Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 5150 Bom
Judgement Date : 27 July, 2017
cra95.17.J.odt 1/11
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 95 OF 2017
Laxminarayan Parmeshwarlal Jaiswal.
Aged about 66 years, Occup-Agriculturist &
Business, R/o-Shrawagi Plots, Opp. Dargah,
Near Tower, Umri Road, Akola,
Tah and District - Akola. ..... APPLICANT
...VERSUS...
1] Pravin S/o Prithviraj Jaiswal,
Aged about 37 years, Occup-Business.
2] Smt. Pushpalata Wd/o. Devkinandan Jaiswal,
Aged about 67 years, Occup-Agriculturist.
3] Sushilkumar s/o Devkinandan Jaiswal,
Aged about 41 years, Occup-Agriculturist
and Business.
All Respondents R/o. At Post Pinjar,
Tah-Barshitaklil, Dist-Akola. ...... RESPONDENTS
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Shri A. M. Ghare with Nitin L. Jaiswal, Advocate for the Applicant.
Shri R. R. Dawda, Advocate for the Respondent No.1.
Shri Nilesh Kalwaghe with S. N. Gaikwad for Respondent Nos.2 & 3.
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CORAM : S.B. SHUKRE, J.
th DATE : 27 JULY, 2017.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
By this application, the applicant-original defendant
No.1 has taken an exception to the legality and correctness of the
cra95.17.J.odt 2/11
order dated 18.07.2017 thereby rejecting the application (Exh.46)
filed for rejection of plaint on the ground that the plaint is barred
by law as provided under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, passed by Civil Judge Junior Division, Barshitakli, in
Regular Civil Suit No.74 of 2016.
02] Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by
consent.
03] It is well settled law that when an application under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure is filed, the
Court has to confine its inquiry only to the pleadings in the plaint.
The Court cannot travel beyond those pleadings and look into the
defence taken by the defendant. A useful reference in this regard
may be made to the case of Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd vs M/S. Hede
and Company, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 614. Now bearing in
mind these principles of law, let us examine whether the impugned
order is consistent with the settled principles of law or not.
04] Shri. A. M. Ghare learned counsel for the applicant, in
his extensive argument, has submitted in nut-shell that there are no
cra95.17.J.odt 3/11
pleadings in the plaint showing the basis for exclusive and separate
possession of property, which is admittedly a joint family property
in which the respondent No.1 (original defendant No.2), the
present applicant (original defendant No.1) and respondent Nos.2
and 3 (original plaintiff Nos.1 & 2) are the co-sharers. He submits
that even when it is pleaded that possession of one of the co-sharers
is exclusive, such possession is always held to be on behalf of all the
co-sharers, unless it can be shown that there is some mutually
agreed arrangement between all the co-sharers to allow one of the
co-sharers to retain exclusive possession of the joint family
property. He places his reliance on the case of Sakhahari
Parwatrao Karahale and Another ..vs.. Bhimshankar Pawatrao
Karahale, reported in (2002) 9 Supreme Court Cases 608.
05] Shri. Nilesh Kalwaghe, learned advocate for the
respondent Nos.2 and 3, in his detailed argument, has submitted
that the possession of the joint family property held by the
respondent Nos.2 and 3 is permissive and this can be inferred from
the fact that there has been no objection taken to the separate
possession held and separate cultivation of the suit property, which
are agricultural fields, by this applicant. He invites my
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attention to the findings recorded by Civil Court in it's judgment
dated 13th October, 2014 in the previous suit being Special Civil
Suit No.24/2001, which was filed by this applicant against the
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and other co-sharers. He submits that in
paragraph No.370 of this judgment, the Civil Court has found that
the separate cultivation of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 was never
objected to by this applicant and so intention to separate from
family to enjoy the share in severalty was unequivocal and that the
exclusive possession by way of separate cultivation was admitted by
this applicant. He submits that if this is so, not the ratio of the case
of Sakhahari Parwatrao Karahale (supra) but the ratio of case of
Tanushree Basu and Others ..vs.. Ishani Prasad Basu and
Others, reported in (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 791 would be
applicable to the facts of this case. Thus, he submits that the
respondent Nos.2 and 3 have a right in law to defend their separate
and exclusive possession, which is basically of permissive nature,
till they are dispossessed by due process of law and therefore, he
supports the impugned order.
06] The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 supports
the argument of learned counsel for the applicant.
cra95.17.J.odt 5/11
07] On going through the pleadings in the plaint, one can
see that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 have admitted that the suit
property is a joint family property, comprising agricultural land, in
two parts, bearing Survey No.9 admeasuring 8 hectares and 64 R
situated at village Umardari, Taluka Barshitkali, Distt. Akola, that
the respondent Nos.2 and 3 as well as the applicant and respondent
No.1 have their specific undivided share in this property and that
this property is yet to be physically partitioned. They have also
admitted that although the previous suit which was for partition
came to be decreed by the Civil Court on 13 th October, 2014
between these parties, an appeal filed against that judgment and
decree by the present applicant before the Court of District Judge,
Akola is still pending for final disposal. In the present plaint,
however, the respondent Nos.2 and 3 have nowhere specifically
contended that their exclusive possession arises out of some family
arrangement between all the co-parceners or the consent given by
all the co-parceners or co-sharers. They also do not specifically
plead that the applicant or for that matter any other co-sharers
never raised any objection to their exclusive possession. They do
not say as well categorically that theirs was a permissive possession
resulting from some mutual arrangement. All that they submit is that
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Devkinandan, the husband and father of respondent Nos.2 and 3
respectively, came into exclusive possession of the suit property
after the death of the common ancestor Parmeshwarlal and that
after the death of Devkinandan, respondent Nos.2 and 3 received
the exclusive possession of the suit property. It is not their case
that Devkinandan or they came into exclusive possession of the suit
property on account of some mutual agreement between all the co-
sharers, rather their pleadings show that the basis of their
possession is closeness of Devkinandan to Parmeshwarlal and
assistance given by the former to the latter in cultivation and
respondent Nos.2 and 3 being sons of Devkinandan. In the case of
Sakhahari Parwatrao Karahale (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that once it is pleaded that all the co-parceners had undivided
share in the joint family property, the possession held by one of the
co-sharers would be the possession on behalf of all the co-sharers.
It further held that in such a case even if it is pleaded that the
possession of one of the co-sharers is exclusive to the remaining co-
sharers, such possession in law would be a possession for and on
behalf of all the co-sharers. With the pleadings being what they
are, one would have to say that in this case also the exclusive
possession contended to be held by the respondent Nos.2 and 3
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would have to be understood as the possession not only for
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and but also on behalf of all the remaining
co-sharers.
08] The learned advocate for the respondent Nos.2 and 3
has argued that as no objection was taken to the exclusive
possession of the joint family property by the other co-sharers
including this applicant, it has to be understood that the possession
in this case was of permissive nature and the permissiveness would
have to be considered as flowing from failure of the applicant and
respondent No.1 to take objection to their exclusive possession till
October, 2016, when the cause of action to file this suit arose. He
also seeks to draw support in this regard from the findings recorded
by the Civil Court in the judgment rendered in Special Civil Suit
No.24 of 2001.
09] I am not impressed by this argument. The findings
recorded by the Civil Court in judgment rendered in Special Civil
Suit No.24 of 2001 are not the essence of it's interpretation of only
the pleadings in the plaint in that suit but the interpretation of
plaint pleadings, pleadings in the written statement and evidence
cra95.17.J.odt 8/11
led by the parties. Therefore, these findings, cannot be considered
to be the pleadings of the respondent Nos.2 and 3. On the
contrary, these findings are yet to attain finality as appeal preferred
against the judgment is pending and respondent Nos.2 and 3 admit
that. It would then follow that these findings cannot claim any
equivalence to unequivocal pleadings in the plaint itself. If any
reliance was to be placed on the findings, which are now disputed,
it was necessary for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 to have also
pleaded in specific terms that the basis of their exclusive possession
was the permissiveness arising from inaction on the part of the
applicant as well as the findings recorded by a Civil Court in that
regard. But that is not the case here. Apart from it, it is significant
to point out here that the Civil Court has infact recorded no clear
finding about the possession being permissive in its nature. It has
rather said (para 370) that intention to separate from family to
enjoy share in severalty is unequivocal. This finding is arrived at by
the Court by way of an interference through process of
interpretation, which process cannot be applied to understand the
pleadings in the plaint. Plaint pleadings are to be considered on
their face value and taking them to be correct as they appear to be.
So this finding cannot be taken as a pleading in the plaint raised by a
cra95.17.J.odt 9/11
party. On the contrary, the specific pleadings are that the suit
property is a joint family property in which all co-sharers have their
respective undivided shares. In this suit, apart from absence of a
pleading of permissive possession, there is also no pleading that by
conduct of the parties the intention to separate was revealed long
ago and was put into effect and that it was this intention which
formed the basis of exclusive possession. So, I do not see any
substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondent
Nos.2 and 3 in this regard.
10] In the case of Tanusree Basu and Others relied upon by
the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3, same
proposition of law as held in the case of Sakhahari Parwatrao
Karhale (supra) has been laid down. In paragraph No.13 of the
judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that there cannot be any
doubt or dispute as a general proposition of law that possession of
one co-owner would be treated to be possession of all, but the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the facts peculiar to that case held that the
plaintiffs themselves having admitted that by reason of mutual
adjustment the parties were in separate possession of three flats,
the separate possession of the disputed property would have to be
cra95.17.J.odt 10/11
acknowledged and accordingly limited injunction would have to be
granted. Such being not the facts of this case, no respite as thought
to be due to the plaintiffs in the case of Tanusree Basu and Others
(supra), can be given to the respondent Nos.2 and 3 - plaintiffs in
the present case.
11] The reliefs claimed in the plaint are of permanent
injunction on cutting of standing crops and prohibitory injunction
against dispossession for a particular period of time. But as held in
the case of Sakhahari Parwatrao Karahale (supra), in a suit of the
present nature, wherein there is no basis pleaded for the retention
of the exclusive possession of the joint family property by the
plaintiffs, no injunction can be granted to one co-sharer against
other co-sharers. Going by the law, the facts pleaded in the plaint
show that this suit is barred by law as no injunction as claimed
here could be sought against the other co-sharers. The impugned
order being contrary to the settled principles of law, needs to be
quashed and set aside. I find that plaint is liable to be rejected
being barred by law under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Hence the order.
cra95.17.J.odt 11/11
O R D E R.
(i) The revision application is allowed and the impugned
order is quashed and set aside.
(ii) The application vide Exh.46 is allowed.
(iii) The plaint is rejected.
(iv) Parties to bear their own costs.
JUDGE
PBP
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