Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 3691 Bom
Judgement Date : 28 June, 2017
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1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.458 OF 1999
The State of Maharashtra,
Through Police Station, Kuntoor,
Tq-Biloli, Dist-Nanded.
...APPELLANT
VERSUS
1) Geetabai w/o Digamber Thete,
Age-36 years, Occu:Household,
R/o-Barbada, Tq-Biloli, Dist-Nanded,
2) Ejajbeg s/o Hasanbeg,
Age-25 years, Occu:Agril.,
R/o-Barbada, Tq-Biloli, Dist-Nanded.
...RESPONDENTS
...
Mr.P.G. Borade A.P.P. for Appellant - State.
Mr.N.R. Shaikh Advocate appointed for
Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
...
CORAM: S.S. SHINDE AND
S.M. GAVHANE, JJ.
DATE : 28TH JUNE, 2017
JUDGMENT [PER S.S. SHINDE, J.] :
1. This Appeal is filed by the State
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challenging the Judgment and order dated 27th
August, 1999, passed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Biloli in Sessions Case No.6 of 1999,
thereby acquitting Respondent Nos.1 and 2/original
accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 201 both read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code (For short "I.P.
Code").
2. The prosecution case, in nut-shell, is as
under :-
A) Accused No.1 Geetabai is the wife of the
deceased Digambar. She was residing with her
husband Digambar, two daughters and one son at
village Barbada. Accused No.2 Ejaj is the resident
of same village. The deceased Digambar had
employed accused No.2 Ejaj for cultivation of his
land on crop share basis. Accused No.2 Ejaj used
to pay visits to the house of deceased Digambar.
Thereupon illicit relations were developed in
between accused No.1 Geetbai and accused No.2
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Ejaj. The marital relations in between accused
No.1 Geetabai and her husband Digambar became
strained. Accused Nos. 1 and 2, in furtherance of
their common intention, during the night in
between 24th September, 1998 and 25th September,
1998 in the house of the Digambar, strangulated
the neck of Digambar by means of a cloth after
causing him to drink liquor and thereby both the
accused killed Digambar. Both the accused then put
the dead body in gunny bag and tied it with a Sari
and took the dead body outside the house during
that night and they threw the same at the river
bank outside the village.
B) The said bundle of gunny bag containing
dead body was noticed by people of village Barbada
on 27th September, 1998. The informant Shriram
(PW-1), the police patil of the village, lodged a
report Exhibit 21 on 27th September, 1998 at
police station, Kuntoor giving the information
about the said dead body. On his report, crime was
registered on the same day at police station,
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Kuntoor for the offence punishable under Section
302 of the I.P. Code. The inquest panchnama
Exhibit 10 of the dead body and the spot panchnama
Exhibit 11 were prepared on 28th September, 1998.
Thereafter the said dead body was identified by
accused No.1 Geetabai as of her husband Digambar.
The clothes of the said dead body were seized
under panchnama Exhibit 12 on 28th September,
1998. On postmortem examination of the said dead
body, it was found that the death of that person
was occurred due to Asphyxia due to strangulation
leading to Cardio respiratory failure.
Accordingly, Certificate of cause of death
Exhibit 42 and postmortem report Exhibit 41 were
issued by PW-12, the concerned medical officer.
C) The statements of the witnesses were
recorded and accused Nos.1 and 2 were arrested
during the course of investigation. On completion
of investigation, police filed charge-sheet
against both the accused in the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Nilanga.
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D) Thereafter the case was committed to the
Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Biloli. Charge
at Exhibit-4 was framed against both the accused
for the offences punishable under Sections 302
and 201 read with Section 34 of the I.P. Code and
the same was explained to them. The accused
persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried, with the defence of total denial.
3. After recording the evidence and
conducting full fledged trial, the trial Court
acquitted both the accused persons from the
offences with which they were charged, as stated
herein above in Para-1 of the Judgment. Hence this
Appeal.
4. Heard learned A.P.P. appearing for the
State and learned counsel appearing for
Respondent Nos.1 and 2/ accused Nos.1 and 2, at
length. With their able assistance, we have
carefully perused the entire notes of evidence so
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as to find out whether the findings recorded by
the trial Court are in consonance with the
evidence brought on record or otherwise.
5. The prosecution examined PW-12 Dr.
Ashalata w/o Digambarrao Gaikwad. She deposed that
on 28th September, 1999 she was attached to the
primary health center of Barbada as a Medical
Officer. On that day she did the post-mortem
examination of the dead body of Digambar Maroti
Thete. She further deposed about the injuries
noticed by her on the dead body of Digambar. She
stated that the last meal was taken four hours
before the death. Probably the death was more
than 3 days prior to the post-mortem examination,
as it is seen from the decomposition and maggots
present on whole body. She further deposed that,
the probable cause of death was "Asphyxia due to
strangulation leading to cardio respiratory
failure". During the course of her cross-
examination, she denied that wrong opinion given
by her that the death occurred more than 3 days
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before the postmortem examination. However, she
admitted that maggots appear in between 18 to 36
hours of the death.
6. The prosecution has examined PW-1 Shriram
Ramji Kumbhargave, who at the relevant time was
working as Police Patil at Barbada. He is the
informant. He deposed that on 27th September,
1998, Mahajan Kotwal came to his house and told
that one bundle of gunny bag in tied condition was
lying at the bank of river. Then they went to the
river bed and they saw one tied bundle at the bank
of river over clay. They opened the said bundle.
He saw the dead body at 2.00 p.m. He went to
Kuntoor police station and lodged report.
7. It is the case of the prosecution that
there were illicit relations between accused Nos.1
Geetabai and accused No.2 Ejaj, and hence there
was motive. In order to prove the said fact, the
prosecution has examined PW-2 Shivaji Maroti
Thete, PW-3 Naibrao Bapurao Sarje, PW-4 Pandit
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Kerba Modad, PW-8 Kewalbai w/o Mahajan Thete, PW-9
Ananda Maroti Thete, PW-11 Govind Bhujang Jadhav
and PW-13 Mahadev Gangaram Mohajad. Upon careful
perusal of the evidence of these witnesses and so
also their cross-examination, it is clear that
they have seen accused No.1 Geetabai and accused
No.2 Ejaj talking with each other in the house of
Geetabai and also in the field. However the
defence has brought on record that accused No.2
Ejaj was cultivating the land of deceased Digambar
on crop basis. Merely because accused No.2 Ejaj
was visiting the house of deceased Digambar, it
cannot be concluded that there were illicit
relations between accused No.1 Geetabai and
accused No.2 Ejaj. As Ejaj was engaged by deceased
Digambar to cultivate his agricultural land on
crop basis, it was obvious for Ejaj to visit the
house of Digambar and his agricultural land. None
of the above witnesses deposed that deceased
Digambar during his life time, told them that
there were illicit relations between his wife
Geetabai and Ejaj. The trial Court has rightly
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observed that, admittedly accused No.2 was engaged
by the deceased Digambar for cultivating of his
field and thus in the natural course of conduct,
accused No.2 was going to the house of Digambar
and it cannot be said that his paying visits to
the house of Digambar were with an intention of
keeping illicit relations with Digambar's wife
Geetabai. The trial Court has concluded that no
inference of illicit relation can be drawn from
the talking terms in between the accused Nos.1
and 2.
8. The case of the prosecution is based only
on the circumstantial evidence and there is no eye
witness in this case. It is the case of the
prosecution that deceased Digambar was lastly seen
in the company of accused No.2 Ejaj. In order to
prove 'last seen theory', the prosecution has
relied upon the evidence of PW-3 Naibrao Sarje,
PW-10 Anjana Mundphale and PW-13 Mahadev Mohajad.
PW-3 Naibrao deposed that, on Wednesday at 10
p.m. he took meal and came outside the house. At
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that time Digambar had sat in front of the door of
his house and one man was sitting over the cot by
the side of Digmbar and that man and Digambar were
talking to each other. Thus evidence of this
witness PW-3 Naibrao is not at all helpful to the
prosecution as he not specifically stated that he
saw deceased Digambar in the company of accused
No.2 Ejaj.
. PW-10 Anjana is a child witness, 11 years
old. She deposed that her family runs shop in
their house and sales eggs. She further deposed
that Digambar had come to her shop before his
death to purchase eggs. When he came to the shop,
there was one man with him, and the time was 9.00
p.m. She further stated that the person who had
accompanied Digambar was a Muslim fellow, and she
can identify him. She identified accused No.2
Ejaj, who was present in the Court and stated that
he is the same person who came with Digambar.
However, during her cross-examination, PW-10
Anjana admitted that on the last date of hearing
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while returning to her house she sat in the police
vehicle, and at that time both the accused were
also there in the said police vehicle. Therefore
the identification of accused No.2 Ejaj by PW-10,
child witness, cannot be believed.
. PW-13 Mahadev Mohajad deposed that on
Thursday, he returned from the field to the house
at 6.00 p.m. After taking meal, he started going
to the field. When he was going to the field, he
saw Digambar and Ejaj on the way in front of the
house.
9. If we consider the evidence of PW-3
Naibrao, PW-10 Anjana and PW-13 Mahadev, they
have deposed that they have seen deceased Digambar
in the company of accused No.2 Ejaj during late
night hours on 24th September, 1998, and it is the
case of the prosecution that dead body of Digambar
was found on 27th September, 1998. There is time
gap of three days in between deceased was
allegedly last seen in the company of the accused
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and recovery of dead body. Therefore said
circumstance of 'last seen' cannot be relied upon.
The Supreme Court in the case of Shyamal Ghosh vs.
State of W.B.1, on the basis of the evidence in
that case, in Para 74 of the Judgment, observed
that reasonableness of the time gap is of some
significance. If the time gap is very large, then
it is not only difficult but may not even be
proper for the Court to infer that the deceased
had been last seen alive with the accused and the
accused, thus, was responsible for commission of
the offence.
. The Supreme Court in the case Rambraksh
alias Jalim vs. State of Chhatisgarh2 held that, it
is trite law that a conviction cannot be recorded
against the accused merely on the ground that the
accused was last seen with the deceased. In other
words, a conviction cannot be based on the only
circumstance of last seen together. Normally, last
seen theory comes into play where the time gap, 1 (2012) 7 S.C.C. 646 2 A.I.R. 2016 S.C. 2381
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between the point of time when the accused and the
deceased were seen last alive and when the
deceased is found dead, is so small that
possibility of any person other than the accused
being the perpetrator of the crime becomes
impossible. To record a conviction, the last seen
together itself would not be sufficient and the
prosecution has to complete the chain of
circumstances to bring home the guilt of the
accused.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Inderjit
Singh and another vs. State of Punjab, supra, in
Para-2 of the Judgment held that:-
"2. After giving our careful consideration, we are unable to agree with the Courts below. These circumstances are not sufficient to establish guilt of the accused. It is well settled that in a case pending on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the circumstances by independent evidence and the circumstances so established must form a complete chain in proof of guilt of the
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accused beyond all reasonable doubts. The circumstances so proved must also be consistent only with the guilt of the accused. Among the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, in the light of these principles we find that except the circumstance No.1, the other circumstances are not incriminating. In number of cases it has been held that the only circumstance namely that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused by itself is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. It is no doubt true that deceased's death was homicidal but since there is no direct witness connecting any of the appellants with the crime we should fall back on the circumstantial evidence and we are of the view that circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are hardly sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. The circumstance, i.e. the accused also had no enmity between the accused and the deceased and the witness would also show that the accused also had no enmity against the deceased. Therefore, this circumstance is neutral. However, now coming to the recovery of the gun, the High Court has acquitted him of that charge. The only relevant circumstance as pointed above is that the appellants and
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the deceased left the house together in a friendly manner for bird-shooting. It is needless to say that no conviction can be passed on this sole circumstance. In the result, the convictions and sentences awarded by the Courts below are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellants be set at liberty."
11. The trial Court has observed that, the
prosecution has not established the material
circumstances, on which reliance was placed by the
prosecution. The trial Court has further observed
that the chain of circumstances is not so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused. The trial Court has held that the
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, if
accepted to be proved for the sake of argument,
then also those circumstances are not conclusive
in nature, though some suspicion may be raised as
against the accused. The trial Court placed
reliance on the reported Judgment in the case of
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Shivaji Vithl Barde vs. State of Maharashtra 3 and
held that suspicion which may be grave, cannot
form the ground for conviction. After considering
the entire evidence on record the trial Court held
that benefit of doubt is to be given to both the
accused. Accordingly the trial Court has acquitted
both the accused from the offences with which they
were charged.
12. After considering the entire evidence
brought on record by the prosecution, we are
convinced that the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial Court are in consonance with the
evidence brought on record. There is no perversity
as such. The view taken by the trial Court is
plausible and therefore there is no reason to
cause interference in the order of acquittal. It
is settled principle of law that when the
plausible view is taken on the basis of material
on record, in that case even if another view is
possible, is no ground to interfere in the order
3 1998(1) B.Cr.C. 567
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of acquittal.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of
Muralidhar alias Gidda and another Vs. State of
Karnataka4 in para 12 held thus:-
12. The approach of the appellate Court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu Vs.State, AIR 1954 SC 1, Madan Mohan Singh Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 637, Atley Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807, Aher Raja Khima Vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217, Balbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G.Agarwal Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200, Noor Khan Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 SC 286, Khedu Mohton Vs. State of Bihar, [1970] 2 SCC 450, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade Vs. State of Maharashtra, [1973] 2 SCC 793, Lekha Yadav Vs. State of Bihar, [1973] 2 SCC 424, Khem Karan Vs. State of U.P., [1974] 4 SCC 603, Bishan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, [1974] 3 SCC 288, Umedbhai Jadavbhai Vs. Sate of Gujarat, [1978] 1 SCC 228, K.Gopal Reddy Vs. State of A.P., [1979] 1 SCC 355, Tota Singh Vs. State of Punjab, [1987] 2 SCC 529, Ram
4. 2014 [4] Mh.L.J.[Cri.] 353
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Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, 1995 Supp [1] SCC 248, Madan Lal Vs. State of J & K, [1997] 7 SCC 677, Sambasivan Vs. State of Kerala, [1998] 5 SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh Vs. State of M.P. [2002] 4 SCC 85, Harijana Thirupala Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., [2002] 6 SCC 470, C. Antony Vs. K.G.Raghavan Nair, [2003] 1 SCC 1, State of Karnataka Vs. K.Gopalakrishna, [2005] 9 SCC 291, State of Goa Vs. Sanjay Thakran, [2007] 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, [2007] 4 SCC 415. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate Court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal,
(iii) Though, the powers of the appellate Court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate Court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by
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the trial court. It is so because the trial Court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate Court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate Court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and
(iv) Merely because the appellate Court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate Court in the judgment of the trial Court.
[Underlines added]
14. In the light of discussion herein above,
we are of the opinion that there is no merit in
the Appeal filed by the State. The Criminal Appeal
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stands dismissed. Bail Bonds, if any, shall stand
cancelled.
15. We appreciate the able assistance
rendered by the learned counsel Mr. N.R. Shaikh
during the course of hearing of this Appeal, to
come to the right conclusion. We quantify his fees
to Rs.7500/- (Rupees Seven Thousand Five Hundred).
[S.M. GAVHANE, J.] [S.S. SHINDE, J.] asb/JUN17
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