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Gajanan S/O Tulshiram Deole And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra Through ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 1992 Bom

Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 1992 Bom
Judgement Date : 25 April, 2017

Bombay High Court
Gajanan S/O Tulshiram Deole And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra Through ... on 25 April, 2017
Bench: V.A. Naik
                                                                            wp.607.15

                                                  1



                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                            BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.
                                       ...

WRIT PETITION NO. 607/2015

1) Gajanan s/o Tulshiram Deole Aged adult, 45 years

2) Bapurao s/o Shriram Kute Aged adult, 52 years

3) Sau. Prayagbai w/o Bharat Jogdand Aged adult, 41 years

4) Ravikumar s/o Bhagwandas Bhutda Aged adult, 38 years

5) Dr.Jagdish s/o Gyanrao Ghuge Aged adult, 55 years

6) Sanjay s/o Narayan Ghuge Aged adult, 56 years

7) Shivaji s/o Raghoji Kale Aged adult, 62 years

8) Anandrao s/o Awadoot Deole Aged adult, 44 years

All 1 to 8 occu: cultivators R/o Malegaon Tah. Malegaon Dist.Washim. ..PETITIONERS

v e r s u s

1) The State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary Cooperative Department, Mantralya, Mumbai-32.





                                                                                                             wp.607.15





2)        The Director of Marketing 
          Market yard, Gultekdi, Pune. 

3)        The Divisional Joint Registrar 
          Cooperative Societies, Amravati. 

4)        The  District Deputy Registrar
          Cooperative Societies, Washim.

5)        The Agricultural Produce Market Committee 
          Malegaon, Dist. Washim 
          Through its Secretary 

6)        Maharashtra State Agricultural Marketing 
          Board, Pune, having its office  at 
          Plot No.R-7, Market Yard, 
          Gultekdi, Pune
          Through its Director.                                                                 ..RESPONDENTS

...........................................................................................................................

Mr. A.M.Ghare, Advocate for the petitioners Mrs. Geeta Tiwari, Assistant Government Pleader for respondents 1 to 4 Respondent nos.5 and 6 served.

...........................................................................................................................

                                                     CORAM:    SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK   &
                                                                   MRS . SWAPNA  JOSHI, JJ
                                                                                          . 
                                                    DATED :       25  April, 2017
                                                                    th



ORAL  JUDGMENT: (PER SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J.)


Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The Writ Petition is heard finally

with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

2. By this Writ Petition, the petitioners-Board of Directors of the

Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Malegaon have challenged the order

of the District Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Washim superseding

wp.607.15

the Board of Directors of the Market Committee, under Section 45 of the

Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development & Regulation) Act,

1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the sake of brevity).

3. The petitioners were the elected Directors of the Market Committee,

Malegaon. Certain complaints were made against the Directors of the Market

Committee and a preliminary enquiry was conducted in the complaint by the

Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Malegaon. According to the Assistant

Registrar, there was some substance in the complaints made against the

petitioners. After securing the report from the Assistant Registrar, the District

Deputy Registrar served a notice under section 45 (1) of the Act, asking the

petitioners as to why the Market Committee should not be superseded or the

members be removed, in view of the default committed by them. The

petitioners replied to the show-cause notice, but their reply did not find

favour with the District Deputy Registrar. By the impugned order dated

31.01.2015, the District Deputy Registrar superseded the Market Committee.

The petitioners have challenged the said order in the instant petition.

4. Inter alia, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned

order is liable to be set aside, as the provisions of Section 45(1) of the Act

have not been complied with, before the order of supersession was passed. It is

stated that the State Marketing Board was not 'previously consulted', as the

State Marketing Board had not expressed its opinion one way or the other in

wp.607.15

regard to the supersession of the Market Committee. It is submitted that it is

well-settled that before superseding a Market Committee under the provisions

of the Act, it would be necessary for the State Government to consult the State

Marketing Board and to secure its opinion about the supersession of the

Market Committee. It is submitted that consultation with the State Marketing

Board is held to be mandatory and it has to be effective and merely a show

must not be made that the State Marketing Board was consulted. It is stated

that after the District Deputy Registrar sought the opinion of the State

Marketing Board, the State Marketing Board, vide communication, dated

12.09.2014, only conveyed to the District Deputy Registrar that appropriate

action be taken against the Market Committee in accordance with law. It is

submitted that the said expression by the State Marketing Board would not be

an opinion in the eye of law and it therefore cannot be said that there was an

effective consultation with the State Marketing Board by the District Deputy

Registrar, before passing the order under Section 45 of the Act, in respect of

supersession of the Market Committee. The learned counsel relied upon the

judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Kewal Ram vs.

Maharashtra State Cooperative Societies and others, reported in 1986(2)

SCALE page 89, to submit that the expression "previously consulted" means

that the opinion must be taken into account one way or the other, before

reaching the conclusion, whether or not the Market Committee could be

wp.607.15

superseded. It is submitted that though the judgment in the matter of

Tukaram Narayanrao vs. State of Mahrashatra, reported in 1998 (2) All

MR Page 384 takes a somewhat different view in the matter, it would be

necessary to note that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case

of Kewalram (supra) was not cited before the Court when the said judgment

was rendered. It is submitted that in a recent decision of this Court, in the case

of Abhishek Thakare and others vs. The District Deputy Registrar,

C.S.,Yavatmal and others, reported in 2014 (6) All MR Page 278, this Court

has, after considering the decisions in the cases of Kewalram (supra) and

Tukaram (supra), has held that the expression 'previously consulted' means

the opinion of the State Marketing Board one way other other, must be taken

into account before reaching the conclusion whether or not to supersede the

Market Committee. It is submitted that in the case of Abhishek Thakare

(supra), this Court was considering the order of the State Marketing Board,

which runs into several pages, but it was only stated by the State Marketing

Board that action in accordance with law could be taken. Reliance is also

placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment in the case

of Suresh Yenodkar vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in

2017(2) All MR Page 217,to substantiate his submission.

5. Mrs. Tiwari, the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for

the respondent nos.1 to 4 has supported the order of the District Deputy

wp.607.15

Registrar, superseding the Market Committee. It is submitted that before taking

the decision of superseding the Market Committee under Section 45 of the Act,

the District Deputy Registrar had specifically sought the opinion of the State

Marketing Board and the State Marketing Board, vide communication dated

12.09.2014, had informed the District Deputy Registrar to take appropriate

action in accordance with law. It is stated on instructions from the Manager

of the State Marketing Board, who is present in the Court today, that after

the impugned order was passed on 31.01.2015, the District Deputy Registrar,

again, asked the State Marketing Board to give an opinion one way or the

other and the State Marketing Board has opined that the Market Committee

needs to be superseded.

6. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we find that the

impugned order dated 31.03.2015 cannot be sustained, as the same is passed

without effective consultation with the State Marketing Board. The provisions

of Section 45(1) of the Act empower the State Government to supersede the

Market Committee and/or to remove its members as the case may be, when it

is of the opinion that the Market Committee is not competent to perform

and/or is persistently making default in performance of duty imposed on it,

under the Act. The proviso to sub-section (1) of the Section 45, however,

stipulates that no Market Committee could be superseded without prior

consultation with the State Marketing Board. It is held by this Court, time and

wp.607.15

again, that the consultation with the State Marketing Board is mandatory and

the consultation has to be effective. It is held that the State Government

cannot just make a mere show of having consulted the State Marketing Board

and the consultation has to be effective. So also, the proviso to sub-section (1)

of Section 45 of the Act provides that the consultation should be previous

consultation and the State Marketing Board cannot be consulted after the

decision is taken. In the instant case, after the District Deputy Registrar asked

the State Marketing Board to give its opinion in regard to the supersession of

the Market Committee by supplying the material in respect of the complaints

and the report of the Assistant Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, by a

single line order-communication, dated 12.09.2014, it was informed by the

State Marketing Board to the District Deputy Registrar that appropriate action

may be taken in accordance with law. What is expected from the State

Marketing Board is an opinion one way or the other and it would be

necessary for the State Marketing Board to convey its opinion that either the

Market Committee needs to be superseded and/or the members need to be

removed or that no action needs to be taken against the Market Committee or

its members on the basis of material available before it. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court has held in the judgment in the case of Kewalram (supra),that the

opinion of the Federation one way or the other must be taken into account

before reaching the conclusion whether or not to supersede. The Hon'ble

wp.607.15

Supreme Court went on to add that it is not a good answer to say that the

opinion of the Federation could not be taken into account because no opinion

was expressed by it. It is further observed that a reply from the Federation,

one way or the other should be insisted upon. In the instant case, probably,

the District Deputy Registrar realised the mistake committed by him in

superseding the Market Committee, under Section 45 (1) of the Act, by

considering the communication of the State Marketing Board, dated

12.09.2014, which was not an opinion in the eye of law. A mere statement in

the communication that appropriate action may be taken would not be an

opinion of the State Marketing Board. When a specific opinion is sought by the

State Government whether a Market Committee should be superseded or not,

it would be necessary for the State Marketing Board to convey to the State

Government that in the circumstances of the case,the Market Committee needs

to be superseded or the Market Committee should not be superseded. If the

so called opinion, which is conveyed by the State Marketing Board vide

communication, dated 12.09.2014 is said to be an opinion as is contemplated

under section 45 (1) of the Act, 'previous consultation' would be an empty

formality. If an opinion like the one expressed by the State Marketing board

vide communication dated 12.09.2014 is expressed by the State Marketing

Board, it would be necessary for the State Government or the authority under

the Act, to which the power under section 45(1) is delegated, to ask the State

wp.607.15

Marketing Board to express its opinion one way or the other. In the instant

case, after realising the folly of taking a decision without the 'opinion' of the

State Marketing Board, the District Deputy Registrar could not have asked the

State Marketing Board to express its opinion one way or the other and then

supported the earlier impugned decision on the basis of a post-decisional

opinion. We are afraid that the opinion expressed by the State Marketing

Board after the order of supersession of the Market Committee is passed on

31.01.2015 would not mean 'previous consultation' as is provided under the

proviso to Section 45(1) of the Act. The proviso to Section 45(1) of the Act,

as stated herein-above speaks of 'previous consultation'. A consultation post

the decision, would be of no consequence. We are supported in our view by

the judgment in the case of Abhishek Thakare (supra). While rendering the

judgment in the case of Tukaram (supra) this Court did not have an occasion

to consider the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment

in the case of Kewalram (supra), but this Court had, after considering the

law laid down in the case of Kewalram (supra) as also the law laid down in

the case of Tukaram (supra), and a catena of decisions, has held in the

judgment in the case of Abhishekh Thakare (supra) that the State Marketing

Board would fail in its obligation if it does not express its opinion in regard to

the supersession of the Market Committee one way or the other. In the

circumstances of the case, the order superseding the Market Committee is

wp.607.15

liable to be set aside.

7. Hence, for the reasons aforesaid, the Writ Petition is allowed. The

impugned order is quashed and set aside. The respondents are free to take

action in accordance with law.

Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.

                 JUDGE                                    JUDGE

sahare





 

 
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