Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 5456 Bom
Judgement Date : 3 August, 2017
hcs
1 appln5503.2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.5503 OF 2004
Bharat Puri & Others .. Applicants.
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr. .. Respondents.
WITH
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.5505 OF 2004
Bharat Puri & Others .. Applicants.
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr. .. Respondents.
Mr.Kirti Parekh with Ms.Henna Daulat i/b Prem J. Ranga for the Applicants.
Ms.P.N. Dabholkar APP for the State.
Mr.G.H. Keluskar for Respondent No.2
CORAM : A. K. MENON, J.
RESERVED ON : 6TH JULY, 2017
PRONOUNCED ON : 3RD AUGUST, 2017
JUDGMENT :
1. These two criminal applications under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure can be conveniently disposed of by this common order. The facts
leading to the present applications are extracted from Application no. 5503 of 2004
and are set out as under : Applicant No.7 is Cadbury India Limited. They have also
been impleaded as applicant Nos.8 and 9 in these applications because the original
complaint names them separately with different addresses at which the applicant
no.7 carries on business. Applicant No.1 was the Managing Director of Applicant
2 appln5503.2004
no.7 at the material time. Applicant Nos.2 to 6 were Executive Directors of Applicant
no.7. Respondent No.2 Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation filed a criminal
complaint against the applicant no.1 - Mr. Cedric Vaz, nominee of applicant no.7
under the Prevention of Food and Adulteration Act, 1954 (the "Act"), directors of the
Applicant no. 7 and one M/s. Indrayani Bazar a retail and grocery store selling
various articles including chocolates and the office bearers of the said Indrayani
Bazar.
2. It is contended that on or about 10th August, 2003 one Mr.Patil
purchased a Cadbury milk chocolate and upon opening it he found a live insect
inside. The said Patil filed a complaint under the Act at Yamuna Nagar police station
and the police Sub-Inspector communicated this fact to the Medical Health Officer of
Respondent no.2 corporation. The Health Officer ordered samples to be taken from
the said shop which were accused i.e. Indrayani Bazar - original accused no.12.
3. On 10th August, 2003 the complainant Patil along with the Food
Inspector visited Yamuna Nagar and a panch, one Mangilal Choudhari, when the
Chairman of Indrayani Bazar, Sanjay Thembre was present. The Food Inspector
explained the purpose of his visit and purchased a number of samples of Cadbury
milk chocolates weighing 13 gms and 25 gms manufactured at - applicant no.7's
factory at Induri District. A panchnama was prepared and the complainant with the
Food Inspector visited Yamuna Nagar police station, who examined 5 gms chocolates
but did not any insect at that time. The samples were then sent to the State Health
Laboratory and Local Health Officer with detailed information. The public analyst
reported presence of live grub and concluded that chocolate does not conform to
3 appln5503.2004
standards of milk chocolate as per the Act. The chocolate was found to be unfit for
human consumption. The Factory Inspector forwarded the samples with all relevant
correspondence to the Joint Commissioner of Food and Medical Administration, State
of Maharashtra to file a complaint against all concerned.
4. On 16th December, 2003, the Joint Commissioner, Food and Medical
Administration, State of Maharashtra gave sanction to file a complaint and around
18th December, 2003. A complaint came to be filed against Indrayani Bazar, its
Chairman and the person nominated by the company under Section 17 read with Rule
12-B of the Prevention of Food and Adulteration Rules, 1954 (for brevity "Rules"). A
consumer complaint was also filed by the said Hindurao Patil. Respondent No.2 also
addressed a letter dated 23rd December, 2003 informing them that the complaint
had been filed before the Judicial Magistrate at Akurdi. The Magistrate issued process
and it is this issuance of process that has been challenged by the applicants invoking
the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and seeking process to be quashed.
5. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants in
both these matters submitted that the applicants are being incorrectly prosecuted. In
fact accused nos.22 and 23 were the same company but shown as carrying on
business at different addresses. Applicant No.21 one Mr. Cedric Vaz was the "nominee"
of applicant no.7 company and was responsible for the affairs of the company by
virtue of his nomination under Rule 12-B of the Rules and under the Act.
Respondent No.2 has also prosecuted the said Vaz. As far as prosecution against the
present applicants are concerned, Mr. Parekh submitted that by an order dated 24th
4 appln5503.2004
June, 2004 further proceedings in the trial Court were stayed upon Rule being
issued.
6. Mr. Parekh further submitted that there is no substance in the
complaint against the applicants inasmuch as no prima facie case was made out
against the present applicants for issuance of process. Quite apart from the fact that
applicant no.7 company cannot be prosecuted thrice for the same complaint and for
the alleged incident, there is no allegation of any overt act alleged against the
applicants except the mention of their names in the cause title. There is no evidence as
required under Section 17 of the Act by which the concept of vicarious liability
could be invoked and fastened on the Directors especially since, as provided in Rule
12-B of the said rules, Mr. Vaz had been nominated by the company under the Act
to be responsible for the affairs of the company.
7. According to Mr. Parekh the complaint has been filed to pressurize
and harass accused nos.14 to 19 who are the Managing Director and other Executive
Directors because it is not the case of respondent corporation that the aforesaid
persons or applicants were responsible for conducting business of the company. It
was further submitted that the complaint against Mr. Vaz could proceed and there
was no occasion for the complainant to proceed against present applicants especially
since the company had nominated the said Mr. Vaz.
8. In application No.5505 of 2004 the complaint was filed by the same
person based on the same set of facts but a separate complaint was filed on account
of the seizure of a 35 gms pack of the same chocolate.
5 appln5503.2004
9. In support of his contention Mr. Parekh has relied upon the following
judgments :
(i) Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Food Inspector & Anr. (2011) 1 SCC 176
(ii) Kapil Wadhawan & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra Criminal Application No.707 of
2011 dt. 27th July 2011
(iii) Adhiraj Amar Kannhaiyalal Sarin & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra 2011(1)Mh.L.J.
(iv) Keki Bomi Dadiseth & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra 2002(3)Mh.L.J. 246
(v) Corpn. Products Co. & Ors. vs. S.B. Shinde & Anr. Criminal Writ Petition No.807 of
1998 dt. 29th June, 2001
10. Mr. Parekh submitted that the complaint cannot be proceeded with in
view of the specific provision that when a Manager is named under Rule 12-B, in
absence of relevant facts alleging liability of individual Director and in absence of
the complaint indicating as to whether the Directors had any role to play and whether
they or any of them were in charge of day-to-day management and conduct of the
business, it would not be appropriate that the Directors should be prosecuted. In the
circumstances he submitted that the complaint against accused nos.1 to 6 could not be
proceeded with. Mr. Parekh further submitted that the aforesaid Vaz has already
been nominated and hence there was no occasion to permit the prosecution of other
Directors against whom there was no specific complaint.
11. Mr. Parekh further submitted that in case of Kapil Wadhawan and Anr
(supra) a Single Judge of this Court had allowed the criminal application for the
6 appln5503.2004
same reason when the complaint reveal that the applicant as Director of the
company was responsible for day-to-day affairs of the company and no specific role
was attributed to the applicant. Similarly, in the case of Adhiraj Sen (supra) another
Single Judge of this Court had also held in favour of the applicant to the effect that
there was no role attributable to the Directors and only the Director(s) against
whom such a role is attributable will be responsible. Mr. Parekh also relied upon a
decision of the Keki Bomi Dadiseth (supra) and submitted that the prosecution of the
Directors of the company for alleged violation of the provisions of the Act could not
be sustained when there was no specific allegation or complaint which would
demonstrate the consent or connivance by the Directors with regard to commission of
offence.
12. In yet another decision of this Court Corn Products Co. (India) Ltd.
(supra) the Court likewise held that the complaint itself did not contain a whisper of
allegation and there was valid nomination held under Section 17 read with Rule12-
B and in absence of such specific allegations against the Directors it would not be
open for the authorities to prosecute the Directors especially when there was a
nomination under the Rules. He therefore submitted that the present application is
liable to be allowed and the complaint against the applicants be quashed.
13. Mr. Keluskar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent -
corporation opposed the application on the basis that the interpretation of the Act and
the Rules the applicant is not correct. He submitted that the attempt of the applicants
was to take shelter under the provision for nomination of an officer under Rule 12-B
read with Section 17 and that nomination alone will not relieve the applicants of their
7 appln5503.2004
liability. He submitted that nomination is factory/plant specific. It was not a general
nomination on behalf of the company and that in the case of any entity if there are
different factories/plants, the nomination is only in respect of a particular plant. He
further submitted that in the instant case the offending product was manufactured at
the Induri plant and the nomination of Mr. Vaz was only in respect of factory at
village Induri. Mr. Keluskar referred to Exhibit-E to the t application which is the
nomination Form No.VIII under Rule 12-B of the said Rules. The said nomination
form refers to the resolution passed in the said meeting held by the company and it
made Mr. Vaz responsible for the factory at Induri. Therefore, according to Mr.
Keluskar the complaint as filed against other accused is certainly maintainable.
14. According to Mr. Keluskar the offence has occurred at Indrayani Bazar,
Sambhaji Nagar, Chinchwad and the complaint was filed at Chinchwad. According to
Mr. Keluskar the complaint has been filed on the basis of bill produced by the vendor
and accused nos.1 to 13 were jointly responsible for production, distribution and sale
of the milk chocolate in which insect was found and which was not appropriate for
human consumption. According to him accused nos.14 to 20 viz, the Managing
Director and Executive Directors (the applicant Nos.1 to 7) are liable for punishment
under Section 16 and 17, Section 7(1) read with Section 2(ia)(a) 2(ia)(f) of the Act
and related Rules. He submitted that accused nos.21 who is the said nominee Cedric
Vaz and the accused no.22 and 23 viz the company are also liable for punishment
under Section 7(1) read with Section 2(ia)(a) and 2(ia)(f) and Section 16 and 17, 7(1)
read with Section 2(ia)(a) and 2(ia)(f).
15. Mr. Keluskar submitted that the accused are all responsible for the
8 appln5503.2004
offences and that the applications have no merit and deserves to be dismissed. In
support of his submission he relied upon the case of Azim Premji and Ors. vs.
State of Maharashtra 2002 (1) Mh.L.J. 668 wherein it was held that a
separate license is required in respect of each area and nomination of management
of Directors under Section 17(2) of the Act has to be filed with the Local authority
having jurisdiction where the manufacture, storage, selling or distribution for sale
is being carried out. He submitted that in the instant case the health authority has
to examine whether nomination is in order and transfer of primary liability to
nominee would be effective only when there is strict compliance and complete
adherence to the provisions relating to nomination including filing of nomination
with valid jurisdiction with the health authority. Mr. Keluskar therefore submitted that
the applications are liable to be rejected.
16. I have heard counsel for the parties at length and before dealing with
rival contentions it is necessary to consider the contents of the complaint, at Exhibit-B
and its fair translation at Exhibit-D-1. Both counsel agree that the translation at
Exhibit-D-1 is an accurate translation of Exhibit-D of the complaint originally which
is in vernacular. The complaint alleges that accused nos.1 to 12 are liable for violation
of Section 7(1) read with Section 2 (ia)(a) and Section 2(ia)(f). The aforesaid
provisions are reproduced for ease :
"2 [(i-a)] "adulterated" an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated---
(a) If the article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality,
demanded by the purchaser and is to his prejudice, or is not of the nature,
substance or quality, which it purports or is, represented to be;
9 appln5503.2004
(b) If the article contains any other substance which affect, or if the article is so
processed as to affect injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof;
(c) If any inferior or cheaper substance has been substituted wholly or in part
for the article so as to affect injuriously the nature substance or quality thereof;
(d) If any constituent of the article has been wholly or in part abstracted so as to
affect injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof.
(e) If the article has been prepared, packed or kept under in sanitary conditions
whereby it has become contaminated or injurious to health;
(f) If the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, rotten,
decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect-infested or is
otherwise unfit for human consumption;
17. Accused nos.1 to 3 are the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary of
Indrayani Bazar, Vice Chairman and Secretary. Accused no.4 to 12 are the Directors
of the said Indrayani Bazar. Indrayani Bazar and its Directors are not party to the
present application. Accused no.13 is proprietor of Gupta Marketing which is
distributor of the products of the company. He is accused of offence liable for
punishment under Section 16, 7(1) read with Section 2(ia) and 2(ia)(f). Accused
nos.14 to 20 are present applicants who are accused of violating Section 16, 17, 7(1)
2(ia) and 2(ia)(f) of the Act. Accused no.21 is nominee of the company and accused
no.22 is company. Both are accused of violation of Section 7(1) read with 1955 Rules
read with Section 2(ia)(a) and 2(ia)(f). The company once again shown as accused
no.23 for violation of same sections and rules.
10 appln5503.2004
18. I am of the view that there is no justification in joining accused nos.22
and 23 repeatedly simply because there are different offices and factories from
where the company operates. According to the complaint, the offence had occurred
within jurisdiction of the Court at Akurdi. In these applications we are only
concerned with the complaint against the present applicants. The relevant pleadings
in the complaint as regards present applicants proceeds on the basis that accused
nos.1 to 13 have committed offences by producing, distributing and selling of the
chocolates. This is factually inaccurate since none of the applicant nos.1 to 13 are
involved in the production of chocolates. To that extent the averment in the
complaint is clearly erroneous. As far as present applicants are concerned there is
not a single averment that by virtue of their having been Directors, they were engaged
into the day-to-day affairs of the company. The complaint has dealt with various
aspects of seizure of the product, manner of search, opening of chocolates in
presence of the panchas, number of pieces sold and the amount paid for purchase
of the chocolates in presence of panchas. It is also observed that stock of which
samples were seized had not crossed expiry dates. The samples were then stored in
model bottles and were labelled. The complaint records that on the basis of bills
produced by the complainant, vendor information about the shop was collected
and thereafter the Medical Health Officer had instituted the complaint and after
receiving sanction from the Joint Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration the
complaint was filed. There is no allegation in the complaint that the present
applicants were engaged in the day-to-day affairs of the manufacture or
distribution or storage of the product. There is nothing to connect the present
applicants with these activities and on a regular basis. The decision in Pepsico
(supra) deals with sweetened carbonated water (Pepsi) which allegedly contained
11 appln5503.2004
residue of the pesticide carbofuran. It was alleged that the product was adulterated
by violating standards prescribed by Directorate General of Health Services and the
public analyst had so opined. The applicants' approached the High Court for
quashing of criminal complaint. In the complaint filed against company the
Directors were impleaded. The High Court refused to quash the complaint. In the
course of submissions before the High Court it was contended that the Directors
would be liable vicariously and reference was made to the decision of the Supreme
Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 ,
wherein the question of vicarious liability was considered and it was held that a
Director cannot be ipso facto be charged for responsibility of the company and for
conduct of its business unless such fact was averred by the company. SMS
Pharmaceuticals (supra) had made reference to the judgment of MCD vs. Ram
Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1 wherein it was held that vicarious liability did
not extend to the Directors of the company who were not responsible to the company
for its day-to-day business.
19. In paragraph 50 of the judgment in Pepsico the Supreme Court
observed that in a complaint against the company and its Directors, the complainant
has to indicate in the complaint itself whether the Directors are in charge or
responsible to the company for day-to-day management or whether they were
responsible to the company for conduct of its business. A mere bald statement that a
person was a Director of the company against which certain allegations had been
made was not sufficient to make such Director liable unless there were specific
allegations regarding his role in the management of the company.
12 appln5503.2004
20. Furthermore, in paragraph 52 the Supreme Court considered the fact
that the person had been nominated under Section 17(2) to be a person in charge of
and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. Accordingly, the order
impugned was set aside. In the case at hand is on similar lines inasmuch as Mr.Cedric
Vaz has been nominated under Section 17(2) and Form VIII had been filed which
clearly indicates that Mr. Vaz, Chief Manager Operations of Cadbury India Ltd. has
been nominated to be in charge of and responsible to the said factory at Induri,
Maharashtra. The complainant in the present case had specifically named the said
nominee in the complaint. The complainant - respondent no.2 has expressly
mentioned him by name. The company has also been named as accused no.22
(applicant no.8 herein). In the circumstances the contention of Mr. Keluskar that the
judgment of this Court in Azim Premji (supra) and the observation therein that
transfer of primary liability to the nominee would be effective when there is
compliance, adherence and filing of the nomination within jurisdiction of the Local
Health Officer does not in any manner help the respondent since in the instant case it
is after inquiry into the facts that the complainant has chosen to file the complaint
against the nominee Vaz by impleading him as accused no.21.
21. There is a specific averment is made in paragraph no.14(4) accused
no.21 is liable for violation of Section 7(i) read with Section 2(ia)(a) and 2(ia)(f).
Thus, the averment made consciously is that the said nominee is responsible for
business of the company and as contemplated in the decision of the Supreme Court in
Pepsico (supra). The decision in Pepsico (supra) has been followed by our Court in
Kapil Wadhwan (supra) and Keki Bomi. Dadisheth (supra) which in turn has been
followed in Adhiraj Sarin (supra). In Keki Bomi Dadisheth this Court observed that
13 appln5503.2004
under scheme of Section 17 there are three categories in which the accused can be
found guilty. The persons nominated by the company can be held responsible for
the company in conduct of business and any Director of the company can also be held
responsible if it is proved that the offence had been committed which would
demonstrate any aspect of consent or connivance in regard to commission of offence
by the Directors or if even remotely the offence was attributable to any neglect on the
part of such Director. In the instant case the complaint does not demonstrate nexus
between the Director and the offence. There is nothing to show consent or connivance
in regard to commission of offence which is attributable to the applicants. In the
absence of such allegations in the complaint and in the facts of the present case it is
not possible hold even prima facie that the allegation in the complaint are made out
case against Director.
22. In Corn Products (supra) this Court quashed the process against the
petitioner nos.2 to 9, who were Directors of the company since the complaint did not
mention any offence being committed with consent or connivance by the Directors.
In the case at hand the Respondents have maintained that the named nominee is
responsible for the affairs of the company in relation to the Act at the material time. In
the circumstances I am of the opinion that the contention of Mr. Keluskar, learned
counsel for respondent no.2 corporation that notwithstanding impleadment of Cedric
Vaz as nominee of the company and specific recognition of his being nominee of
the Induri plant does not hold good to make him liable if at all. The contention of
respondent no.2 to that it could prosecute all Directors of the company is in my view
unsustainable. If the company and its Directors are to be prosecuted without specific
material against them, it would run against the scheme of Section 17 read with
14 appln5503.2004
Rule 12(b). The specific provisions are made to make the nominee accountable since it
is company which has chosen to make him accountable and responsible for the
business of the company. It is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Keluskar
that the product in question was not manufactured at Induri plant and therefore,
nomination of Mr.Cedric Vaz is no longer relevant and that notwithstanding the
fact that the complaint had been filed against him, it was now open to the
complainant to proceed against all Directors.
23. The argument adopted by Mr. Keluskar, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent no.2 and based on the decision of Azim Premji (supra) does not
entail that all the Directors can now be held responsible and prosecuted in the facts
at hand. The complainant has chosen to implead the nominee and specific reference
has been made against the nominee. The nomination of a said General Manager
under Rule 12(b) is accepted by the respondent - corporation. The plea that the
product in question was not manufactured at Induri plant but elsewhere and that
Mr.Cedric Vaz has not been nominated for the other plant is obviously an after
thought. In any case these are aspects that involve the merits of the case and cannot be
gone into in these applications. In such case the Respondent would have accused such
other nominee. According to Mr. Keluskar the offending product was found at
Indrayani Bazar which is located in Sambhaji Nagar, Chinchwad, whereas Mr. Vaz
has been nominated at Induri plant. This by itself does not allow the Respondent a
carte blanche to prosecute all the Directors of the company. In the circumstances
the application 5503 of 2004 must succeed.
24. In application No.5505 of 2004 the complaint is identical. The
15 appln5503.2004
allegations are also identical so are the accused persons. The nominee is also same
person. The slight variation is in respect of the weight of the packets of chocolate
seized. In one case the packet weighed 13 grams and in the other 25 grams. In the
result all other facts being identical Application No.5505 of 2004 must also succeed.
25. In the circumstances I pass the following order :
(i) The proceedings in case No.9 of 2003 from the learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class I, Court at Akurdi, at Akurdi are quashed
and set aside as against the applicants.
(ii) The proceedings in case No.10 of 2003 from the learned
Judicial Magistrate, First Class I, Court at Akurdi, at Akurdi are
quashed and set aside against the applicants.
(iii) The complaints against the accused no.21 nominee shall
proceed in accordance with law uninfluenced by observations
herein.
(iii) Rule made absolute in the above terms.
(A.K. MENON, J.)
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!