Bombay High Court
Gaurav Vijay Bhatia vs Ramnath P.Subramaniam And Anr on 14 August, 2015
Bench: V.L. Achaliya
1 APL335.2014.odt
sgp
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO. 335 OF 2014
Gaurav Vijay Bhatia
Aged about 45 years,
22, Sita Mahal, B. D. Petit Road,
Near Parsee General Hospital,
Mumbai - 400 036. ... APPLICANT
(Original Accused No. 3)
VERSUS
1. Ramnath P. Subramaniam,
302, Mahalaxmi Apartment,
Rajkamal Studio Compound,
Rajkamal Lane, Parel
Mumbai - 400 012.
2. State of Maharashtra. ... RESPONDENTS
.............
Mr Manoj S. Mohite, Advocate i/b Mr. Amol J. Phoujdar, Advocate for the
applicant
Respondent No. 1 in-person absent.
Mrs. A. A. Mane, APP for respondent/State
..............
CORAM : V. L. ACHLIYA, J.
RESERVED ON : 20/4/2015
PRONOUNCED ON : 14/08/2015
JUDGMENT:
. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, taken up for
final disposal at the stage of admission.
2. The applicant/accused No. 3 in the complaint has filed this
application u/s 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to set aside the
order of issuance of process dt. 12/08/2013 passed in Criminal Complaint
Case No. 2916/SS/2013, by Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court at Dadar,
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Mumbai and further to quash the said criminal proceedings to the extent of
applicant.
3. Few facts leading to filing of the present application are as
under :
The complainant (respondent No. 1) herein filed criminal
complaint u/s 138 r/w 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short
"NI Act") as against accused No. 1 - Managing Director of M/s. Tricom India
Limited and three others, which include the present applicant as Director of
accused No. 4 - Company. In the complaint filed, the complainant has
alleged that in discharge of liabilities of legitimate dues on account of the
interest accrued against the I.C.D. Loan / re-payment of the loan given by him
to the original accused No. 4 - Company, a cheque bearing No. 015420 dt.
3/3/2013 for an amount of Rs. 54,000/- was issued by accused No. 4 -
Company. Towards the repayment of loan, accused issued one cheque
bearing No. 015420 for an amount of Rs. 54,000/- payable on 03/3/2013 and
drawn and payable from the account of accused with the State Bank of India,
IND FIN Branch, Andheri (East), Snehal Chambers, Telli Galli Andheri
(East), Mumbai. The cheque was issued on behalf of accused No. 1 under the
signature of authorized signatory. The said cheque when presented for
realization on 31/5/2013 with HDFC Bank Ltd, same was dishonoured by
bankers of accused with endorsement "funds insufficient" and was
communicated vide memo dt. 1/6/2013. According to the complainant though
he has given considerable time, the amount was not paid. Therefore he issued
notice on 20/6/2013 to all the accused through his Advocate. The notice was
duly served upon accused on 01/7/2013. It appears from the complaint that,
accused No. 3 in the complaint sent reply dt. 23/7/2013 through his Advocate
denying his liability as Exh. H to complaint. Since the payment towards the
cheque dishonoured was not made by the accused, the complainant has filed
complaint. The complaint appears to be filed on 12/8/2013. Learned
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Metropolitan Magistrate on consideration of the complaint documents filed on
record pleased to issue process u/s 138 r/w 141 of the NI Act, against the
accused persons making it returnable on 16/11/2013. Being aggrieved by the
said order, the applicant/accused No. 3 has filed the present application u/s
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside the order passed by Ld.
Metropolitan Magistrate and further to quash the criminal proceedings to the
extent of the applicant.
4. I have heard the submissions advanced by Mr Manoj S. Mohite,
learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant and Mrs Mane, learned
APP for respondent/State. Respondent No. 1 in-person has not caused his
presence, though served.
5. By referring the contents of the complaint filed by the
complainant, the learned Counsel for the applicant has contended that on the
face of the complaint filed, no prima facie case has been made out for
issuance of process u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act, as against the
applicant/accused No. 3. By referring the provisions of Section 141 of NI
Act, the learned Counsel has submitted that, in order to attract the vicarious
liability u/s 141 of NI Act, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to
specifically plead as to how and in what manner the accused was guilty of
commission of offence u/s 138 r/w 141 of the NI Act. It is pointed out that
the facts pleaded in the complaint nowhere make out any case to attract the
vicarious liability of the applicant for the alleged dishonour of cheque and
commission of offence u/s 138 of NI Act. It is submitted that, in order to
attract offence u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act, there must be specific averments. It
is not sufficient to make a bald statement in complaint that the Director i.e.
accused in the complaint is incharge or/and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the Company. In support of the contention that the averments
made in the complaint are not sufficient to attract the offence u/s 138 r/w 141
of NI Act as against the applicant/accused No. 3, the learned Counsel has
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relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National
Small Industries Corp. Ltd. Vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal & Anr. reported in
2010 ALL MR (Cri) 921 (S.C.) and further relied upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasani Vs. State of
Maharashtra reported in 2015 ALL MR (Cri) 419 (S.C.). Learned Counsel
for the applicant has further assailed the order passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate with contention that the order has been passed in a
gross non-application of mind and without any material available on record.
Learned Counsel has submitted that, neither the complaint nor the documents
filed by the complainant remotely disclose that the applicant was concerned
with the day-to-day affairs of the Company or anyway responsible for the
conduct of the business of the Company. In the entire complaint, the
complainant has not attributed any role to the applicant except alleging that
he is one of the Directors. The learned Counsel submitted that the accused
No. 3 has responded to the notice. In the notice sent by applicant to
respondent No. 1, it has been specifically informed that the present applicant
is no more Director of the Company, still the process was issued against the
applicant / accused No. 3.
6. In order to appreciate the submissions advanced, I have
thoroughly perused the averments made in the complaint so as to attract the
vicarious liability of the applicant / accused No. 3 in commission of offence
u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act. In my view, on the face of the complaint, no case
for issuance of process u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act have been made out against
the applicant / accused No. 3. In this context, it is useful to refer to the
averments made in para Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7.
"2) I say that pursuant to valuable consideration and in
discharge of liabilities of legitimate dues on account of the
interest accrued against the I.C.D. Loan/Repayment of Loan by
the accused to me the Complainant. That towards the payment
of the said interest dues, accused are liable to pay a sum of Rs.
54,000/- being the interest accrued therein, the Accused above
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issued Cheque in discharge of debts in favour of me drawn on
State Bank of India, IND FIN Branch, Andheri (East), Snehal
Chambers, Telli Galli Andheri (East), Mumbai - 400 001, the
details whereof is set hereunder :-
Cheque No. Date Amount
015420 3.3.2013 Rs. 54,000/-
------------------------
Rs. 54,000/-
Copy of the above Cheque bearing No. 015420
dated 3.3.2013 for Rs. 54,000/- are annexed as Exhibit - A with
this Complaint.
3) I say that the aforesaid Cheque was deposited on
31.5.2013 for realization with Banker HDFC Bank Ltd which is
annexed as exhibit- B and the same was returned dishonored by
the Banker for want of funds for the reason "Funds Insufficient",
as the Accused had not arranged for the funds in his Account.
Hereto annexed the copy of the Cheque Return Memo dated
1.6.2013 issued by State Bank of India CCPC Mumbai to HDFC
Bank Ltd & the cheque return memo dated 1.6.2013 of HDFC
Bank Ltd., Mumbai clearing branch to me through my banker
H.D.F.C. Bank Ltd which are exhibits - C & D respectively.
4) I say that after receipt of dishonoured Cheque from the
Banker, my Advocate by his Notice dated 20.6.2013 recorded all
the aforesaid facts and called upon the Accused to pay the
amount of the said dishonoured Cheques within the statutory
period. Hereto annexed and marked as Exhibit - E the copy of
said Advocate's Notice dated 20.06.2013.
6) I say that the said Speed post & Registered A/D Packets
addressed to the Accused at the above address was received by
the accused and given the postal acknowledgement on 1.7.2013.
Hereto to annexed and marked as Exhibit - G to G-3, the copies
of Speed post/Registered Postal Acknowledgement dated
1.7.2013 by the accused. I say that the Accused No. 3 sent the
reply dated 23.7.2013 through his advocate and denied (without
furnishing) his liability in the present matter which reply is
annexed at Exhibit - H.
7) I say that the Complaint is not barred by Law of
Limitation as the demand notice dated 20.6.2013 sent by Speed
post on 28.6.2013 to all the accused after the receipt of the
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dishonured cheque on 1.6.2013 by me and the said notice sent by
Registered A.D. on 29.6.2013 which received by the accused on
1.7.2013 and this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and
try this Complaint against the Accused as the Complainant is
residing within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and the
demand notice sent from the residential address of the
Complainant demanding the dishonored cheque amount and the
cause of action is within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.
7. Thus, bare perusal of the aforesaid averments noway satisfy the
ingredients of Section 141 of NI Act, to attract the vicarious liability of the
applicant/accused No. 3. The entire averments made in the complaint if read
in its totality, then at the most the role attributed to the applicant in
commission of offence is that he was one of the Directors of the Company at
the time of alleged transaction. In the instant case, the fact is not in dispute
that the cheque in question has not been signed by applicant / accused No. 3.
So also the applicant / accused No. 3 has not been described as Managing
Director or person in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business
and affairs of accused No. 4-Company. According to the complainant, the
applicant was Non-executive Director and he has resigned way back in the
year 2012 i.e. on 26/3/2012, much before the cause of action arose for filing
of the complaint. Section 141 of NI Act, being a penal provision creating
vicarious liability needs to be strictly construed. In this context, it is useful to
refer the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pooja Ravinder
Devidasani (supra) and in particular paragraph 17 thereof, wherein it is held
as under:
"17. ............ To fasten vicarious liability under Section 141 of the
Act on a person, at the material time that person shall have been
at the helm of affairs of the Company, one who actively looks after
the day-to-day activities of the Company and particularly
responsible for the conduct of its business. Simply because a
person is a Director of a Company, does not make him liable
under the N.I. Act. Every person connected with the Company will
not fall into the ambit of the provision. Time and again, it has
been asserted by this Court that only those persons who were in
charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the
7 APL335.2014.odt
Company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for
criminal action. A Director, who was not in charge of and was not
responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the
relevant time, will not be liable for an offence under Section 141
of the N.I. Act. In National Small Industries Corporation, [2010
ALL MR (Cri) 921 (S.C.)] (supra) this Court observed:
"Section 141 is a penal provision creating vicarious
liability, and which, as per settled law, must be strictly construed.
It is therefore, not sufficient to make a bald cursory statement in a
complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in charge
of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business
of the company without anything more as to the role of the
Director. But the complaint should spell out as to how and in
what manner Respondent 1 was in charge of or was responsible to
the accused Company for the conduct of its business. This is in
consonance with strict interpretation of penal statutes, especially,
where such statutes create vicarious liability. A company may
have a number of Directors and to make any or all the Directors
as accused in a complaint merely on the basis of a statement that
they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company without anything more is not a sufficient
or adequate fulfillment of the requirements under Section 141.
8. In paragraph 28 and 30 of the judgment in the case of Pooja
(supra), the Apex Court has held as under :
"28. In the entire complaint, neither the role of the appellant in
the affairs of the Company was explained nor in what manner the
appellant is responsible for the conduct of business of the
Company, was explained. From the record it appears that the
trade finance facility was extended by the Respondent No. 2 to the
default Company during the period from 13th April, 2008 to 14th
October, 2008, against which the Cheque were issued by the
Company which stood dishonoured. Much before that on 17 th
December, 2005 the appellant resigned from the Board of
Directors. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that continuation
of the criminal proceedings against the appellant under Section
138 read with Section 141 of the N. I. Act is a pure abuse of
process of law and it has to be interdicted at the threshold.
30. Putting the criminal law into motion is not a matter of
course. To settle the scores between the parties which are more in
the nature of a civil dispute, the parties cannot be permitted to
put the criminal law into motion and Courts cannot be a mere
spectator to it. Before a Magistrate taking cognizance of an
offence under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act, making a person
vicariously liable has to ensure strict compliance of the statutory
8 APL335.2014.odt
requirements. The Superior Courts should maintain purity in the
administration of Justice and should not allow abuse of the
process of the Court. The High Court ought to have quashed the
complaint against the appellant which is nothing but a pure
abuse of process of law."
9. In the light of discussion made in foregoing paras, I am of the
view that the complaint filed by the complainant makes out no case for
issuance of process u/s 138 r/w 141 of N.I. Act, against the applicant/accused
No. 3. Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate appears to have passed the order
mechanically. Learned Metropolitan Magistrate has not taken any pains to
read the complaint and the documents relied on to find out as to whether a
prima facie case has been made out or not to attract the vicarious liability of
the applicant as contemplated u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act. No doubt, the
detailed enquiry is not contemplated at the stage of exercise of powers under
Section 204 of Cr.P.C., but, certainly the magistrate is bound to consider as to
whether the facts averred in the complaint and the documents, if any, relied
make out a prima facie case for issuance of process u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act.
It is pertinent to note that in the instant case, there are specific averments
made in the complaint itself in paragraph 6 that the accused No. 3 had replied
the notice and denied his liability in the matter annexed as Exhibit H to
complaint. The copy of that reply appears to have been produced along with
the complaint as Exh. H. However, the Magistrate has not taken any pains to
go through the contents of the said notice. It is the say of the applicant that,
the notice was duly replied by him through his Advocate on 23/7/2013. In
reply sent to the notice, the applicant has specifically stated that the applicant
was appointed as Non-executive Director and he had resigned from the
Company on 26/3/2012, which was accepted by the Board of Directors and
also intimated in prescribed proforma i.e. Form No. 32 to the Registrar of the
Company. Not only this, the applicant has also informed about recording of
this fact in the 20th Annual Report of accused No. 4 - Company for the
financial year 2011-12. In spite of that the learned magistrate has passed the
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order of issuance of process as against the applicant / accused No. 3. The
order passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate, which is impugned in this
petition, reads as under:
"ORDER BELOW EX-1
1. Complainant is present alongwith counsel.
Complainant has recorded his statement vide Ex.3 by way of
verification in view of recent judgment delivered by Hon'ble
Bombay High Court in a case between Rajesh B. Chalke Vs
State of Maharashtra and 1 other reported in 2011(1) Mh.L.J.
244.
2. Perused the complaint, documents attached thereto and
the statement of the complainant on oath. According to the
complainant, accused No. 4 is the Company and accused Nos.
1 to 3 are the Directors of accused No. 4 company i.e. M/s.
Tricom India Ltd. Complainant has reiterated the case as per
complaint averments in the verification, statement Exh. 3.
The complainant has made out prima facie case against the
accused for an offence punishable under Section 138 r/w 141
of Negotiable Instruments Act. Hence issue process against
he accused Nos. 1 to 4 for the offence punishable under
Section 138 r/w 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, returnable
on 16.11.2013. Complainant to supply all the documents to
the accused. Summons to be serve through R.P.A.D. or Speed
Post. Case be tried as summons case.
Sd/-
( R. B. Bhagwat )
Metropolitan Magistrate,
Mumbai. 7th Court, Dadar, Mumbai.
Date : 12.08.2013."
Thus, the bare perusal of order passed by Metropolitan
Magistrate leads to conclusion that the order has been passed without
perusing the contents of complaint and documents relied in support of
complaint particularly the reply notice in reply sent by applicant/accused No.
3 on 23/7/2013, which was produced as Exhibit H to complaint. It is a glaring
case of non-application of mind. Hence, in my view, the order is not
sustainable in law.
10 APL335.2014.odt
10. In the light of the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs, I
have no hesitation to hold that, on the face of the complaint, no case was
made out for issuance of process u/s 138 r/w 141 of the NI Act as against the
applicant/accused No. 3. The order passed by the learned Magistrate appears
to be passed without application of mind and due consideration of averments
made in the complaint. The averments made in the complaint make out no
case to attract the vicarious liability of the applicant / accused No. 3 for
commission of offence u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act.
11. The applicant has approached with a case that he was
Non- executive Director of the Company. He has resigned as a Director of the
Company on 26/3/2012. The resignation of the applicant was accepted in the
Board of Directors meeting held on 14/5/2012. The fact in respect of the
resignation of the applicant was duly intimated in a prescribed proforma
i.e. Form No. 32, to the Registrar of the Company on 14/5/2012. This was
also reflected in the 20th Annual Report of the Company for the fiscal year
2011-12 published on 24/11/2012. In support of this submission, the
applicant has produced on record the following documents.
(i) Copy of resignation.
(ii) Copy of Resolution dt. 14/5/2012 passed in the meeting of Board of
Directors.
(iii) Copy of notice given to the Registrar of the Company in a prescribed
proforma i.e. Form No. 32.
(iv) Copy of 20th Annual Report of the Company for the financial year
2011-12.
(v) Copy of reply notice dt. 23/7/2013 sent to complainant through his
Advocate by the applicant.
12. As per the complaint, the cause of action for filing of the
complaint arose on 12/8/2013. There is no dispute as to the fact that the
cheque in question was issued on 3/3/2013. It was dishonoured on 31/5/2013.
The notice of demand was issued on 20/6/2013 and cause of action for filing
of complaint arose on 12/8/2013. Thus, the act of dishonour of cheque has
taken place much after the resignation tendered by the applicant / accused No.
11 APL335.2014.odt
3. Learned Counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the decision of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anita Malhotra Versus Apparel Export
Promotion Council and Another reported in (2012) 1 SCC 520. In a case
based upon similar facts, the Apex Court has held that in exercise of
jurisdiction u/s 482 of Cr.P.C., if on the face of documents relied upon by
accused which are beyond suspicion of doubt, if it is considered that
accusation against accused cannot stand, the High Court can consider such
documents in exercise of jurisdiction u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. In paragraph 20 of the
said Judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under :
"20. As rightly stated so, though it is not proper for the High Court to
consider the defence of the accused or conduct a roving enquiry in respect
of merits of the accusation, but if on the face of the document which is
beyond suspicion or doubt, placed by the accused and if it is considered
that the accusation against her cannot stand, in such a matter, in order to
prevent injustice or abuse of process, it is incumbent on the High Court to
look into those document/documents which have a bearing on the matter
even at the initial stage and grant relief to the person concerned by
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code."
13. Thus, in view of the fact that the document placed on record by
the applicant, the genuineness of which is not in doubt and disputed by
respondent No. 1, clear case has been made out that the applicant has resigned
as a Director of accused No. 4 - Company much prior to dishonour of cheque
and cause of action for filing of the criminal complaint. The defence of the
applicant is duly supported with the documentary evidence. Therefore, the
order of issuance of process u/s 138 r/w 141 of NI Act, deserves to be set
aside and proceeding is liable to be quashed to the extent of applicant.
14. I am, therefore, inclined to allow the application in terms of
prayer clause 'A' to the extent of applicant / accused No. 3 and same is
accordingly allowed.
15. Rule made absolute in above terms with no order as to costs.
[ V. L. ACHLIYA, J. ]
