Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 5922 Bom
Judgement Date : 10 October, 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 846 OF 2016
Rajendra s/o Madhav Pate,
Age : 49 years, Occu. Business,
R/o Laxminagar, Chalisgaon,
District Jalgaon PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. The State of Maharashtra,
through Secretary,
Home Department and Police
Station Officer, Chalisgaon,
District Jalgaon
2. The Drugs Inspector,
Food and Drugs Administration,
1st Floor, Dr. Ambedkar Market,
Jalgon RESPONDENTS
----
Mr. R.R. Mantri, Advocate for the Petitioner
Mr. A.R. Borulkar, A.P.P. for the Respondents
----
CORAM : S.S. SHINDE AND
SANGITRAO S. PATIL, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 3rd OCTOBER, 2016
PRONOUNCED ON : 10th OCTOBER, 2016
JUDGMENT (PER : SANGITRAO S. PATIL, J.) :
Rule, returnable forthwith. With the consent
of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the
learned A.P.P., heard finally.
2 criwp846-2016
2. By this writ petition, the original accused has
prayed for quashing of the criminal proceedings bearing
Summary Criminal Case (S.C.C.) No. 671 of 2014,
instituted by the Police Station Officer, Chalisgaon in
the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class at
Chalisgaon on the basis of the FIR bearing No. 62 of
2013, lodged in the Police Station by respondent No. 2 -
Drugs Inspector, for the offence punishable under
section 27 (b) (ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
("the Act", for short).
3. The case of respondent No. 2, in short, is that
as per the order dated 20th June, 2013, passed by the
Assistant Commissioner and Licensing Authority, Drugs
and Medicine Administration, Government of Maharashtra,
Jalgaon, the licence of the petitioner to run the
business of selling the drugs was suspended from 1st
October, 2013 to 15th October, 2013 (both days
inclusive). He was made aware that legal action would
be initiated against him for selling drugs during the
said period as it would amount to committing breach of
Section 18 (c) of the Act. It is alleged that on 10 th
3 criwp846-2016
October, 2013, the Assistant Commissioner Shri H.Y.
Metkar and the Drugs Inspectors Shri A.M. Manikrao (i.e.
respondent No.2) and Shri A.S. Sarkade visited M/s Suyog
Medical and General Stores, Station Road, Nehru Square,
Chalisgaon, that was run by the petitioner and without
disclosing their identity, orally asked for a cough
syrup, whereon the petitioner sold out Alkof cough syrup
to them without asking for prescription from the medical
practitioner and without issuing any bill. However,
when the price of the cough syrup i.e. Rupees 36/-, was
offered to the petitioner, he politely refused to
receive the same. The above named three officers seized
the cough syrup bottle and prepared the inspection
report which was signed by the petitioner. Thereafter,
on the next day, respondent No.2 lodged the FIR in
Police Station, Chalisgaon against the petitioner for
the offence punishable under section 27 (b) (ii) of the
Act. After completion of the investigation, the
Investigating Officer i.e. API Mushtaq Shaikh, submitted
the chargesheet against the petitioner in the Court of
the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Chalisgaon for
the above mentioned offence on the basis of which the
S.C.C. No. 671 of 2014 came to be instituted.
4 criwp846-2016
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed
tenability of the chargesheet and the subsequent
criminal proceedings bearing S.C.C. No. 671 of 2014,
firstly on the ground that as per Section 32 of the Act,
the cognizance of the above mentioned offence could not
have been taken on the basis of the chargesheet filed by
the police officer. He submits that it was only on the
basis of the complaint filed by respondent No.2 that the
cognizance could have been taken in view of section 32
of the Act. He points out to Section 36-AC (a) of the
Act which enumerates the offences punishable under
certain sections of the Act which have been made
cognizable. Therefore, according to him, the cognizance
of the offence taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Chalisgaon, on the basis of the chargesheet
submitted by the police officer, itself is illegal and
hence, the criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed
and set aside.
5. He further submits that the licence of the
petitioner to run the business of selling and purchasing
the drugs was suspended by the Assistant Commissioner
5 criwp846-2016
Shri H.Y. Metkar after holding necessary enquiry and
giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
Moreover, respondent No. 2 was serving as the Drugs
Inspector for Chalisgaon Taluka since the year 2012.
Both of them were known to the petitioner. Therefore,
the case of respondent No. 2 that the Assistant
Commissioner Shri H.Y.Metkar and himself visited the
shop of the petitioner and without disclosing their
identity, purchased the cough syrup ex facie cannot be
accepted. He submits that respondent No. 2 being the
Drugs Inspector, was empowered to inspect the shop of
the petitioner and take samples of any drug. The
petitioner was bound by law to hand over the bottle
containing drug asked for by the Drugs Inspector for
inspection and taking samples. His refusal to hand over
the bottle of any drug to the Drugs Inspector would have
entailed his criminal prosecution. He further submits
that since the said officers were known to the
petitioner, on being asked by them, the petitioner
handed over the bottle of cough syrup to them. He was
not even knowing that the said officers were proposing
to purchase the said bottle. He further submits that the
refusal to receive the price of the cough syrup bottle
6 criwp846-2016
on the part of the petitioner itself indicates that he
was not intending to sell the said cough syrup bottle to
them.
6. He then submits that there is absolutely no
evidence to show that during the period of suspension of
the licence of the petitioner, he sold out any drug to
any person. According to him, no offence punishable
under section 27 (b) (ii) of the Act can be said to have
been committed by the petitioner. He submits that
continuation of the criminal proceedings in the above
circumstances would be nothing but abuse of process of
law. He, therefore, prays that the said criminal
proceedings may be quashed and set aside.
7. On the other hand, the learned A.P.P. submits
that the Assistant Commissioner Shri H.Y. Metkar and
respondent No. 2 alongwith one Shri A.S. Sarkade visited
the shop of the petitioner. They did not disclose their
identity to the petitioner and asked for a bottle of
cough syrup without producing any prescription of any
medical practitioner. The petitioner immediately handed
over the cough syrup bottle to them. This, according to
7 criwp846-2016
him, would be sufficient to establish the sale
transaction of the drugs by the petitioner during the
period of suspension of his licence. According to him,
the petitioner has been rightly prosecuted for the above
mentioned offence.
8. As per Section 18 (c) of the Act, no person
shall himself or by any other person on his behalf
manufacture for sale or for distribution, or sell, or
stock or exhibit or offer for sale, or distribute any
drug or cosmetic, except under, and in accordance with
the conditions of, a licence issued for such purpose
under Chapter IV of the Act. Undisputedly, the
petitioner has obtained a licence for sale of drugs
through his shop namely M/s Suyog Medical and General
Stores. The petitioner has produced the copy of the
order dated 20th June, 2013, passed by the Assistant
Commissioner Shri H.Y. Metkar whereby the licence
granted to the petitioner for sale and purchase of drugs
through his shop was suspended for a period from 1 st
October, 2013 to 15th October, 2013 (both days
inclusive). The copy of this order is shown to have
been given to respondent No. 2 also.
8 criwp846-2016
9. The FIR lodged by respondent No. 2 itself makes
it clear that before passing of the said order, a notice
to show cause was given to the petitioner and after
considering his reply, the said order came to be passed.
It is further mentioned in the FIR that respondent No. 2
is working as a Drugs Inspector for Chalisgaon Taluka
since the year 2012. In the circumstances, the
contention of respondent No. 2 that when he himself, the
Assistant Commissioner Shri H.Y. Metkar and one more
officer visited the shop of the petitioner, the
petitioner was not knowing them and that without
disclosing their identity, they asked the petitioner to
hand over the cough syrup bottle to them, prima facie,
cannot be accepted. Moreover, the contents of the FIR
do not disclose that respondent No. 2 expressed his
desire to purchase the cough syrup bottle. It is
mentioned that respondent No.2 and the other two
officers orally asked the petitioner to handover the
cough syrup bottle. When respondent No. 2 - Drugs
Inspector, who was empowered vide section 22 of the Act
to inspect the shop of the petitioner, asked for any
particular drug bottle for inspection, it was most
9 criwp846-2016
natural on the part of the petitioner to obey his
dictate by handing over the said bottle to him, failing
which the petitioner would have been liable to be
prosecuted for committing an offence made punishable
under sub-section (3) of section 22 of the Act.
Respondent No. 2 himself states in the FIR that the
petitioner politely refused to accept the price thereof.
Had the petitioner really intended to sell the cough
syrup bottle to unknown persons, as alleged, he would
have immediately accepted the price thereof. If the
said bottle was handed over by him to those officers on
being asked by them, without receiving any price
thereof, then it cannot be assumed that it was sold out
by him to them. As such, the alleged sale of the cough
syrup bottle by the petitioner, cannot be believed from
the contents of the FIR itself.
10. There is absolutely nothing on record to show
that the petitioner sold out the drugs to any other
persons during the period of suspension of his licence.
It was not difficult for respondent No. 2 to seize the
bill-book containing the receipts or to send a spy
witness to purchase the drugs with prescription and then
10 criwp846-2016
after sale of the drugs by the petitioner, to take
necessary action against him. Without doing that
exercise, respondent No. 2 tried to show that the
petitioner sold the drugs during the period of
suspension of his licence.
11. Here, it would be necessary to refer to the
material portion of the provisions of Section 36-AC (1)
(a) of the Act, enumerating the offences punishable
under certain sections of the Act, which have been made
cognizable, which read thus :-
"Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable in certain cases -
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
(a) every offence, relating to adulterated or spurious drug and punishable under clauses (a)
and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13, clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 13, sub-section (3) of section 22, clauses (a) and
(c) of section 27, section 28, section 28-A, section 28-B and sub-sections (1) and (2) of
section 30 and other offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs, shall be cognizable."
The offence punishable under section 27 (b) (ii) of the
Act has not been included in clause (a) of sub-section
(1) of section 36-AC of the Act. In view of the settled
11 criwp846-2016
legal position that special enactment will prevail over
general law, as has been reiterated in the case of
Suresh Nanda Vs. C.B.I. (2008) 3 SCC 174 cited by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, the provisions of
section 36-AC of the Act would prevail over the general
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
classifying the offences as cognizable or non-
cognizable, and the offences those have been enumerated
in section 36-AC only would be treated as cognizable. As
such, the offence under section 27 (b) (ii) of the Act
being non-cognizable, the police machinery was not
empowered to take cognizance thereof and conduct
investigation, without the order of the Magistrate vide
section 155 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It
is not the case of the respondents that the
investigation into the present case was carried out
after obtaining order from the Magistrate vide section
155 (2) of the Code. Thus, the investigation conducted
by the police officer in this case is illegal.
12. Section 32 of the Act reads as follows :-
"Cognizance of offences -
(1) No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except by -
12 criwp846-2016
(a) an Inspector; or
(b) any Gazetted Officer of the Central
Government or a State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central
Government or a State Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government; or
(c) the person aggrieved; or
(d) a recognised consumer association whether such person is a member of that association or not.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no
Court inferior to that of a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter.
(3) Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or
omission which constitutes an offence against this Chapter."
From the above provisions, it is clear that the
cognizance of the offences punishable under Chapter IV
of the Act, which includes the offence under Section 27
(b) (ii), cannot be taken on the basis of the
chargesheet filed by the police under section 173 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
13. Indisputably, the cognizance of the offence
punishable under section 27 (b) (ii) of the Act alleged
13 criwp846-2016
to have been committed by the petitioner has not been
taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class on
the basis of the complaint as defined under section 2
(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, filed by
respondent No. 2 - the Drugs Inspector. Consequently,
the cognizance of the said offence taken on the basis of
the chargesheet filed by the police officer cannot be
said to be legal. The learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said
offence against the petitioner on the basis of the
chargesheet filed by the police officer ignoring the
provisions of section 32 of the Act.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies
on the judgment in the case of G. Sagar Suri and another
Vs. State of U.P. and others (2000) 2 S.C.C. 636,
wherein it has been held that the High Court can
exercise the jurisdiction of quashing criminal
proceedings even when the application for discharge of
the accused is pending with the trial Judge. However,
such power should be exercised cautiously to prevent
abuse of process of court. He further cited the judgment
in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special
14 criwp846-2016
Judicial Magistrate and others 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 599
(S.C.), wherein also it has been held that though the
Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the
trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but
that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the
High Court under section 482 of the Code or Article 227
of the Constitution to have the proceedings quashed
against him when the complaint does not make out any
case against him and still he must undergo the agony of
a criminal trial.
15. In view of the above facts and circumstances of
the present case and the rulings referred to above, we
are of the considered view that the continuation of
criminal proceedings against the petitioner would be a
sheer abuse of process of the Court. In the result, we
allow the writ petition with the following order :-
(i) The criminal writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The criminal proceedings bearing Summary
Criminal Case No. 671 of 2014, instituted in
the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Chalisgaon, against the petitioner for
15 criwp846-2016
the offence punishable under section 27 (b)
(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, are
quashed and set aside.
(iii) The petitioner is set at liberty. His bail
bonds are cancelled.
(iv) Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
Sd/- ig Sd/-
[SANGITRAO S. PATIL] [S.S. SHINDE]
JUDGE JUDGE
npj/criwp846-2016
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