Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 1461 Bom
Judgement Date : 5 April, 2017
1 WP No. 11991/2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.11991 OF 2015
Balasaheb s/o Gulabrao Salunke,
Aged 65 years, Occ. Pensioner & Agriculture,
R/o. Khadgaon, Tq. & Dist. Latur.
Now at - Flat No.102, Aseem Co-operative
houseing Society, Jayant Palkar Road,
Worli, Mumbai - 400030 = PETITIONER
VERSUS
1) Anil s/o Raosaheb Deshmukh,
Aged 55 years, Occ. Business,
R/o. Ambajogai, Dist. Beed.
Now at-Flat No.10, Ashutosh building,
Dahanukar Colony, Kotrud, Pune.
2) Bapusaheb s/o Raosaheb Deshmukh
Aged 54 years, Occ. Business,
R/o Ambajogai, Dist. Beed.
Now at - 106/9, Parshuram Kuti,
Erandwane, Pune
3) Balasaheb s/o Raosaheb Deshmukh,
Aged 51 years, Occ. Business,
R/o Ambajogai, Dist. Beed.
Now at 13-C, Flat No.3
Pashima Nagari, Kothrud, Pune
= RESPONDENTS
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Mr. S.S. Choudhary, Advocate for Petitioner;
Mr. V.V. Bhavtankar, Advocate for Respondent No.2.
-----
CORAM : P.R.BORA,J.
DATE :
5 th
April,2017.
ORAL JUDGMENT:
1) Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable
forthwith by consent of learned Counsel appearing
for the parties.
2) Under which circumstances the execution
of the decree can be stayed by invoking Order XXI
Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is the
short question, to be determined in the present
petition.
3) The present petitioner had filed Special
Civil Suit No.57/2010 against the present
respondents which has been decreed on 10th
September, 2013. As per the decree so passed,
the present respondents were directed to repay to
the present petitioner, amount of Rs.37,94,140/-
within the period of three months from the date
of decree. The decree also specifies that the
suit property shall be kept under the charge of
Rs.37,94,140/- till recovery of the amount by the
decree holder from the judgment debtors.
4) Since the order passed in the aforesaid
Special Civil Suit was not complied with, the
petitioner initiated the Execution proceedings
vide Regular Darkhast No.4/2015. In the said
Regular Darkhast proceedings, the present
respondents filed an application at Exhibit-30
invoking Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (for short, CPC) and prayed for staying
the execution proceedings till disposal of
Regular Civil Suit No.73/2013.
5) It was the contention of the respondents
in the aforesaid application that the petitioner
has compelled his wife, who is the real sister of
the respondents, to file a suit for partition and
separate possession bearing Regular Civil Suit
No.73/2013 in the court of Civil Judge, Junior
Division, at Ambejogai. It was the further
contention of the respondents that the suit
property, which is the subject matter of Regular
Civil Suit No.73/2013, is the same property,
which has been attached for recovery of decreetal
amount in Regular Darkhast No.4/2015. It was the
further contention of the respondents that the
petitioner i.e. the decree holder, is deft.No.7
in the said suit and has filed an application in
the said suit for his transposition as plaintiff
No.2 in the said suit. In the backdrop of the
aforesaid facts, invoking the provisions under
Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code, the aforesaid
application was filed at Exh.30 by the
respondents. According to the respondents, since
Regular Civil Suit No.73/2013 was pending between
the petitioner/decree holder and the Respondent
-judgment debtors, the further proceedings in
Regular Darkhast No.4/2015 were liable to be
stayed. The application so filed was resisted by
the decree holder/petitioner. However, the
learned Civil Judge allowed the said application
and thereby stayed the execution proceeding till
disposal of the Regular Civil Suit No.73/2013 on
condition that the judgment debtors shall furnish
bank guarantee to the tune of decreetal amount,
i.e. Rs.37,94,140/- within one month from the
date of the order.
6) Shri S.S.Choudhari, learned Counsel
appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the
impugned order is patently wrong. The learned
Counsel submitted that having regard to the facts
involved in the instant petition, the provisions
under Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code would not
apply. The learned counsel in support of his
contention relied upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shaukat Hussain
alias Ali Akram and Ors. Vs. Smt. Bhuneshwari
Devi and Ors. - AIR 1973 SC 528. In view of the
law laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the
learned Counsel prayed for allowing the petition
thereby setting aside the order dated 30th June,
2015 impugned in the present petition.
7) Shri Bhavthankar, learned Counsel for
the respondents, supported the impugned order.
8) I have carefully considered the
submissions advanced by the learned Counsel
appearing for the respective parties. Since the
impugned order is passed under Order XXI Rule 29
of the Code, I deem it appropriate to reproduce
the said provision, which reads thus, -
"29. Stay of execution pending suit between decree holder and judgment debtor.- Where a suit is pending in any court against the holder of a decree of such court or of a decree which is being executed by such court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided:
Provided that if the decree is one for payment of money, the court shall, if it grants stay without requiring security, record its reasons for so doing."
9) In the case of Shaukat Hussain (cited
supra), one of the questions for consideration
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, - In what
circumstances the execution of the decree can be
stayed under Order XXI Rule 29 of the C.P.C."
While deciding the said issue, the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Para 6 of the said judgment, has held
thus, -
"6. Order XXI, Civil Procedure Code deals generally with the execution of decrees and orders. That order is divided into several topics, each topic containing a number of rules. The first four topics cover rules 1 to 25 and the fifth topic, namely, stay of execution comprises 4 rules, namely, rules 26 to
29. A perusal of these rules will show that the first three rules i.e. rules 26 to 28 deal with the powers and duties of a court to which decree has been sent for execution. Under rule 26, that court can stay the execution of the decree transferred to it for execution for a reasonable time to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the court by which the decree was passed or to any court having appellate jurisdiction over the former for an order to stay execution or for any other order relating to the decree or execution which might have been made by the court of first instance or the appellate court. It will be seen, therefore, that under rule 26 the transferee court has a limited power to stay execution before it. Moreover, under sub-rule (2) if any property is seized by it in the course of execution, it may even order the restitution of the property pending the result of the application made by the judgment-debtor to the court of the first instance or to the appellate
court. Rule 27 says that any such restitution made under sub-rule (2) of rule 26 will not prevent the property of the judgment-debtor from being retaken in execution of the decree sent for execution. Rule 28 provides that any order of the court by which the decree was passed, in relation to the execution of such decree, shall be binding upon the court to which the decree was sent for execution. And then we have rule 29 which deals with a different situation. The rule is as follows :
" Where a suit is pending in any court against the holder of a decree of such court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided."
It is obvious from a mere perusal of the rule that there should be simultaneously two proceedings in one court. One is the proceeding in execution at the instance of the decree-holder against the judgment- debtor and the other a suit at the, instance of the judgment-debtor against the decree-holder. That is a condition under which the court in which the suit is pending may stay the execution before it. If that was the only condition, Mr. Chagla would be right in his contention, because admittedly there was a proceeding in execution by the decree-holder against the judgment- debtor in the court of Munsif 1st Gaya and there was also a suit at the instance of the judgment-debtor against the decree holder in that court. But there is a snag in that rule. It is not enough that there is a suit pending by the judgment-debtor, it is further necessary that the suit must be against
the holder of a decree of such court. The words "such court" are important. "Such court" means in the context of that rule the court in which the suit is pending. In other words, the suit must be one not only pending in that court but also one against the holder of a decree of that court. That appears to be the plain meaning of the rule."
10) As has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex
Court for invoking Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code,
there should be simultaneously two proceedings in
one court. One is the proceeding in execution at
the instance of the decree-holder against the
judgment-debtor and the other a suit at the,
instance of the judgment-debtor against the
decree-holder. In the instant petition, Regular
Civil Suit No.73/2013 is admittedly pending in
the court other than the court wherein Regular
Darkhast No.4/2015 is pending. Moreover, Regular
Civil Suit No.73/2013 is not filed by the present
respondents, i.e. judgment debtors in Regular
Darkhast No.4/2015. Moreover it is also not in
dispute that R.C.S.No. 73/2013 is not against the
decree-holder of R.D.No.4/2015 and he is only a
formal party to the said suit. Thus, none of the
requirements is satisfied so as to invoke the
provisions under Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code.
Regular Civil Suit No.73/2013 is filed by wife of
the present petitioner against the present
respondents seeking partition and separate
possession of the ancestral property, wherein the
petitioner - decree holder is a formal party.
11) The learned Civil Judge, Junior
Division, while passing the impugned order, has
failed in appreciating the facts, as aforesaid,
and has also failed in understanding the import
of the provision under Order XXI Rule 29 of the
Code. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be
sustained and deserves to be set aside.
12) For the reasons stated above, the
impugned order is quashed and set aside. It
would be however open for the present respondents
to revive the prayer made by them, vide prayer
clause (B), in the application submitted by them
at Exh.30, since the learned Trial Court while
deciding the said application at Exh.30, has not
considered the said prayer on merits.
13) Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid
terms. The writ petition is disposed of
accordingly.
(P.R.BORA) JUDGE bdv/
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