Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 6698 Bom
Judgement Date : 1 September, 2017
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Civil Revision Application No. 14 of 2016
Applicant : The Southern Nagpur Cooperative Housing
Society Limited, through its Administrator
Shri Ravindra B. Moon, aged about 53 yrs
Occ: service, resident of Bhagwan Nagar,
Bank Colony, Moreshwar Apartment,
Nagpur
versus
Respondent : Ganpati son of Yadarao Kumbhare
(original Disputant), aged about 85 years,
Occ: Retired, resident of Data Niwas, Model
Mill Road, District Nagpur
Shri A. A. Mardikar, Advocate for applicant
Shri V. R. Choudhari, Advocate for respondent
Coram : S. B. Shukre, J
Dated : 1st September 2017
Oral Judgment
1. Heard. Admit. Heard finally by consent.
2. This revision application challenges the order passed on 16 th
October 2015 by the District Judge, Nagpur in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 120
of 2013. By this order, the learned District Judge upset the order dated
27th April 2011 passed below objection application (exhibit 11) filed in
the execution proceedings initiated by the respondent/original disputant.
3. In the year 1991, a Dispute was raised by the respondent
before the Cooperative Court, Nagpur. In this Dispute, the relief that was
sought by the respondent was that the applicant Society be directed to
allot to him plots no. 3 and 4 of the Society's Layout, he being member of
the Society and in view of the arrangement between the Society and its
members. In the year 1996, the respondent sought an amendment in the
Dispute Application, which was allowed. By virtue of this amendment, the
respondent was permitted to let his claim be for allotment of a different
plot, Plot No. 5A instead of plots no. 3 and 4. The Dispute was strongly
resisted by the applicant. However, on merits of the case, the Cooperative
Court allowed the dispute and passed an Award dated 31.3.2000, thereby
directing the applicant to allot Plot No. 5A to the respondent.
4. The decree of the Cooperative Court was challenged in
appeal before the Cooperative Appellate Court. The appeal was also
dismissed. Thereafter a writ petition was preferred by the applicant being
Writ Petition No. 4441 of 2002. This writ petition was dsposed of by this
Court on 7th October 2006 after noticing that an objection has been
preferred by the applicant to the execution of decree. Thus, this Court
relegated the present dispute between the parties to the executing court.
The objection application was filed as per exhibit 11. It was allowed by
the executing court on 27th April 2011 against which an appeal was
preferred by respondent which was allowed by the 1 st appellate court, the
Court of District Judge-9, Nagpur 16 th October 2015. Thus, the
judgment-debtor became obliged under the law to abide by the decree
and allot Plot No. 5A to the respondent. But, it was not to be and,
therefore, revision application has been preferred by the applicant, which
is the present Civil Revision Application.
5. According to Shri Mardikar, learned counsel for the
applicant, the decree is unexecutable since Plot No. 5A is not in existence.
He also submits that this property (plot no. 5A) has been sold by
registered sale deed executed in the year 1994 and the Society is no
longer the owner of this Court. He further submits that evidence was led
before the executing court by the parties and all the facts have been
admitted by the parties and, therefore, the 1 st appellate court ought to
have dismissed the appeal. Shri Choudhari, however, does not agree. He
submits that even if some construction, according to the case of the
applicant, has been made, that construction is illegal and it has been held
to be so by the 1st appellate court and, therefore, there would be no
difficulty in bringing down that construction and restoring the original
status of Plot No. 5A. Thus, according to him, the decree is well
executable. As regards the sale deed executed on 9 th June 1994, Shri
Choudhari submits that no such objection was raised before the executing
court and, therefore, now it cannot be allowed to be raised here.
6. On going through the paper book including the award passed
by the cooperative court, objection application, order passed by the
executing court on application (exhibit 11) and the impugned order, I
find that there is a great substance in the argument of learned counsel for
the respondent and no merit in the argument of learned counsel for the
applicant.
7. It is the case of the applicant that a proposal was moved by
the applicant Society before the Municipal Authorities well before the year
1985 for amalgamation of plots no. 4,5 and 5A and also for grant of
permission for constructing a community hall. It is the further case of the
applicant that this proposal was sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation
and building permit was also issued by it following which, by the end of
the year 1985, plots no. 4, 5 and 5A had been consolidated and
construction of community hall over such consolidated piece of land was
also completed. So, in the year 1985 itself, plot no. 5A was not available
for allotment; it had no separate existence and identity. If this is the case
of the applicant, I do not understand as to what prevented the applicant
from bringing all these material facts to the knowledge of the respondent
as well as the cooperative court which passed the decree on 31.3.2000
and which goes to the root of the whole issue. It appears that the
applicant silently watched the proceedings before the cooperative court,
allowed the cooperative court to pass a decree, probably knowing well
that eventually the respondent would not get in his hand anything and
the applicant would not be required to pass on the property to the
respondent. As if this was not enough, the applicant also maintained
complete silence before the cooperative appellate court. Even during the
pendency of appeal and till its final disposal, the applicant did not utter a
single word about plot no. 5A losing its separate identity way back in the
year 1985. The applicant also did not voluntarily abide by the decree
dated 31.3.2000 which was confirmed by the cooperative appellate court.
After the appeal was dismissed on 20 th April 2002, as a law-abiding citizen
and responsible member of the larger society, the applicant was under a
duty at least to the larger society, if not to the respondent, to uphold the
law of the land. But, the applicant did not do so. The applicant did not
allot plot no. 5A to the respondent and if it had been already
amalgamated into some other plot, the applicant also did not take any
efforts in de-segregating plot no. 5A from the other plots. Thus, the
applicant created a situation wherein the respondent was compelled to
file execution proceedings against the applicant and it was at this stage,
which arose some time in the year 2002, the applicant suddenly raked
up the issue which it was holding so close to its heart for about eleven
years. At this point of time, the applicant for the first time raised an
objection about inexecutability of the decree, for, plot no. 5A had lost its
separate identity way back in the year 1985.
8. All the facts discussed, therefore, only show that the
applicant has no respect for the law and somehow or the other, it wants
to deprive the respondent of the fruits of the decree. If the effort of the
applicant is allowed to succeed, it would mean that the applicant has been
permitted to take advantage of its own wrong. This Court being a Court
of law and equity, would never countenance such a situation and would
not give shelter to a person who commits wrong and tries to derive
advantage out of his own wrong. In the case of Union of India & ors v.
Major General Madan Lal Yadav reported in (1996) 4 SCC 127, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court while referring to the principle propounded by the
Latin maxim nullas commondum capere potest de injuria sua propria
meaning, no man can take advantage of his own wrong, held that the
maxim is based on elementary principle and is fully recognized in Courts
of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch
of legal procedure. The conduct of the applicant here disentitles him to
any relief and as a matter of fact, amounts to abuse of process of law.
9. This reminds me of the situation which obtained way back in
1872. It was assessed by the Privy Council in terms that the difficulties of
a litigant begin when he obtains a decree. The situation which a litigant
like the applicant faced in the past continues even today with little change
in it. The respondent, I am sure, must even now be thinking that it is
easier to obtain a decree, but it is a Herculean task to execute it. When a
decree attains finality and rights of the parties are crystalized and settled,
there remains nothing for the judgment-debtor to a decree to avoid the
obedience to the decree. He must bow before the law and voluntarily
comply with the directions given in the decree and if he does not, the
least that could be expected of him is to not raise any such objection to
its execution as is founded upon fraud, his own misconduct or frivolity or
the likewise. After all, just as every material thing and relations of
material thing has shelf life, every dispute between the parties, one must
realize, also has its own shelf life and the only difference between the
expiry period of material things and relations of material things on one
hand and the dispute arising from inter se relations between the human
beings on the other, is that the expiry date of the former is known the
day they take birth and expiry date of the latter becomes known only
when the adjudication of the dispute by a competent court attains finality.
So, a judgment-debtor who owes a duty to the larger society to respect
law by his abidance by the terms of a decree must know that after expiry
of the shelf life of the dispute, there is no way for him to rekindle the
dispute and somehow or the other try to keep the flame alive. In the case
of Satyavati v. Rajender Singh & anr reported in (2013) SCC 491, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the decree-holders must enjoy
the fruits of the decree obtained by them in an expeditious manner and
duty is cast upon the courts in India to be careful to see that processes of
the Courts of law of procedure are not abused by the judgment-debtors
and the Courts of law do not play into hands of the judgment-debtors in
defrauding the creditors who have obtained the dcrees in accordance with
their rights.
10. Now, coming to the question of losing of identity of Plot No.
5-A, I must say that this is not something which is irreversible. A change
in things is irreversible when the change cannot be undone and things
cannot be restored to their original shape or form or structure, as it
happens when sugar dissolves in water. Such irreversibility is not there
when two pieces of lands are combined together by a paper order. Here
the amalgamation of the plot in question has taken place with two other
plots under an administrative order. Such amalgamation is always open
for reversal and any of the three plots can be detached from the rest of
the plots. This can be done even under the decree of the Court of law
and in the instant case, this could have been by the Cooperative Court at
the time of grant of decree had this fact been brought to its notice in time.
Since it was not, now the applicant would have to do it by seeking
appropriate order of the competent authority. If the applicant does not
show any willingness and is reluctant to take necessary steps, the law will
come to the rescue of the respondent and compel the applicant to do
everything that is necessary for desegregation of plot no. 5-A. Same
principle would apply to the construction made on this property. Even
otherwise, this construction has been found by the 1 st appellate court to
be illegal. Therefore, this construction will also have to be pulled down
by the applicant and if it does not do so, the spirit of law will always
ensure that the law of the land is respected.
11. About the transfer of Plot No. 5-A by sale deed executed in
June 1994, I must say that there is nothing in the objection application
vide exhibit 11 to give even an inkling of transfer of plot no. 5A and its
amalgamation with other plots. There is no averment made in this
application about the transfer of said plot. It was not a subject-matter of
debate and adjudication before the executing court. Therefore, this Court
exercising revisional powers with a view to examine the legality, material
irregularity or correctness of the impugned order cannot permit the
applicant to take such a plea at this stage. Then, one does not know
whether such a sale deed was really executed or not, the reason being
that had it really been executed, the applicant would surely have
incorporated pleadings about the same in its objection application vide
exhibit 11. This has not been done so and, therefore, the argument made
in this regard cannot be accepted.
12. In the result, I find that there is nothing illegal, improper or
irregular about the impugned order. I do not notice any perversity in the
impugned order and, therefore, this revision application deserves to be
dismissed with costs which, in my opinion, must be heavy given the
attitude of the applicant in respect of which I have already made my
detailed comments in the foregoing paragraphs.
13. Revision application is dismissed with costs. In addition,
exemplary costs of Rs. 25,000/- are imposed on the revision applicant to
be paid to the respondent.
S. B. SHUKRE, J
joshi
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