges on the Dying Declarations and
therefore it raised suspicion about obtaining the thumb
impressions. The Dying Declarations, per se, are contradictory to
each other. He further submitted that therefore if those Dying
Declarations were left out of the consideration, there is no
evidence against the Appellant and therefore the Appellant
deserves to be acquitted.
11. He further submitted that none of the neighbours or
the persons who had removed the deceased to the hospital was
examined. The person to whose house she had first gone, was
not examined. Her other relatives have not supported the
prosecution case. The articles were not sent for chemical
analysis. The deceased or her clothes were not showing presence
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of kerosene or at least there is no evidence to that effect
adduced by the prosecution. He submitted that the scribes of
these Dying Declarations were not examined.
12. As against these submissions, the learned APP has
supported the prosecution case on all counts and in particular
the learned APP has relied on the three Dying Declarations.
13. Considering the above rival submission it is quite
obvious that the case rests on the three Dying Declarations. The
first of these Dying Declarations is recorded at 01.45 a.m. in the
night, when she was admitted to the hospital. This is in respect
of the history given by the deceased herself to the Doctor, which
is recorded in the medical papers at Ex.43. The history given by
the deceased recorded at 01.45 a.m. on 21/12/2007 reads thus;
"Homicidal burns by (Sanjay Sasne R/o Rendal, Age-35
yrs.) on 20/12/2017 at 10.30 p.m. by kerosene."
14. In the same document it is clearly mentioned that the
patient was conscious, oriented, was in agony and was obeying
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commands. The said document further mentions that the burns
were superficial to deep upto 73% and both the thumbs were
burnt. This recording of history by the doctor satisfies all the
requirements of a Dying Declaration mentioned u/s 32 of the
Evidence Act. The statement was made by the victim, was clear
and was related to the transaction leading to the death of the
deceased. The Medical Officer himself recorded that the patient
was conscious and oriented and this information was given
immediately. There is no reason to disbelieve the said witness
P.W.9 Dr.Dhekale in this behalf. The Medical Officer was an
independent witness and was treating the deceased and
therefore he cannot be attributed any motive to implicate the
Appellant falsely.
15. The next Dying Declaration was recorded by P.W.6
Assistant PSI Chigari between 03.15 a.m. to 04.15 a.m. This
Dying Declaration was exhibited as Ex.27 in the trial. After
Savitri was admitted in the hospital, the Medical Officer
informed the police, who came in the hospital and after taking
endorsement of the Medical Officer, this Dying Declaration was
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recorded and at the end of this Dying Declaration also there was
an endorsement by same P.W.9 Dr. Dhekhale. The first
endorsement at the top mentions that the patient was in a
condition to give statement and the second endorsement at the
bottom mentions that the statement was given in front of the
said witness P.W.9 Dr. Dhekale. From the evidence of P.W.6 it is
clear that he had gone to the Medical Officer to obtain his
opinion about the fitness of patient to give statement. In this
connection P.W.9 Dr.Dhekale has elaborated in paragraph No.3
by his deposition that the lady was conscious and oriented and
has admitted his endorsement on Ex.27. He further clarified that
the endorsement was written by his Assistant Doctor, though he
does not name him. He further asserted that the statement was
recorded as per her own narration and that it was recorded
before him. He further submitted that the endorsement at the
bottom was in his handwriting. Mr.Sarda submitted that the
Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Vs. State of
Maharashtra, reported in AIR 202 SUPREME COURT 2973,
has held that it is necessary that the person who records the
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Dying Declaration should be satisfied that the deceased was in
fit state of mind. It was further held that when it is proved that
the Magistrate recording the statement was satisfied that the
declarant was fit to make the statement, then even without
examination of the declarant by the doctor the declaration can
be acted upon, provided the Court ultimately holds the same to
be voluntary and truthful. It was further held that a certification
by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the
voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be
established otherwise. Mr.Sarda submitted that the satisfaction
of P.W.6 ASI Assistant PSI Chigari to that effect was not proper
as he had relied on the endorsement of the Doctor. In the case of
Laxman (Supra) the Honourable Supreme Court has already
held that the certification by the Doctor is essentially a rule of
caution. In the present case the Medical Officer, who was
treating Savitri, has recorded that the patient was well oriented
and was in a position to give statement, then there is no reason
why such evidence cannot be relied on. Therefore we are
satisfied that the prosecution has sufficiently led evidence to
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show that at the point of recording of Dying Declaration Ex.27,
the deceased was well oriented and was in a position to give
statement and therefore this Dying Declaration can safely be
relied on.
16. The prosecution has also relied on the Dying
Declaration recorded by Executive Magistrate Sharad Patil, who
was examined as P.W.4. He has stated that he was requisitioned
by the police to record the Dying Declaration. Accordingly he
went to the hospital at about 10.15 a.m. on 21/12/2007. He
waited till 11.10 a.m. for arrival of the Doctor. But since the
Doctor was not available, he satisfied himself that the patient
was capable to give the statement and thereafter he recorded
the statement. This witness in his deposition has stated that he
had ascertained that the patient was in a condition to speak and
thereafter he recorded the statement. In the cross examination a
specific suggestion was put to him to which he answered thus,
"It is not true to say that due to burn injuries, physical health
and mental condition of Savitri was not good. Therefore she was
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not able to make any statement." Thus, the defence in the cross-
examination has brought out the prosecution case and in
particular the case of this witness P.W.4 that the mental
condition of the deceases was good at that point. Further more,
the initial questions mentioned in Ex.23 of the said Dying
Declaration also indicate that the said witness P.W.4 has
satisfied himself that she was giving proper answers and hence
was well oriented. In this view of the matter, we see no
impediment in relying on this Dying Declaration.
17. Mr.Sarda has submitted that since scribes of these two
Dying Declarations Ex.23 and Ex.27 who had actually written
them, were not examined, these Dying Declarations cannot be
said to be proved. Here in respect of both these Dying
Declarations P.W.6 and P.W.9 have stated that those Dying
Declarations were in the handwriting of their assistants. But
they were recorded as per the enquiries made by these witnesses
and they were recorded before them. They have identified those
Dying Declarations. Therefore we see no reason to disbelieve
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these witnesses to the effect that these Dying Declarations were
recorded as per the statement given by the deceased herself and
which were recorded in the presence of those witnesses. In this
connection Mr.Sarda has relied on the observation made by the
Honourable Supreme Court in Govind Rajan and Anr. Vs. State
of Rajasthan, reported in 1993 Cri.L.J. In that case the scribe
who had written the Dying Declarations on Exhibit P-3 was not
examined and the benefit was given to the accused. However, in
the present case, the person in whose presence and on whose
questioning the Dying Declarations were recorded, are examined
by the prosecution.
18. Mr.Sarda further submitted that it was not possible
that ridges of the thumb would appear below the thumb
impression, because according the prosecution case the thumbs
were burnt. In this connection it can be seen that the thumb
impression below Ex.23 is not clear and there are no ridges
visible and the thumb impression below Ex.27 is also not very
clear. It can be seen that the evidence shows that the burns were
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superficial to deep. Therefore in the absence of clear evidence to
show that patient had suffered deep burn injuries on the thumb,
nothing much can be held against the prosecution in that behalf
as submitted by Mr.Sarda.
19. Mr.Sarda has further relied on the ratio laid down by
the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manik Vanaji
Gawali Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2013 Cri.L.J.
972, in which it is held that the evidence led by the prosecution
about mental state of the declarant can be classified as
subjective and objective. It is only on the clear evidence led by
the prosecution showing the manner in which the person
recording Dying Declaration reaches his opinion, his subjective
satisfaction can be proved. In this case, we find that the initial
questions put by the S.E.M. does show that he made efforts to
ascertain the fitness of state of mind of the declarant and only
thereafter he had recorded the statement. In case of other two
Dying Declarations the expert's opinion i.e. the Medical Officer's
opinion about the fitness of mind was clear enough and
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therefore there cannot be any doubt about the deceased being in
a proper fit state of mind to give Dying Declaration.
20. Mr.Sarda has further submitted that there is a
discrepancy in the Dying Declarations i.e. between Ex.23 and
Ex.27. In Ex.27 it is mentioned that the Appellant himself
poured water on the deceased after she was set ablaze; whereas
in Ex.23 it is mentioned that after she suffered burn injuries, she
came out of her house and at that time the neighbours poured
water on her and tried to extinguish the fire. We do not see this
as a major discrepancy or contradiction between the two Dying
Declarations, because after the Appellant threw water on her, he
immediately fled away from the spot. That by itself does not
mean that the fire was extinguished completely and therefore
when she came out of the house and when the neighbours
poured water on her to extinguish fire, there cannot be any
discrepancy between these two Dying Declarations.
21. Mr.Sarda further submitted that the articles seized
from the spot were not sent for chemical analysis, neither there
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is any evidence to show that there was any kerosene smell on
the person of the deceased when she was admitted in the
hospital. When the deceased was admitted in the hospital the
fire was already extinguished as water was poured on her before
she was taken to the hospital. Therefore there may not be any
smell of kerosene. The absence of C.A. Report in respect of
articles found on the spot is not material in the present case
simply because the occurrence of the incident cannot be
disputed. Since we are relying on the Dying Declarations, these
other circumstances do not help the Appellant in his case.
22. In view of the discussion made in the foregoing
paragraphs, we are satisfied that there is no merit in the Appeal
and hence the following order:
ORDER
The Appeal stands dismissed.
(SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.) (A. A. SAYED, J.)
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