Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 4296 Bom
Judgement Date : 11 July, 2017
1 WP-6689-05
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.6689 OF 2005
1. Union of India,
Through the Secretary,
Ministry of Defence,
South Block, New Delhi
2. The General Manager,
Ordnance Factory,
Varangaon, Tq. Bhusawal,
Dist. Jalgaon ..Petitioners
Vs.
Deepak Arjun Malwadkar,
(now deceased, through
Legal Representative)
Smt. Shobha D. Malwadkar,
Age : 45 years, Occ. Nil,
r/o. Type - II 96/B Ordnance
Estate, Ordnance Factory,
Varangaon, Tq. Bhusawal,
Dist. Jalgaon,
only legal representative
of Deepak Arjun Malwadkar
(now deceased) ..Respondent
--
Mr.D.G.Nagode, Standing Counsel for petitioners
Mr.S.S.Rathi, Advocate for respondent/sole
--
CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE AND
SANGITRAO S. PATIL, JJ.
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON: JUNE 23, 2017
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON:JULY 11, 2017
::: Uploaded on - 12/07/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 13/07/2017 00:45:26 :::
2 WP-6689-05
JUDGMENT
(PER SANGITRAO S. PATIL, J.):
The petitioners have challenged the
judgment and order dated 09.03.2005 passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench, at
Mumbai ("the Tribunal", for short) passed in
Original Application No.787 of 2003, whereby they
have been been ordered to pay salary to the
deceased respondent in respect of the period of
his suspension, after deducting the suspension
allowance, if any, paid to him.
2. The deceased respondent was an employee
working with the Ordnance Factory at Varangaon,
Tq. Bhusawal, Dist. Jalgaon. He came to be
arrested on his wife's sustaining burn injuries on
27.04.1999. In respect of that incident, crime was
registered against the deceased respondent and
others for the offences punishable under Sections
307, 498-A and 506 read with 34 of the Indian
Penal Code. The deceased respondent came to be
3 WP-6689-05
arrested on 01.05.1999. He was in Police Custody
till 04.05.1999 and then in magisterial custody
till 20.05.1999, on which date he was released on
bail. Petitioner no.2 suspended the deceased
respondent by order dated 31.05.1999 with
retrospective effect from 01.05.1999. Sessions
Case No.183 of 1999 was instituted against the
deceased respondent and his other family members.
All the accused persons, including the deceased
respondent, came to be acquitted as per the
judgment dated 22.07.2002. Respondent no.2 then
revoked suspension of the deceased respondent as
per the order dated 08.01.2003 with effect from
09.01.2003. The deceased respondent made a
representation on 15.01.2003 for treating his
suspension period as the period spent on duty.
Petitioner no.2 issued notice to the deceased
respondent to show cause as to why the period of
suspension should not be treated as suspension
because he was acquitted for want of sufficient
evidence.
4 WP-6689-05
3. The deceased respondent replied that
notice and stated that his wife had sustained burn
injuries accidentally and that has been upheld by
the Sessions Court. He, therefore, prayed that
since he has been honourably acquitted, he was
entitled to get his suspension regularised as the
period spent on duty with full back wages and
allowances as well as continuity in service.
Respondent no.2 passed order on 28.02.2003,
rejected the representation of the deceased
respondent and ordered that the period of
suspension of the deceased respondent shall be
treated as justified suspension and not the period
spent on duty for any purpose and the deceased
respondent shall be allowed only the pay and
allowances as had been paid to him during the
period of suspension.
4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by
respondent no.2, the petitioners filed above
5 WP-6689-05
numbered Original Application before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal, after considering the rival claims
of the parties as well as the factual and legal
aspects of the matter, allowed that application.
The said order is under challenge in this
petition.
5. The learned Standing Counsel for the
petitioners, relying on the judgment in the case
of Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar Vs. State of
Maharashtra and ors., (1997)3 SCC 636, submits
that the acquittal of the employee based on
insufficient evidence in a criminal case would not
automatically entitle him to get back wages,
pensionary benefits and other consequential
benefits on his retirement where suspension is
ordered pending criminal case. He submits that the
competent authority is empowered to treat
suspension period as not spent on duty and has
discretion in the matter of treating the
suspension period as the period spent on duty and
6 WP-6689-05
also in granting benefits of continuity in service
as well as back wages and allowances. He submits
that petitioner no.2, after considering the reply
of the deceased respondent, has rightly refused
the relief claimed by the deceased respondent. He
submits that the deceased respondent was acquitted
of the criminal charges because his wife turned
hostile and there was no sufficient evidence to
establish his guilt of the offences. Therefore,
according to him, petitioner no.2 rightly denied
the claim of the deceased respondent.
6. As against this, the learned Counsel for
the deceased respondent submits that the judgment
delivered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case
No.183 of 1999 makes it clear that the wife of the
deceased respondent had sustained burn injuries
accidentally and it is the deceased respondent who
took her to the hospital and saved her life. He
submits that it was a case of no evidence and not
that of insufficient evidence. Since the deceased
7 WP-6689-05
respondent has been given a clean chit, he is
entitled to get his suspension period regularised
as the period spent on duty with continuity in
service and back wages. According to him, the
Tribunal has rightly allowed the application filed
by the deceased respondent and ordered the
petitioners to allow the claims made by the
deceased respondent.
7. The copy of the judgment in Sessions Case
No.183 of 1999 is produced on record. It shows
that the wife of the deceased respondent, who is
now substituted in his place in the Writ Petition
after his demise, sustained burn injuries on
27.04.1999. She was examined before the Court,
wherein she specifically stated that she sustained
burn injuries accidentally. She deposed that the
deceased respondent also sustained injuries since
he tried to extinguish the fire at the time of the
incident. The deceased respondent was medically
examined on 01.05.1999 when blisters were found on
8 WP-6689-05
both of his hands. The deceased respondent himself
had taken his wife to the hospital for treatment
after the incident. This circumstance coupled with
the positive statement of the wife of the deceased
respondent weighed the learned Judge who inferred
that the wife of the deceased respondent had
sustained injuries accidentally. He, therefore,
acquitted the deceased respondent. If all these
facts and circumstances of the case are
considered, it would be clear that the deceased
respondent was not involved in any crime. Thus,
it was a case of no evidence against the deceased
respondent. Consequently, the inference drawn by
petitioner no.2 that the deceased respondent was
acquitted for want of sufficient evidence is
without any basis. It was clear-cut acquittal of
the deceased respondent of the charges levelled
against him.
8. The case of Krishnakant Raghunath
Bibhavnekar (supra) is based on Rule 72 of the
9 WP-6689-05
Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign
Services, and Payment during Suspension, Dismissal
and Removal) Rules, 1991, which is not applicable
to the deceased respondent. Therefore, this
judgment would not be of any help to the
petitioners to controvert the claim of the
deceased respondent.
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioners
further relied on the decision in the case of
Madhukar Namdeo Patil Vs. Chairman, Sudhagad
Education Society and others, 2000(4) Mh.L.J.206
based on Rule 33 of the Maharashtra Employees of
Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules,
1981, wherein it is held that sub-rule (5) of Rule
33 stipulates that the employee in such a case
shall be considered as under suspension for any
period during which he is under preventive
detention or where he is detained in police or
judicial custody for a period exceeding 48 hours
or is undergoing imprisonment. The period of
10 WP-6689-05
suspension under the provisions of sub-rule (5) of
Rule 33 must necessarily come to an end once the
period of judicial or police custody is
terminated. The suspension under this sub-rule is
not indefinite suspension during the pendency of a
criminal prosecution.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioners
then relied on the judgment in the case of Union
of India Vs. Rajiv Kumar, 2003 DGLS (SC) 525
wherein the respondent employee was governed by
the Central Civil Services (Acquisition, Control,
Appeal) Rules, 1965 ("the Rules of 1965", for
short). Since the respondent was governed by the
Rules of 1965, the provisions of Rule 10 were
under consideration of the Hon'ble Apex Court and
it was held that the order in terms of Rule 10(2)
is not restricted in its point of duration or
efficacy to the period of actual detention only.
It continues to be operative unless modified or
revoked under sub-rule (5)(c) as provided under
11 WP-6689-05
sub-rule (5)(a). It is further held that the
deemed suspension would continue to be in force
till anything has been done under Rule 10(5)(c).
11. In the present case, petitioner no.2, as
per the order dated 31.05.1999, had placed the
deceased respondent under deemed suspension with
effect from 01.05.1999, though he was on bail
during the period from 27.05.1999 till 31.05.1999.
The judgments in the cases of Madhukar Namdeo
Patil (supra) and Union of India Vs. Rajiv Kumar
(supra), based on the Rules which are not
applicable to the service conditions of the
deceased respondent, are of no help to the
petitioners to advance their case.
12. The learned Counsel for the deceased
respondent has strongly relied upon the decision
in the case of Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of
India, AIR 1984 SC 380 wherein, the appellant-
employee was working as Upper Division Clerk in
the Defence Accounts Department, who was
12 WP-6689-05
prosecuted for the offence punishable under
Section 19(F) of the Indian Arms Act and Section 5
of the Indian Explosive Substances Act. Pending
investigation, he was convicted by the learned
Magistrate for the offence punishable under
Section 19(F) of the Indian Arms Act and sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for one and half year as
per the judgment of the trial Court. He came to be
dismissed from service. The appellant preferred an
appeal against the conviction and sentence which
was allowed and he was acquitted. The appellant
was reinstated in service. The authority concerned
divided the period of suspension of the appellant
into two parts; the first being the period
intervening his conviction by the Trial Court and
acquittal by the Appellate Court and the second
being from his acquittal till the date of his
reinstatement in service. With regard to the later
part, the authority concerned directed payment of
full salary after giving credit for the suspension
allowance that was drawn by him. However with
13 WP-6689-05
regard to the earlier part the authority concerned
held that the appellant could not be said to be
fully exonerated and therefore, direction was
given to pay 3/4th of his salary for that period of
suspension. As such, he was refused 1/4th of his
salary for that period. The appellant filed a suit
for recovery of that part of salary, which was
decreed by the trial Court, dismissed by the
District Court and that dismissal of the suit was
confirmed by the High Court. The Hon'ble Apex
Court held that keeping in view the facts of the
case that the appellant was never hauled up for
departmental enquiry and that he was prosecuted
and ultimately acquitted and on being acquitted he
was reinstated and was paid full salary for the
period commencing from his acquittal and further
that even for the period in question the concerned
authority has not held that the suspension was
wholly justified because 3/4th of the salary is
ordered to be paid, the approach of the trial
Court was correct and unassailable and the decree
14 WP-6689-05
passed by the trial Court came to be restored.
13. The learned Counsel for the deceased
respondent has pointed to the Office Memo issued
by the Government of India on 19.09.1975 and
particularly Clause (8) wherein, direction have
been given as to what action should be taken when
the appeal/revision against the conviction
succeeds. It is open for the competent authority
either to file an appeal against acquittal or to
initiate departmental enquiry if sufficient
grounds are there to initiate the same. If no such
steps are taken, the action as stated in paragraph
(3) has to be taken. Paragraph (3) reads as
under :-
"3. In cases where neither of the courses mentioned in Paragraph 3 is followed, a formal order should be issued setting aside the previous order imposing the penalty (Standard Form for such order is annexed - Form at the end of this chapter). In cases where the penalty imposed was dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service, full pay allowances will be paid from the date of acquittal to the date of rejoining
15 WP-6689-05
duty and the period counted as duty for all purposes whereas for the period from the date of suspension/removal/dismissal to the date of acquittal, pay and allowance will be allowed as directed by the Competent Authority under FR 54(2) or FR 54(3) and the period treated as duty or non-duty under FR 54(4) OR FR 54(5), as the case may be."
14. The case of the deceased respondent is
governed by the Office Memo and particularly, the
above paragraph. This clause does not give any
discretion to the competent authority in the
matter of considering regularisation of the period
of suspension of an employee by treating it as
suspension only or the period spent on duty and
also in respect of the payment of back wages with
continuity in service.
15. In the above circumstances, since the
deceased respondent was given a clean chit in the
criminal case instituted against him, he would be
entitled to get his suspension period regularised
as the period spent on duty as well as back wages
16 WP-6689-05
with continuity in service. The Tribunal has
rightly considered the facts of the case as well
as the law applicable thereto and has rightly
allowed the Original Application filed by the
deceased respondent. We do not find any reason to
interfere with the judgment and order passed by
the Tribunal.
16. Hence, the order :-
(i) The Writ Petition is dismissed.
(ii) Rule is discharged. (iii) No costs. [SANGITRAO S. PATIL, J.] [T.V. NALAWADE, J.] kbp
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!