Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 129 Bom
Judgement Date : 29 February, 2016
sa.116.01
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.
...
SECOND APPEAL NO. 116 /2001
Atmaram s/o Amruta Mehange Aged about 48 years Occu: Agriculturist R/o village Jawla (Bk)
Tahsil and District: Akola. ... APPELLANT
v e r s u s
Smt. Banarasibai w/o Nandlal Agrawal
(Died ): Through Legal heirs :
1) Shri Sunderlal s/o Nandlal Agrawal
Aged about 50 years, occu: Business
2) Shri Ratanlal s/o Nandlal Agrawal
Aged 45 years, occu: Business
3) Shri Motilal s/o Nandlal Agrawal,
Aged about 40 years, occu: Business
4) Shri Pawan s/o Nandlal Agrawal,
Aged about 38 years, occu: Business
5) Shri Nawal s/o Nandlal Agrawal
Aged 36 years, occu: Transport Business
6) Shri Manoj s/o Nandlal Agrawal
Aged 34 years, occu: Transport business
7) Ku.Kaushyala D/o nandlal Agrawal.
Aged about 42 years, occu: Household
8) Ku. Baby @ Laxmi D/o Nandlal Agrawal
Aged about 39 years, occu: household
sa.116.01
All the legal heirs 1 to 8 are
residing at Jaipuriya House,
Gandhi Chowk, Akola, Tah. & Dist.Akola.... RESPONDENTS
...........................................................................................................................
Mr. V.M.Moon, Advocate for the appellant Mr. B.N. Mohta, Advocate for LRs of Respondent ............................................................................................................................
CORAM: A.B.CHAUDHARI, J .
DATED : 29th February, 2016
ORAL JUDGMENT:
1.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16th
February, 2001 in Regular Civil Appeal No.120/1999 passed by the
learned 4th Additional District Judge, Akola, setting aside the judgment
and decree dated 30.3.1999 passed by 3rd Joint Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Akola in Regular Civil Suit No. 664/1992, the present Second
Appeal was preferred by the unsuccessful original defendant.
FACTS:
2. The respondent/original plaintiff-Smt.Banarasibai
instituted a suit for permanent injunction against the appellant/original
defendant of the suit land, on 18.11.1992. In the suit, she pleaded that
she had purchased the suit field/property belonging to the appellant in
a village which was located 40 kms. away from Akola town and that
after the purchase, when her son had gone to the field on 11.10.1992,
the appellant had threatened him not to enter the field and, therefore,
sa.116.01
a notice dated 13.10.1992 (Exh.72) was issued to him. In the notice,
as well as in the suit, it was stated that the respondent/plaintiff was in
possession of the suit land for the last three years and, as such, her
possession could not be disturbed, she being lawful owner of the suit
property. The property was duly mutated in the revenue records in
her name and, thus, she prayed for permanent injunction. The
appellant having appeared, filed written statement and opposed the
suit and submitted that the appellant was having a fair price shop and
three years before the alleged sale-deed, there was a transaction of
taking loan since the appellant was in need of money for running the
shop as his crops had failed in those years. The transaction of taking
loan on interest and repaying back and again taking loan, had taken
place. Insofar as the sale deed is concerned, it was a mortgage that he
was executing the mortgage deed, but the same turned out to be the
ultimate sale deed. The sale deed was for security of loan which was
also paid by the appellant. The respondent-money lender has been
lending money on higher interest to the fair-price shopkeepers and
agriculturists and, therefore, the transaction was by way of security of
loan and not the real transaction of sale. The respondent/plaintiff
was never in possession of the suit property and in connivance with the
revenue officials, she managed to enter her name as the purchaser
sa.116.01
but possession was never given. Since she was not in possession, the
question of issuing temporary injunction did not arise. The appellant
therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit.
The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit filed by the
respondent/plaintiff, who carried an Appeal to the District Court. The
lower Appellate Court allowed the Appeal and decreed the suit. Hence
this Second Appeal.
SUBMISSIONS :
3. In support of the Appeal, Mr.V.M.Moon, learned counsel
for the appellant vehemently argued that the transaction was out and
out transaction of loan, because the respondent was a money lender
lending money to the people on exorbitant rate of interest and it is out
out of money lending transaction only, the sale deed was executed,
on the pretext of executing a mortgage deed by way of security of loan
that was taken by the appellant. According to him, the loan was
completely repaid and sale deed was never to be acted upon and was
in fact not acted upon, inasmuch as the possession was never given to
the respondent/plaintiff who resides at Akola town, which is at a
distance of 40 kms. from the location of the field and not only that
DW 3 Rameshwar has been examined by the appellant to prove the
sa.116.01
fact that the respondent/plaintiff is a money lender and, in fact, in the
case of Rameshwar almost during the same time i.e. on 24.1.1991 six
months before the sale deed in question, Rameshwar had taken a
loan and an agreement was executed for sale of 3.59 H for
consideration of Rs. 75,000/- in favour of respondent. According to
him, Rameshwar entered the witness box and his evidence went
unchallenged on material particulars. As to business of money lending
done by the respondent/plaintiff, inviting my attention to Exh. 87,
copy of the suit being Suit No.169/1993, Mr. Moon contended that
ultimately on 2.8.1995 after Rameshwar paid the entire amount with
interest, by filing a withdrawal pursis (Exh.89) the said suit was
withdrawn, by way of out of court settlement. But then, according to
Mr. Moon, the fact that the respondent had been doing money lending
business and the sale deed in question is of the same period as in the
case of Rameshwar and, therefore, the appellant has clearly proved his
case beyond all probabilities about the money lending business of
respondent. According to Mr. Moon, the respondent never asserted
that he was agriculturist or agricultural labourer in order to purchase
the suit property and, on the contrary, her son admitted in the cross-
examination that their business was of sale of grains. Mr. Moon then
submitted that the respondent never filed any Khasra for the relevant
sa.116.01
years to show that possession was given to the respondent i.e. relevant
year 1991-92, but filed Khasra 7/12 extract of the year 1992-93
but then that was manipulated. What was relevant was the Khasra for
the year 1991-92 which is not found on record. Mr. Moon then
contended that the respondent miserably failed to prove the ownership
by providing the sale deed itself and that is finding of fact recorded
by the trial Judge and, as such, no ownership could be said to be
proved on the plaintiff by merely looking the entry 7/12 extract in the
absence of the available documentary evidence, namely, the original
sale deed which was never filed on record. What was filed was photo
copy of the alleged original sale deed. Even certified copy was not
obtained for filing in the Court for leading the secondary evidence.
Thus, the sale deed having been denied, the respondent was not the
owner of the suit field as contended by her and, therefore, the decree
could not have been passed by the lower Appellate Court. The judgment
of lower Appellate Court is clearly faulty and does not meet the
reasons recorded by the trial Judge on the aspect of ownership or
possession. The appellant therefore prays for reversal of for the
judgment of lower Appellate Court. Mr. Moon, the learned counsel
relied on the following decisions:
sa.116.01
1) AIR 1982 SC 20 : Smt. Gangabai vs.Smt.Chhabubai
2) AIR 1993 SC 398 : Bhagwan Sharma vs. S,t/Bani Ghosh
3) AIR 1994 SC 762 : Mahendra Singh vs. Jagbir Singh
4. Per contra, Mr. B.N.Mohta, learned counsel for the
respondent/plaintiff vehemently opposed the Appeal and supported the
impugned judgment and order made by the lower Appellate Court. Mr.
Mohta, contended that though it is true that the original document of
sale deed was not brought on record and consequently it could be
said that the sale transaction was proved, nevertheless the possession
was proved by the respondent/plaintiff and, therefore, there can be a
decree for protecting possession of plaintiff with the aid of Section 53A
of the Transfer of Property Act, by treating the sale deed as agreement
of sale, that too registered. Mr. Mohta, fairly conceded that the
original sale deed as well as the certified copy was not produced
before the Court in order to prove the ownership. But then the fact
remains that the respondent/plaintiff paid valuable consideration for
transfer of the suit property and the document in the form of sale deed
was executed in favour of respondent /plaintiff and the revenue record
clearly shows possession of the respondent/plaintiff throughout. He
then contended that at the appellate stage 7/12 extract was filed on
sa.116.01
record, but then fairly stated that no application was made for filing
additional evidence before the Appellate Court. Nevertheless, according
to him, the 7/12 extract or the Government records show
consistently the respondent in possession right after 1992-93. He
therefore, contended that the lower Appellate Court's judgment need
not be interfered with. He contended that there is no evidence that the
respondent was doing money lending business, as alleged. A single and
solitary incident brought through Rameshwar about the money lending
transaction as alleged, is not ipso facto proof of the fact that the
transaction of sale deed in question was a money lending transaction.
The theory of mortgage has not been proved by the appellant or that the
consideration in the sale deed was towards security for loan. He,
therefore, contended that there is no substantial question of law that is
required to be decided and, therefore, the Appeal deserves to be
dismissed. In the alternative, Mr.Mohta contended that since another
suit is pending before the trial judge regarding partition etc. there is no
need to record a finding about the nature of transaction. Mr. Mohta
cited the following decision :-
1) AIR 1999 SC 2203 : Brij Raj singh (Dead) by Lrs vs. Sewak Ram
2) Judgment in W.P. No. 6330/2006 of Bombay High Court
sa.116.01
5. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties at length. Seen
the reasons recorded by the courts below. This Court had admitted
this Appeal on 24.6.2004 on the following substantial questions of
law.
(1) Whether Lower Appellate Court framed the proper
points for determination as provided under order 41 Rule 31
of the Civil Procedure Code?
(2) Whether the defendant is precluded from leading oral evidence in support of his contention that the sale deed is in question was sham and bogus and it is a money lending
transaction to security of loan and it was not to be acted upon by the parties under Section 54 of the Transfer of
Property Act and under Section 92 of Evidence Act?
(3) Whether the finding of fact recorded by the Lower Appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature under Section 103 (b) of
Civil Procedure Code?
6. In supersession thereof, I frame the following substantial
questions of law :
sa.116.01
1) Whether the respondent/plaintiff having failed to produce and prove the primary evidence, namely,
the sale deed in original, on which the suit was filed, the plaintiff could ever be termed as the owner of the suit property under the sale deed? ..No
2) Whether the appellant/defendant was entitled to plead and prove that the transaction in the alleged
sale deed was not intended to be acted upon at all
between the parties and the document of sale deed being sham and bogus was not admissible in evidence
and particularly that the transaction was one of money lending, more so in the light of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Gangabai vs. Chhabubai: AIR 1982 SC 20.? ..Yes.
3) Whether the lower Appellate Court erred in reverting the finding of fact arrived at by the trial
Judge that the plaintiff was never placed in possession and the possession was never proved, as such to make any decree for permanent injunction ? .. Yes.
What order ? Second Appeal is allowed.
CONSIDERATION:
7. At the outset, there should not be any difficulty in
sa.116.01
answering the Question No.1 because, in fairness, Mr. Mohta, learned
counsel for the respondent conceded and the record also shows that
though the original sale deed could be filed on record and proved, the
the same was never brought before the Court to prove the ownership of
respondent/plaintiff, for which no explanation is forthcoming. The
terra firma of the case of respondent/plaintiff was that sale deed was
of 25.6.1991 itself. The defendant denied that it conveyed the suit
property as the transaction was in the nature of security for loan. That
is the important reason why the original sale deed was required to be
placed before the Court for proving the ownership and delivery of
possession. That apart, the plaintiff even did not produce certified
copy of the original sale deed on record, in order to have the secondary
evidence before the Court but what was produced was photo copy of
the original alleged sale deed which was not exhibited or admitted in
evidence, but given article. Therefore, the requirement of proof as
admissible evidence is lacking in this case and the plaintiff miserably
failed to prove that she became the owner by virtue of the sale deed
dated 25.6.1991. The plaintiff having thus failed to produce the sale
deed, it could not consequently be proved that there was any recital in
the same about the delivery of possession. Therefore the document,
namely, the sale-deed, would have proved the ownership as well as
sa.116.01
title and possession of the respondent/plaintiff; but the plaintiff chose
to keep it away from the Court though it was possible to bring and
prove the same. The question No.1 is therefore answered in the
negative.
8. As regards Question No.2, I have perused the plaint as
well as written statement carefully. The averments in the plaint is
that the sale deed was executed on 25.6.1991 and the plaintiff was in
possession for last three years before filing of the suit. The suit was
filed because there was a threat imparted on 3.11.1992 and after
the legal notice (Exh.72) was issued about it. The notice (Exh.72)
dated 13.10.1992 also shows that the respondent/plaintiff was in
possession for the last three years. The averment in the notice Exh.72
as well as in the suit that was filed on 18.11.1992 that the respondent
was in possession for the last three years, is clearly false because the
sale deed is said to be the date 25.6.1991 and the suit was instituted
on 18.11.1992 i.e. after one year and five months. It is difficult to
countenance as to how the plaintiff came in possession three years prior
to filing of the suit or notice Exh.72. It is then seen in the evidence
that the suit property was situated at a distance of 40 kms away from
Akola town where the respondent/plaintiff resides and that she is a
sa.116.01
money lender lending money at high rate of interest, to farmers and
needy people without any money lending licence. It is then stated in
the written statement that possession was never handed over though the
sale deed was executed, obviously because the transaction was of money
lending. The plaint averments were never amended or any pleadings
contrary to the defence were brought. The sale deed not being brought
on record, whether the possession was delivered on the same day of the
sale deed or earlier or thereafter is not to be seen anywhere on the
record and that could be best piece of documentary evidence to find out
whether the possession was really given or not. That apart, the sale
deed is said to be dated 25.6.1991 and the agricultural year would
end by April 1992 and if the possession was really handed over at the
time of sale deed on 25.6.1991, the entry for the agricultural year
1991 -92 must show the possession of the respondent/plaintiff; but that
is not so. There is no document whatsoever on record to show the
possession of the respondent/plaintiff for the agricultural year 1991-92
but there is a document on record i.e. 7/12 extract showing her
possession for the agricultural year 1992-93. In other words, the
contention that the possession was given at the time of sale deed on
25.6.1991 itself, must be held to be clearly wrong. There is, therefore,
reason to hold that the alleged sale deed was executed but possession
sa.116.01
was not handed over and it was the appellant/defendant who remained
in possession. The only reason for not delivering the possession upon
execution of the alleged sale deed, appears to be probable nature of the
transaction namely, money lending transaction. The appellant had led
his evidence and evidence of one Rameshwar (DW 3) as his witness,
in order to support the theory that the respondent was indulging in
money lending transaction without licence and was taking documents
accordingly from farmers or others. It would be appropriate to quote
the evidence of Rameshwar (DW 3) for defendant, the relevant portion
of which reads thus :
"1. I know the plaintiff and defendant. I know all
the sons of the plaintiff. Out of those sons - Ratanseth is sitting in the court hall. I do cultivation work. Similarly I
have the licence of Fair Price shop and I run the said shop. I used to take money on interest from the plaintiff and her sons. The rate of interest of the loan is Rs.10/- per hundred per month. About ten years ago, I had borrowed an amount
of Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff. They had taken my signatures on the blank stamp paper and executed the earnest note and submitted the same before the Civil Judge, Senior Division. Compromise has taken place in the said suit. I paid Rs. 18,000/- to the plaintiff and settled the matter. In that earnest note, my agricultural land admeasuring 9 acres
sa.116.01
was got written. The said transaction between myself and the plaintiff was the part of money lending business. I do
not know what business Banarasibai and her son is doing at this time. But during that period they were giving money on interest.
2. About 7 to 8 years ago, there was some money transactions between the defendant and Banarasibai over
the Fair price Shop. Atmaram was running a Fair Price
Shop. Since Atmaram was running a Fair Price Shop, I know him. This transaction with Atmaram was similar to
that of the transaction with me.
3. Banarasibai had given the money on interest to
1) Gavai of village Bizora; 2) Gavai from village Sukoda; 3)
Keshao Dhomle from village Koradi and 4) Jaholkar from village Mangul."
From the perusal of examination-in-chief of Rameshwar
(DW 3), it clearly appears that the respondent/plaintiff was giving
money to the needy persons on interest and was thus doing money
lending business without license. I have carefully gone through the
cross-examination of this witness and what I find is that the entire
material evidence about the activity of respondent/plaintiff of money
lending business has not been put to challenge at all and there is a
sa.116.01
slipshod cross-examination and the material portion has not been
touched of his cross-examination. It is important to note that this
evidence of Rameshwar is supported and Documents Exhs. 87, 88 and
89 which was pursis that was filed after the compromise. It is then
important to note that the transaction with Rameshwar was said to
have taken place on 24.1.1991 in respect of money lending; while
transaction in question of sale deed is of the date 25.6.1991 i.e.
difference of only five months. It is thus clear that the evidence led by
the appellant/defendant about the nature of transaction namely the
business of the respondent /plaintiff in doing money lending by giving
money to the farmers etc. without any license was clearly proved
beyond any doubt or at least preponderance of probabilities. On the
contrary, there is no rebuttal evidence from respondent/plaintiff. The
appellant was entitled to bring on record the circumstances leading to
the execution of the document and show the real nature of
transaction, in the light of the decision in the case of Gangabai
vs.Chhabubai (supra). Thus, the real transaction was clearly explained
and shown by appellant/defendant not only by his evidence but also
from the evidence of Rameshwar (DW 3) supported with documentary
evidence Exhs.86,87, 88 in respect of his suit in which he was
defendant and the respondent was the plaintiff. The trial Judge has
sa.116.01
relied on one more factor, namely, that the suit land was 40 kms.
away from Akola town where the respondent/plaintiff resides and
there was no evidence to suggest or show that the property was
purchased as a transaction of sale, pure and simple. In the wake
of the above evidence and in the absence of primary evidence on the
basis of which the suit was filed and the nature of money lending, the
question No.2 will have to be answered in the affirmative.
9. Insofar as aspect of possession is concerned, I have
already found while answering Question No.2 that the record shows
that possession was never handed over at the time of execution of
alleged sale deed, since the same would have appeared in the 7/12
extract for the year 1991-92, but 7/12 extract for the year 1992-93
showed the possession of respondent /plaintiff, which obviously
appears to have been shown by the revenue officer. But but then at
any rate 7/12 extract in the absence of sale deed, will lose its
complete significance about the real nature of transaction and even the
aspect of possession, in the absence of any recital in the sale deed about
the handing over of possession or any terms and condition regarding
possession. The Court is entitled to find out from the alleged sale deed
about the aspect of possession. That apart, the trial Judge recorded a
sa.116.01
detailed finding on the aspect of possession in paragraph nos. 9 and 10
in his judgment, which I quote :-
"9. It is to be noted that the suit field is about 35 to
40 kilometers away from Akola. Plaintiff is not having any agricultural implements. Hence under such circumstances she might have hired those agricultural implements from the
person from this village or from the other village. Even
plaintiff would have hired persons to carry out agricultural operations throughout the year along with implements.
Under such circumstances the plaintiff ought to have examined such person on her behalf. But the plaintiff has miserably failed to examine those persons and to establish
her possession over the suit field. Besides, the defendant by
his evidence of the suit field and his family is cultivating the same. As already stated above that the version of the plaintiff in para 3 of his deposition could not be negatived
by the plaintiff in the cross-examination of the defendant, it remained unchallenged. Thus, it becomes clear that even after the said so called sale-deed Article-A possession was
not parted by the defendant. Thus it gives weightage to the say of the defendant that the said transaction is a money lending transaction. Had it been out and out sale then in that case the possession would have been handed over to the plaintiff. But it is clear that the said sale deed is a sort of security to the loan advanced by plaintiff. On the point of
sa.116.01
money lending, defendant has examined one Rameshwar Shriram Kakad at Exh.77. This witness has deposed that he
is having a fair price shop and used to take loan from the plaintiff. Before about 10 years, he had taken loan of Rs. 12000/- and the plaintiff had obtained his signature on
blank stamp paper. Thereafter, she had prepared Issar Chitthi of that stamp and had filed a civil suit against this witness. He has stated that he had paid Rs. 18000/- to the plaintiff
and had settled the said civil suit. To the said aforesaid
version there is no denial by the side of the plaintiff. There is no denying question in the cross-examination of this witness
by the side of the plaintiff. Thus the said version of this witness remained unchallenged. Besides, this version of the D.W. 3 is also being supported by the copy of the plaint in
the suit filed by Banarasibai against this witness at Exh.87.
The copy of the written statement in the said suit is at Exh.
88. Withdrawal pursis Exh.34 in the said suit No.169/1993 is also filed on this record, which is also placed at Exh.89.
This pursis shows that there is compromise out of Court and plaintiff Banarasibai had withdrawn the suit. When there is no denial on the side of the plaintiff to the aforesaid version
of this D.W. 3 Rameshwar Kakad, then in that case it has been proved through this witness that he had taken loan of Rs. 12000/- and signatures of this witness were obtained on a blank paper, which was converted into Issar Chitthi and then this suit came to be filed. It is further proved that this witness has paid Rs. 18000/- to the plaintiff and the
sa.116.01
said civil suit came to be compromised. I have already stated that versions of this witness D.W. 3 Rameshwar have
not been negatived by the plaintiff in his cross-examination. Thus it is to be taken that those versions have been admitted by the plaintiff and did not challenge it. Thus it has
been proved that there was money lending transaction in between this Rameshwar and Banarasibai. Besides, this witness has also referred to some names of other persons to
whom Banarasibai had advanced loans. This,. Itself goes to
show that Banarasibai was and is a money lender without licence, who is advancing loan under the garb of sale deeds
and agreements of sales. Thus the version of the defendant in this case, that the loan was advanced to hereunder the garb of sale deed have turned to truth in this case. Thus, the
sale deed in question is a money lending transaction and not
out and out sale. Hence, the question of handing over possession to the plaintiff in consequent to the sale deed does not arise at all. Thus the plaintiff was never in
possession of the suit property. The possession was with the defendant and his family.
10. The plaintiff appears to be very clever.
Immediately after mutating the property in her name she had mortgaged the suit field to one Bhoo-vikas Bank and had encashed her loan. It appears that she was aware that she has not received possession and she will not be able to recover the loan from the defendant. Hence plff. Had
sa.116.01
mortgaged the suit property with the said Bank and by obtaining loan encashed, the loan advanced to the defendant
was encashed. It was done by plaintiff with a view that when the loan remains unpaid, the said Bank will auction the suit field and the plaintiff will not have to take any
pains in that respect. Thus the plaintiff has already encashed the suit transaction by obtaining loan. In fact, as the suit transaction is a loan transaction, title in the suit
property cannot pass to the plaintiff."
The trial Court has thus recorded a categorical finding
based on evidence about the aspect of possession and held that the
respondent /plaintiff was never placed in possession. In that view of
the matter, I think the Question No.3 will have to be answered in
affirmative.
10. Mr. Mohta, learned counsel for the respondents then raised
a new question before me, praying that under Section 53A of the
Transfer of Property Act, his possession is required to be protected and
that relief at least should be granted in favour of respondent /plaintiff.
I do not agree, firstly because the finding on possession of the trial
Court, has been upheld by me that the possession was never handed
over to the respondent/plaintiff and, secondly, Section 53A of the T.P.
sa.116.01
Act applies to the cases of agreement and, in no case, the Court
would read alleged sale deed as agreement contemplated u/s. 53A of
the T.P. Act. Here, the case of the respondent/plaintiff was of complete
sale transaction and not of agreement of sale envisaged by Sec. 53A of
the T.P. Act. In the wake of findings it would be difficult to apply Sec.
53A in the facts and circumstances of the preset case. I therefore find
that the benefit of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act cannot be extended, as
claimed by Mr. Mohta. In the result, I make the following order :-
ORDER
1) Second Appeal No. 116/2001 is allowed.
2) The judgment and decree dated 16.02.2001 in Regular Civil
Appeal No. 120/1999 passed by learned 4th Additional District Judge,
Akola, is set aside.
3) The judgment and decree dated 30.03.1999 in Regular Civil
Suit No.664/1992 passed by learned 3rd Joint Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Akola, is restored.
4) No order as to costs.
JUDGE
sahare
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