Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 510 Bom
Judgement Date : 10 March, 2016
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
: NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
Misc. Civil Application (Review) No. 804 of 2015
in
Misc. Civil Application (Arbitration) No. 677 of 2013
Sanjay Vegoil Products Pvt. Ltd.
504, Krishna Complex, 4-1-938,
Tilak Road, Abids, Hyderabad.
Through its Director Sanjive Bhurariya
(original respondent) .... Applicant
// VERSUS //
Ketan S/o Mukesh Sawadia
Aged about 28 years, Occ.- Business,
C/o Ames Enterprises, Triveni Hall,
Agrawal Complex, Datta Wadi,
Amravati Road, Nagpur.
(original applicant) .... Non-Applicant
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shri N. G. Jetha, Advocate for the applicant
Shri A. Shelat, Advocate for the non-applicant
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CORAM : PRASANNA B. VARALE, J.
DATE : 10-3-2016.
ORAL JUDGMENT
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith.
2. By the present application, the applicant i.e. the original
respondent to the proceeding i.e. Misc. Civil Application No.
677/2013 is seeking review of the order passed by this Court on the
ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.
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3. The non-applicant i.e. the applicant in Misc. Civil
Application No. 677/2013 submitted application seeking
appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
This Court by order dated 5-9-2014 allowed the application by
appointing sole arbitrator.
4. Shri Jetha, the learned counsel for the applicant
submitted that though the notice was issued to the applicant and
though it was reported that notice was served, the applicant was not
aware of the application filed in this Court and it only came to
knowledge of the applicant when the applicant received notice from
the learned arbitrator appointed by this Court. The submission of
Shri Jetha, learned counsel seeking review of the order was that
the application submitted by the non-applicant itself was untenable.
It was submitted by Shri Jetha, the learned counsel by referring to
the documents placed on record along with the application, namely,
the statements that all these three statements placed on record along
with the application nowhere refers to a fact of any arbitration
agreement between the parties. Shri Jetha, learned counsel
submitted that the copy of the statements placed on record do not
even refer the name of the non-applicant it is issued by the firm
3 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
AMES Enterprises. It was the submission of Shri Jetha, learned
counsel that while the applicant sought appointment of the
arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act, it was for the applicant to
satisfy this Court that there exists an arbitration agreement and the
same is agreed by the another party either expressly or otherwise
through certain communication. Shri Jetha, learned counsel
submitted that nothing is placed on record and this Court on the
submissions of the applicant, presuming that there exists an
arbitration agreement between the parties allowed the application.
Thus, the submission of Shri Jetha, the learned counsel that this is
an error apparent on the face of the record, the applicant is
approached this Court seeking review of the order.
5. Per contra, Shri Shelat, learned counsel for the non-
applicant and the applicant before this Court in Misc. Civil
Application No. 677/2013 vehemently opposes this application.
Submission of Shri Shelat, learned counsel is two fold. First
submission of Shri Shelat, learned counsel is as there is no specific
provision in the said Act i.e. the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") of review, this Court may
not entertain the present application seeking review of the order.
4 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
The other limb of the submission of Shri Shelat, learned counsel is
when the application was presented before this Court, this Court
issued notice to the respondent and the notice is duly served. As the
notice is served, the respondent had an opportunity to contest the
claim of the applicant. Respondent ought to have appeared before
this Court. When the respondent failed to appear before this Court,
the act of the respondent can be termed as waiver of the objection
and on this backdrop, the applicant cannot seek review of the order
passed by this Court. Shri Shelat, learned counsel then submitted
that the ground raised by the applicant that though the notice was
issued to the respondent and was served, the respondent was
unaware of the application filed in this Court holds no water on the
backdrop of the fact that in the application, the status of the
respondent along with the address was shown and on the very
address, the notice was issued to the respondent. Shri Shelat, the
learned counsel submitted that the applicant cannot take the ground
of ignorance of the proceedings when the notice issued by the sole
arbitrator was duly served and received by the applicant on the very
address and on receiving the very notice of the sole arbitrator, the
applicant approached this Court by filing the present review
application. Shri Shelat, learned counsel in support of his
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submission placed reliance on certain judgments.
6. As the controversy relates to the review of the order
passed by this Court appointing the sole arbitrator and on the
backdrop of the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant
provisions of the Act. The application was moved under Section 11
of the Act. Said provision reads thus :
11. Appointment of arbitrators. - (1) A person of any nationality may be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties.
(2) Subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or
arbitrators.
(3)........
(4)........
(5)........
(6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties, -
(a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure ; or
(b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators,
fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or
(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment.
6 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
(7).........
(8).........
(9).........
(10).......
(11).......
(12).......
It will be also useful to refer to Section 4 as reliance is placed on the
said provision, which reads thus :
4. Waiver of right to object. - A party who knows that -
(a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate, or
(b) any requirement under the arbitration
agreement, has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such non- compliance without undue delay or, if a time limit is provided for stating that objection, within that period of
time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to so
object.
As Shri Shelat, learned counsel also made a submission that the
order passed by this Court attained finality in view of sub-section (7)
of Section 11, it would be necessary to refer to the said provision
also.
(7) A decision on a matter entrusted by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him is final.
7. Though the submissions of Shri Shelat, learned counsel
for the non-applicant looks attractive at first blush, on considering
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the relevant provisions referred to above and the judgments of this
Court as well as the Apex Court, I am unable to accept the
submissions of Shri Shelat for the reasons stated below.
8. It was an attempt to submit that as there is no specific
provision in the Act for review, the review may not be entertained. It
will not be out of place to mention that the ground raised seeking
review is an error apparent on the face of record, namely, there was
no arbitration agreement between the parties. If Section 11 is
perused and more particularly, the conjoint reading of sub-sections
(2) and (6) of Section 11 leaves no scope to state that to invoke the
powers under Section 11 by a party concerned to the Court, the
condition precedent would be existence of arbitration agreement
between the parties. As sub-sections (2) and (6) refers to liberal
procedure for the parties for appointment of arbitrator sole or
arbitrators and if the object of the Act is perused, it is clear that by
the said Act, a speedy and effective redressal between the parties is
provided through the arbitration and conciliation proceedings and
the existence of such an agreement is a condition precedent.
9. It would be useful to refer to the judgment of the Apex
Court in the matter of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju and ors. Vs. P.V.G.
8 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
G. Raju (died) and others reported in AIR 2000 SC 1886 wherein
the issue of reference to the arbitrator was before the Apex Court.
The Hon'ble Apex Court referring to the provisions of the Act stated
thus, "Part I of the Act deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 5,
which is contained in Part I of the Act, defines the extent of judicial
intervention in arbitration proceedings. It says that notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in
matters governed by Part I, no judicial authority shall intervene
except where so provided in that Part. Section 5 brings out clearly
the object of the Act, namely, that of encouraging resolution of
disputes expeditiously and less expensively and when there is an
arbitration agreement, the Court's intervention should be minimal.
The Apex Court then deal with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act
and the Apex Court further observed that the conditions which are
required to be satisfied under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8
before the Court can exercise its powers are : (1) there is an
arbitration agreement; (emphasis supplied) (2) a party to the
agreement brings an action in the Court against the other party; (3)
subject matter of the action is the same as the subject matter of the
arbitration agreement; (4) the other party moves the Court for
referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first
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statement on the substance of the dispute."
10. It will not be out of place to refer to Section 7 of the
Act. Section 7 reads thus :
7. Arbitration agreement. - (1) In this Part, "arbitration agreement" means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing. (4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in -
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a
record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.
The Apex Court in the case of Wellington Associates Ltd. Vs. Kirit
Mehta reported in AIR 2000 SC 1379 while dealing with the
provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 16, 11 and 7 observed thus :
10 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
17. Further, a reading of sub-clauses (4), (5) and (6) of S. 11 shows that they enable the Chief Justice or his designate to appoint arbitrator or arbitrators, and
likewise S. 11(12) enable the Chief Justice of India or his designate to appoint arbitrator or arbitrators : under Rule 2 of the scheme framed by the Chief Justice of India, a request is to be made to the Chief Justice of India along
with a duly certified copy of the 'original arbitration agreement'. Section 2(b) of the Act defines 'arbitration agreement' as an agreement referred to in S. 7. Section 7 defines 'arbitration agreement as follows.
S. 7. Arbitration agreement. - (1) In this Part,
"arbitration agreement" means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a
separate agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.
(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in -
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or
other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.
The words in sub-clause (1) of S. 7, "means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration", in my opinion, postulate an agreement which necessarily or
11 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
rather mandatorily requires the appointment of an arbitrator/arbitrators. Section 7 does not cover a case where the parties agree that they "may" go to a suit or
that they 'may' also go to arbitration.
18. Thus, unless the document filed by the party before the Chief Justice of India or his designate is an
'arbitration agreement' as defined in S. 7 as explained above, requiring a reference in a mandatory sense, no reference, in my view, can be made to the arbitral Tribunal. It is, as already stated, indeed implicit - if an
objection is raised by the respondent before the Chief Justice of India or his designate that the so-called
arbitration clause is not an arbitration clause at all falling within S. 7 - that such a question will have to be decided in the proceedings under S. 11 of the Act. ....
11. Shri Shelat, learned counsel relied on certain judgments
in support of his submissions. Firstly, he relied on the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi and ors. Vs.
Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji reported in AIR 1970 SC 1273 in
support of his submission that there is no power of review in the
Arbitration Act. As stated above, even if there is no specific
provision in the Act, as the applicant is approaching this Court on
the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the record
and there are numerous judgments of this Court as well as the Apex
Court that if an error apparent on the face of record is brought to
the notice of the Court, in such a case, the review application can
be considered.
12 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
12. It will be interesting to note that Shri Shelat, learned
counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of S. P.
Awate Vs. C. P. Fernandes and anr. reported in AIR 1959 Bombay
466 (V 46 C 136). Justice Chagla in clear and unambiguous
words observed that, "it is always wrong for any Judge to assume
infallibility for his judgment and every Judge must be prepared to
consider that his judgment is erroneous." Thus, if on the certain
erroneous material, the order is passed or a judgment is delivered
and it is noticed by the Court that the error is apparent on the face
of the record or so manifest and clear, then no Court would permit
such an error to remain on the record. Shri Shelat, learned counsel
also made an attempt to place reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. And anr.
Vs. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 2009 SC 357 in
support of his submission based on Section 4 i.e. waiver of right to
object. Reliance was placed on paragraph 18 of the said judgment
which reads thus :
18. Pursuant to section 4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a party who knows that a requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with and still proceeds with the arbitration without raising an objection, as soon as possible, waives their right to object. The High Court had appointed an
13 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
arbitrator in response to the petition filed by the appellant. At this point, the matter was closed unless further objections were to be raised. If further objections
were to be made after this order, they should have been made prior to the first arbitration hearing. But the appellant had not raised any such objections. The appellant therefore had clearly failed to meet the stated
requirement to object to arbitration without delay. As such their right to object is deemed to be waived.
(emphasis supplied)
Now even considering this judgment of the Apex Court and
paragraph 18 as the reliance was sought to be placed on paragraph
no. 18, this Court cannot ignore that even in paragraph 18, the
requirement was of having a arbitration agreement between the
parties for raising the ground of waiver of objection. Thus, it only
supports the case of the applicant that as there was no such
arbitration agreement between the parties, the application filed
before this Court itself was untenable.
13. There was also an attempt on behalf of the learned
counsel Shri Shelat for the non-applicant to submit that the
documents which were placed on record along with the application,
namely statement of account referred to note. The note reads thus :
All disputes are within the jurisdiction at Nagpur by Arbitrator under the Arbitration Act.
If there would have been such an agreement of arbitration, that
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could have been at least filed by the applicant at the time of
contesting the review application. No such attempt is made by the
non-applicant who was the original applicant before this Court.
Thus, what emerges from the material placed on record is the non-
applicant to the present application and the applicant in Misc. Civil
Application No. 677/2013 could not comply with the condition
precedent of having an arbitration agreement between the parties
for seeking an appointment of the arbitrator under Section 11 of the
Act while approaching this Court. Shri Shelat, learned counsel has
placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
M/s. Shakti Bhog Foods Ltd. Vs. Kola Shipping Ltd. reported in
AIR 2009 SC 12. The Apex Court observed that the an arbitration
agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract
or in the form of a separate agreement and furthermore an
arbitration is considered to be in writing if it is contained in a
document signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters, telex,
telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a
record of the agreement or an exchange of statement of claim and
defence in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by one
party and not denied by the other. Thus, even for the submission of
waiver of the objection as tried to be submitted by the learned
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counsel for the non-applicant, the party will firstly have to establish
that there is an arbitration agreement. It may be a clause in the
agreement itself or a separate agreement or some other material like
exchange of communication. Thus, even by referring to the said
judgment on which the learned counsel sought reliance to be placed
would be of no help to the non-applicant for the reason as stated
above that the non-applicant utterly failed to establish the factum of
existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties.
Considering all these aspects, in my opinion, as the applicant in
Misc. Civil Application No. 677/2013 utterly failed to show any
existence of arbitration agreement between the parties and this
Court passed an order appointing the sole arbitrator without there
being any such arbitration agreement between the parties, the order
passed by this Court was certainly an error apparent on the face of
the record. In such a situation, the order passed by this Court
cannot sustain. The learned counsel for the applicant has made out
the case seeking review of the order passed by this Court dated 5-9-
2014. In the result, the application is allowed. The order passed by
this Court dated 5-9-2014 is recalled.
14. As this Court dealt with the basic aspect of the matter,
16 jg.mca(review)804.15.odt
namely, there is no existence of the arbitration agreement between
the parties, the application filed before this Court at the instance of
the applicant Ketan S/o Mukesh Sawadia itself was untenable. The
application ought not to have been entertained by this Court, Misc.
Civil Application No. 677/2013 thus is rejected.
JUDGE
wasnik
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