Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 3078 Bom
Judgement Date : 22 June, 2016
1 WP No. 4691/2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.4691 OF 2016
Foundation Brake Kamgar Sanghatna
"Savali", 8, Kalyani Nagar,
Behind Dadawadi Temple, Jalgaon,
Tq. and Dist. Jalgaon
Through its General Secretary = PETITIONER
VERSUS
M/s Foundation Brake Manufacturing
Pvt. Ltd., Bambhori, Tq.Dharangaon,
District Jalgaon, Through its
Deputy General Manager (HR) = RESPONDENT
-----
Mr.T.K.Prabhakaran, Advocate for Petitioner;
Mr.Sandesh R. Patil, Advocate for Respondent.
-----
CORAM : P.R.BORA, J.
DATE :
22 nd
June,2016.
JUDGMENT:
1) Heard. The petitioner union has filed
the present petition against order dated 26th
February, 2016 passed by Member, Industrial
Court, Jalgaon in Appeal (IESO) No.1 of 2015.
2) The aforesaid appeal was filed by the
present respondent, seeking quashment of order
dated 21.8.2015 in Application No.1 of 2015
passed by Deputy Commissioner of Labour, i.e.
Certifying Officer, under The Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (for
short, the Act), whereby he had allowed the
application of the petitioner union and has
consequently allowed to extend age of retirement
from 58 years to 60 years in the Standing Orders.
Vide the impugned order, the Industrial Court,
which is an appellate authority, as provided
under the provisions of the Act, has set aside
the order dated 21.8.2015 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner of Labour, Nasik Division, Nasik in
Application No. 1 of 2015 and consequently, he
has rejected the application filed by the
petitioner union, whereby the union had prayed
for extension of age of retirement from 58 years
to 60 years.
3) When the present matter was taken up for
hearing, Shri T.K.Prabhakaran, learned Counsel
appearing for the petitioner union, submitted
that the matter will have to be remitted back to
the Appellate Authority for its re-consideration
in view of the fact that under Section 6(1) of
the Act, the Appellate authority does not possess
any power to set aside the order passed by the
Certifying Officer. In view of the submission so
made by Shri Prabhakaran, I heard the learned
counsel appearing for the parties on the limited
issue of jurisdiction of the Industrial Court
(Appellate Authority) in passing the orders under
Section 6(1) of the Act.
4) After hearing the arguments of the
learned Counsel for the parties, it was clarified
by this Court that the issue of jurisdiction will
be decided first by the Court and if this court
reaches to the conclusion that the Appellate
Authority has no power to set aside the order
passed by the Certifying Officer, necessary
orders will be passed or else the matter will be
heard on merits on the next date.
5) Accordingly, Shri Prabhakaran, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sandesh
Patil, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, made their respective submissions on
the limited issue of jurisdiction, as aforesaid.
6) Shri Prabhakaran, learned Counsel,
submitted that the plain reading of Section 6 of
the Act makes it clear that the Appellate
Authority has the power either to confirm the
order of Certifying Officer or alter in the form
certified by the Certifying Officer amending the
said Standing Order by making necessary
modification thereto as he thinks necessary.
However, the Appellate Authority has no power to
cancel the Standing Orders or set aside the
Orders passed by the Certifying Officer. In
order to substantiate his arguments, the learned
counsel relied upon two judgments; one delivered
by the Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala
Agro Machinery Vs. Industrial Tribunal and Ors. -
1988(II)LLJ 18 (KL HC) and the other by Himachal
Pradesh high Court in the case of Gabriel
Employees Union Vs. Gabriel India Ltd. And Ors. -
2008(I) LLJ 618 (HP HC).
7) Shri Sandesh Patil, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent, opposed the
submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner
union. Placing reliance on the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of Electric
workers Union Vs. The U.P. Electric Supply Co.
reported in AIR (36) Allahabad 504, the learned
Counsel submitted that the Appellate court has
power to set aside such amendment. Taking
support of the observations made by the Hon'ble
Apex court in the case of James Joseph Vs. State
of Kerla - (2010) 9 SCC 642, the learned Counsel
submitted that statutory provisions for appeals
against the original orders or decrees will not
have any limitations and as such the argument
advanced on behalf of the petitioner union that
the appellate authority under the provisions of
the said Act does not possess any power to set
aside the order passed by the Certifying Officer,
cannot be accepted.
8) I Have carefully considered the
submissions made by the leaned Counsel appearing
for the respective parties. Section 6(1) of the
Act reads thus, -
"6. Appeals -
(1) Any employer, workman, trade
union or other prescribed representatives of the workmen aggrieved by the order of the
Certifying Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 5 may, within thirty
days from the date on which copies are sent under sub-section (3) of
that section, appeal to the appellate authority, and the appellate authority, whose decision, shall be final, shall by order in
writing confirm the amendments either in the form certified by the Certifying Officer or after further modifying the same as the appellate authority thinks necessary."
9) From the plain reading of the
aforementioned Section, it is clear that the
Appellate Authority has power either to confirm
the order of the Certifying Officer or to alter
in the form certified by the Certifying Officer
amending the said Standing Order by making
necessary modification thereto as he thinks
necessary.
10) The similar issue had arisen for
consideration before the Kerala High Court in the
matter of Kerala Agro Machinery (cited supra)
'whether the Industrial Tribunal has got
jurisdiction to set aside the order passed by the
Certifying Officer under The Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946' and while
deciding the said issue, the Kerala High court
has held as under, -
"The powers of the Appellate Authority are specified in sub- section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. The Appellate Authority has the power to confirm the standing orders
certified by the Certifying Officer,
or to amend or modify and add to the standing orders as it thinks
necessary to make the standing orders certifiable under the Act. This power of the Appellate
Authority includes the power to adjudicate the fairness or reasonableness of the standing
orders also. Under the first part
of sub-section (1) of S.6, right is given to any person aggrieved by the
order of the Certifying Officer to challenge the same by preferring an appeal. The power of the Appellate
Authority is to confirm the standing orders either in the form certified
by the officer or by amending the same or by making such modifications
or additions as it thinks necessary to render the standing orders certifiable under the Act. The Appellate Authority can exercise
only those powers conferred on it under S.6(1). The Appellate Authority has no power to cancel the standing orders or set aside the order passed by the Certifying Officer. Therefore, the Appellate
Authority has no power to set aside
the orders of the Certifying Officer and remand the mater for fresh
disposal. The power to remand is not a procedural one."
11) Similar view was taken by the Himachal
Pradesh High court while delivering the judgment
in the case of Gabriel Employees Union (cited
supra).
12) The judgment in the case of Electric
Workers Union (cited supra) delivered by
Allahabad High court, relied upon by Shri Patil,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent, may
not apply to the facts of the present case since
Section 6 of the Act has suffered the amendment
in the year 1958, and the relevant portion in
Section 6(1), i.e. "confirm the amendments either
in the form certified by the Certifying Officer
or after further modifying the same as the
appellate authority thinks necessary" was
substituted vide the said amendment.
13) In so far as the powers of the Appellate
Authority are concerned, in the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex court itself, which has been relied
upon by Shri Patil, it has been clarified that
the width, extent and limitation of / on
appellate jurisdiction depends on the language
employed by the statute conferring the appellate
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the statute
itself does not confer the power to the appellate
authority to set aside the order passed by the
Certifying Officer. Section 6 of the Act
specifies the powers to be exercised by the
appellate authority. The appellate authority can
exercise only those powers conferred on it under
Section 6(1) of the Act. As mentioned earlier,
under Section 6(1) of the Act, the appellate
authority has no power to set aside the order
passed by the Certifying Officer.
14) In the instant case, the appellate
authority has set aside the order dated 21.8.2015
passed by the Certifying Officer. The power that
has been exercised by the appellate authority is
one beyond the scope of Section 6(1) of the Act.
The order passed by the appellate authority is
thus without jurisdiction. Such order cannot be
sustained and has to be set aside and the matter
has to be sent back to the appellate authority to
reconsider it afresh in accordance with the
provisions of law.
15) In the result, the following order, -
ORDER
i) Order dated 26.2.2016 passed by Member,
Industrial Court, Jalgaon (the appellate
authority) in Appeal (IESO) No.1 of 2015, is
quashed and set aside;
ii) The matter is remitted to the appellate
authority to reconsider it afresh in accordance
with law by giving opportunities to both the
parties.
iii) The writ petition is allowed in the
aforesaid terms;
iv) No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(P.R.BORA,J.)
bdv/
fldr 15.6.2016
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