Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 2945 Bom
Judgement Date : 8 June, 2017
WP/500/2000
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 500 OF 2000
The Divisional Controller,
Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation,
Jalgaon Division, Jalgaon. ..Petitioner
Versus
Suresh Namdev Pagare
Near Prakash Talkies
Pachora, Dist. Jalgaon. ..Respondent
...
Advocate for Petitioner : Shri S.K. Goyanka
Advocate for Respondent : Shri B.S.Deshmukh
...
CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
Dated: June 08, 2017 ...
ORAL JUDGMENT :-
1. The petitioner Corporation is aggrieved by the judgment of the
Labour Court-cum-Controlling Authority dated 25.5.1999, thereby
allowing the Gratuity Application No. 7 of 1995 filed by the
respondent. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the judgment of the
appellate authority dated 27.8.1999, by which, the appeal preferred
by the petitioner has been rejected.
2. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that he cannot
continue to espouse the cause of the respondent as he has been
WP/500/2000
empaneled by the MSRT Corporation and now he represents the
Corporation in other matters.
3. While admitting this petition on 15.10.2001, this Court
directed the petitioner to deposit the entire gratuity amount of
Rs.14550/- to be invested in the Nationalized Bank. On the condition
of depositing the amount, the impugned directions were stayed. The
said amount has been deposited on 20.12.2001 in this Court.
4. I have considered the strenuous submissions of learned counsel
for the petitioner and have gone through the petition paper book and
record available.
5. The following factors are undisputed:-
(a) The respondent was a Bus Conductor.
(b) He was apprehended in a surprise check, having
reissued used tickets and having mis-appropriated the ticket
fare collected from the passengers.
(c) After conducting a departmental enquiry under the
Discipline and Appeal Rules of the Corporation, the respondent
was issued with the order of dismissal from service dated
WP/500/2000
7.10.1991, as punishment for proved misconduct of
misappropriation.
(d) On 9.10.1991, the respondent preferred a first
department appeal, praying for reviewing the order of
dismissal.
(e) By order dated 1.9.1992, the first appellate authority
set aside the order of dismissal and substituted the
punishment with stoppage of three increments.
(f) Despite the above order, the respondent did not report
for duties.
(g) The petitioner issued letters on 30.9.1992, 4.1.1993,
13.2.1993, 8.4.1993 and 11.6.1993 calling upon the respondent
to report for duties.
(h) On 26.9.1993, the first appellate authority itself
recalled it's order dated 1.9.1992 and restored the order of
dismissal dated 7.10.1991.
(i) The respondent did not challenged the re-imposition of
the order of dismissal and has accepted it.
WP/500/2000
(j) The respondent preferred application PGA No.7 of 1995
before the Controlling Authority praying for payment of
gratuity, which has been allowed by the impugned judgment.
Said judgment has been sustained by the appellate authority.
6. Shri Goyanka has strenuously submitted that when the
dismissal order was restored, it was on account of the stigma of
dishonesty and which amounts to moral turpitude. Once an employee
is dismissed for moral turpitude, he would not be entitled for gratuity
in view of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the
matter of Jorsingh Govind Vanjari Vs. Divisional Controller [2017(3)
Mh.L.J. 407 = 2017 (152) FLR 127 = 2016 (12) SCALE 511].
7. While considering the case of the petitioner and the vehement
submissions of Shri Goyanka, I have called upon the learned counsel
to indicate from the Discipline and Appeal Rules as to whether the
first appeal authority, which has passed the order dated 1.9.1992,
had the powers to review it's own decision and restore the decision
of the disciplinary authority. Shri Goyanka could not point out from
the said Rules that the first appeal authority had the power to review
it's own order suo moto or even on an application.
8. In the light of the above, the first appellate authority of the
WP/500/2000
Corporation did not have the power and authorization to review it's
own order and restore the order of dismissal. If the respondent has
not reported for duties, though the order of dismissal was set aside,
it would be a case of abandonment of service, for which the
Corporation could have initiated disciplinary proceedings for proving
unauthorized absenteeism. Nevertheless, the said issue does not
survive after 25 years since the respondent has approached the
controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act seeking
gratuity on the count that he is not in employment. He, therefore
has, by his conduct, established that he did not desire to report for
duties. It is informed by Shri Goyanka that the date of
superannuation of the respondent was 28.2.2012 and he did not
report for duties after 1.9.1992 till 28.2.2012.
9. It is undisputed from the records that the gratuity of the
respondent has been calculated till he had last worked with the
petitioner. These are peculiar facts and circumstances, wherein, the
respondent by his conduct declined to report for duties and
proceeded on the presumption that he has been dismissed whereas
the petitioner's first appeal authority had reinstated the respondent.
10. Shri Goyanka submits that the respondent has not raised any
other claim against the Corporation in last 25 years, save and except
these gratuity proceedings. It cannot be over-looked that the
WP/500/2000
petitioner has not passed an order of forfeiture of gratuity.
11. In the light of the above and considering the scope of the D &
A Rules of the Corporation, the order of the first appeal authority
could not be reviewed by the same authority and as such, the action
of recalling the punishment of stoppage of three increments cannot
be sustained. The first appeal authority had no jurisdiction to recall
or review his order.
12. With this position being established squarely based upon the D
& A Rules of the Corporation, the order of dismissal for moral
turpitude stands set aside by the first appeal authority. Once the
order of dismissal is held to be set aside and replaced by the
punishment of stoppage of three increments, the respondent could
not be deprived of gratuity. It is an altogether different issue that
the respondent did not have the desire to continue in the
employment of the petitioner and hence did not report for duties.
This cannot be a ground for presuming that the appellate authority
could review it's order without having any power to do so under the D
& A Rules.
13. Shri Goyanka then has raised the issue of interest at the rate
of 9% p.a. granted by the Labour Court from the date of it's
judgment. It cannot be ignored that since the petitioner /
WP/500/2000
Corporation had set aside the order of dismissal and had replaced the
same with the punishment of stoppage of three increments, there
was no occasion to pay gratuity to the respondent. It is in peculiar
facts of these case that the respondent himself had abandoned his
employment and sought gratuity. So also the amount of gratuity has
been deposited in this Court on 20.12.2001.
14. Considering the above, this petition is disposed off. The
judgment of the Labour Court stands implemented by the order of
this Court dated 15.10.2001. Rule is, therefore, discharged.
15. The respondent is, therefore, at liberty to withdraw the entire
amount deposited in this Court, along with accrued interest, by
tendering an application, duly identified by an Advocate and
supported with a recent photograph, copy of the Election Commission
Voter Id card and recent address proof.
( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. ) ...
akl/d
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