Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 3459 Bom
Judgement Date : 29 June, 2016
wp.3172.16
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.
...
WRIT PETITION NO. 3172 /2016
1) The State of Maharashtra
Through its Secretary Revenue & Forest Department Mantralaya, Mumbai 400 032.
2) The Settlement Commissioner and
Director of Land Records,
Maharashtra State, Pune -1.
3) The Deputy Director of Land Records,
Civil Lines, Nagpur. ..PETITIONERS
v e r s u s
Shri Krishna s/o Dashrath Pimpalkar
Aged about 67 years, occu: Retired.
R/o Apartment No.2/1,
Vidarbha Housing Board Swaraj Colony,
Kukde Layout
Behind Medical College
Nagpur 4400027. .. ...RESPONDENT
...........................................................................................................................
Mr. Ambarish joshi, Assistant Government Pleader for petitioners Mr. Bharat Kulkarni, Advocate for Respondent ............................................................................................................................
CORAM: SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK &
SMT . SWAPNA JOSHI, JJ
.
DATED : 29 June, 2016
th
ORAL JUDGMENT: (PER SMT.VASANTI A. NAIK, J.)
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The petition is heard
finally at the stage of admission, with the consent of the learned counsel for
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the parties.
By this Writ Petition, the petitioners impugn the order of the
Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, dated 30.4.2015, allowing an
Application filed by the respondent for condonation of delay in filing the
Original Application.
The respondent is retired as Taluqa Inspector of Land Records.
He had filed an Original Application before the Tribunal with two prayers. The
respondent had firstly challenged the order dated 4.4.2001 by which he was
not permitted to cross the efficiency bar. The respondent had also challenged
the order dated 25.4.2006 imposing a punishment of reducing the pay-scale of
the respondent by two steps. The said orders were challenged by filing the
Original Application on 20.3.2012. A preliminary objection was raised on
behalf of the petitioners in regard to the tenability of the Original Application
that was filed after the period of limitation. After the objection was raised, the
respondent filed an Application for condonation of delay in filing the Original
Application. Two reasons were stated in the Application for condonation of
delay; the first being that certain documents that were sought by the
respondent for preferring the Original Application were not supplied by the
petitioners till 2008; secondly, the petitioner was suffering from 40%
disability and hence he was not in position to file the Original Application,
within time. The Application for condonation of delay was decided by the
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Tribunal by the impugned order and the delay in filing the Original Application
was condoned. The petitioners have challenged the order in the instant
petition.
Shri Ambrash Joshi, the learned Assistant Government Pleader
appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the Tribunal was not
justified in allowing the Application for condonation of delay when there was
a delay of more than 11-years, in challenging the order rejecting the proposal
to cross the efficiency bar and 6-years for challenging the order imposing the
minor penalty on the respondent. It is stated that since there was an
inordinate delay in filing the Original Application and it was stated in the
Original Application that the same was filed within the prescribed limitation,
the petitioners had raised an objection in regard to the limitation in the
reply. It is stated that more than one year after the filing of the reply, the
respondent filed an application for condonation of delay mentioning therein
that the delay occurred, in view of the non-supply of the documents by the
petitioners, till the year 2008 and because the respondent is 40% disabled. It
is stated that the aforesaid explanation cannot be sufficient for condoning
the inordinate delay as the documents were supplied in 2008 only. It is stated
that the order of the year 2001 could have been challenged immediately as
the documents did not pertain to the said order. It is submitted that the delay
was condoned on extraneous considerations. It is stated that the Tribunal
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partially considered the merits of the matter while deciding the Application for
condonation of delay. It is stated that the physical disability of the respondent
cannot be a ground for filing the Original Application, belatedly. It is stated
that the Application should have been filed in any case, in the year 2008
against the order of imposition of minor penalty.
Shri Bharat Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the sole-respondent
supported the order of the Tribunal and submitted that the Tribunal has
rightly, in the circumstances of the case, allowed the Application for
condonation of delay. It is stated that the respondent was illegally punished,
just a few days before he attained the age superannuation and this fact
rightly weighed with the Tribunal while allowing the Application. It is stated
that the petitioner is physically challenged and since the Original Application
was pending in the Tribunal for nearly three years when the impugned order
was passed, the Tribunal allowed the Application. The learned counsel relied
on the decisions in the case of Basawant Devidas Nandgavali vs. Secretary,
Water Resources Department and others, reported in 2013 (3) Mh.L.J.
389 ; and Valsamma Mamachan vs. Union of India and others, reported in
2006(4) Mh.L.J. 270, to substantiate his submissions.
On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on a perusal
of the impugned order as also the Application for condonation of delay, we
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find that the Tribunal has committed a serious error in allowing the
application for condonation of delay. The Application made by the respondent
for permission to cross the efficiency bar was rejected on 4.4.2001. The said
order should have been challenged by the respondent immediately. Nothing
was done in respect of the said order till a minor punishment was imposed on
the respondent, on 24.5.2006. It is clear from the conduct of the respondent
that the respondent accepted the order dated 4.4.2001 and 24.5.2006,
without any demur. The said orders were not challenged before any Court or
authority till the Original Application was filed on 20.3.2012. There are only
a couple of reasons in the Application for seeking condonation of delay, one
being that the documents were not supplied to the respondent till 25.1.2008
and the other being that the respondent is physically challenged to the extent
of 40%. These grounds cannot be sufficient for condoning the inordinate
delay. The documents were supplied to the respondent on 25.1.2008. There
is nothing in the Application to point out as to why the respondent did not
file the Original Application immediately after receiving the documents and
why the Original Application was filed more than four years thereafter on
20.3.2012. Also, the petitioner had suffered 40% disability in view of an
accident that occurred in 1989. If the petitioner has suffered disability in
1989, the same cannot be a ground for belatedly filing the Original
Application. The disability existed for more than 11-years and 16 years before
the orders that are impugned before the Tribunal, were passed. There is no
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explanation whatsoever for the delay after 25.1.2008, in respect of the
challenge to the order dated 24.5.2006. A party cannot be permitted to
approach the court at its own leisure. The period of limitation is required to
be adhered to unless the party points out that there is sufficient cause in
approaching the Court, belatedly. No straight-jacket formula could be applied
while considering an Application for condonation of delay. The judgments
reported in 2013 (3) Mh.L.J. 389 and 2006 (4) Mh.l.J. 270 cannot be made
applicable to the facts of this case. In those decisions, it is observed by this
Court that the delay is liable to be condoned when the delay is not
attributable to the party that approaches the Court alone and is occasioned
due to the conduct of the other side also. Even assuming that the documents
were not supplied to the respondent till 25.1.2008, the delay till that date
could be considered to have been explained. There is no explanation, much
less any plausible explanation whatsoever, about the delay of more than 4-
years after the said date. We find that the Tribunal gave undue weightage
to the fact that the Original Application was pending in the Tribunal for nearly
three years and the respondent was physically challenged to the extent of 40
per cent. The Tribunal ought not have entered into the merits of the matter
while deciding the Application for condonation of delay and observed that
the enquiry against the respondent was completed within a month due to
pressure. Such observations on the merits of the matter were not warranted
while passing an order on an Application for condonation of delay.
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Hence for the reasons aforesaid, the Writ Petition is allowed. The
impugned order is quashed and set aside. The Original Application filed by
the respondent is dismissed.
Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms, with no order as
to costs.
JUDGE ig JUDGE
sahare
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