Bombay High Court
Raman Bhagwandas Vanjari vs Mohammad Salim Sk Abdullah & ... on 24 March, 2017
Bench: A.S. Chandurkar
248-J-FA-390-05 1/7
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
FIRST APPEAL NO.390 OF 2005
Raman Bhagwandas Vanjani
Aged Adult, Occ. Business,
(LIC Agent), R/o Civil Lines,
Washim, District-Akola
(Now District Washim). ... Appellant.
-vs-
1. Mohammad Salim Sk. Abdullah
Aged- Adult, Occ. Driver
2. Deorao V. Ghate
Aged about Adult,
Owner of Auto Rickshaw
Both R/o Mangwadi, Tah. Risod,
Dist. Akola (Now Dist. Washim)
3. The Branch Manager,
New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
Old Cotton Market, Akola. ... Respondents.
Shri P. V. Ghare, Advocate for appellant.
Shri V. G. Wankhede, Advocate for respondent Nos.1 and 2.
Ms T. D. Khade, Advocate for respondent No.3.
CORAM : A.S.CHANDURKAR, J.
DATE : March 24, 2017
Oral Judgment :
The appellant who is the original claimant has challenged the
judgment of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Akola as he is aggrieved by the
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judgment dated 31/01/2005 by which his claim for compensation has been
dismissed.
According to the appellant he was travelling on his motorcycle on
13/10/1996, when he was dashed by an autorickshaw coming from opposite
direction. The appellant sustained injuries on his head and was required to
be hospitalized. On that basis he filed claim for compensation under Section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, the said Act) . The claim was
contested by the respondents and the learned Member of the Claims Tribunal
after considering the evidence on record held that the appellant had suffered
injuries on account of a motor vehicle accident. However the claim for
compensation came to be rejected on the ground that the appellant had not
approached the Tribunal with clean hands. It found that two medical
receipts were fabricated by him and on that basis the entire claim for
compensation was dismissed by passing the impugned judgment.
2. Shri P. V. Ghare, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
in so far Issue Nos.1 to 4 framed by the Claims Tribunal are concerned, they
have been answered in favour of the appellant. The only reason for
disallowing the claim for compensation is that according to the learned
Member two bills at Exhibits-56 and 59 had been manipulated. According
to him on that basis the entire claim for compensation came to be dismissed.
He submitted that considering the fact that the appellant had suffered
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disability to the extent of 10%, he was entitled to receive some amount of
compensation in that regard.
3. Shri V. G. Wankhede, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2
supported the impugned order. According to him the findings recorded
against Issue No.5 were sufficient to disallow the claim for compensation. It
was submitted that the appellant by his own conduct was rightly held dis-
entitled to receive compensation. He urged that the appeal was liable to be
dismissed.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and I
have perused the records of the case. The following point arises for
consideration :
" Whether the entire claim for compensation under Section 166
of the said Act was liable to be rejected on the ground that two medical bills
were found to be manipulated ?"
5. The Claims Tribunal while answering Issue Nos.1 to 4 has held
that the appellant sustained 10% permanent disability on account of motor
vehicle accident that occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the
offending vehicle by the respondent No.1. These findings recorded against
Issue Nos.1 to 4 are not under challenge. While answering Issue No.5 the
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amount of compensation under Section 166 of the said Act has been
disallowed after noticing some additions in the figures of medical receipts at
Exhibits-56 and 59. The Claims Tribunal after noticing these receipts
concluded that the appellant had not approached the Tribunal with clean
hands and held that dismissal of claim petition would be sufficient
punishment for him.
6. Perusal of the entire order of the Claims Tribunal indicates that on
account of insertions made in Exhibits-56 and 59, the appellant was guilty of
committing an offence against administration of justice. He was therefore
not entitled for any compensation.
The learned Member of the Claims Tribunal after having found
that the appellant had suffered 10% permanent disability by virtue of a
motor vehicle accident ought to have considered the prayer for grant of
compensation under Section 166 of the said Act. If the learned Member
found that some medical bills were interpolated, the claim for grant of said
medical expenses could have been disallowed. It is not the case that there
was a doubt created with regard to occurrence of the accident itself. Issue
Nos.1 to 4 had been answered in favour of the appellant. The approach of
the learned Member that as two medical bills were found to be interpolated,
dismissal of the entire claim petition would result in sufficient punishment
appears to be a harsh view. If the occurrence of the accident was not in
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doubt and it was proved that the appellant had suffered 10% permanent
disability the Tribunal could have disallowed those amounts with regard to
which it had a doubt of having been incurred.
7. There is another aspect of the matter. The maxim " falsus in uno
falsus in omnibus " which means if some part of the version of a witness is not
found to be believable his entire version must be disregarded has not
received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India as held in
Nisar Ali vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 366. In other words, if
the case of the appellant with regard to medical bills at Exhibits-56 and 59
was to be disbelieved, that part of his deposition was liable to be excluded
while determining the amount of compensation if his case otherwise entitled
him to grant of compensation. The entire case was not liable to be
disbelieved resulting in refusal to grant any compensation whatsoever.
8. Coming to the aspect of the amount of compensation, the
appellant had placed on record certificate issued by the Life Insurance
Corporation dated 02/01/1997 at Exhibit-30 which indicated the amount of
income from commission for the period from 01/04/1995 to 31/03/1996 to
be Rs.2,31,922/-. This certificate indicated that income tax of Rs.18,172 had
been deducted. Considering the date of accident which is 13/10/1996
coupled with the document at Exhibit-31 which is a certificate indicating
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deduction of tax at source, the monthly income of the appellant can be taken
to be Rs.15,000/- . As per certificate at Exhibit-38 the appellant suffered
10% disability. Considering the nature of avocation being done by the
appellant as an insurance agent, the loss of income as a result of said
accident could be taken at 10% which would come to Rs.1500/- per month.
The annual reduction in the amount of income would come to Rs.18,000/-.
By applying the multiplier of 16 according to his age, the amount of
compensation would come to Rs.2,88,000/-. An amount of Rs.22,100/- as
per document at Exhibit-52 towards operation charges has been duly proved.
Said amount is also admissible. Thus in the facts of the present case, total
compensation of Rs.3,10,000/- is payable by the respondents. As noted
above the medical bills sought to be relied upon by the appellant have been
discarded on account of being interpolated. Hence I am not inclined to
grant any amount towards medical expenses.
9. In view of aforesaid discussion, I find that in the facts of the
present case grant of amount of Rs.3,10,000/- would be fair compensation
to the appellant for the accident in question. The point as framed is
answered accordingly. In the result the following order is passed :
(i) The judgment of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Akola in
M.A.C.P. No.211/1997 dated 31/01/2005 is quashed and set
aside.
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(ii) It is held that the appellant is entitled for compensation of
Rs.3,10,000/- payable with interest @ 7.5% per annum from
15/12/1997 till realization. The said amount shall be jointly and
severally paid by the respondents.
(iii) First appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms with no order as to
costs.
JUDGE
Asmita
