Bombay High Court
Pradip Mittal S/O Kaushal Kishore ... vs Central Bureau Of Investigation ... on 19 July, 2017
Bench: Ranjit More
1 WP 1983-17.doc-912
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1983 OF 2017
Pradip Mittal S/o. Kaushal Kishore Mittal. ] ... Petitioner
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigations & Ors. ] ... Respondents
Mr. Vikram Nankani, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Sujay Kantawala i/b
Mr. Yogesh M. Rohira for Petitioner.
Mr. H. S. Venegaonkar for CBI - Respondent Nos.1 to 3.
Mr. S. R. Shinde, APP for State.
CORAM :- RANJIT MORE &
SARANG V. KOTWAL, JJ.
RESERVED ON :- 5 JULY, 2017
PRONOUNCED ON :- 19 JULY, 2017
ORDER (PER : SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.) :-
1. The present petition is filed by the petitioner for various
prayers. Initially, it was filed for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that the transit remand granted to the CBI for the
custody of the present petitioner was illegal. Subsequently, the
petition was amended and two other prayers were added. By the
amended prayer (aa), the petitioner prayed for setting aside the order
dated 03/05/2017 granting transit remand of the petitioner and the
prayer (aaa) was for issuance of a writ of mandamus or other
directions, for directing continuation of the proceedings in respect of
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FIR No. RC 8(A)/2017-CBI, ACB, Vishakhapatanam, only before the
Special Judge for CBI cases at Mumbai.
2. The brief facts borne out from the petition and its
annexures are as follows :-
An FIR was lodged at Vishakhapatanam bearing number
RC 08(A)/2017 of CBI on 01/05/2017 under Sections 7 and 12 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The said FIR listed 8 accused.
The first accused was the Commissioner of Income Tax, Appeal - 30,
Mumbai. The entire accusation in the FIR revolves around the said
accused demanding and obtaining illegal gratification. He is the only
public servant amongst the 8 accused who were named in the FIR,
and since he was a public servant, the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 were applied. The FIR was lodged on the basis
of reliable information received in the office of the Superintendent of
Police, CBI, ACB, Vishakhapatanam. The said accused no.1 was
deciding income tax matters related to M/s. Balaji Trust (named as
accused no.2 in the FIR). The said trust was represented by its trustee
ESSAR Investments Limited, Mumbai. The said matter was handled
on behalf of the said M/s. Balaji Trust by the CA firm M/s. G. K.
Choksi, Ahmedabad, through one Shreyas Parikh (named as accused
no.3 in the FIR). This trust, through the said CA, had agreed to pay a
hefty bribe running into crores, as illegal gratification to the accused
no.1, on his demand for a favourable order in the matter.
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3. The present petitioner was employed by the afore-
mentioned ESSAR group and he was monitoring the progress of the
matter of paying the illegal gratification to the accused no.1. The
petitioner was in touch with the accused no.3 Shreyas Parikh and the
accused no.4 Gautam Choksi, both representing M/s. G. K. Choksi at
Mumbai. The favourable order in the present matter was passed by
the accused no.1, which was uploaded on 21/04/2017. The FIR
further mentioned that, at the time of lodging of the FIR, the accused
no.1 was on leave and was at Vishakhapatanam, Andhra Pradesh.
The said accused no.1 was in close association with one Suresh Jain
(named as accused no.7 in the FIR). He was in the bullion and real
estate business at Vishakhapatanam. The accused no.1 had contacted
the accused no.2 Shreyas Parikh through the accused no.7 Suresh Jain
on 25/04/2017. On behalf of accused no.1, Suresh Jain (accused
no.7) contacted Gautam Choksi (accused no.4) and enquired about
the delivery of the agreed payment of illegal gratification.
4. On 27/04/2017, one Vipin Bajpai (named as accused no.6
in the FIR), was directed by the petitioner to deliver an installment of
illegal gratification to Shreyas Parikh (accused no.3). Thereafter, one
Manish Jain (named accused no.8 in the FIR), on instructions of
accused no.7 Suresh Jain, took the delivery of the amount of illegal
gratification.
5. On 28/04/2017, Manish Jain collected another
installment of the illegal gratification from Vipin Bajpai and confirmed
about the same to Suresh Jain.
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6. On 01/05/2017, the accused no.1 asked the accused no.7
Suresh Jain to deliver part of the amount of the illegal gratification
received by the said Suresh Jain on his behalf. The said delivery of
the amount was to take place at the residence of the accused no.1 on
02/05/2017. Based on this information, the afore-mentioned FIR
came to be lodged.
7. Pursuant to the said information, a trap was laid on
02/05/2017 and Mr. B. B. Rajendra Prasad (accused no.1) and Suresh
Jain (accused no.7) were intercepted while handing over and
receiving illegal gratification of 19.34 Lakhs at Vishakhapatanam. The
said amount was recovered from the accused no.1 Mr. B. B. Rajendra
Prasad. Search of the Mercedez-Benz car in which the accused no.7
had reached the residence of accused no.1, yielded an amount of
Rs.2.50 Lakhs which was also seized as being part of the crime
proceeds. Thereafter, pursuant to the voluntary disclosure made by
the accused no.7 Suresh Jain, an amount of Rs.1.50 Crores was
recovered being the balance amount of the illegal gratification which
he had collected on behalf of the accused no.1 Mr. B. B. Rajendra
Prasad. Thus, a total amount of around Rs.1.71 Crores was recovered,
which was the amount of illegal gratification involved in the case.
Both accused nos.1 and 7 were arrested on 03/05/2017.
8. In the meantime, the present petitioner was arrested on
03/05/2017 at approximately 4.00 a.m. in connection with the same
FIR which was lodged at Vishakhapatanam. The CBI i.e. respondent
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no.1 herein, sought transit remand of the petitioner from the CBI
Special Judge at Greater Mumbai to enable them to produce the
petitioner before the competent Court at Vishakhapatanam. The
petitioner, on his part, along with another co-accused Vipin Bajpai,
preferred an application for transit bail for a period of one week to
enable them to approach the concerned Court at Vishakhapatanam,
Andhra Pradesh.
9. The present petition is preferred by the petitioner as
mentioned earlier. The main contention of the petitioner is that the
entire transaction has taken place in Mumbai, and neither the
investigating agency nor the Court at Vishakhapatanam has any
jurisdiction to deal with the said crime and secondly, this Court has
jurisdiction to transfer the FIR registered vide RC 8(A)/2017-CBI,
ACB and further proceedings from Vishakhapatanam to Mumbai.
10. We have heard Mr. Vikram Nankani, learned Senior
Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. H. S. Venegaonkar, learned
Advocate for respondent nos.1 to 3. Mr. Nankani, in support of his
contention that this Court can entertain the present petition and direct
transfer of investigation and further proceedings from
Vishakhapatanam to Mumbai, relied on the judgment in the case of
Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,
reported in (2000) 7 Supreme Court Cases, 640. In the said case,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the powers of High Courts
in issuing certain writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Paragraph nos.16, 17, 22, 27, 28 and 29 of the said judgment read thus :-
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"16. Article 226 of the Constitution of India which
provides the power to High Courts to issue certain writ
reads as follows :
"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.--
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32,
every High Court shall have power, throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any
Government, within those territories directions,
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to
issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also be
exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of
such person is not within those territories."
17. From the provision in clause (2) of Article 226 it is
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clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ
petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause
of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part,
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
18. .....
19. .....
20. .....
21. .....
22. So far as the question of territorial jurisdiction
with reference to a criminal offence is concerned the main
factor to be considered is the place where the alleged
offence was committed.
23. .....
24. .....
25. .....
26. .....
27. Tested in the light of the principles laid down in
the cases noted above the judgment of the High Court
under challenge is unsustainable. The High Court failed
to consider all the relevant facts necessary to arrive at a
proper decision on a question of maintainability of the
writ petition, on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction. The Court based its decision on the sole
consideration that the complainant had filed the
complaint at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the
petitioner had prayed for quashing the said complaint.
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The High Court did not also consider the alternative
prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of
mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to
transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High
Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ
petition that filing of the complaint at Shillong was a
mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass
and pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction
for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ
petition may be one of the relevant criteria for
consideration of the question but cannot be the sole
consideration in the matter. On the averments made in
the writ petition gist of which has been noted earlier it
cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for
filing the writ petition arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.
28. The next question for consideration is regarding
a proper order to be passed in the case.
29. Considering the peculiar fact-situation of the
case we are of the view that setting aside the impugned
judgment and remitting the case to the High Court for
fresh disposal will cause further delay in investigation of
the matter and may create other complications. Instead,
it will be apt and proper to direct that further
investigation relating to complaint filed by J. B. Holdings
Ltd. Should be made by the Mumbai Police."
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11. Thus, from the ratio laid down in the above judgment, it is
clear that, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition. The
question, however, remains that whether in the factual matrix of the
present case, this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and for the said purpose, the
occurrence of incident and events of various dates are required to be
considered in the light of the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
12. Mr. Nankani further submitted that the entire cause of
action has arisen in Mumbai and what took place at Vishakhapatanam
was not an offence or was not even the part of the transaction
relatable to the offences alleged. According to Mr. Nankani, transfer
at Vishakhapatanam was, strictly, change of hands of the tainted
money, from the accused no.1's agent to accused no.1 himself; which,
at best, can be described as 'utilization of amount which was already
received' and cannot be termed as an 'acceptance of the amount
constituting an offence'. Thus, in short, he submitted that, when the
bribe amount was accepted by some person at Mumbai at the behest
of the accused no.1, the offence was complete in Mumbai itself. Mr.
Nankani, therefore, submitted that since no part of the offence took
place at Vishakhapatanam, the investigating agency or the Court at
Vishakhapatanam has no jurisdiction whatsoever in respect of the
present case. In support of his contention, Mr. Nankani relied on the
judgment of CBI, AHD, Patna Vs. Braj Bhushan Prasad and Others,
reported in (2001) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 432.
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13. In the said case of CBI Vs Braj Bhushan (supra), the
question arose as to where the cases should be conducted in respect of
the Court cases styled with the sobriquet "Bihar Fodder Scam Cases"
after the new State of Jharkhand was created. In the cases under
consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, huge sums of money
were withdrawn from the Government Treasury situated in Jharkhand
State and the question which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was, whether the Court at Patna would get jurisdiction
when certain allied activities such as conspiracy or preparation or
even the ensued consequences took place within the jurisdiction of the
Courts at Patna. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after discussing the
relevant provisions, came to the conclusion that the Courts at
Jharkhand had jurisdiction to try all these cases. According to Shri
Nankani, in the said case the amounts were withdrawn from
Jharkhand and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the cases should
be tried at Jharkhand. In the present case also the money was taken
from accused and paid to the agents of the accused no.1 at Mumbai
and therefore the court in Mumbai would get exclusive jurisdiction.
The relevant paragraphs in the said judgment for the purpose of
deciding the present petition are as follows :-
"31. Section 4 of the PC Act relates to the jurisdiction of the
court for trial of offences under that Act. The first sub-
section of Section 4 declares that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code or in any other law, the offences
punishable under the PC Act can be tried "only" by the
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Special Judge, appointed under Section 3(1) of the PC Act.
Now sub-section (2) of Section 4 is the important provision
and it is extracted below :
"4. (2) Every offence specified in sub-section (1) of
section 3 shall be tried by the special Judge for the area
within which it was committed, or, as the case may be,
by the Special Judge appointed for the case, or, where
there are more special Judges than one for such area,
by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf
by the Central Government."
32. Thus, the only court which has jurisdiction to try the
offences under the PC Act is the court of Special Judge
appointed for the areas within which such offences were
committed. When such an offence is being tried sub-section
(3) enables the same Special Judge to try any other offence
which could as well be charged against that accused in the
same trial. So the pivot of the matter is to determine the
area within which the offences was committed.
33. For that purpose it is useful to look at Section 3(1) of
the PC Act. It empowers the Government to appoint Special
Judge to try two categories of offences. The first is, "any
offence punishable under this Act" and the second is, "any
conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any
abetment of any of the offences specified" in the first
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category. So when a court has jurisdiction to try the offence
punishable under the PC Act on the basis of the place where
such offence was committed, the allied offences such as
conspiracy, attempt or abetment to commit that offence are
only to be linked with the main offence. When the main
offence is committed and is required to be tried it is rather
inconceivable that jurisdiction of the court will be
determined on the basis of where the conspiracy or attempt
or abetment of such main offence was committed. It is only
when the main offence was not committed, but only the
conspiracy to commit that offence or the attempt or the
abetment of it alone was committed, then the question
would arise whether the court of the Special Judge within
whose area such conspiracy etc. was committed could try
the case. For our purpose it is unnecessary to consider that
aspect because the charges proceed on the assumption that
the main offence was committed.
34. What is the main offence in the charges involved in all
these 36 cases ? It is undisputed that the main offence is
under Section 13(1)(c) and also Section 13(1)(d) of the PC
Act. The first among them is described thus :
"13. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct,-
(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or
otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to
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him or under his control as a public servant or allows any
other person to do so."
The next offence is described like this :
"13. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct,-
(d) if he,-
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for
any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for
himself or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any
person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without
any public interest."
35. We have no doubt in our mind that the hub of the act
envisaged in first of those two offences is "dishonestly or
fraudulently misappropriates". Similarly, the hinge of the
act envisaged in the second section is "obtains" for himself
or for any other person, any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage by corrupt or illegal means.
36. The above acts were completed in the present cases
when the money has gone out of the public treasuries and
reached the hands of any one of the persons involved.
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Hence, so far as the offences under Section 13(1)(c) and
Section 13(1)(d) are concerned the place where the offences
were committed could easily be identified as the place where
the treasury concerned was situated. It is an undisputed fact
that in all these cases the treasuries were situated within
the territories of Jharkhand State.
37. Thus, when it is certain where exactly the offence under
Section 13 of the PC Act was committed it is an unnecessary
exercise to ponder over the other areas wherein certain
allied activities, such as conspiracy or preparation, or even
the prefatory or incidental acts were done, including the
consequences that ensued.
38. In this context it is useful to refer to Section 181 of the
Code which falls within Chapter XIII, comprising of
provisions regarding jurisdiction of the criminal courts in
inquiries and trials. Section 181 pertains to "place of trial
in case of certain offences". Sub-section (4) thereof deals
with the jurisdiction of the courts if the offence committed is
either criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of
trust. At least four different courts have been envisaged by
the sub-section having jurisdiction for trial of the said
offence and anyone of which can be chosen. They are : (1)
the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was
committed; (2) the court within whose local jurisdiction
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any part of the property which is the subject of the offence
was received; (3) the court within whose local jurisdiction
any part of the property which is the subject of the offence
was retained; and (4) the court within whose local
jurisdiction any part of the property which is subject of the
offence was required to be returned or accounted for, by the
accused.
39. Now, observe the distinction between Section 181(4) of
the Code and Section 4(2) of the PC Act. When the former
provision envisaged at least four courts having jurisdiction
to try a case involving misappropriation the latter provision
of the PC Act has restricted it to one court i.e. the Court of
the Special Judge for the area "within which the offence was
committed". No other court is envisaged for trial of that
offence. We pointed out above that when the charge
contains the offence or offences punishable under the PC Act
as well as the offence of conspiracy to commit or attempt to
commit or any abetment of any such offence, the court
within whose local jurisdiction the main offence was
committed alone has jurisdiction.
40. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel contended that
Section 4(2) of the PC Act does not override the provisions
of the Code regarding jurisdiction because among the four
sub-section included in Section 4 of the said Act, only first
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and the last sub-section are tagged with the non obstante
words "notwithstanding anything contained in the code of
Criminal Procedure". In his submission the fact that sub-
section (2) is freed from the non obstante words would
indicate that the provisions of the Code can as well be read
with that sub-section. In that context learned Senior
Counsel invited our attention to Section 178 to 180 of the
Code, showing that different courts having domain over
different local areas have concurrent jurisdiction to inquire
into or try the offences and hence the trial is permissible in
any one of them.
41. Absence of a non obstante clause linked with Section
4(2) of the PC Act does not lead to a conclusion that the
sub-section is subject to the provisions of the Code. A
reading of Section 4(2) of the Code (not the PC Act) gives
the definite indication that the legal position is the other
way round. Section 4 of the Code is regarding trial of
offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. Sub-
section (1) of it relates only to offences under the Indian
Penal Code. Sub-section (2) relates to "all offences under
any other law". It is useful to read the said sub-section at
this stage :
"4. (2) All offences under any other law shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt
with according to the same provisions, but subject to
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any enactment for the time being in force regulating
the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into,
trying or otherwise dealing with such offences."
42. Thus, if the PC Act has stipulated any place for trial of
the offence under that Act the provisions of the Code would
stand displaced to that extent in regard to the place of trial.
We have, therefore, no doubt that when the offence is under
Section 13(1)(c) or Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act the sole
determinative factor regarding the court having jurisdiction
is the place where the offence was committed."
14. From the ratio laid down in the above judgment, it is clear
that the main determinative factor for deciding the place of offence is
the place where the offence has actually taken place. It is also
observed in the said judgment that when it is certain where exactly
the offence under Section 13 of the PC Act is committed, it is an
unnecessary exercise to ponder over the other areas wherein certain
allied activities such as conspiracy or preparation had taken place or
where the consequences had ensued.
15. In the present case, Mr. H. S. Venegaonkar, learned
Advocate for respondent nos.1 to 3, has made a statement that the
investigating agency has applied Section 13(1)(d) in the present
investigation on 08/05/2017. The offence as defined under Section
13(1)(d) is made out, when the public servant, by corrupt or illegal
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means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing
or pecuniary advantage; or by abusing his position as a public servant,
obtains for himself or any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or while holding office as a public servant,
obtains for any person or any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
without any public interest.
16. In the present case, the allegations are squarely covered
under these 3 categories of Section 13 (1) (d) (i), (ii) and (iii). All
these 3 categories refer to the situation when the public servant
'obtains' such thing or pecuniary advantage. In the present case, we
do not agree with the submission of Mr. Nankani that what took place
at Vishakhapatanam was not acceptance of money. We are of the
opinion that when the public servant actually took physical delivery of
the part of the bribe amount, he had clearly obtained a valuable thing
or pecuniary advantage. We also do not agree with Mr. Nankani's
submission that it was merely the 'utilization of amount and not
acceptance of amount' and that the acceptance was completed in
Mumbai much before the public servant was caught with the bribe
amount at Vishakhapatanam.
17. There is another angle from which the present case can be
looked into and, that is relatable to the wordings of Section 12 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Section 12 reads thus :-
"12. Punishment for abetment of offences defined in
Sec. 7 or Sec. 11 - Whoever abets any offence punishable
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under Sec. 7 or Sec. 11 whether or not that offence is
committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be
not less than six months but which may extend to five
years and shall also be liable to fine."
18. From the said wordings, it is quite clear that Section 12
can be applied in connection with commission of offences punishable
under Section 7 and 11 only. Section 12 does not refer to Section 13
at all. Therefore, Section 13 is a complete offence by itself,
independent of Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Hence when the public servant had accepted the amount at
Vishakhapatanam, the offence under Section 13(1)(d) was completed
and therefore was no question of taking recourse to Section 12 to find
out whether the investigating agency or the Courts at
Vishakhapatanam had any territorial jurisdiction considering the
events which had taken place in Mumbai.
19. Even otherwise, as far as Section 7 is concerned, the
question would arise as to what transpired at Vishakhapatanam would
constitute acceptance of the tainted money or can it be said that the
public servant had obtained the bribe amount. Section 7 reads thus :-
"7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal
remuneration in respect of an official act.-- Whoever,
being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts of
obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any
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person, for himself or for any other person, any
gratification whatsoever, other than legal remuneration, as
a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any
official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the
exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any
person or for rendering or attempting to render any service
or disservice to any person, with the Central Government
or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature
of any State or with any local authority, corporation or
Government company referred to in Cl. (c) of Sec. 2, or
with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall
be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less
than six months but which may extend to five years and
shall also be liable to fine."
In this case, when the accused no.1, who was the public servant, had
actually taken physical delivery of the part of the bribe amount at
Vishakhapatanam, even for the purposes of Section 7, it can be said
that the acceptance as envisaged under Section 7, was made at
Vishakhapatanam.
20. When the petitioner was produced for transit remand
before the Special Court at Mumbai, the learned Special Judge has
considered the FIR. The said FIR was lodged at Vishakhapattanam. In
the said FIR, it is mentioned as to what were the allegations against
the public servant. It was also mentioned that the accused no.7
Suresh Jain who was based at Vishakhapatanam, was instrumental in
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demanding the bribe amount. Thus, at that stage, the learned Special
Judge had sufficient material to conclude that the Court at Vishakhapatanam
had jurisdiction to remand the accused and in our opinion, he has
complied with the provisions of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C.
21. Mr. Nankani has further relied on the case of D.
Velayutham Vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Salem
Town, Chennai, reported in (2015) 12 Supreme Court Cases, 348.
The said decision pertains to the case where accused no.2 was alone
entrapped while accepting the bribe amount and the question was
whether the accused no.1 could claim acquittal merely for non-
handling of the bribe money. In our opinion, this case does not touch
upon the question which we are deciding in the present petition.
22. Mr. Nankani then relied on an unreported case decided by
the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in the case of Nishi Kant Vs.
State of Jharkhand & Anr, decided on 12/07/2011 in TRP (CR)
No.4/2011. In the said case, the demand of illegal gratification was
made from Ranchi and the trap was executed at Ranchi and it was
contended that no occurrence had taken place within the jurisdiction
of Court of Dhanbad. The High Court of Jharkhand had held in that
case that since the complainant was at Dhanbad when the demand
from the complainant was made and since the land involved in the
case was located in the district of Dhanbad, the Court at Dhanbad had
jurisdiction. In our opinion, this case is of no relevance to the facts of
the present case before us. Mr. Nankani also relied on the bail order
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passed by the High Court of Delhi in Bail Application No.444 of
2012 in the case of Sumit Tandon Vs. CBI, decided on 10/04/2012.
In the said case, the FIR was registered at Delhi and the treasury from
which the money was embezzled was at Delhi but the offence of
misappropriation took place in the State of Uttar Pradesh and
therefore, the Court held that the Court at Uttar Pradesh alone was
competent to try the same. The observations in the said case, in fact,
appear to be against the contention of Mr. Nankani in the present case.
23. Applying the ratio of Majithia's case (Supra), we find that,
there is no malafide intention in registration of FIR at
Vishakhapattanam. It is also not possible to hold that no part of the
offence took place at Vishakhapattanam.
24. Thus, looking at from any angle as discussed above, we
are convinced that the investigating agency at Vishakhapatanam has
jurisdiction to investigate the said case and therefore, the FIR registered
at Vishakhapatanam should not be transferred to Mumbai. Consequently,
we also hold that the transit remand order passed by the Special
Judge for CBI at Mumbai does not suffer from any illegality or
impropriety and therefore does not call for any interference.
25. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed.
(SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.) (RANJIT MORE, J.)
URS 22 of 22
