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Su-Raj Diamonds (I0 And Its ... vs M/S Winsome Diamonds And ...
2016 Latest Caselaw 5805 Bom

Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 5805 Bom
Judgement Date : 1 October, 2016

Bombay High Court
Su-Raj Diamonds (I0 And Its ... vs M/S Winsome Diamonds And ... on 1 October, 2016
Bench: S.C. Gupte
     sg                                                                         wp3080-05

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

                     ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION




                                                                                  
                                         
                        WRIT PETITION NO.3080 OF 2005




                                                          
     Su-Raj Diamonds (I) And its Associates 
     And/Or Contracts Staff Association                                     ....Petitioner
                 vs.
     1.  M/s. Winsome Diamonds and Jewellery Ltd.




                                                         
     Formerly known as
     Su-Raj Diamonds and Jewellery Ltd.
     And prior to that it was known as
     M/s. Su-Raj Diamonds (I) Ltd.




                                            
     2. The Chairman,        
     M/s. Winsome Diamonds and Jewellery Ltd.
     Formerly known as
     Su-Raj Diamonds and Jewellery Ltd.
                            
     And prior to that it was known as
     M/s. Su-Raj Diamonds (I) Ltd.

     3.  Shri G.D. Tadvalkar,
      

     Member, Industrial Court, Mumbai
                                                                   ....Respondents
   



                                    ....
     Mr. Joy Deb Saha, President of Petitioner Union-in-person, for the
     Petitioner.





     Mr. T.R. Yadav, for the Respondents.
                                     ....
                                   CORAM : S.C. GUPTE, J.

                             RESERVED ON :  APRIL 5,  2016





                                PRONOUNCED ON : OCTOBER 1,  2016
     JUDGMENT :

. This writ petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenges an order passed by the Industrial Court, Mumbai on a complaint of unfair labour practice. By the

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sg wp3080-05

impugned order, the Industrial Court dismissed the complaint of the workmen, whom the Petitioner represents in the present writ

petition.

2. The complainant workmen's case is that they were employed with the first Respondent in various capacities on a monthly salary ranging between Rs.2,500/- to Rs.6,000/- per

month. The first Respondent had two units - one at Seepz, employing about 2,000 employees and, the other at Goregaon, employing about 200 employees. The first Respondent was engaged

in importing rough diamonds, polishing them at these units and

thereafter exporting the polished diamonds. It is the complainants' grievance that the work, for which they were engaged, was purely

clerical/technical in nature. It is the complainants' grievance that some of the workmen of the first Respondent went on strike in or about 1997/1998. The complainants, however, did not join the

strike and continued to work with the first Respondent. By a

settlement dated 25 February 1998, signed between the Union and the first Respondent, inter alia, providing for transfer/employment of various groups of workmen, the workmen were grouped in four

categories under Annexures 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D'. The workmen listed in Annexure 'D', which included the complainants, were to be transferred to Surat. It is, however, their case that their transfer to

Surat was temporary and made with an assurance that they would be soon brought back to Mumbai; that notwithstanding their transfer they continued to be controlled from Mumbai with their wages also being paid at Mumbai. The settlement provided that, in the meantime, so long as the workmen worked at Surat, they would be provided a proper accommodation at Surat. It is the case of the

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complainants that believing the representations made by the first Respondent, the complainants went to Surat and worked there from

1 March 1998 till 7 August 1998. The complainants' grievance is that they were not paid salary from June 1998, though they

continued to work at Surat. It is also their grievance that though they were assured of an accommodation at Surat, no proper accommodation was provided to them at Surat. It is also their

complaint that their service conditions were also breached inasmuch as by a purported agreement of 9 June 1998, the first Respondent claimed to have changed their status as monthly wage

earners to daily piece rate workers. The complainants submit that

as they were not receiving salary at Surat and had no source of accommodation at Surat and they were based in Mumbai, it was

not possible for them to continue to report at Surat and, accordingly, they returned back to Mumbai and reported for work at the Seepz unit from time to time. It is their grievance that though

the first Respondent promised to assign them work at the Seepz

unit, no work was actually assigned to them. It is also the complainants' grievance that there was favouritism between the employees of the first Respondent; that whilst some employees were

assigned work at the Seepz unit in Mumbai, the complainants herein were not. The complainants, in the premises, filed the subject complaint, being Complaint (ULP) No.324 of 1999, before the

Industrial Court at Mumbai. The complaint alleged unfair labour practice on the part of the first Respondent within the meaning of items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 ("the Act").

3. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Industrial

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Court, inter alia, framed issues of jurisdiction, limitation and merits of the complaint. In so far as jurisdiction is concerned, the

Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the employees were transferred to Surat and, accordingly, reported and worked at Surat.

They received their wages at Surat and finally abandoned the work at Surat; and that, in the premises, it is the Court at Surat, which alone has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. On the bar of

limitation, the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the complaint being related to non-payment of wages for the months of

June and July 1998, filing of the complaint on 11 March 1998, i.e. more than 90 days after the accrual of cause of action, was beyond

time. On merits of the complaint, the Industrial Court held that it was the workmen, who failed to report for work; that there was no

change of service conditions; and that there was no breach of settlement or award and no discrimination amongst workmen. The Industrial Court, in the premises, dismissed the complaint.

4. In so far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the complaint related both to non-payment of wages as well as non-assignment of work. It was the Petitioner's

case that their wages were payable at Mumbai and even assignment of work had to be done in Mumbai and that, in the premises, the complaint of non-payment of wages and non assignment of work

lied before the Industrial Court at Mumbai under items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. The complaint is on the footing that the complainants' transfer to Surat was merely temporary and for a short period on a specific assurance that the workmen would be called back shortly to Mumbai. It is the specific case of the complainant workmen that even after they had been so transferred,

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they continued to be controlled from Mumbai and their wages were also paid at Mumbai. The complainants' grievance is that since,

contrary to the settlement, the complainants were not provided proper accommodation at Surat and since their service conditions

were changed with effect from June 1998, inasmuch as their monthly wages were converted to piece rate and daily wages, they refused to report at Surat and returned to Mumbai to their original

work place. Their grievance is that, despite reporting for duty at Seepz in Mumbai, no work was assigned to them. On these facts, the complaint clearly lies before the Industrial Court at Mumbai.

The workmen have led cogent evidence on these issues, much of

which was not seriously controverted by the first Respondent. Even the order of the Industrial Court clearly proceeds on the footing that

the workmen actually stopped reporting for duty at Surat and demanded work at Mumbai. (This without considering the workmen's case of temporary nature of their transfer as also the

reasons for their refusal to report at Surat.) The impugned order

also specifically accepts the complainants' case that the complainants continued to be controlled from Mumbai and even their wages were paid from Mumbai; the pay slips of the workmen

were made in Mumbai and the entire correspondence was addressed to the workmen from Mumbai. In the face of the evidence and the observations in the order referred to above, the Industrial Court's

conclusion of lack of jurisdiction to any Court in Mumbai, is clearly untenable. It can certainly be termed as something no reasonable person duly instructed in law could have reasonably arrived at.

5. As for the Industrial Court's conclusion on limitation, the same is simply based on the fact that the complaint alleges non-

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payment of wages for the months of June and July 1998 and is filed more than 90 days after the due dates of payment. The Industrial

Court has failed to consider that apart from the question of non- payment of wages for two months, the main thrust of the complaint

was on non-assignment of work at Mumbai, which was in the nature of a continuous cause of action. Apart from this, the Industrial Court also failed to consider that, by an earlier order dated 14 June

2002, on an application of the complainants (Exhibit U-17), the delay in filing of this complaint in so far as the claim of non- payment of wages from June 1991 onwards was concerned, was

condoned. Despite this, the Industrial Court has in the impugned

order strangely recorded that there was no application to condone the delay. In the face of these facts and particularly, an express

condonation of delay by an order of the Court, the Industrial Court could not have rejected the complaint on the ground of bar of limitation.

6. In so far as the merits of the complaint are concerned, the conclusion of the Industrial Court is based primarily on the following aspects :

(i) The complainants' case was that some of the employees were transferred to Surat and on their return to Mumbai were

employed at Seepz in Mumbai, whereas the complainants were not so employed. The Industrial Court termed this case as ipse dixit and on that footing did not consider the same;

(ii) Secondly, the order proceeds on footing that the complainants abandoned their services at Surat and that this

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abandonment was a voluntary act on their part, since admittedly they returned to Mumbai and, thereafter, proceeded on strike and

joined hands with the other employees of the first Respondent, who were already on strike and, in the premises, there was no unfair

labour practice qua the complainants;

(iii) Thirdly, the Industrial Court came to the conclusion

that the settlement dated 9 June 1998 entered into between Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh and the first Respondent

inter alia provided for new production norms and payment of piece rate daily wages and that accordingly there was no illegal change in

the service conditions of the complainant workmen.

7. The complainants had, apart from oral evidence of the workmen, who deposed before the Court, led voluminous documentary evidence on unequal treatment given to two sets of

workmen, including documents from the Office of the Provident

Commissioner, Kandivali, Mumbai produced in pursuance of a summons. The Industrial Court was expected to examine this evidence and enter a finding on whether or not there was

discriminatory and unequal treatment to different sets of workmen. It could not have simply brushed aside the complainants' case on the ground that it was ipse dixit. Even as regards the purported

voluntary act of abandonment of services at Surat and return to Mumbai, the discussion in the impugned order is wholly unsatisfactory. The order, as I have noted above, does not in terms consider, in the first place, the complainants' case that their transfer to Surat was merely temporary with an express assurance to shortly call them back to Mumbai. The Industrial Court also does not

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consider satisfactorily the issue concerning the circumstances, which the complainants claim to have led them to stop reporting at Surat

and return to Mumbai. The conclusion of the Industrial Court that the complainants after their return to Mumbai proceeded on strike

and joined hands with the other employees of the first Respondent, also hangs in the air without any discussion concerning evidence on the issue. As for the purported settlement dated 9 June 1998, it was

an express case of the complainants that they had resigned from Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh and were not party to the settlement and did not consent to the settlement. This case has also

not been considered by the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court

simply appears to have proceeded on the footing that there was a settlement between Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh and

the first Respondent and that this settlement was decisive and held the field, without discussing whether the complainants were bound by the particular settlement. In the premises, what broadly

emerges from a reading of the impugned order is that the major

contentions of the complainants, on which there was evidence before the Court, went unexamined. This state of affairs clearly warrants an order of remand, requiring the Industrial Court to

consider the issue of unfair labour practice afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the discussion above.

8. In the premises, Rule is made absolute and the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the following order :-

(I) The impugned order of the Industrial Court dated 25 August 2005 is quashed and set aside and Complaint (ULP) No.324 of 1999 is remanded to the Industrial Court for a fresh consideration

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in accordance with law. Since the Court has to merely proceed to consider the merits of the case of unfair labour practices alleged by

the complainants in the light of the evidence already on record, the Industrial Court is directed to dispose of the complaint expeditiously

and in any event, within a period of three months from today;

(II) The Industrial Court shall proceed on the footing that it

has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and also that the complaint is within limitation;

(III) The Industrial Court shall consider all aspects on merits

of the complaint of unfair labour practice and appropriate relief to be granted to such of the complainant workmen as are entitled to;

                            
     and


     (IV)              No order as to costs.
      
   



                                                         (S.C. GUPTE, J.)






                                                                             page 9 of 9




 

 
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