Bombay High Court
Smt. Sudha Ganeshdatta Tiwari vs Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj ... on 14 November, 2017
Bench: B.P. Dharmadhikari
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1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.
...
WRIT PETITION NO. 4012/2016
* Smt. Sudha Ganeshdatta Tiwari
Aged 61 years, occu: Service
R/o 50/51 Gurukripa Society
Naik Nagar, Manewada Ring Road,
Nagpur-27. .. PETITIONER
versus
Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University
Nagpur : Through its Registrar
Civil Lines, Nagpur. .. RESPONDENT
...............................................................................................................................................
Mr. B.G.Kulkarni, Advocate for the petitioner
Mr. P.B.Patil, Advocate for respondent
................................................................................................................................................
CORAM: B.P. DHARMADHIKARI &
MRS. SWAPNA JOSHI, JJ.
DATED: 14th November, 2017
ORAL JUDGMENT: (PER B.P.DHARMADHIKARI, J.)
1. Considering the nature of controversy, matter is heard finally, by issuing
Rule and making it returnable forthwith.
2. The petitioner submitted her application for registration for Ph.D. on
15.7.2010. The application has been considered in terms of Direction No.10/2011 by
Research and Recognition Committee (henceforth abbreviated to "RRC") of
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respondent-University on 28.11.2011. The application has been entertained and
registration has been granted vide communication dated 15.5.2012 mentioning
15.7.2010 as date of registration.
3. As per clause (14), this registrations lasts for five years and expires
automatically. The petitioner's registration was therefore valid till 15.7.2015. She
sought extension by moving application on 21.4.2015. The application has been
rejected on 16th October 2015, giving reason that it was not received before three
months as mandated by Direction No.10/2011. It is this communication which has
been assailed before us.
4. Advocate Kulkarni submits that initial application itself was granted
after delay of about one year ten months and fifteen days. Thus, out of period of
five years permitted for completing research valuable time was lost. He further
submits that application was belated and there was delay of only six days. Inviting
attention to clause (14) of Directions, he submits that requirement of submitting such
request for renewal for at least three months prior to date of expiry of registration is
only directory and, in present matter, no prejudice has been caused to respondent
because it is delayed by six days. He has invited our attention to three instances in
which similarly situated scholars, namely, Mr. Vijay Nawle, Mr.Narendra Vanjari and
Mr.Gautam Wakde, have been entertained and their extension applications have been
allowed.
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5. He has also invited our attention to observations contained in
paragraph 9 of the judgment dated 19th April,2017 delivered in Writ Petition No.
5445/2016 where the date of meeting or RRC has been accepted as date of
registration.
6. Lastly, he points out that even rejection of 21.4.2015 has not been
timely communicated. Had it been so communicated the petitioner could have, with
assistance of her Guide, attempted to complete it before 15.7.2015. The rejection
has been communicated on 16.10.2015 and, therefore, serious prejudice is suffered
by her.
7. Advocate Patil has invited our attention to the clause 8(b)(i) which
prescribes either 15th July or 15th January every year, as deemed dates of
registration after the approval of RRC. He states that therefore here petitioner was
rightly informed informed that her date of registration is 15.7.2010 and petitioner
never questioned this communication dated 15.5.2012.
8. Insofar as the Division Bench judgment of this Court is concerned, he
submits that it looks into entirely different legal provision i.e. Ordinance 33/2008 where
the date of RRC has been accepted as date of registration.
9. He fairly submits that in case of three scholars mentioned supra,
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extensions have been erroneously granted. According to him, such erroneous
exercise of power cannot be viewed as a precedent.
10. Inviting attention to Clause (14), he argues that emphasis is on
completion of research within five years. Proviso only makes an exception and
therefore operates in contingencies stipulated therein. The procedure stipulated
therein must be complied with and for proviso to operate, the petitioner has to act in
mode and manner prescribed therein. He contends that petitioner was all the while
aware of expiry of her registration by 15.7.2015 and she has not given any reason for
not applying before 15.4.2015. He has read out reply-affidavit, particularly paragraph
7 to press into service elaborate arrangements required to be made for constituting
a RRC. As those arrangements require minimum time of three months, the said time
limit is also incorporated in clause (14).
11. To explain the submission that proviso cannot be interpreted so as to
nullify the object of main clause, he has taken support from the Full Bench Judgment
of this Court, in the case of Anant H. Ulahalakar and another vs.chief Election
Commissioner and others, reported in 2017 Vol.(1)Mh.L.J.431, particularly paragraphs
46 and 48. He has therefore prayed for dismissal of the petition.
12. Facts at hand show that application for registration validly submitted on
15.7.2010 has been considered in first RRC held thereafter on 28.11.2011. Thus, no
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meeting of RRC could be held after 15.7.2010 till 28.11.2011. It is in this backdrop that
we have considered the controversy.
13. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.5445/2016
in paragraph 9, only observes that application for registration made by that petitioner-
Narayanam was received by University on 15.1.2011 and it was placed before RRC
only on 2.8.2012. The Division Bench has found that this delay cannot be attributed to
petitioner and it is the University which alone is responsible for the same. These
observations can also apply to present facts. The University cannot blame petitioner
for not holding RRC before 28.11.2011 and also cannot make him suffer therefor.
14. Learned counsel for University has also invited our attention to clause
16 (A) of Directions. However, it is on the subject of submission of thesis. It permits
submission of summary thesis only after completion of 22-months from date of
registration. The date of registration appears to be an artificial concept explained in
Clause 8(b). The said clause 8(b)(i) reads as under :
"(b) ADMISSION/ REGISTRTION:
"(i) After allotment of guide, an eligible applicant seeking
admission to the Ph.D. Programme shall apply for registration to
the Controller of Examinations, Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj
Nagpur University, Nagpur through guide and the Head of the
place of Research in the prescribed Ph.D. registration form
(Annexure-I) along with the registration fees as may be
prescribed from time to time along with relevant supporting
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documents on or before 15th July/ 15th January, every year.
These dates shall be considered as dates of registration after
the approval of Research and Recognition Committee. "
15. In the light of these facts, question arose and, therefore, we attempted
to find out whether Direction No.10./2011 or then any other statutory provision obliges
the RRC to meet at regular intervals, at least, twice in a year. It is admitted position
that at the time there was no such legal provision but it has been so provided for in
later directions.
16. The petitioner lost period of one year ten months and fifteen days after
submission of application till it was approved by RRC. If clause 16(A) is applied in
this backdrop, it follows that she could not have submitted summary within a period
of 22 months, from 15.7.2010, had RRC not met and her application been not approved
for two more months. Thus, period of 22-months stipulated in clause 16(A) would have
easily expired. Direction 16A(1) deliberately prohibits submission of thesis before
completion of 22-months from date of registration. No applicant can act in haste and
must conduct his research with due care and caution. Period of 22-months therefore
has to be used effectively for ground work. If this period of 22-months is to be allowed
on uniform basis to all, the date of registration has to be corelated with date of RRC
meeting. Otherwise, in case of candidate like petitioner, the period will begin to run
retrospectively from 15.7.2010 and may very well expire even before first RRC meeting
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after such application is held. In case of others, they may get a longer or different
period for submission of thesis.
17. The concept of approval in clause 8(b)(i) of the Directions within itself
contemplates appreciation of something which has occurred in past. However, not
stipulating the date of RRC meeting and choosing only the two dates i.e. 15th January or
15th July clearly show that actual date of application for registration is not decisive for
any purpose in scheme of Direction. When there was/is no obligation to hold such RRC
even once in a year, it sounds logical that year in which the application is moved by the
scholar is also not left relevant. Allowing maximum period of 5-years to complete
research or not permitting submission of summary within first 22-months from the date
of registration, all show that time-period needs to be computed in relation to date either
15th January or 15th July. If there is no obligation to hold RRC meeting between these
two dates and therefore, twice in a year, this artificial date may turn out to be much prior
to date of such RRC. Thus, it may be even of an earlier calender year or before two
calender years, as in present matter. This introduces a glaring uncertainty which is
abhorrent in the important field of education. It arises here only because of acceptance
of year in which petitioner files his application. We find that the word or concept of
"year" does not figure in the clause 8(i)(b) of the Direction & omission to do so is with
some purpose. The "year" needs to be worked out with reference to the date of the
holding of relevant RRC. The absurdity arises by not adhering to & implementing the
artificial concept of "date of registration" fully. If meeting is held after 15th January, the
date of registration in respect of all applications approved therein can be treated as 15 th
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July of that calender year. If such meeting is held after 15th July, the date of registration
in respect of all applications approved therein can, in that event be treated as 15 th
January of the next year. The intention behind prohibiting submission of summary for
period of 22 months after such date of registration, also stands accomplished by its
uniform implementation for all aspirants without any discrimination. Acceptance of a
future 15th January or 15th July advances object of not permitting anybody to derive an
undue advantage because his application is filed just before few days of date of such
RRC. This also avoids any prejudice to the other applicants whose applications remain
unattended for more than five months or even an year. This is in consonance with
principle of avoiding the retrospective operation of any provision like clause 8(i)(b) of
the Directions unless the language expressly warrants it. It is settled principle that if
such provision is ambiguous & admits of two interpretations, one which avoids
uncertainty or absurdity must be adopted. Thus viewed, absence of any particular year
in clause 8(b) (i) becomes significant. It mentions only 15th July or 15th January of every
year, as the dates of registration. The application for registration becomes operative
after approval of RRC. The last sentence in this clause stipulates that these dates i.e.
15th July and 15th January, every year, shall be considered as dates of registration
after the approval of RRC.
18. So read, Clause 16A and Clause 8(b)(i) all can be understood
harmoniously as forming a complete code in Direction No. 10/2011.
19. Therefore, if in case of petitioner date of registration is treated as 15th
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January 2012, her period of five years expired on 15th January 2017. By way of
abundant precaution, even if we presume that date 15.7.2011 could have been taken
as date of registration, period would have expired on 15.7.2016. In that situation, she
would not have been required to apply for extension on 21.4.2015. However, we leave
this issue open for further consideration as this is not the only decisive issue involved in
this matter.
21. Here, petitioner indirectly accepted that her registration has expired
on 15.7.2015. She therefore sought extension on 21.4.2015. The application has been
considered by a validly constituted RRC on 3rd June, 2015. It is therefore obvious
that RRC which functioned on 3.6.2015 was legal and respondent did not find it difficult
to constitute it. No prejudice has therefore been caused to the respondent because
the submission of application for extension got delayed by six days. Administrative
difficulties pointed out in paragraph 7 are not supported by any statutory stipulation
which requires a specific step to be taken within a stipulated time. Those are steps to
be taken on administrative side and, in a given case, a valid RRC can be constituted
within three days or seven days. Needless to say that in the present facts, we do not
see any injury caused to respondent -University because application for extension was
not submitted on or before 15.4.2015 by the petitioner.
22. The contention that proviso to Clause (14) must be read strictly and
not as a directory also appears to be misconceived. The Full Bench judgment of this
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Court has looked into the statutory provision which enables a candidate not holding
caste validity to contest election and said exception was made in his favour. He was
given time to cure the lacuna. In present matter, it cannot be said that by giving
extension to eligible scholar any exception has been made in their favour. On the
contrary, though normally research is to be completed within five years, if the reasons
for extension are proper and request is supported/ recommended by Guide and
Head of the Place of the Research, RRC can evaluate those reasons and grant
extension. The purpose of proviso therefore is not to nullify the hard labour put in by
research scholar for a period of five years. It is only to eliminate those who do not
utilize time effectively and still seek extension. The application of mind by RRC in
present matter, does not show any such consideration. The RRC has found the
application of petitioner belated and therefore has refused to look into the merits
thereof.
23. Taking overall view of the matter, we find the proviso to Clause (14) an
enabling provision made in the interest of genuine scholars and therefore power must
be exercised by RRC with due care and caution. Merely because application is belated,
same could not have been rejected.
24. The instances on which the petitioner has placed reliance before us
show that in case of Mr.Vijay Nawle, his application was delayed by four days and still
he w as given extension. In case of Mr.Narendra Vanjari, his application was delayed
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by 4 months and 5 days. However the application has been submitted by Mr.Vanjari
after expiry of period of registration and not before its expiry. His registration expired
on 7.1.2015 and he has submitted application on 12.5.2015. As per scheme of proviso
to Clause (14) he should have moved application before 7th October, 2014. Thus, the
actual delay in his case is of 7-months and 5-days. In case of Mr.Gautam Wakde,
there is delay of about 23 days.
25. We do not find any substance in contention of University that extension
to these three candidate has been erroneously granted. As already observed above,
the power is conferred upon the RRC, to be exercised with responsibility in genuine
cases.
26. In this situation, we find the impugned communication dated 16th
October 2015, unsustainable. It is quashed and set aside. The application for
extension submitted by petitioner shall be reconsidered by RRC within a period of six
weeks from today. The extension if allowed shall begin to run from the date on which it
is communicated to the petitioner.
27. The Writ Petition is thus allowed. Rule is made absolute in the
aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.
JUDGE JUDGE
sahare
