Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 6365 Bom
Judgement Date : 26 October, 2016
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.2817 OF 1997
Sunil Balkrishna Chandsarkar,
Age-36 years, Occu-Unemployed,
Residing near Pandurang Building,
Datta Mandir, Satana Naka,
At Post : Malegaon,
Dist. Nasik -- PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. The President,
Khandesh College Education Society,
Jalgaon - 425002,
M.J.College Parisar,
Jalgaon,
2. Dr.Director,
Technical and Vocational Training Centre,
Old Agra Road, Near Trambak Naka,
Nasik,
3. Dy.Director of Education,
Gole Colony, Nasik Region,
Nasik,
4. Presiding Officer,
School Tribunal
Behind Runanubandh Mangal
Karyalaya, Everest Colony,
Nasik -- RESPONDENTS
WITH WRIT PETITION NO.2818 OF 1997 Sunil Balkrishna Chandsarkar, Age-36 years, Occu-Unemployed, Residing near Pandurang Building, Datta Mandir, Satana Naka, At Post : Malegaon, Dist. Nasik -- PETITIONER
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VERSUS
1. The President, Khandesh College Education Society, M.J.College Campus, Jalgaon, Dist.Jalgaon,
2. Principal, Khandesh College Education Society, Industrial Training Centre/Sanstha,
Maniyar Law College, Jalgaon,
3. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Behind Runanubandh Mangal Karyalaya, Everest Colony, Nasik -- RESPONDENTS
Mr.A.G.Talhar h/f Mr.S.S.Gangakhedkar, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.V.T.Choudhary, Advocate for respondent No.1. Mr.P.N.Kutti, AGP for respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Respondent No.4 is deleted in both the petitions being formal party.
( CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
DATE : 26/10/2016
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Respondent No.4 is the School Tribunal and hence it is deleted
from the proceedings.
2. Both these petitions have been filed by the petitioner / original
appellant since by the impugned judgment dated 08/08/1996, his
Appeals Nos.21/1994 and 34/1994, challenging his terminations
dated 05/09/1990 and 17/07/1994, have been dismissed.
khs/OCT.2016/2817-d
2. This Court, by its order dated 30/03/1998, has concluded that
it would be open to the petitioner/employee to prosecute only one
amongst the two causes of action. Mr.Talhar, learned Advocate for
the petitioner, therefore, submits that he would be prosecuting the
second cause of action arising out of the termination order dated
17/07/1994.
3. I have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates for
the respective sides at length and with their assistance, I have gone
through the petition paper book.
4. There is no dispute as regards the following factors :-
[a] The petitioner/employee was initially engaged by the
appointment order dated 22/08/1986 as an "Instructor" in the Trade of Draught'sman (Civil) in the Industrial Training Institute of the respondent Education Society. His salary structure has been mentioned in the appointment order.
[b] He has lastly worked upto 31/07/1990 which is a period of about 4 years.
[c] He was issued with order of termination 05/09/1990 wherein the Management has taken a stand that since one of its units has been closed, he would not have any work to do. [d] A Senior Instructor by name Mr.G.J.Mahajan was appointed as
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an Instructor in the surviving unit in August 1990. [e] Eventually, the first unit was permanently closed down in
August 1992 and the second unit was closed down from August 1993.
[f] Both the units are presently not operational.
5. It appears that the first termination order was issued by the
Management de-hors Rule 26 of the MEPS Rules, 1981. Same was
assailed after 4 years by the petitioner before the Tribunal. During
the pendency of Appeal No.21/1994, the Management issued the
second termination order dated 17/07/1994 "without prejudice to its
rights in the pending appeal".
6. It is, therefore, apparent that the first termination order was
issued without the compliance of the provisions of the rules and
consequentially the Tribunal has concluded that since the second
termination order has been issued, the said order would be
insignificant. It cannot be ignored that the second termination order
dated 17/07/1994 is in due compliance of Rule 26 and the petitioner
has been given 3 months termination notice and obviously salary for
the said 3 months period. The factum of closure is not disputed and
as such, the said ITI Institute conducted by the Management is no
longer operational. In this backdrop, the prayer for reinstatement,
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with continuity and full back wages put forth by the petitioner cannot
be entertained.
7. In the backdrop of the first termination order dated
05/09/1990, being unsustainable, it leads to a legal presumption
that the petitioner has continued in employment. The Management,
by way of abundant precaution, has issued the second termination
order so as to fall back upon the said order to justify the termination
of the petitioner. Considering Rule 26 and the reason for termination,
the order of termination dated 17/07/1994 deserves to be sustained
and has rightly been sustained by the Tribunal.
8. In the above backdrop, it has to be legally assumed that the
petitioner has continued in employment till the date on which his
termination order dated 17/07/1994 was given effect to. It is
undisputed that the second order effects the termination from
18/11/1994 and the petitioner has been paid his salary during the
notice period.
9. In the light of the above, the petitioner would thus be entitled
for his last drawn wages as paid to him by drawing an average of the
3 months notice period, for the period from 05/09/1990 till
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16/07/1994, assuming that the Management has paid the salary to
the petitioner during the notice period. Consequentially, the Second
Petition No.2818/1997 challenging the impugned termination order
dated 05/09/1990 is rendered infructuous and stands disposed of.
Rule is discharged.
10. The First Petition No.2817/1997 stands partly allowed only to
the extent of granting the petitioner his wages as observed in the
foregoing paragraph for the period 05/05/1990 till 16/07/1994. In
the event his wages have not been paid for the 3 months' notice
period, the same shall also be payable. The respondent/Management
shall accordingly pay the petitioner the said amount of wages within
a period of 12 weeks from today, failing which the said amount shall
carry simple interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of the impugned
judgment of the Tribunal till actually it is paid and the entire amount
shall have to be paid by the Management.
11. Rule is made partly absolute accordingly.
( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
khs/OCT.2016/2817-d
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