Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 1642 Bom
Judgement Date : 12 April, 2017
912.WP4157_2017.doc
Vidya Amin
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION No. 4157 OF 2017
Union of India through
The Chief Engineer ... Petitioner
Vs.
M/s. Arun Kumar Deedwania ... Respondent
Ms. Vaishali Choudhari, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Vishwajeet Sawant a/w. Mr. Prabhakar Jadhav a/w. Mr.
Veerdhaval Kakade, Advocate for the respondent.
CORAM: MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.
DATE: 12th April, 2017.
JUDGMENT:
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, the Petition
is heard finally and disposed of at the stage of admission.
2. The petitioner-Union of India challenges the order dated 24 th
January, 2017 passed by the Additional District Judge, Pune in
Execution Petition No. 2416 of 2016. The respondent is a decree
holder in the arbitral proceedings, so he filed Special Darkhast No.
2418 of 2016 before the District Judge, Pune.
3. In this case, the Union of India had filed Civil Miscellaneous
Application No, 450 of 2011 challenging the award under section 34
of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the arbitral award passed in
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favour of the respondent. The said application was rejected by the
District Judge-12, Pune on 2nd May, 2014. After losing that case, the
UOI preferred Arbitration Appeal bearing No. 33 of 2014 before this
Court, which was dismissed by this Court by order dated 18 th June,
2015. In the said Appeal, no ground was taken by the petitioner/UOI
that the said Application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act ought
to have been entertained and decided by the Principal District Judge
and should have decided by the District Judge-12, Pune.
4. Thereafter, the respondent filed Special Darkhast No. 2418 of
2016 for execution of award under section 36 of the Arbitration Act.
The Application under section 36 was presented before the District
Court. In the said Darkhast, one Application Exhibit 12 was filed by
UOI praying that the darkhast should be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, as it was not filed before the Principal District Judge, who
was supposed to be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
under the Arbitration Act. The said Application was opposed by the
respondent/decree holder that the execution was filed in the Court of
Principal District Judge and his Court is not Subordinate Court like
Civil Judge Senior Division, Civil Judge Junior Division or Small
Causes Court. The said Application was rejected on 24 th January,
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2017 and learned District Judge-13, Pune has taken a view that
under section 36 of the Act, if the execution petition is filed before the
Principal District Judge, it can be assigned by the Principal District
Judge to any other Court including the Court of Civil Judge Senior
Division.
5. The learned counsel for UOI submitted that in the said
Darkhast, the judgment debtor-Union of India moved an application
that the Darkhast for enforcement of the arbitral award is not
maintainable before the said Court because the Court as defined
under section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is
of a Principal District Judge and the order is passed by the Additional
District Judge, Pune and the proceedings are before the Additional
District Judge, Pune, hence the order passed by him rejecting the
application taking objection to the maintainability of the order is to be
quashed and set aside in view of Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent while supporting the
order passed by the District Judge, Pune pointed out that the order is
not passed by the Additional District Judge as mentioned in prayer
clause but it is the order of the District Judge, Pune. He submitted
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that as per the definition of "Court" under section 2(1)(e) of the
Arbitration Act, it is the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a
district and it is not to be read as Principal District Judge. He further
submitted that in fact earlier the petitioner itself has filed the
proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
before the District Court and it was disposed of by the District Judge-
12, Pune. The learned counsel further submitted that the Arbitral
award is enforced by the District Court and it may be either Principal
District Judge or any other District Judge.
7. In support of his submissions, he relied on the order of Division
Bench of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court dated 22 nd and 23rd
December, 2010 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 229 of 2010 in the
case of The Akola Janata Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs.
Raju Natthuji Badhe vs. Ors.
8. The learned counsel further submitted that in the order under
challenge, the learned District Judge has mentioned that the matter
in hand was presented before the Principal District Judge and
thereafter he assigned the matter to the District Judge. Therefore,
the objection taken on the jurisdiction is devoid of merits in law and
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also in facts. The learned counsel further submitted that if the
analogy of the hierarchy between the Principal District Judge is
applied, then that will be applicable in Bombay High Court also.
Under section 34 of Arbitration Act, Bombay High Court is the Court
of principal civil court of original jurisdiction, then only the Hon'ble the
Chief Justice is empowered to entertain the Application under section
34 or under section 36 of the Arbitration Act.
9. On the point of precedent, the learned counsel relied on
following decisions:
(I) Three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Government of West Bengal vs. Tarun K. Roy & Ors., reported
in (2004) 1 SCC 347.
(II)Special Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Murarao Malojirao Ghorpade & Ors.,
reported in 2009(6) Mh. L.J. 788.
10. At the outset, it is made clear that in the prayer clause (a) of the
petition, the nomenclature of the authority is wrongly mentioned as
Additional District Judge, Pune. The authority who passed the order
is District Judge-13, Pune. There is difference in Additional District
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Judge and District Judge. A short point which arose is formulated as
follows :
"Whether the meaning of "Court" which is defined under section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is restricted to the Principal District Judge or it covers all the District Judges in the District."
11. Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
reads as follows:
(e) "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having, jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject- matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject- matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;
12. The relevant nomenclature used is "principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction in a district". In the Act, the legislature has not
used the terms as "Principal District Judge of original jurisdiction".
The Principal District Judge and District Judges also are within the
scope of term "principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district".
In order to understand the meaning and scope of principal Civil Court
of original jurisdiction, I refer and rely the definition of District Courts
in Part III of Bombay Civil Courts Act of 1869. Section 7 of the
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Bombay Civil Court Act is about the Original jurisdiction of District
Court -
"The District Court shall be the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure".
Thus, the nomenclature of the authority which is worded in the
Bombay Civil Courts Act is adopted as it is and mentioned in Section
2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
13. There is difference in terms "Court" and "Judge". "Court"
includes many Judges and "Judge" refers to a person holding that
post. Therefore all District Judges are covered under the term
"District Court". There may be only one District Judge or may be 10
District Judges, but all form the "District Court".
14. For better understanding of the phrase, Section 2(4) of Civil
Procedure Code is to be seen -
"District" means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a "District Court") and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of High Court.
15. In Section 2(8) of CPC, "Judge" means a Presiding Officer of
the Civil Court.
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16. Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code is about subordination of
Courts which reads thus-
"For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court."
17. However, the hierarchy between the Principal District Judge,
District Judge or Additional District Judge is not defined under the
Code but the terms "District Judge" and "District Court" is defined and
explained in Maharashtra Civil Courts Act of 1869. Section 5 of
Maharashtra Civil Courts Act reads thus -
"There shall be in each District a District Court presiding over by a Judge to be called the District Judge".
18. Section 7 of Maharashtra Civil Courts Act reads as follows:
"The District Court shall be the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure."
19. Section 9 of Maharashtra Civil Courts Act states about -
"Powers of the District Judge having the control and inspection of Courts."
20. Section 11 states about -
"The seal which the District Judge is required to use".
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The Maharashtra Civil Courts Act has created a cadre of Additional
District Judge.
21. Maharashtra Judicial Service Rules, 2008 (as amended upto
11-02-2016), in Chapter II-Constitution of Service, there is no such
post of Principal District Judge but it is a post of only District Judges
and all these District Judges necessarily form a District Court and the
District Court which is defined under section 2(1)(e) of Arbitration Act
as principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.
22. This hierarchy illustrates that the District Court is a higher Court
than the Civil Court and Small Causes Court. Thus, all District
Judges who are sitting in the District Court are the Judges having the
higher rank than the Judges of Civil and Small Causes Courts. In
Section 2(4) of Code of Civil Procedure also the legislature has used
and incorporated the same terminology, i.e., principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction and it is further mentioned "hereinafter called a
"District Court"". Thus, the word "principal" which is used as an
adjective of Civil Court, is to be read in context with original
jurisdiction. In the absence of word "principal", the terminology is
"Civil Court of original jurisdiction" means "any Civil Court", i.e., Civil
Judge Junior Division or Civil Judge Senior Division or Small Causes
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Court Judge, i.e., the Court of first forum. Had the legislature
intended to vest the powers of execution of the arbitral award or
powers under section 34 of the Arbitration Act exclusively with the
Principal District Judge then the legislature would have specifically
mentioned the said designation. Under such circumstances, the
jurisdiction to entertain the execution of the arbitral award or
challenge under section 34 of the Arbitral award would have been
vested persona designata with the Principal District Judge only and
not with any District Judge. However, the legislature did not use the
designation in the act which it has used wherever intended.
For eg.: Earlier before the amendment of 2015 under Section 11 of
the Arbitration Act, the power vested only with the Chief Justice.
23. While dealing with this issue I could lay my hand on a judgment
dated 11th June, 2015 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this
Court, Bench at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 2218 of 2015 in
the case of Sanjay Suryakant Mhaske & Ors. vs. Zilla Parishad,
Jalna. In the said Petition, the legality and validity of the order
passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Jalna of assigning the
matters under section 34 of the Arbitration Act to the District Judges
and Adhoc District Judges was challenged. The learned Judge in the
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said case has heavily relied on the judgment of Full Bench of this
Court in Fountain Head Developers and etc. vs. Mrs. Mariya
Arcangela Sequeria (decd.) by LRs. & Ors., reported in AIR 2007
Bombay 149. The learned Single Judge held that "it would not open
for a Principal District Judge to exercise powers under Maharashtra
Civil Courts Act under section 16 thereof to delegate or assign his
powers to deal with the proceedings under Arbitration and
Conciliation Act to any other Judge and thus he allowed the Writ
Petition and set aside the order of the Principal District Judge. With
due respect to the view taken by the Hon'ble Single Judge of
Aurangabad Bench, I am of the opinion that in the judgment of
Fountain Head Developers (supra) wherein the Full Bench has not
held anywhere either the District Judge to be read as Principal
District Judge or the principal Court of Civil jurisdiction means the
principal District Judge only. In the case of Fountain Head
Developers, the Full Bench has held that the District Judge in a
district alone is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction and it is
not included in other Judge subordinate to him. It is also held that
"The Parliament intended to have only one court as the forum for
arbitral proceedings, that is, the "principal court of original
jurisdiction" in a district". This ratio laid down by the Full Bench in
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Fountain Head Developers cannot be misread that the District
Judge or the District Court means only a Court of Principal District
Judge. It appears that the order of the Division Bench of Nagpur
Bench in The Akola Janata Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd.
which is very relevant and useful, was not placed before the Hon'ble
Single Judge and therefore, he had no opportunity to consider this
aspect from the other prospective.
24. In the case of The Akola Janata Commercial Cooperative
Bank Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench of Nagpur has held that
"The word "Court" occurring in Section 36 must be held to be a Court of District Judge also for the purpose of enforcement of the award. It further held that "From a conjoint reading of these provisions, it is clear that an award must be treated as a decree passed by the District Judge and, therefore, it may be executed either by the District Judge himself or by any Court to which it may be sent by such District Judge for execution vide Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure . The transfer of decree by the District Judge would be governed by Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, a decree holder must apply for execution of an award to the Court of District Judge, who may either execute the award as a decree himself or send it for execution to another Court including a subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction."
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25. In the absence of the judgment in the case of The Akola
Janata Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd., the ratio laid down in
the case of Sanjay Suryakant Mhaske (supra) being a precedent,
binding on this Court. While meeting this situation, it is worthwhile to
refer the case of Government of West Bengal (supra), wherein the
three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
Court is to follow the precedent binding on it. While discussing the
rule of law and the rule of binding precedent, it is held that -
"An order passed to the contrary by another learned Single Judge in ignorance of the earlier binding precedent by itself would not constitute a binding precedent and may be held to have been rendered per incuriam."
26. The Special Bench in the case of State of Maharashtra and
Ors. vs. Murarao Maljirao Ghorpade & Ors., (supra), held that -
"The law of precedent lays down the judicial discipline leading to certainty and finality in judicial decisions. Further it is held that "Normally, the judgment of a higher Court or a larger Bench or Coordinate Bench would be binding on a Bench of a lesser strength. The exception to the applicability of the law of precedent is, if on the facts of a given case and the law applicable, the case falls for good and valid reasons within the exception specified in the judgment, or that the judgment is per incuriam, sub silentio
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and/or hit by stare decisis. Unless the subsequent judgment discusses such an issue and records reason, it may fall within the mischief of violating the law of precedent which may not be in conformity with the canons of judicial discipline. The concept of certainty and finality is essential in judicial decision making process."
27. Thus, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction has a wider
connotation which includes Principal District Judge and so also of the
District Judges, who collectively fall under the category of Judges
having principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Hence, the
challenge given cannot sustain. Writ Petition is dismissed.
(MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.)
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