Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 4505 Bom
Judgement Date : 5 August, 2016
1
sa160.03.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
Second Appeal No.160 of 2003
Smt. Manda Purushottam Zatte,
Aged about 45 years,
Occupation - Agriculturist,
R/o Nilapur,
Po. Bhalar, Tq. Wani,
District - Yavatmal. ig ... Appellant/
Ori. Deft.No.2
Versus
1. Chandrakumar Parasmalji Chordiya,
Aged about 43 years,
Occupation - Money lending,
R/o State Bank Road,
Gandhi Chowk, Wani,
Tq. Wani,
District - Yavatmal. ... Ori.Plaintiff
*2. Purushottam Wasudeo Zatte.
[*Appeal is dismissed against
respondent No.2 vide order
dated 5-9-2013 passed by the
Registrar (J)] ... Ori.Deft.No.1
::: Uploaded on - 09/08/2016 ::: Downloaded on - 11/08/2016 00:03:20 :::
2
sa160.03.odt
... Respondents
Shri Abdul Subhan, Advocate, holding for Shri Firdos Mirza,
Advocate for Appellant.
Shri M.P. Khajanchi, Advocate for Respondent No.1.
Shri Anoop J. Gilda, Advocate, as Amicus Curiae.
Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
th th
Dated : 4 and 5
August, 2016
Oral Judgment :
4-8-2016:
The respondent No.1-Chandrakumar Parasmalji Chordiya
is the original plaintiff and he had filed Regular Civil Suit No.93
of 1995 claiming the reliefs as under :
"a) Defendant, his family members, his agents, his
servants, or any other person on their behalf be restrained permanently from making any interference and obstruction to the enjoyment and cultivation over the field
Survey No.16/3; Gat No.54; Area 2 Hec, 57 Are of village Nilapur, Tq. Wani, Distt. Yavatmal by way of permanent injunction.
b) Defendants his family members, their agents, their
servants, or any other person on their behalf be restrained perpetually from making any interference and obstruction to the cultivation and enjoyment over the field Survey No.16/3; Gat No.54; Area 2 Hec. 57 Are of village Nilapur perpetual injunction.
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c) Any other suitable relief for plaintiff is found entitled may be granted to him.
d) Cost of the suit be saddled on the defendant.
A decree be drawn accordingly."
In para 2 of the plaint, it is averred that the defendent agreed to
sell the suit property to the plaintiff for a total consideration of
Rs.60,000/- on 2-9-1994 by executing the Isarchitthi and an
earnest amount of Rs.45,000/- was paid. The balance amount of
Rs.15,000/- was to be paid at the time of execution of the
sale-deed on or before 31-3-1995. According to the averments
made in para 3, the balance amount of Rs.15,000/- was paid on
1-11-1994 and the sale-deed was executed on that date by the
defendant No.1, which was registered on 14-11-1994 before the
Sub-Registrar, Wani. The specific averment is that the
possession of the suit property was delivered to the plaintiff on
the date of execution of the earnest note on 2-9-1994, and since
then the plaintiff is in continuous cultivating possession of the
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suit property. The plaintiff alleged that on 15-6-1995, the
defendant No.2 tried to obstruct his possession and, therefore, he
was constrained to file the suit on 17-6-1995 after lodging a
police complaint, on 15-6-1995 vide Sana Entry No.28/95. It is
also alleged that the defendant issued notice dated 13-6-1995 to
challenge the sale-deed.
2.
The defendant No.1 neither did file the written statement
nor did enter the witness-box. The defendant No.2, who is the
wife of the defendant No.1, opposed the claim and denied the
agreement to sell as well as the execution of sale-deed and
payment of consideration. The defendant No.2 specifically
denied that the suit property was delivered to the plaintiff at any
point of time and asserted that she has been in continuous
cultivating possession of the suit property. She has urged that the
defendant No.1, who is her husband, was addicted to vices and
gambling and he was indebted to the Society-Wani Taluka
Kharedi Vikri Samiti Ltd. for misappropriating the amount of the
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said Society. It is also the stand taken that the defendants have
one son and two daughters and the property in question was the
ancestral property in the hands of the defendant No.1, who was
not competent to transfer it alone.
3. The plaintiff entered the witness-box and examined
himself, whereas the defendant No.2 entered the witness-box and
also examined DW 1-Mangal Arjun Bhagade, an attesting witness
to the agreement/Isarchitthi dated 2-9-1994, and another witness
DW 3-Anandrao Govindrao Matte, an employee in the said
Society.
4. The Trial Court records the finding that the sale-deed is not
filed on record and no evidence is led by the plaintiff to establish
that the sale-deed was executed, the mutation entries in the name
of the plaintiff are not on record, and in such a situation, the
plaintiff should have filed the suit for declaration and the suit
founded purely to claim the protection under Section 53-A of the
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Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was not maintainable in view of
the bar to grant injunction created under Section 41(h) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Trial Court also noted the fact
that out of two attesting witnesses to the Isarchitthi, only one
attesting witness was examined by the defendant No.2, who has
stated that only an amount of Rs.20,000/- was paid in his
presence to the defendant No.1 by the plaintiff and he does not
support the case of the plaintiff of payment of earnest money of
Rs.45,000/- on the date of execution of Isarchitthi. The Court
also takes note of the fact that another attesting witness-Ganpat
Ramji Wankar was not examined by the plaintiff, and in the
notice at Exhibit 65 dated 13-6-1995 issued by the defendant
No.1 to the plaintiff, it is alleged that the transaction was a
money-lending transaction and it was not to be acted upon. The
Court records the finding that the possession of the land was
never delivered to the plaintiff, nor it was ever intended to be
delivered, and the interest note and sale-deed were to serve
merely as a mask to hide real transaction of money lending.
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5. The lower Appellate Court has reversed the findings
recorded by the Trial Court. It holds that the certified copy of the
sale-deed is produced on record. The application at Exhibit 66
filed on 29-7-2002 before the Trial Court, which was not
objected, shows that the original sale-deed was not available in
the office of Sub-Registrar, Wani. In such a situation, it was not
necessary to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 65 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to obtain a permission to lead
secondary evidence, and obtaining the original was beyond the
control of the party. The lower Appellate Court also notes that
the executant, who is the defendant No.1, remained ex parte
throughout the proceedings, and once the document is registered,
there is a presumption of execution, and there is no need to prove
the contents of the document. The Court noted that the defendant
No.1 has admitted the execution of the sale-deed, but he has
raised a plea that it was a nominal sale-deed arising out of the
money lending transaction, as is apparent from the notice at
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Exhibit 65. The defendant No.1 did not step into the witness-box
and, therefore, the adverse inference was drawn by the Appellate
Court. The lower Appellate Court further proceeds to hold that
the defendant No.2 had no locus to object to the transaction in
question and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have filed a
suit for specific performance of contract, and the bar under
Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act did not operate. The
Court further holds that the property in question belonging to
Dattu would devolve upon the defendant No.1 and thereby it
would become the self-acquired property of the defendant No.1
and the succession would open only upon his death. It further
holds that even if the property is to be treated as joint family
property, the defendant No.1 being Karta, was entitled to alienate
the same for legal necessity.
6. On 23-9-2005, this Court passed an order framing the
substantial questions of law as under :
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"(i) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in
allowing the secondary evidence in respect of the sale-deed dated 1.11.1994?
(ii) Assuming that the secondary evidence was admissible, whether the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the sale-deed was proved in accordance with
law?"
7. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and others, reported
in (2008) 4 SCC 594, the Apex Court has stated the questions,
which arose for its determination in the appeal, in para 12 of the
decision, which are reproduced below :
"(i) What is the scope of a suit for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property?
(ii) Whether on the facts, the plaintiffs ought to have filed a suit for declaration of title and injunction?
(iii) Whether the High Court, in a second appeal under
Section 100 CPC, could examine the factual question of title which was not the subject-matter of any issue and based on a finding thereon, reverse the decision of the first appellate court?
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(iv) What is the appropriate decision?"
In para 13.3, the Apex Court has held as under :
"13.3. Where the plaintiff is in possession, but his title
to the property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from the defendant, the plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief
of injunction. Where the title of the plaintiff is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not able
to establish possession, necessarily the plaintiff will have to file a suit for declaration, possession and injunction."
In para 21 of the said decision, the Apex Court has summarized
the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating
to immovable property, and clauses (c) and (d) being relevant are
reproduced below :
"(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and
appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as notice in Annaimuthu Thevar). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question
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of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are
necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the
court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suits for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.
(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue
regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of
title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more
cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where
it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the
plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case."
Keeping in view the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the
Apex Court, the facts of the present case will have to be looked
into.
8. The suit is simpliciter for grant of permanent injunction
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restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of
the suit property, filed on the basis of threat said to be received by
the plaintiff on 15-6-1995 from the defendant No.2. It is not a
suit for declaration of title of the plaintiff over the suit property.
Perusal of the findings of the lower Appellate Court indicate that
the property belonged to one Dattu and it was an ancestral
property in the hands of the defendant No.1. The defendant No.2
is the wife of the defendant No.1, and on the date of execution of
the Isarchitthi on 2-9-1994, they had one son and two daughters.
Having recorded such findings, the aspect of locus of the
defendant No.2 to defend the title on behalf of minor son, loses
its significance. There is no finding on the legal necessity. The
original sale-deed said to have been executed by the defendant
No.1 on 1-11-1994 and registered on 14-11-1994, is not placed
on the record of the Courts below. There, however, appears to be
a certified copy of the sale-deed placed on record and marked as
Article-C. The lower Appellate Court records the finding that the
original sale-deed is not available in the office of Sub-Registrar,
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Wani, where it was registered. The plaintiff alleging to be the
owner of the suit property is expected to be in possession of
original sale-deed. Assuming that the execution of sale-deed is
proved, the evidence on the basis of plea that it was a money
lending transaction and not to be acted upon becomes admissible.
There are several such aspects, which were required to be
considered.
9. In view of the aforestated factual position, it was not a duly
constituted suit to claim an order of permanent injunction against
the defendants on the basis of title, which was not a matter of
issue. The question as to whether it was a nominal sale-deed
executed by way of security of the money lending transaction,
and the question of authority of the defendant No.1 to execute the
sale-deed in respect of the ancestral property, in which the other
coparcener has a share, could be gone into in a suit for title. The
issue regarding title, in the facts and circumstances of this case,
involves adjudication of complicated facts and law and the parties
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were required to be relegated to the remedy of filing a
comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the
issue in a simpliciter suit for permanent injunction. In view of
this, both the questions of law framed by this Court for
adjudication in the present second appeal would not arise for
consideration. However, this would not mean that the second
appeal is required to be dismissed, and if this Court is satisfied on
the existence of any other substantial question of law in the
present appeal, the same can be framed and answered at the time
of final hearing.
10. In view of the aforesaid findings recorded by this Court,
the facts and circumstances of the present case require this Court
to frame the following substantial questions of law :
1. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim an order of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession solely on the basis of the
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clause of possession contained in the earnest note
dated 2-9-1994 at Exhibit 74?, and
2. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to permanent injunction in the facts and circumstances of this case?
11. Put up this matter tomorrow, i.e. 5-8-2016, for further
hearing so as to afford the learned counsels an opportunity to
address this Court on the aforesaid substantial questions of law
along with the authorities in support of their rival submissions.
5-8-2016: 12. Heard the learned counsels on the aforesaid substantial
questions of law at length.
13. Both the substantial questions of law framed can be
decided together. Shri Khajanchi, the learned counsel appearing
for the respondent No.1/plaintiff, has placed heavy reliance upon
the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sadashiv
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Chander Bhamgare v. Eknath Pandharinath Nangude, reported
in 2004(3) Mh.L.J. 1131. The reference to the Full Bench was for
the decision of the question as to whether a suit simpliciter for
injunction which is filed seeking protection under Section 53-A
of the Transfer of Property Act is maintainable. The Court has
answered the said issue holding that a proposed transferee in
possession can institute a suit for protection of his possession,
which is threatened. However, while deciding the question, the
Court holds in para 7 of the decision that it proceeds on the
footing that the conditions specified under Section 53-A of the
Transfer of Property Act have been fulfilled or complied with,
viz. that (i) there must be a contract for transfer for consideration
of any immovable property; (ii) the contract must be in writing,
signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf; (iii) the
writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to
construe the transfer can be ascertained; (iv) the transferee must
in part-performance of the contract take possession of the
property, or of any part thereof; (v) the transferee must have done
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some act in furtherance of the contract; and (vi) the transferee
must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the
contract. It is only if such conditions are fulfilled or complied
with, that would make the plaintiff entitled to claim an order of
permanent injunction in a simpliciter suit filed to seek protection
of his possession obtained under Section 53-A of the Transfer of
Property Act, is the ratio of the decision. Hence, the substantial
question of law at serial No.(i) is answered in the affirmative
subject to the evidence on record regarding fulfillment of the
aforesaid conditions in the facts and circumstances of the case.
14. Except the document, i.e. the earnest note dated 2-9-1994
at Exhibit 74, there is no other documentary evidence available
on record to establish the possession of the plaintiff over the suit
property. The suit property consists of agricultural field, and it is
not the case that the fencing was erected to protect the
possession. Even if it is accepted that such a document is proved,
there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was in
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cultivating possession of the suit property and his name was
entered in the 7/12 extract, evidencing the fact. It is not the claim
of the plaintiff for specific performance of contract or for
protection of possession with a plea that he is ready and willing
to perform his part of contract. Hence, two conditions under
Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, have not been
fulfilled in the present case. Merely because the possession of
the plaintiff is established, that by itself is not enough to grant
protection.
15. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Nanjegowda and another v. Gangamma and others, reported in
(2011) 3 SCC 232, it has been held that the satisfaction of
conditions under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is
cumulative and additive to invoke the said provision, and
non-satisfaction of even one condition would deny the protection
under Section 53-A of the said Act. It is, therefore, held that the
plaintiff is not entitled to protection of possession in the facts and
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circumstances of this case. The substantial question of law at
serial No.(i) is answered accordingly.
16. Thus, on both the counts, viz. (i) that all the conditions
specified under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act
have not been fulfilled by the plaintiff with necessary pleadings
and proof; and (ii) that the adjudication of issue regarding title in
the present case involves complicated questions of fact and law,
the lower Appellate Court, therefore, could not have decreed the
suit simpliciter for grant of permanent injunction by disturbing
the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court. The substantial
question of law at serial No.(ii) is answered holding that the
plaintiff was not entitled to grant of permanent injunction in the
facts and circumstances of the case.
17. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment
and order dated 20-1-2003 passed by the lower Appellate Court
in Regular Civil Appeal No.224 of 2002, is hereby quashed and
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set aside. The decree passed by the Trial Court in Regular Civil
Suit No.93 of 2005 regarding dismissal of suit on 31-10-2002, is
hereby restored. No order as to costs.
18. It is made clear that the parties shall be at liberty to work
out their rights over the suit property, including the title, by filing
independent proceedings, and none of the findings recorded by
the Trial Court on merits of the matter shall come in their way.
JUDGE.
Lanjewar/Nikhare
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CERTIFICATE
"I certify that this Judgment uploaded is a true and correct copy of original signed Judgment."
Uploaded by : P.D. Lanjewar, PS
Uploaded on : 9-8-2016
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