Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 3952 Bom
Judgement Date : 4 July, 2017
1 F.A.No.2659/2013
REPORTED
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT
BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
FIRST APPEAL NO.2659 OF 2013
1. Kamalbai W/o Arjun Bhalekar,
Age 50 years, Occ.Household,
2. Sangita W/o Ramesh Bhalekar,
Age 30 years, Occ.Household.
3. Balaji S/o Ramesh Bhalekar,
Age 11 years, Occ.Household,
4. Jyoti D/o Ramesh Bhalekar,
AGe 18 years, Occ.Nil.
5. Nita D/o Ramesh Bhalekar,
Age 13 years, Occ.Nil.
6. Bharat S/o Ramesh Bhalekar,
Age 7 years, Occ.Nil,
All R/o Village Manjari,
Tq. Latur, Dist.Latur.
The claimant Nos.3,5 and 6 are
minors, u/g of their mother
Appellant No.2. ...Appellants.
Versus
1. Sanjay S/o Pandhari Potbhare,
AGe major, Occ.Business,
R/o Village Manjari, Tq.
and Dist.Latur.
2. The Manager,
The New India Assurance Co.Ltd.
::: Uploaded on - 07/07/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 08/07/2017 00:42:16 :::
2 F.A.No.2659/2013
Chandra Nagar, Near Bus
Stand, Latur. ... Respondents.
...
Mr.R.P.Adgaonkar, advocate for the Appellants.
Mr.Amit Yadkikar, advocate for Respondent No.1.
Mr.M.M.Ambhore, advocate for Respondent No.2.
...
CORAM : V.K.JADHAV,J.
Date : 04.07.2017.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Heard finally with consent at the
admission stage.
2. Being aggrieved by the judgment and
award passed by the Member of the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal,Latur, in MACP No.323/2010
dt.2.5.2013, the original claimants have
preferred this appeal.
3. Brief facts giving rise to the present
appeal are as follows :
i) On 29.9.2010, in between 6 to 6-30 p.m.
on Manjari Samangaon road within the limits of
village Manjari, Tq. and District Latur, deceased
Arjun was hit by a tum tum auto rickshaw bearing
registration No.MH-44-A-1084. Deceased Arjun was
a pedestrian at the time of accident. After the
vehicular accident, deceased was brought to his
house in an injured condition in the same auto
rickshaw. However, on reaching to the home, he
was found dead.
ii) The claimants/legal representatives of
deceased Arjun approached the Tribunal by filing
MACP No.323/2010 for grant of compensation under
the various heads. It has been contended in the
claim petition that deceased Arjun at the
material time was milk vendor and he was earning
Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) p.m. out of the
said business. He was also a part time worker in
the restaurant on the monthly salary of
Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand). He was
bread-winner of the family and the appellant-
claimants were depending on his income. The
appellants-claimants have therefore, claimed
compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lacs)
on all the counts.
iii) The Respondent-owner of the auto
rickshaw has strongly resisted the claim petition
by filing the Written Statement. It has been
contended that the claimants in collusion with
the Police have falsely shown the involvement of
the said auto rickshaw in the vehicular accident.
It has been specifically contended that deceased
was hit by un-known vehicle.
iv) The Respondent insurer has also
strongly resisted the claim petition on the
similar grounds and also raised plea of false
involvement of the auto rickshaw in the vehicular
accident. It has been denied that the said auto
rickshaw hit the deceased. In addition to this,
the Respondent insurer has also raised a plea of
breach of terms and conditions of the policy in
the form that the driver of the auto rickshaw was
not holding valid and effective driving license
at the relevant time.
v) The appellants-claimants have adduced
oral and documentary evidence in support of the
contentions. The Respondent-owner of the auto
rickshaw has examined himself to substantiate his
contention. The Respondent-insurer has not
adduced any evidence.
vi) The learned Member of the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Latur, by its impugned
judgment and award in MACP No.323/2010, dismissed
the claim petition. Hence, this appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the
appellants/claimants submits that on the very
next day of the accident the appellant/claimant
No.1 had lodged the complaint in the concerned
Police Station and on the basis of her complaint,
Crime No.65/2010 came to registered against the
unknown vehicle. The learned counsel submits
that though the said crime was initially
registered against the driver of the unknown
vehicle, it has been specifically mentioned in
the complaint that deceased Arjun was brought to
his house in injured condition in auto rickshaw
by its driver Ajay Kaka Potbhare. The learned
counsel submits that Investigating Officer has
thoroughly investigated the crime and submitted
the charge-sheet Exh.27 against the said Ajay
Kaka Potbhare. The learned counsel submits that
the appellants-claimants have succeeded in
proving the involvement of said vehicle auto
rickshaw in a vehicular accident and in the facts
and circumstances of the case the maxim "Res ipsa
loquitur" squarely applies to the case. Deceased
Arjun was a pedestrian and he was given dash by
motor vehicle. In the post mortem report Exh.29
the cause of death is due to intracranial
haemorrhage due to head injury. Learned counsel
submits that the said maxim is resorted to when
an accident is shown to have occurred and the
cause of accident primarily is within the
knowledge of the Respondent-owner. The learned
counsel submits that the Respondent-owner had not
examined his driver Ajay Kaka Potbhare to explain
as to how deceased Arjun had sustained the
injuries and as to why he was brought to his
house in injured condition in said auto rickshaw.
Learned counsel submits that said Ajay Kaka
Potbhare, the driver was in the management of the
vehicle auto rickshaw and as such by application
of said maxim burden shifts on the Respondent-
owner to prove that the driver was not negligent
in causing the death of deceased Arjun in a
vehicular accident. The learned counsel submits
that the Tribunal has not given thought to the
said maxim and dismissed the claim petition in
toto.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants-
original claimants in order to substantiate his
contention placed reliance on following cases :
i) "Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation Vs. Mr.Sahadev @ Sadu Aba Pore and
others" First Appeal No.956 of 1997
dt.14.12.1998;
ii) "Jagannath Narahari Naik Vs. Vasudev
Datta Malik and other" First Appeal No.197 of
2009 dt.4.1.2017;
iii) "Kusum Lata and others Vs. Satbir and
others" reported in A.I.R. 2011 Supreme Court
234;
iv) "Shyam Sunder and others Vs. The State
of Rajasthan" reported in A.I.R.1974 Supreme
Court 890;
v) "Kamalkant Chari Vs. Cajetan Manuel
Dourado and others" reported in 2011 Legal Eagle
(Bom) 2796;
vi) "Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi Vs. Ranjit
Ginning and Pressing Company Private Limited"
reported in 1977 (2) SCC 745;
vii) "Ravi Kapur Vs. State of Rajasthan"
reported in 2012 AIR (SC) 2986;
viii) "Managing Director, North East K.R.T.C.
Vs. Devidas Manikrao Sadananda" reported in 2006
AIR (SCW) 4770;
6. The learned counsel for the Respondent-
owner submits that there is a reference in the
FIR to the effect that deceased Arjun was brought
to his house in injured condition by one Ajay
Kaka Potbhare. Merely on the basis of said
recital in the First Information Report, nothing
can be concluded. The Respondent-owner has also
denied the involvement of his vehicle in the
accident and in order to substantiate his
contention also examined himself before the
Tribunal. Though the appellants claimants have
placed on record the certified copy of charge-
sheet Exh.27, the appellants-claimants have not
examined any eye witness to the said accident or
the Investigating Officer to substantiate their
contention about the involvement of the vehicle
in the alleged incident. The learned counsel
submits that as such the evidence as adduced by
the appellants-claimants fall short to attract
the said maxim "Res ipsa loquitur". The learned
Member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has
therefore, rightly dismissed the claim petition
for want of evidence about the involvement of the
vehicle owned by Respondent No.1 in the alleged
accident. The learned counsel submits that the
peculiar circumstances constituting the event or
accident should have been brought on record by
the appellants-claimants. There is no evidence
about the involvement of the said vehicle in the
accident and in absence of the said evidence,
there is no question of tendering a reasonable
explanation as to the cause of the said accident
by the Respondent-owner. The learned counsel has
referred the Law Lexicon by writer Ramanatha
Aiyar, wherein the meaning of the said maxim has
been given. The application of the said maxim
always pre-supposes that some part of the casual
process is known, but what is lacking is evidence
of its connection with the defendant's act or
omission. The learned counsel submits that no
satisfactory line can be drawn between "Res ipsa
loquitur" cases and those where it does not
apply. In the instant case in absence of any
evidence about the involvement of the vehicle in
vehicular accident, the Respondent-owner can not
be called upon to explain the cause of the
accident by applying the said maxim.
7. The learned counsel in order to
substantiate his contention also place his
reliance on the case "Shyam Sunder and others Vs.
The State of Rajasthan" reported in AIR 1974
Supreme Court 890 and "Syad Akbar Vs. State of
Karnataka" reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court
1848.
8. The learned counsel for the Respondent-
insurer submits that the appellants-claimants
have failed to prove the involvement of the
vehicle auto rickshaw in the accident and as such
the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the claim
petition. The learned counsel submits that there
is no dispute that the strict proof of the
accident may not be required to be given by the
claimants and the claimants may prove their case
by preponderance of probabilities. However,
merely on the basis of recital in the FIR Exh.26
and filing of charge-sheet is not sufficient to
draw inference that the vehicle owned by the
Respondent No.1 came to be involved in the
accident. The appellants claimants have not
examined any eye witness or Investigation Officer
to substantiate their contention.
9. The learned counsel for Respondent No.2
however, to substantiate his submissions placed
reliance on the following cases :
i) "New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs.
Laxman S/o Dadarao Karpe and others" First Appeal
No.2973/2013 dt. 28.7.2015(CORAM :A.V.NIRGUDE,J.)
ii) "Bajaj Allianz General Insurance
Co.Ltd. Vs. Meera W/o Raju Choudhary and others"
First Appeal No.1921/2013 dt.17.2.2014 (CORAM;
K.U.CHANDIWAL,J.),
iii) "Pukhraj Bumb Vs. Jagannath Atchut Naik
and others" reported in 2014(4) Mh.L.J.447;
iv) "Faridabegum Shaikh Yousuf and others
Vs. Daulat Khan S/o Sardar Khan (D) through L.Rs.
and another" reported in 2014(5) All MR 696;
v) "M/s La'BuilDe Corporation Vs. Union of
India and others" reported in 2014 (5) ALL MR
699;
vi) "K.E.Basavarajappa Vs. H.Chandrappa"
Misc. First Appeal No.1822/2010 dt,9.1.2012.
(CORAM: A.S.PACHHAPURE,J.);
vii) "North West Karnataka Rd.Transport
Corporation Vs. Gourabai and others" Civil Appeal
No.3171/2009 arising out of SLP (C) No.15070/2007
dt.1.5.2009;
viii) "Shabbeer Khan Vs. Gaurav Sharma and
another" reported in 2015 (4) TAC 439(Raj.).
10. On careful perusal of the evidence and
the impugned judgment and award passed by the
Tribunal, I find that the evidence in this case
falls short to attract the said maxim "Res ipsa
loquitur". Though the FIR Exh.26 came to be
filed on the very next day of the accident, the
said FIR was lodged against the driver of unknown
vehicle. Though the name of the Ajay Kaka
Potbhare was mentioned in the FIR as a person who
brought deceased Arjun in injured condition to
his house, the appellant-claimant No.1 who has
lodged the said complaint, has not even expressed
her doubt about the involvement of the said
vehicle in which deceased Arjun was brought in
injured condition to his house, however, after
due investigation, the Investigating Officer has
submitted the charge-sheet Exh.27 against said
Ajay Kaka Potbhare. The appellants-claimants
have not examined any eye witnesses nor the
Investigating Officer to substantiate their
contention about the involvement of the vehicle
in the accident. The Respondent has specifically
denied the involvement of his vehicle in the said
accident.
11. In Law Lexicon by writer P Ramanatha
Aiyar, it has been quoted that :
"The phrase "res ipsa
loquitur" is a symbol for the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff's
prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to
meet with an explanation. It is
merely a short way of saying that the
circumstances attendant on the
accident are of such a nature as to
justify a jury, in light of common
sense and past experience, in
inferring that the accident was
probably the result of the
defendant's negligence, in the
absence of explanation or other
evidence which the jury believes."
It has been further
quoted :
"It is said that "res ipsa
loquitur" does not apply if the cause
of the harm is known. This is a dark
saying. The application of the
principle nearly always presupposes
that some part of the casual process
is known, but what is lacking is
evidence of its connection with the
defendant's act or omission. When
the fact of control is used to
justify the inference that
defendant's negligence was
responsible it must of course be
shown that the thing in his control
in fact caused the harm. In a sense,
therefore, the cause of the harm must
be known before the maxim can apply"
It is difficult to draw line between "res ipsa
loquitur" cases and those were it does not apply.
12. In a case "Shyam Sunder and others Vs.
The State of Rajasthan" reported in AIR 1974
Supreme Court 890, relied upon by the learned
counsel for appellants-claimants as well as
counsel for Respondent-owner. In para 10,11 and
12, the Supreme Court has made the following
observations :
"10. The maxim is stated in
its classic form by Erie,C.J.:
... Where the thing is to
shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and
the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the
defendants, that the accident arose
from want of care.
11. The maxim does not
embody any rule of substantive law
nor a rule of evidence. It is
perhaps not a rule of any kind but
simply the caption to an argument on
the evidence. Lord Shaw remarked
that if the phrase had not been in
Latin nobody would have called it a
principle See Ballard V. North
British Railway Co. AIR 1923 S.C.43.
The maxim is only a convenient label
to apply to a set of circumstances in
which the plaintiff proves a case so
as to call for a rebuttal from the
defendant, without having to allege
and prove any specific act or
omission on the part of the
defendant. The principal function of
the maxim is to prevent injustice
which would result if a plaintiff
were invariably compelled to prove
the precise cause of the accident and
the defendant responsible for it,
even when the facts bearing on the
matter are are at the outset unknown
to him and often within the knowledge
of the defendant. But though the
parties' relative access to evidence
is an influential factor, it is not
controlling. Thus the fact that the
defendant is as much at a loss to
explain the accident or himself died
in it, does not preclude an adverse
inference against him if the odds
otherwise point to his negligence
(see John G. Fleming, The Law of
Torts, 4th ed., p.264). The mere
happening of the accident may be more
consistent with the negligence on the
part of the defendant than with
other causes. The maxim is based on
common sense and its purpose is to do
justice when the facts bearing on the
causation and on the care exercised
by defendant are at the outset
unknown to the plaintiff and are or
ought to be within the knowledge of
the defendant.
12. The plaintiff merely
proves a result, not any particular
act or omission producing the result.
If the result in the circumstances,
in which he proves it, makes it more
probable than not that it was caused
by the negligence of the, defendant,
the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur"
is said to apply, and the plaintiff
will be entitled to succeed unless
the defendant by evidence rebuts that
probability."
13. In a case of "Syad Akbar Vs. State of
Karnataka" reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court
1848, relied upon by the learned counsel for
Respondent-owner, in para 19, 20 and 26 the
Supreme Court has made the following
observations:
"19. As a rule, mere proof
that an event has happened or an
accident has occurred, the cause of
which is unknown, is not evidence of
negligence. But the peculiar
circumstances constituting the event or
accident, in a particular case, may
themselves proclaim in concordant,
clear and unambiguous voices the
negligence of somebody as the cause of
the event or accident. It is to such
cases that the maxim "res ipsa
loquitur" may apply, if the cause of
the accident is unknown and no
reasonable explanation as to the cause
is coming forth from the defendant. To
emphasise the point, it may be
reiterated that in such cases, the
event or accident must be of a kind
which does not happen in the ordinary
course of things if those who have the
management and control use due care.
But, according to some decisions,
satisfaction of this condition alone is
not sufficient for res ipsa to come
into play and it has to be further
satisfied that the event which caused
the accident was within the defendant's
control. The reason for this second
requirement is that where the defendant
has control of the thing which caused
the injury, he is in a better position
than the plaintiff to explain how the
accident occurred. Instances of such
special kind of accidents which "tell
their own story" of being offsprings of
negligence, are furnished by cases,
such as where a motor vehicle mounts or
projects over a pavement and hurts
somebody there or travelling in the
vehicle; one car ramming another from
behind, or even a head-on-collision on
the wrong side of the road.
20. Thus, for the
application of the maxim "res ipsa
loquitur" no less important a
requirement is that the res must not
only bespeak negligence, but pin it on
the defendant."
26. From the above
conspectus, two lines of approach in
regard to the application and effect of
the maxim "res ipsa loquitur" are
discernible. According to the first,
where the maxim applies, it operates as
an exception to the general rule that
the burden of proof of the alleged
negligence is, in the first instance,
on the plaintiff. In this view, if the
nature of an accident is such that the
mere happening of it is evidence of
negligence, such as, where a motor
vehicle without apparent cause leaves
the highway or overturns or in fair
visibility runs into an obstacle; or
brushes the branches of an overhanging
tree, resulting in injury, or where
there is a duty on the defendant to
exercise care, and the circumstances in
which the injury complained of happened
are such that with the exercise of the
requisite care no risk would in the
ordinary course ensue, the burden
shifts or is in the first instance, on
the defendant to disprove his
liability. Such shifting or casting of
the burden on the defendant is on
account of a presumption of law and
fact arising against the defendant from
the constituent circumstances of the
accident itself, which bespeak
negligence of the defendant. This is
the view taken in several decisions of
English Courts."
14. In view of the observations made by the
Supreme Court in the above two cited cases and in
the facts and circumstances of the present case,
I do not think that the said maxim "Res ipsa
loquitur" can be made applicable. However, it
is a fact that deceased Arjun who was grazing his
cattles by the side of the road met with an
accidental death. He was on his foot and as per
the probable cause of death given in the post
mortem report, deceased Arjun died due to
intracranial haemorrhage due to head injury. In
the circumstances, it would be just and
appropriate if the appellants-claimants would be
given one more opportunity to prove their case
before the Tribunal by leading additional
evidence. The Respondents are also at liberty to
adduce evidence in rebuttal in case the
appellants-claimants adduce the evidence before
the Tribunal after remand of the matter. Hence,
the following order :
ORDER
i) First Appeal No.2659/2013 (Kamalbai W/o
Arjun Bhalekar and others Vs. Sanjay S/o Pandhari
Potbhare and others) is hereby partly allowed.
ii) No costs.
iii) The Judgment and award passed by the
learned Member of the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Latur, in MACP No.323/2010 dt.2.5.2013
is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is
remanded to the Tribunal with following
directions :
a) To readmit the MACP No.323/2010 under
its original number and the Tribunal shall
proceed to determine the claim petition afresh.
b) The evidence recorded during the
original trial shall be the evidence during the
trial after remand.
c) The appellants-claimants are at liberty
to adduce additional oral/documentary evidence in
support of their case and the Respondents are at
liberty to adduce the evidence in rebuttal. The
learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Latur, shall dispose of the claim petition within
six (6) months from the date of appearance of the
parties. The parties are hereby directed to
appear before the Tribunal on 4.8.2017.
d) The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
Sd/-
(V.K.JADHAV,J.)
asp/office/Fa2659.13
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