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Amit Bhanudas Ujgare And Anr vs The State Of Mah And Anr
2016 Latest Caselaw 5910 Bom

Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 5910 Bom
Judgement Date : 7 October, 2016

Bombay High Court
Amit Bhanudas Ujgare And Anr vs The State Of Mah And Anr on 7 October, 2016
Bench: V.K. Jadhav
                                                                            cran1990.07
                                          -1-




                                                                             
                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                              BENCH AT AURANGABAD




                                                     
                        CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1990 OF 2007




                                                    
     1.       Amit S/o Bhanudas Ujgare,
              Age. 28 years, Occu. Business,
              R/o. Wadwani, Tq. & Dist. Beed.

     2.       Gautam S/o Tatyaba Ujgare,




                                         
              Age. 25 years, Occu. Labourer,
              R/o. Wadwani, Tq. & Dist. Beed.
                              ig                               ...Applicant

                               Versus

     1.       The State of Maharashtra.
                            
     2.       Bhimrao S/o Yamaji Ujgare,
              Age. 41 years, Occu. Business,
              R/o. Wadwani, Tq. Wadwani,
              Dist. Beed.                                      ...Respondents
      


                                         ...
   



            Advocate for Applicants : Mr. V.C. Patil h/f Mr. U B Bondar
                    APP for Respondent No.1: Mr. P.G. Borade
      Advocate for respondent No.2: Mr. R.S. Shinde h/f Mr. Joydeep Chatterji
                                        .....





                                                CORAM : V. K. JADHAV, J.

DATED : 7th OCTOBER, 2016

ORAL JUDGMENT:-

1. The applicants original accused Nos.1 and 2 are seeking

quashment and setting aside the order dated 17.5.2007 passed by

the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Majalgaon in R.C.C. No.99 of

2007 thereby issuing process for the offences punishable under

Sections 171-G, 193, 196, 197 r.w. 34 of I.P.C.

cran1990.07

2. Brief facts, giving rise to the present criminal application are as

follows:-

The applicant No.1 and respondent No.2 contested the

elections of Zilla Parishad, Beed from Wadwani constituency, which

was reserved for Scheduled Caste (male) candidate. The applicant

No.1 got elected from the said constituency by defeating respondent

No.2 with considerable margin of votes. On 25.4.2007, respondent

No.2 filed a private complaint in the court of J.M.F.C. Majalgaon

against present applicants and two others alleging therein that

applicant No.1 was disqualified for the said election, however, by

submitting false information and affidavits, he has contested the

election and as such committed offences punishable under Sections

171-G, 193, 196, 197 r.w. 34 of I.P.C. Learned J.M.F.C. by order

dated 17.5.2007 issued process against the applicants and other two

accused persons for the aforesaid offences. Hence, this application.

3. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that respondent

No.2 has challenged the election results by filing election petition No.

4 of 2007 before the District Judge, Majalgaon. The learned District

Judge-1, Majalgaon by judgment and order dated 16.4.2008

dismissed the said election petition. The learned District Judge has

cran1990.07

recorded the finding while disposing of said election petition that the

petitioner (respondent No.2 herein-original complainant) failed to

prove that respondent No.1 (present applicant No.1) made false

declaration and he is, therefore, disqualified to contest the election

from Wadwani constituency. In the light of above observations made

by learned District Judge, while disposing of election petition, the

allegations made in the complaint, which is subject matter of the

present criminal application, are not sustainable and on this ground

alone the impugned order is liable to be quashed set aside. Learned

counsel for the applicants submits that learned District Judge after

conducting full-fledged trial of election petition, recorded the finding in

negative and the said finding binds the parties. Criminal proceedings

stand suspended in view finding recorded by the civil court and

thereby the findings of the civil court get precedence over the

criminal proceedings. Apart from the above legal position, the

allegations made against present applicant No.2, though accepting

as it is, prima facie, no offence is made out and thus, the impugned

order is liable to be quashed and set aside to the extent of applicant

No.2.

4. Learned counsel for respondent No.2-original complainant

submits that if criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the

same cause, the judgment of civil court would be relevant if any of

cran1990.07

conditions of Sections 40 to 43 of Evidence Act are satisfied. It

cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except, as

provided under section 41 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel

submits that the criminal prosecution would not be required to be

dropped alone on the ground that the civil suit, for the same cause,

came to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the respondent-original

complainant, in order to substantiate his submissions, places

reliance on the judgment in the case of K.G. Premshankar vs.

Inspector of Police and Anr, reported in 2002 Cri.L.J. 4343.

5. Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act provide which judgment

of the Court of justice are relevant and to what extent. Sections 40 to

43 of the Evidence Act read as under:-

"40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.--

The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial.

41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.

--A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing,

cran1990.07

is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof--

that any legal character, which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation;

that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person;

that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease;

and that anything to which it declares any person to be so

entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such

judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.

42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41.--Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they

relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which

they state.

43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40

to 42, when relevant.--Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act."

6. In the case of K.G. Premshankar vs. Inspector of Police

and Anr, (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent

original complainant, the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the

similar issue by making observations in para 31 to 33 of the

cran1990.07

judgment. Paras 31 to 33 of the said judgment are reproduced as

follows:-

"31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 to 41 or

other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged

trespass by 'A' on "B's property, 'B' filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession form 'A' and suit is decree.

Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by 'B' against 'A' for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceeding cold be

relevant and Court may hold that if conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of 'B' over the property. In such case, 'A' may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every

case, first question which would require consideration is- whether

judgment, order or decree is relevant? If relevant - its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon facts of each case.

32. In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of M.S. Sheriff's case (supra) would be binding, wherein it has been specifically held that o hard and fast rule can be

laid down and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages "such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court biding on the other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages."

33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah's case (supra) that the finding recorded by the criminal Court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the Civil Court is not correct

cran1990.07

enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam

Chand's case are in context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the

Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff's case as well as sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act."

7. So far as previous judgment rendered by the civil court, which

has attained finality, is concerned, the same can be relied upon by

taking recourse of provisions of Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence

Act. If the criminal case and civil proceedings are for the same

cause, the judgment of Civil Court would be relevant, if any

conditions of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied. It cannot be said that

the judgment rendered by the Civil Court would be conclusive and it

terminates the criminal proceedings. An exception is carved out in

Section 41 of Evidence Act. In the instant case, Section 41 has no

application. Furthermore, the judgment and order or decree passed

in the civil proceedings are relevant as provided under Sections 40

and 42 of the Evidence Act. Thus, in the instant case, the learned

Magistrate would require to consider all evidence and to find out

whether the judgment and order or decree passed in the said

election petition is relevant and if relevant, what is effect of the same.

8. In view of the allegations made in the complaint, prima facie,

case is made out for issuance of process against the present

cran1990.07

applicant No.1-original accused No.1. Scope of enquiry under

Section 202 of Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and thus, I do not find any

fault in the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate,

thereby issuing process against applicant No.1 for having committed

offences punishable under Sections 171-G, 193, 196, 197 r.w. 34 of

I.P.C. So far as applicant No.2 (original accused No.4) is

concerned, he is merely a proposer in the nomination form filled up

by present applicant No.1 for contesting the said election and except

that there is no other allegation made against him. In view of this,

the order of issuance of process against applicant No.2 (original

accused No.4) is thus liable to be quashed and set aside.

Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following order:-

ORDER

I. Criminal application No. 1990 of 2007 is hereby partly

allowed.

II. The impugned order dated 17.05.2007 passed by learned

J.M.F.C. Majalgaon in R.C.C. No. 99 of 2007 thereby

issuing process as against applicant No.2 (original accused

No.4) is quashed and set side.

cran1990.07

III. The order passed by the learned Magistrate dated

17.5.2007 in R.C.C. No. 99 of 2007 thereby issuing

process for the offences punishable under sections 171-G,

193, 196, 197 r.w.34of I.P.C. against the present applicant

No.1 (original accused No.1) stands confirmed.

IV. Criminal application is accordingly disposed of. Rule is

made absolute in the above terms.

( V. K. JADHAV, J.)

rlj/

 
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