Girijashankar S/O Baladin ... vs State Of Mah. Thru. Secty. & 3 Ors. ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 5114 Bom

   jlpa385of08                                                                       1



             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                           NAGPUR BENCH

               LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.385 OF  2008
                                 IN
                   WRIT PETITION NO. 2810 OF 2000


  Girijashankar S/o. Baladin Jaiswal,
  aged about 70 years, Occ. Business,
  R/o. Hamalpur, Amravati.

           (Legal representatives of Appellant
           are brought on record as per 
           courts Order dtd. 29.11.2016)
       i.  Virendra s/o. Girijashankar Jaiswal,
         Aged about 57 years, 
          R/o. Hamalpur, Amravati

      ii.  Shrinivas s/o. Girijashankar Jaiswal,
           Aged about 48 years, 
           R/o. Hamalpur, Amravati                          ...   APPELLANTS

                               Versus

  1. The State of Maharashtra,
     through the Secretary, 
     Home Department, 
     Mantralaya Mumbai - 32.

  2. The Commissioner of State Excise,
     Maharashtra State, Mumbai

  3. The Collector, Amravati

  4. Shriram Bhaiyalal Jaiswal                       - Dead
           through LRs.
       i) Chandrakalabai wd/o. Shriram Jaiswal       - Deleted
      ii)  Ramesh S/o. Shriram Jaiswal,
           Aged about 50 years, Occ. Service,
           R/o. Belpura, Amravati.                  ...   RESPONDENTS




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    jlpa385of08                                                                        2



  Shri. V.V. Bhangde, Senior Counsel for appellants.
  Shri. A.V. Palshikar, AGP for respondent 1 to 3.
  Shri. S.S. Alaspurkar, Counsel for respondent 4.
                     .....

                                CORAM :       B.P. DHARMADHIKARI &
                                              ROHIT B. DEO, JJ.

JULY 27, 2017.

ORAL JUDGMENT : (PER ROHIT B. DEO, J.)

Heard Shri M.G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel with

Shri S. Tapadia, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri

A.V. Palshikar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent

1 to 3 and Shri S. Alaspurkar, learned Counsel for respondent 4.

2. An inter se dispute between two partners, Shri

Girjashankar Balaji Jaiswal and Shri Shriram Bhaiyalal Jaiswal, who

are now no more and are being represented by their respective legal

heirs, has reached this Court in the present letters patent appeal. At

stake is a Country Liquor License in Form CL-III.

3. The license was granted in favour of respondent 4 Shri

Shriram Bhaiyalal Jaiswal in the year 1973. Shri Shriram Jaiswal

and appellant - Girijashankar Jaiswal entered into a Partnership-

Deed dated 30.03.1979, which was recognized by the State Excise

Department pursuant to which in the year 1981, the license came to

be issued in the joint names of Shri Shriram Bhaiyalal Jaiswal and

Shri Girijashankar Balaji Jaiswal.

4. By an order dated 06.05.1998, the Collector, Amravati,

was pleased to order the deletion of the name of Shri Shriram from

the said license. This order was challenged before the

Commissioner, State Excise, in Appeal 150 of 1998. The

Commissioner, State Excise by an order dated 11.12.1998, was

pleased to confirm the deletion order passed by the Collector. Shri

Shriram Jaiswal approached the Hon'ble Minister under Section 138

of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as

the Act) and the proceedings culminated into an order dated

16.12.1999, by and under which the Hon'ble Minister set aside the

orders of the Collector and the Commissioner, by which the name of

Shri Shriram Jaiswal was directed to be deleted. This order of the

Hon'ble Minister was assailed before the learned Single Judge in

Writ Petition 2810 of 2000, which is dismissed by the impugned

order dated 24.10.2008. It is this order of the learned Single Judge,

which is under challenge in the present appeal.

5. The facts which are relevant for determination of the

issue involved, are few and mostly undisputed and we shall be

adverting thereto whenever necessary at a later stage in the

judgment.

6. Shri Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant

raised two contentions before us. The first contention is that the

order impugned is unsustainable and falls foul of the doctrine of

merger. He has taken us through the memo of revision dated

16.12.1999 preferred by respondent 4 before the Hon'ble Minister

and has invited our attention to the absence of a specific challenge

to the order of the Commissioner in the memo of revision. The

learned Senior Counsel points out that the only reference to the

order of the Commissioner in the memo of revision is in paragraph 3

and in the entire memo of revision, there is no ground of challenge

to the order of the Commissioner. He urges that even the prayer

clause of the memo of revision, does not make a reference much less

seeks a relief qua the order of the Commissioner.

7. The learned Senior Counsel further urges that the view

taken by the learned Single Judge that the order of the Hon'ble

Commissioner is in exercise of suo motu revisional power, is

erroneous and is a view which militates against the settled legal

position. He contends that suo motu exercise of revisional or review

powers, has to be brought to the notice of the parties to the

proceedings and that in any event it must be asserted by the

authority exercising such powers that recourse has been taken to

suo motu powers. The next contention of learned Senior Counsel is

that even on facts, the view taken by the Hon'ble Minister, which is

confirmed by the learned Single Judge, is unsupported by the

material on record and cannot, therefore, sustain the scrutiny of

law. He urges that a finding of fact is recorded by the Collector, the

Commissioner and also by the Hon'ble Minister that respondent 4

herein neither participated in the business carried on under the

license nor did he receive any share of profit therein. He further

urges that separate applications seeking deletion of name of

4espondent 4 - Shri Shriram Jaiswal were made by Shri Shriram

Jaiswal and Girijashankar Jaiswal. Pursuant to the said applications,

their statements were recorded in the year 1983 by the Inspector in

the office of the Superintendent of State Excise which reveal that

Girjashankar had expressed his unwillingness to continue as a

partner. The learned Senior Counsel urges that the finding of fact

recorded by the Collector and the Commissioner could not have

been interfered with by the Hon'ble Minister in view of the well

recognized limitations of exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

8. Shri Palshikar, learned Assistant Government Pleader

supported the order of the Hon'ble Minister.

9. Shri Alaspurkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

respondent 4 (now through his legal heirs) urges that the doctrine

of merger has no relevance much less applicability to the facts of the

present appeal. He urges that a holistic reading of the entire memo

of revision will bring to fore the intent to also challenge the order of

the Commissioner. He submits that the memo of revision may have

been unhappily drafted, however, that the fact that there is a

reference to the order of the Commissioner in the memo of revision

and the fact that relief is sought against the order of Prohibition

Officer and the Collector would inherently imply and include a

challenge to the order of the Commissioner. He urges, in the

alternative, that even if it is assumed arguendo that there was no

challenge to the order of the Commissioner in the revision before

the Hon'ble Minister, the order made by the Hon'ble Minister would

be an order in exercise of suo motu revisional powers under Section

138 of the Act. He urges that undisputedly the Hon'ble Minister did

possess suo motu revisional powers under Section 138 of the Act and

that 'State' not being a natural person, has to exercise suo motu

revisional powers on the basis of information received from any

source and that the application moved by respondent 4 before the

Hon'ble Minister would be one such source. He urges that no fault

can be found with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that

even if the order of the Commissioner was not challenged, the order

of the Hon'ble Minister can be considered to be an order made in

exercise of suo motu revisional powers.

10. We may now deal with the first contention of Shri

Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel. The doctrine of merger is neither

a doctrine of the Constitutional law nor is recognized by the

statutory law. The doctrine of merger is a product of the common

law and the juristic justification is the principle that there cannot be

in existence more than one operative order or decision on the same

subject at the same time.

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kunhayammed & Ors.

Vs. State of Kerla and Anr., AIR 2000 SC 2587 - explains the

doctrine of merger to be a common law doctrine founded on the

principle of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. The

doctrine of merger would apply not only to judicial fora but also to

quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals. It would be apposite to

refer to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said

judgment in paragraphs 12 and 43 of the report which read thus:

"12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there can not be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject - matter at a given point of time. When decree or order passed by inferior Court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, through the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior Court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior Court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.

"43. We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme court can not and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reverse or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court can not be reversed or modified at the SLP stage. Obviously that order can not also be affirm at the SLP stage.

To sum up our conclusions are:

(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverse or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the sub-ordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the later which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.

(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stage. First stage is upto the disposal of prayer for Special Leave to file an appeal. The Second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave petition is converted into an appeal.

(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the contend of subject matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the incapability or merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may revers, modify or affirm the judgment - decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore, be applied to the former and not to the latter.

(iv)An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion

so as to how the appeal being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, that is gives reason for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implication. Firstly, the statement of law contend in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the supreme court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex court of the Country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, tribunal or authority below has stood merge in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting Special Leave Petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res- judicata. In subsequent proceedings between the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted an appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.

(vii) on an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub rule (I) of Rule (1) of Order 47 of the C.P.C."

In Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd. Vs. Shri. Ratan Lal Singh AIR,

1974 SC 1380 the juristic justification of doctrine of merger is

enunciated thus:

"The juristic justification of the doctrine of merger may be sought in the principle that there cannot be, at one and the same time, more than one operative order governing the same subject-matter. Therefore, the judgment of an inferior Court, If subjected to an examination by the superior Court, ceases to have existence in the eye of law and is treated as being superseded by the judgment of the superior Court. In other words, the judgment of the inferior Court loses its identity by its merger with the judgment of the superior Court."

We may also fruitfully refer to a Seven Judges judgment of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore...Vs... State of Madhya

Pradesh reported, AIR 1990 SC 10, which inter alia holds that

there is no legal justification to make any distinction between Court

and Tribunals as regards applicability of doctrine of merger. The

cause of action must be taken to arise not from the date of original

adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher

authority where statutory remedy is provided. The Seven Judges

judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court has applied the doctrine of

merger to decision of the departmental tribunals. It is, therefore,

well settled, that the doctrine of merger would apply with full vigor

to orders of proceedings not only of the Courts but also to quasi-

judicial authorities and Tribunals. It is equally well settled, that for

the applicability of the doctrine of merger, no distinction can be

made between an order of confirmation and an order of

modification or reversal.

12 We may not proceed to examine the contention of the

learned Senior Counsel that the order of the Hon'ble Minister is

liable to be set aside on the short ground that in the absence of the

challenge to the order of a Commissioner, the order of the Hon'ble

Minister is inconsistent with and militates against the doctrine of

merger. We have given our consideration to the submission of the

learned counsel Shri. Alaspurkar who made an valiant attempt to

persuade us to hold that although the memo of revision is not

happily worded, the intent to also challenge the order of the

Commissioner is manifest and writ large on the face of the

pleadings. We are afraid, we are not in a position to accept the said

submission. The only reference to the order of the Commissioner in

the memo of revision is in paragraph 3 of the memo. The said

reference is to a factual position that the order of Collector was

challenged before the Commissioner. However, a perusal of the

prayer clause would reveal that the order of Commissioner was not

challenged and no relief was sought qua the said order. We have

further given due consideration to the entire memo of revision and

having done so, we are not in a position to hold that there was any

challenge whether explicit or implicit to the order of Commissioner.

Shri Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the

written submissions placed on record before the Hon'ble Minister in

response to the notice issued to the appellant. He would further

contend that a specific submission was made in the written

submissions challenging the maintainability of the revision on the

ground that the order of the Commissioner has not been challenged.

It is unfortunate, that despite the said objection, the respondent 4

took no steps to amend the memo of revision and to incorporate an

appropriate challenge to the order of the Commissioner. We are

therefore, inclined to agree with the contention of the learned

Senior Counsel Shri. Bhangde that the Hon'ble Minister's

adjudicatory order falls foul of the doctrine of merger. We are also

not in a position to accept the contention of learned Advocate Shri.

Alaspurkar that in the absence of any prejudice it would not be

permissible and at any rate would not be appropriate to invoke the

doctrine of merger. The raison d'etre of the doctrine of merger is

that there ought not to be more than one operative and enforceable

order governing the same subject matter at the same time. Such

being the juristic justification of the doctrine, we are not in a

position to accept the submission of the learned Counsel Shri.

Alaspurkar that the doctrine of merger would have applicability only

if a prejudice is demonstrated.

13. Faced with the obstacle posed by the doctrine of

merger, the learned Counsel Shri Alaspurkar would contend that the

view taken by the learned Single Judge that the order of the Hon'ble

Minister could be considered to be an exercise of suo motu revisional

powers, is unexceptionable. He submits that the suo motu revisional

or review powers vested in any authority would have to be exercised

on the basis of some material or information brought to the notice of

the authority. State is not a natural person and therefore, the

material or information warranting exercise of revisional powers

must be necessarily brought to the notice of the State/its officers

and one such mode is an application which may be moved even by

the aggrieved party.

We have no quarrel with the proposition that on an

application by an aggrieved party, here respondent 4, the Minister

could have exercised suo motu revisional powers. However, the

difficulty in accepting the submission of learned Counsel Shri.

Alaspurkar is that it is not the stand of either the authority or of the

State before the learned Single Judge, that the Hon'ble Minister has

exercised suo motu revisional powers. It is further not in dispute

that the Hon'ble Minister did not put the parties on notice that he

was inclined to exercise suo motu revisional powers. We may

fruitfully make a reference to a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court

in M/s. D.N. Roy and Ors Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1971 SC

1045 and in particular to paragraphs 6 & 7 which read thus:

"6. The impugned order of the Central Government does not show that it was made in the exercise of its suo-motu power. It is purported to have been made on the basis of the application made by the 5th respondent under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. In paragraph 3 of this order it says "in view of the position explained above the Central Government in exercise of their revisionary power conferred by Rule 55 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and all other powers enabling in this behalf hereby set aside the order of the State government contained in their letter No. A/MM/4032/62-1789 M dated 31.3.1962.

"7. It is true that the order in question also refers to "all other powers enabling in this behalf". But in its return to the writ petition the Central Government did not plead that the impugned order was passed in exercise of its suo-motu powers. We agree that if the exercise of a power can be traced to an existing power even though that power was not purported to have been exercised, under certain circumstances, the exercise of the power can be upheld on the strength of an undisclosed but undoubted power. But in this case the difficulty is that at no stage the Central Government intimated to the appellant that it was exercising its suo-motu power. At all stages it purported to act under Rules 54 and 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. If the

Central Government was intend to exercise its suo-motu power it should have intimated that fact as well as the grounds on which it proposed to exercise that power to the appellant and given him an opportunity to show cause against the exercise of suo-motu power as well as against the grounds on which it wanted to exercise its power. Quite clearly the Central Government had not only intimated to the appellant the grounds mentioned in the application made by the 5th respondent but also the comments of the State Government, the appellant had adequate opportunity to put forward his case. This conclusion in our judgment is untenable. At no stage the appellant was informed that the Central Government proposed to exercise it suo motu power and asked him to show cause against the exercise of such a power. Failure of the Central Government to do so, in our opinion, vitiates the impugned order."

The law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court mandates

that the authority inclined to exercise suo motu revisional powers

must intimate to the parties its intent and the person must be asked

to show cause against exercise of such suo-motu power. M/s. D.N.

Roy and Ors Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. in AIR 1971 SC 1045 is

followed by the Supreme Court Shahabad Cooperative Sugar Mills

Ltd ..Vs.. Spl. Secretary to Government of Haryana Corporation

& Ors., (2006)12 SCC 404 and in paragraph 26, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court observes that if suo motu power is to be exercised, it

has to be stated so.

With the assistance of the learned Counsel, we have given due

consideration to the pleadings and the order of the Hon'ble Minister.

Learned Senior Counsel Shri. Bhangde is right in contending that

the appellant was neither put on notice that the Hon'ble Minister

was inclined to exercise suo motu power nor did the authority or the

State Government assert even before the learned Single Judge that

the Hon'ble Minister has exercised suo motu revisional power. With

deepest respect to the view taken by the learned Single Judge, we

are not in a position to agree with the finding that the Hon'ble

Minister had exercised suo motu power. At this stage, the learned

Counsel Shri. Alaspurkar prays for liberty to amend the memo of

revision. We are afraid that the submission deserves to be noted

only to be rejected.

14. Shri S.S. Alaspurkar, learned Counsel relies on the

judgment of Kuldeep Kumar Dubey and Ors. vs. Ramesh Chandra

Goyal (D) Th. Lrs., AIR 2015 SC 1135, to contend that mere error,

defect or irregularity in pleadings not affecting merits or jurisdiction

of the Court ought not to be a ground for reversal of an order or

decree. Perusal of the judgment reveals that the suit was held not

maintainable in view of defect of formal nature in description of the

parties. It is in these facts, that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that

an error not affecting the merits or jurisdiction could have been

corrected by the Court under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure

Code and that the appellate Court was not justified in reversing the

decree of the trial Court on a technicality, which did not affect the

merits of the case. Shri S.S. Alaspurkar, learned Counsel also relies

on the judgment of Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalkrishna Setty, AIR

1999 SC 3029, to contend that pleadings should be read as a whole

to gather the true spirit behind the plea. He further relies on the

judgment of Everest Apartments Co-operative Housing Society

Ltd., Bombay vs. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1966 SC

1449, to contend that a revisional power ought to be construed

liberally and a party is not prohibited from inviting the attention of

the Government to facts, which manifest that a glaring injustice has

been done or a patently illegal order is made. We do not, and

indeed cannot, have any difficulty in accepting the proposition of

law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, we have

already held that failure to challenge the appellate order of the

Commissioner, which is an order passed in statutory appeal under

Section 137 of the Act, attracts the doctrine of merger and such

failure cannot be compared with a technical or formal error or

deficient pleadings, which was under consideration in the two

judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court namely, (1) Kuldeep

Kumar Dubey and Ors. vs. Ramesh Chandra Goyal (D) Th. Lrs.,

and (2) Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalkrishna Setty. The third

judgment of Everest Apartments Co-operative Housing Society

Ltd., Bombay vs. State of Maharashtra and others has no

application to the factual matrix inasmuch as the existence of power

with the Hon'ble Minister to suo motu revise any order of the

subordinate authorities and the entitlement of the respondent 4 to

bring the necessary information to the notice of the Hon'ble Minister

even by moving an application under Section 138 of the Act, is not

in dispute. We may reiterate, that in view of the law settled by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Minister was not only duty

bound to put the parties on notice that a suo motu exercise of power

was intended, further the authority and at any rate the State before

the learned Single Judge ought to have asserted that suo motu

revisional power was indeed invoked and exercised. In any view of

the matter, we are inclined to hold that order of the Hon'ble

Minister is hit by the doctrine of merger.

15. The next contention of the learned Senior Counsel Shri

M.G. Bhangde is that the orders impugned are vulnerable even on

facts. He would further urge that the Partnership-deed dated

30-3-1979 was taken note of by the Collector, the Commissioner

and the Hon'ble Minister and was placed on record before the

learned Single Judge. He invites our attention to Clause 8 of the

Partnership-deed, to contend that in view of the said clause, the

legal heirs of Shriram Bhaiyalal Jaiswal (respondent 4) do not have

any right to be inducted as partners and that such right is expressly

reserved only in favour of the legal heirs of the appellant

Girjashankar Jaiswal. He would urge that the findings of fact

recorded by the Collector and the Commissioner were based on

material on record and in view of the well recognised limits of

revisional jurisdiction, the Hon'ble Minister was precluded from

interfering with a view which was an imminently plausible view.

Shri M.G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel contends that apart

from the fact that the statements recorded in the year 1983 manifest

the unwillingness of respondent 4 to continue as partner, other

circumstances like the admitted non-participation in the business

and non-sharing of the profits thereof would indicate that

respondent 4-Shriram Bhaiyalal Jaiswal did a volte-face in the year

1994. He would further urge that even on facts the direction to

delete the name of respondent 4 from the licence issued by the

Collector and confirmed by the Commissioner, is unexceptionable

and the Hon'ble Minister committed a serious error in upsetting the

finding of fact in revisional jurisdiction. Per contra, Shri

S.S. Alaspurkar, learned Counsel would urge, while not disputing

that respondent 4 was not participating in the business from 1983

onwards and was not receiving any share in the profit, that these

circumstances, are not conclusive. He contends that respondent 4

was illegally deprived of the right of participation and share in

profits and certain blank papers have been misused by appellant to

make out a case for deletion of name of respondent 4 from the

licence. Learned Counsel contends that respondent 4 categorically

disputed his authorship of the application for deletion pursuant to

which the Collector ultimately ordered deletion. Both the learned

Counsel have taken us through the material on record and have

advanced contentious submissions on factual aspects of the

controversy. In view of the course, which we propose to adopt, we

refrain from making any observation on the merits of the rival

contentions on facts.

16. In the light of the view which we have taken on the

applicability of the doctrine of merger and the nature of the order of

the Hon'ble Minister, we are inclined to quash and set aside the

order of the Hon'ble Minister dated 05-07-2000 and the judgment

and order of the learned Single Judge dated 24-10-2008 in Writ

Petition 2810/2000. The deletion of the name of respondent 4 from

the licence is not decisive of the rights and obligations under the

Partnership-deed. The order of deletion shall be subservient and

must yield to any determination by the competent civil Court, in the

event, either of the parties intend to approach the civil Court for

appropriate relief. Every contention relating to the factual dispute

between the parties relating to the licence in question including

disputes relating to the partnership, is left expressly open. We direct

that the parties shall maintain status quo for a period of three

months from the date of this judgment. The parties are at liberty to

approach the civil Court within the said period, if so advised, and

shall abide by further orders of the civil Court. The civil Court shall

not be influenced, directly or indirectly, by any observation made in

this judgment.

With these observations and directions, we allow the appeal.

No order as to costs.

                    JUDGE                                      JUDGE
                                               ******



  Belkhede, PA