Assets Reconstruction Company ... vs Smt. Geeta Wd/O Vitthalrao Gomase ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 6590 Bom

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                                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                                            NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR


                                         CIVIL APPLICATION (C) No.17 OF 2017
                                                         IN
                                   CIVIL REVISION APPLIATION ST. No.23459 OF 2016


                         1.    Assets Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd.,
                                through its Director, having its Registered office
                                at Ruby, 10th Floor, 29, Senapati Bapat Marg,
                                Dadar (W), Mumbai-28.

                         2.    Shri Umesh M. Dandawate,
                                Authorised Officer of Assets Reconstruction
                                Company (India) Ltd., having its branch office
                                at Narayani Building, Modi No.3, Sitabuldi, 
                                Nagpur.                                                :      APPLICANTS

                                            ...VERSUS...

                         1.    Smt. Geeta wd/o. Vitthalrao Gomase,
                                Aged about 52 years, Occupation : Household,

                         2.    Shyam s/o. Vitthalrao Gomase,
                                Aged about 31 years, Occupation : Service,

                         3.    Pawan s/o. Vitthalrao Gomase,
                                Aged about 29 years, Occupation : Service.

                                All R/o. At post paradsinga, Tah. Katol, 
                                Distt. Nagpur.

Amendent carried 
                         1.    Smt. Geeta wd/o. Vitthalrao Gomase,
out as per Registrar            Aged about 42 years, Occupation : Household,
(J) Order 
dt.18.7.2017.            2.    Shyam s/o. Vitthalrao Gomase,
                                Aged about 31 years, Occupation : Service,

                         3.    Pawan s/o. Vitthalrao Gomase,
                                Aged about 29 years, Occupation : Service.

                                All R/o. Plot No.45, Bapunagar, 
                                Near Hanuman Mandir, Sakkardara, Nagpur, 
                                Distt. Nagpur.



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        4.    Vishnu s/o. Radhelal Sharma,
               Aged Major, R/o. Bungalow No.44, Mall Road, 
               Kamptee, Tah. Kamptee, Distt. Nagpur.

        5.    ICICI Bank Ltd., Nagpur,
               through its Branch Manager,
               222, Vishnu Vaibhav Complex, Palm Road,
               Civil Lines, Nagpur.                     :      NON-APPLICANTS


        =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
        Shri Anjan De, Advocate for the Applicants.
        Shri S. Malode, Advocate for the Respondent Nos.1 to 3.
        None for the Respondent Nos.4 and 5.
        =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-


                                                       CORAM  :   S.B. SHUKRE, J.

th DATE : 29 AUGUST, 2017.

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Shri Anjan De, learned counsel for the applicants and

Shri S. Malode, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3, who are

the main contesting parties. None appears for the respondent

Nos.4 and 5.

2. In support of the contentions raised in this application, the

applicants have filed on record additional affidavit vide stamp

No.10700/2017.

3. According to Shri Anjan De, learned counsel for the

applicants, the expression sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the

Limitation Act is required to be construed liberally by adopting a

practical and pragmatic approach while avoiding pedantic and technical

J-cac17.17.odt 3/6

approach. He places his reliance upon the view taken by this Court in

the case of Ashok Maheshkar vs. Gangadhar Phadnavis and others,

reported in 2013(2) Mh.L.J. 497. According to Shri S. Malode, no

sufficient cause is disclosed either in the application or in the additional

affidavit.

4. The reasons stated in the application are that the applicants

were acting under bona fide impression that their interests were being

properly secured by the then learned counsel, who had filed his

appearance before the lower Court on 10.12.2012. But, the fact was that

then learned counsel, having joined judicial service, did not remain

present on the date of hearing of the application vide Exh.-14 moved

under Section 9-A and order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It is also submitted by the applicants that after the order now sought to

be challenged, which is an order dated 15.12.2014, came to the

knowledge of the applicants, the applicants took immediate steps for

filing of a revision application in order to challenge the order. It is

submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that he reappeared

on behalf of the applicant before the trial Court on 26.8.2015 and it was

only in a week's time thereafter that he gave his advice to the applicant

to challenge the order dated 15.12.2014. Of course, learned counsel for

respondent Nos.1 to 3 submits that this is no explanation in the eye of

law and therefore, it should not be accepted.

5. As for the events that took place till reappearance of the

present counsel before the trial Court, which was on 26.8.2015, I am of

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the view that the appellants have shown sufficient cause in the matter. It

is not in dispute that the previous counsel, who filed his appearance

before the trial Court on 10.10.2012, soon thereafter, joined judicial

service. So, it is understandable that there was a communication gap

between these appellants and the previous counsel and the result was

that the applicants were not heard before the trial Court when the order

dated 15.12.2014 was passed. But, the real issue begins after acquisition

of the knowledge of passing of the order dated 15.12.2014 by the trial

Court. It is the submission of the applicants that their new counsel had

taken inspection of the Court record on 26.8.2015 and about a week's

time thereafter, they had received advice from him to challenge the order

dated 15.12.2014. So one can say that the appellants were aware of the

fact that they were required to file a revision application at least in the

first week of September 2015 and, therefore, the appellants would be

required to explain the delay occurred from September 2015 till filing of

the present civil revision application. It has been filed along with the

delay condonation application on 18.11.2016. So, the appellants owe an

explanation for the delay of about 14 months and if we exclude the

period of 90 days, it would be of about 11 months. For this period, I find

the only reasons given in the application as well as the additional

affidavit are that there were administrative exigencies arising from the

need to take a decision to file a revision application not locally at Nagpur

but at Mumbai entailing moving of the concerned file through different

channels. In my view, this is no explanation in the eye of law.

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6. If the applicants say that there were administrative

exigencies involved in the decision making process, the applicants should

explain what kind of difficulties and exigencies they faced in arriving at a

decision to challenge the order dated 15.12.2014. It would not be

enough for the applicants to say that those exigencies were there and

that they were of administrative nature. In fact, even the Courts would

understand the administrative exigencies normally bureaucratic

organizations like the applicant No.1 usually face in taking

administrative decisions. But, these difficulties differ from one

organization to another, although broadly speaking they could be termed

as administrative difficulties. Therefore, such organization must inform

the Court of the actual nature of the difficulties faced by such

organization and also the time that was broadly taken by various

decisions making authorities placed in an hierarchical order in the

organization formed on bureaucratic principles.

7. In an organization which is governed by bureaucratic

principles, just as the appellant No.1, there is a division of labour and

such division of labour varies from the nature of the organization, the

objects of the organization and the powers that are conferred upon

various authorities in the whole line of the decision making. So, it is

incumbent upon each of such organizations to explain broadly the

division of labour and time taken by each of the authorities at various

rungs in the organization in considering the proposal for filing of a

challenge in the nature of revision application. In the instant case, as

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stated earlier, this has not been done by the appellant. Rather the

appellants, wary of giving any explanation, have formed an opinion that

the delay was on account of some administrative exigencies. One must

remind the applicants that it is for the Courts to express an opinion and

not for the applicants or the parties to come with some opinionated

pleadings before the Court and insist upon the Court to accept their self

proclaimed judgment about the delay. The fact, to repeat, has been here

that no material was placed before this Court to enable it to form an

opinion that the difficulties faced by the applicants were really of

administrative nature and, therefore, warranted adopting of liberal,

pragmatic and elastic approach, as is the law. There must be an occasion

provided to the Court to interpret that the cause shown by the party is

sufficient cause. If no cause has been given, there would not be any

occasion for the Court to adjudicate it to be a sufficient cause or

otherwise. This is what has happened in the instant case. Therefore, no

assistance could be had by the appellant from the case of Ashok

Maheshkar (supra). The application being devoid of any cause, much

less sufficient cause, deserves to be rejected.

8. The application stands rejected. No costs.

JUDGE okMksns