Sanjay S/O Baldeo Ramteke vs State Of Mahrashtra, Through Its ...
2014 Latest Caselaw 166 Bom

                                        Writ Petition No.3253.14


                                 1




                                                                   
                                           
           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                      NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR




                                          
                  Writ Petition No.3253 of 2014


     Sanjay son of Baldeo Ramteke,
     aged about 28 years,




                              
     occupation   nil,
     resident of Raka,
     Post Chikhali,
     Tq. Sadak Arjuni,
     Distt. Gondia.                         &..           Petitioner.
                  
                               Versus


     1.    State of Maharashtra,
      

           through its Secretary,
           Ministry of Power, Mantralaya,
   



           Mumbai-32.

     2.    Maharashtra State Electricity
           Distribution Company Ltd.,
           Nagpur Zone, Nagpur.





     3.    The Executive Engineer,
           MAHADISCOM, S.V.S.
           Department, Bankhele Building,
           near Vikas Theatre,





           Manchar, Distt. Pune,
           Pine Code 410 503.

     4.    Superintendent of Police,
           Distt. Gondia.                   ....        Respondents.


                               *****
     Mr.   A.B. Moon, Adv., for the petitioner.




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                                                  Writ Petition No.3253.14


                                        2




                                                                          
                                                  
     Ms. K.R. Deshpande, Asstt. Govt. Pleader for respondent
     nos. 1 and 4.




                                                 
     Mr. S.V. Purohit, Adv., for respondent nos.2 and 3.

                                       *****




                                      
                                       CORAM     : A.B.CHAUDHARI AND
                       ig                          P.R. BORA,JJ.

st Reserved on : 01 Dec., 2014.

nd

Pronounced on : 22 December, 2014.

ORAL JUDGMENT [Per A.B. Chaudhari,J.] :

01. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.

Learned AGP Ms. Deshpande waives service on behalf of

respondent nos. 1 and 4, and learned Adv. Mr. S.V.

Purohit, Adv., for respondent nos. 2 and 3. With the

consent of rival parties, this Writ Petition is taken

up for final hearing.

02. By the present petition, the petitioner seeks th quashing of impugned order dated 15 February, 2014,

by which, his selection to the post of Asstt.

Writ Petition No.3253.14

Electrician was cancelled.

03. In support of the Writ Petition, the learned

counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the

petitioner belongs to Scheduled Caste. He applied for

the post pursuant to the advertisement that was issued

for filling the vacant posts in the districts of

Nagpur, Aurangabad, Jalgaon etc., in the State of

Maharashtra on the establishment of the Maharashtra

State Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd. He applied in

the category of Scheduled Caste by making an on-line

th application on 19 June, 2012. He was called for

interview and selection. Having qualified finally, he

th received a message on his mobile phone on 14 June,

2013 that he was selected to the said post in the

category and to remain present at the Zonal Office,

th Pune, on 20 June, 2013 when he was personally handed

over the Letter of Selection. He accordingly went to

complete all the formalities on the very next date and st the respondent no.3 on 21 June, 2013 forwarded the

letter for verification of character to the

Writ Petition No.3253.14

st Superintendent of Police, Gondia. On 21 October,

2013, respondent no.2 asked him to submit Police

Verification Form etc. He completed all formalities

accordingly. During verification, he visited Police

Station, Duggipar, Tq. Sadak Arjuni, Distt. Gondia, and

he submitted the ig documents relating to Crime No.

56/2008 under Section 12A of the Maharashtra Prevention

of Gambling Act and judgment of his acquittal dated th 15 May, 2011 in the said crime delivered by1 the

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sadak Arjuni, in

Summary Case No. 2134 of 2009. Acting upon those

documents, Superintendent of Police, Gondia, submitted th his report on 11 July, 2013 to the respondent no.3,

clearly stating that the petitioner was acquitted on th 15 May, 2011. The said report was received by the

respondent no.3 and he issued the impugned order dated

th 15 February, 2014 cancelling his selection on the

same ground that he deliberately concealed the fact in

the Attestation Form that no offence was pending

against him. The counsel for the petitioner relied on

the following decisions to substantiate his arguments:-

Writ Petition No.3253.14

[a] T.S. Vasudavan Nair Vs. Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre & others [1988 (Supp) SCC 795],

[b] Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda Vs. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal & another [(1999) 2 SCC 247],

[c] D.Mahadevan Vs. The Director General of

[d]

Police [(20080 4 MLJ 88], The Secretary to Govt., Home Deptt., & two others Vs. P. Ravichandran & another

th

October, 2005 of Madras High], and [e] Commissioner of Police Vs. Dhawal Singh

[1999 (1) SCC 246].

04. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent

nos. 2 and 3 vehemently opposed the Writ Petition and

argued, inviting our attention to Clause 11 of the

Attestation Form, which provides for disclosure whether

the candidate was any time arrested, prosecuted,

detained etc., and to that the petitioner did not give

any reply when he fully knew that he was prosecuted

under Section 12A of the Maharashtra Prevention of

Gambling Act in Summary Case No. 2134 of 2009. The fact

Writ Petition No.3253.14

th that he was acquitted on 15 May, 2011, i.e., before th the date of his application for employment on 19

June, 2012 is not relevant, but what is relevant is

whether he honestly disclosed about his prosecution in

a criminal case and, therefore, this Court need not

interfere with the impugned cancellation order.

                                ig                                                            He

     cited           a     Division    Bench    order          of     this        Court       at
                              

Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 8388 of 2013, decided th on 27 January, 2014 [Coram : R.M. Borde & N.W.

Sambre, JJ.] in case of Haresh Pandit Chaudhari Vs.

Chief Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity

Distribution Co., Ltd. The learned counsel for the

respondent nos. 2 and 3 took a Preliminary Objection to

the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain

the Writ Petition, on the ground that the process of

selection and cancellation took place at Pune and the

cause of action arose at Pune and, therefore, it is the

Principal Seat of this Court which has the territorial

jurisdiction and not the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay

High Court and, therefore, the petition should not be

entertained at Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court.

Writ Petition No.3253.14

He relied on the decision in the case of VSP Acqua Mist

Fire Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur Vs. Maharashtra State

Electricity Transmission Co., Ltd., Mumbai [2010 (2)

Mh.L.J. 575]. Mr. Purohit, therefore, prayed for

dismissal of the Writ Petition on both the counts.

CONSIDERATION :

05. We have perused the entire Writ Petition, so

also the documents on record. We have heard learned

counsel for the rival parties.

06. It is essential to address the question of

territorial jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel

for the respondent first.

07. It is necessary to have a short legal history

about the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the

Constitution. In Khajoor Singh Vs. Union of India [AIR

1961 SC 532], a Bench of seven Judges of the Supreme

Court confirmed the view taken in the case of Saka

Writ Petition No.3253.14

Venkata Rao [AIR 1953 SC 210], holding that the person

or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to

issue a Writ must be within its territorial

jurisdiction either by residence or location. Realising

the difficulty of the people at large, the Parliament

amended Article ig 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth

Amendment) Act, 1963, and added a new clause (1-A),

which was then re-numbered as Clause (2) by the

Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, and

that is what is the extant position. The underlying

object of amendment was expressed in the following

words:-

Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court

which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226. So that when any relief is sought against

any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writs.

Thus, the accrual of cause of action was an

Writ Petition No.3253.14

additional ground to confer jurisdiction on the High

Court. Before we proceed to elaborate on this aspect

of the matter, we would first deal with the aspect that

the petitioner has filed this Petition in this Court on

one of the grounds that he is a resident of a village

in the district ig of Gondia, which falls in the

territorial jurisdiction of this Bench, which is

objected to by the counsel for the respondent nos. 2

and 3. We must uphold the objection raised by Mr.

Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2 and

3, that a mere residence of the petitioner in the area

in the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench cannot be

a ground for a person to file a Writ Petition at Nagpur

Bench of Bombay High Court. In fact, that is the trite

law pronounced by the Supreme Court in various

judgments, and one of which is in the case of National

Textile Corporation Ltd., & others Vs. Haribox Swalram

& others [(2004) 9 SCC 786], wherein referring the

earlier decisions, the Apex Court said thus:-

the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it

Writ Petition No.3253.14

was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ

petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained.

Similar are the decision in the cases of [1] Union of

India & others Vs. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd., & others [

AIR 1984 SC 1264], [2] State of Rajasthan & others Vs.

M/s. Swaika Properties [AIR 1985 SC 1289], [3] Oil &

Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu &

others [ (1994) 4 SCC 711], and [4] Union of India Vs.

Adani Exports Ltd [(2002) 1 SCC 567]. In our opinion,

therefore, mere residence of the petitioner in the

territorial area of this Bench does not enable him to

institute a Writ Petition before this Bench.

08. The next aspect is about the cause of action.

The facts in the instant case about cause of action are

that the respondent no.3 sent a letter to the

Superintendent of Police, Gondia, seeking information

about the antecedents of the petitioner. The

Writ Petition No.3253.14

th Superintendent of Police, Gondia, by letter dated 11

July, 2013, informed the respondent no.3 that the

th petitioner was acquitted on 15 May, 2011 of the

offence under Section 12A of the Maharashtra Prevention

of Gambling Act and it is only on the basis of that

letter of the Superintendent of Police, respondent no.3 ig th issued the impugned order dated 15 February, 2014

cancelling his appointment. Thus, the cause of action

partly arose because of these events occurring in

Gondia district. After all, cause of action is a

bundle of several facts, one or the other or all taken

together constitute a cause of action. We, therefore,

hold that part of the cause of action occurred in the

district of Gondia.

In A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. A.P.

Agencies, Salem [AIR 1989 SC 1239], the Supreme Court

stated thus about the cause of action:-

A cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of

Writ Petition No.3253.14

facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant

since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It

does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary

for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a

right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief

prayed for by the plaintiff.

09. It is, thus, clear to us that for the purpose of

deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner would

or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one

has to consider whether such fact constitutes a

material, essential, or integral part of the cause of

action. It is, no doubt, true that even if a small

fraction of the cause of action arises within the

jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the

Writ Petition No.3253.14

suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a part of cause

of action, nothing less than that.

10. As elaborated above, we find that the petitioner

has clear cut cause of action in the instant case

because the cancellation order impugned was made by the

respondent nos. 2 and 3 acting only on the basis of the

letter of Superintendent of Police, Gondia, which th emanated from Gondia on 11 July, 2013. That is the

only reason for cancellation of his appointment. Thus,

we are, on the facts of the present case, fully sure

that the petitioner has a cause of action within the

territorial jurisdiction of this Bench.

11. That apart, there is another reason why this

Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the

present Writ Petition. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, after its amendment, lastly used

the words notwithstanding that the seat of such

Government or authority or the residence of such person

is not within those territories. That means, the

Writ Petition No.3253.14

residence or location of respondents or the defendants

in the petition/suit. We have already held earlier that

the residence or location of the petitioner is not

relevant to institute a petition, but what is relevant

from reading of the above is that even if the seat of

Govt., or the authority or the residence of such person

is not within the territory, the High Court will still

have jurisdiction to issue a Writ even beyond its

territorial jurisdiction, provided the cause of action,

wholly or in part, arises within the territorial

jurisdiction of such Court. To put it again, use of the

word notwithstanding in this context means if the

residence or location of authority/respondent herein is

within the territorial jurisdiction, certainly this

Bench has jurisdiction. It is in this context, we

proceed to deal with the provision of Section 20, Civil

Procedure Code. Section 20 reads thus:-

20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.- Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-

Writ Petition No.3253.14

(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or

carries on business, or personally works for gain; or

(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the

commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily ig resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants

who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c) the cause of action, wholly or

in part, arises.

Explanation A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at

such place.

12. Section 141, Civil Procedure and its Explanation

reads thus:-

141. Miscellaneous proceedings.- The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

Writ Petition No.3253.14

Explanation. In this section, the expression proceedings includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under article 226 of

the Constitution.

It is, thus, clear that the provisions of Civil

Procedure Code do not apply mutatis mutandis to the

writ proceedings. That, however, does not mean that

general principles relating to civil proceedings in a

Civil Court would be ignored altogether. The writ

Court would keep in view principles of the Code and

exercise its discretionary power in the interest of

justice. After all, the jurisdiction under Article 226

is not to deny the justice, but to do the justice.

13. Even though location or residence of the

authority or defendant or respondent in the Writ

Petition as a reason for entertaining a petition does

not appear to have fallen for consideration, we find

that the principles underlying or akin to Section 20

(a) or (b) of Civil Procedure Code can well be followed

or pressed into service, to hold that if the

Writ Petition No.3253.14

respondents carry on business or reside or their

subordinate offices are located within the territorial

jurisdiction of this Bench, this Bench will have

jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition. This view

gets support from the earlier legal history we have

stated that after the decision of Seven Judges in the

case of Khajoor Singh [cited supra], the Parliament

amended Article 226 and inserted Clause (2), since the

effect of the Seven-Judge decision was that it was only

the Delhi High Court which could issue a Writ against

the Govt. of India and no other High Court in the

country could do so, as the Seat of the Govt. of India

was located in New Delhi. That is why the word

notwithstanding in the last part of Clause 2 has been

utilized which conveys that the location or residence

of or the seat of Govt. or authority is also relevant

for determining the territorial jurisdiction of the

particular High Court. We think, looked from that

point of view, the provision stated in Section 20 (a)

and (b) and the principle set out therein should also

be applied to the writ jurisdiction for entertaining a

Writ Petition No.3253.14

Writ Petition.

14. Apart from that, what we find is that the

underlying object of the amendment by inserting Clause

(2) in Article 226 of the Constitution was to remove

considerable hardships ig to litigants from distant

places. In the instant case, we find that the

petitioner is a member of Scheduled Caste residing in a

remote village in Sadak Arjuni Taluka falling in Gondia

district. He is qualified to man the post for which he

was selected. Obviously he is unemployed. The

respondent no.2 is the Company fully owned by the Govt.

of Maharashtra. It supplies electricity to entire State

of Maharashtra which includes Vidarbha Region also, in

which the village of the petitioner is located where

also the Company supplies electricity at price. The

respondent nos. 2 and 3 have subordinate offices, as

envisaged by Explanation for Corporation , in the

district of Gondia, within the territorial jurisdiction

of this Court. The Bench at Nagpur of the Bombay High

Court is for entertaining the cases arising in the

Writ Petition No.3253.14

various districts of Vidarbha Region. The contention

raised by respondent no.2 that the petitioner should go

to Mumbai and file a petition at the Principal Seat of

Bombay High Court at Mumbai, rather than the Bench at

Nagpur, in our opinion, ignores these telltale facts

that the petitioner is a poor villager residing at a

remote place in Gondia district, who is unemployed and

a member of Scheduled Caste, that he needs employment

very badly to support his family and that he was also

selected by the respondent no.2. We cannot be oblivious

of the glaring fact that the cost litigation at Mumbai

is higher than Nagpur and when it comes to the persons

like the petitioner, it is unaffordable. Moreover, the

distance between his place of residence and Mumbai,

travel expenditure, expenditure for residence, food

etc., at Mumbai for filing a case there, and then the

hefty fees of Advocates at Mumbai cannot be ignored.

The Bench at Nagpur, since petitioner is having cause

of action within the territorial jurisdiction of Nagpur

Bench, is the only Bench which must entertain his

petition in the above factual background. It is painful

Writ Petition No.3253.14

for us to hear the objection about the territorial

jurisdiction in the light of the plight of the

unemployed persons from this region, that too by a

Govt. Company. The objection raised by the respondent

no.2 can only be described as pedantics and semantics

and nothing more, to drive away the petitioner from the

course of justice he is otherwise entitled to. We

cannot allow this to happen. Hence we hold that for

the aforesaid reasons, this Court has territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the present Writ Petition.

The decision of Division Bench of this Court in the

case of VSP Acqua Mist Fire Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur Vs.

Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Co., Ltd.,

Mumbai [2010 (2) Mh.L.J. 575], cited by learned counsel

for respondent no.2 has no application, since in the

facts of the said case, the cause of action even

remotely or by fraction did not arise within the

jurisdiction of this Bench, which is not the case at

hand.

15. Having disposed of the objection about the

Writ Petition No.3253.14

territorial jurisdiction as above, we now proceed

further to deal with the matter.

16. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was

prosecuted in Crime No. 56/2008 for offence under

Section 12A of the Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling

Act, and in Summary Case No. 2134 of 2009, he was

acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class by th Judgment and Order dated 15 May, 2011. It is

thereafter, 6974 vacancies were advertised by

th respondent no.2 and applications were called till 30

June, 2012. In response thereto, petitioner applied on th 19 June, 2012, obviously after his acquittal from the

criminal case. He then filled the attestation form

and left Column No.11 thereof unfilled. The objection

raised by learned counsel for respondent no.2 is that

there was a deliberate attempt on the part of

petitioner in suppressing the fact of his prosecution,

which must result into his disqualification for

employment and, therefore, the impugned order of

cancellation was rightly issued. In support of this,

Writ Petition No.3253.14

he relied on an order of this Court [Aurangabad Bench] th in Writ Petition No. 8388 of 2013, dated 27 January,

2014. Learned counsel for the petitioner, per contra,

has cited several decisions and we think that the

Supreme Court decisions should be an answer to the

submission of the respondent no.2. In T.S. Vasudavan

Nair Vs. Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre &

others [cited supra], the Apex Court held non-

disclosure of conviction during emergency for shouting

slogans was held to be not enough to deny employment to

the petitioner therein.

17. From the Judgment delivered by Supreme Court

in Commissioner of Police, Delhi & another Vs. Dhawal

Singh [cited supra], we quote para 6, which reads as

follows:-

6. Learned counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to a judgment rendered by a Bench of this Court on 4.10.1996 in Delhi Admn. v. Sushil Kumar. On the first blush, that judgment seems to support the case of the appellants but there is a material difference between the two cases. Whereas in the instant case, the respondent has conveyed to the

Writ Petition No.3253.14

appellant that an inadvertent mistake had been committed in not giving the information against the relevant column in the Form much before the cancellation of

his candidature, in Sushil Kumar case no such correction was made at any stage by the respondent. That judgment is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts.

18.

In the case at hand, we find an averment in

the petition that the petitioner himself disclosed to

the Police Station Officer by supplying the copy of

Judgment of acquittal, which information was ultimately

forwarded to the Superintendent of Police. In

Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda Vs. Presiding Officer,

Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal & another [cited

supra], the Apex Court found that after his acquittal

from the case, he was entitled to be reinstated in

service, though without back wages but as a fresh

employee. We quote the following portion from para 8

of the said judgment:-

8. .................................. .........In that view of the matter, once the High Court ultimately acquitted the respondent for any reason, with which strictly we are not concerned, the net

Writ Petition No.3253.14

result that follows is that by the time the Labour Court decided the matter, the respondent was already acquitted and hence there remained no real occasion for the

appellant to pursue the termination order. Consequently, that was a sufficient ground for not visiting the respondent with the extreme punishment of termination of service. But even that apart, though the

conviction was rendered by the Sessions Court on 20-2-1979, the show cause notice

for the first time was issued by the appellant after one year i.e. on 26-2-1980 and thereafter the termination order was

passed on 18-4-1983. That itself by the passage of time created a situation wherein the original suppression of involvement of the respondent in the prosecution for an offence under Section

307 of the Indian penal Code did not remain so pernicious a misconduct on his

part as to visit him with the grave punishment of termination from service on these peculiar facts of the case and especially when the Labour Court also did not award any back wages to the respondent

from 1983 till the respondent's reinstatement by its order dated 29-9-1995 and one month thereafter and when the High Court also did not think it fit to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the peculiar

facts of this case. ...

19. That apart, as a policy decision, the Govt.

th has issued a Resolution dated 13 June, 1988,

Writ Petition No.3253.14

Paragraph [अ] of which shows that only in case of

conviction for moral turpitude or violence, the

employment should be denied; otherwise the same should

be granted. In this case, the petitioner was acquitted

of the charge under Section 12A of the Maharashtra

Prevention of Gambling Act. The offence for which he

was charged and acquitted did not constitute even the

above.

20. To sum up, the said policy decision of the

th Govt. dated 13 June, 1988 vide Govt. Resolution No.

पीएचसी -० 287/1892(1)/पोल-5 अ issued by Home Department is

in consonance with the pragmatic approach required in

such matters rather than denying justice to the people

by raising hyper technical objections. In the case at

hand, it is clear that the petitioner had not disclosed

in Column 11 that he was prosecuted. The first reason

is that since he was acquitted well before he filled

application form and that must have made him to leave

the said column no.11 blank and, therefore, we do not

Writ Petition No.3253.14

find anything wrong with him in doing so. At that

time, the petitioner must have had an apprehension in

mind that a valuable opportunity of employment would be

denied to him by respondent no.2 by resorting to the

answer against Column No.11 even though he was

acquitted of the said offence a few years before. We do

not find anything wrong with what the petitioner has

done by keeping Column No.11 blank. In our opinion,

Column No.11 itself should not be read as a mere form,

but must be read in substance. Reading of Column No.11

in substance, to our mind, in the facts of the present

case, clearly shows that the petitioner committed no

mistake or no suppression by not giving an answer to

Column No.11, because he was already acquitted a few

years before he applied for the post. On the contrary,

in our opinion, Column No.11 needs proper

rectification, since the Govt. Departments/Agencies are

utilizing this Column No.11 for denying justice to the

people rather than doing justice to them; and they are

also not considering that upon conviction, that too for

moral or violent conduct, the employment can be denied.

Writ Petition No.3253.14

To sum up, we do not find any reason to deny relief to th the petitioner on any count. The order dated 27

January, 2014 made by Aurangabad Bench of this Court at

in the case of Haresh Pandit Chaudhari does not show

any consideration of the legal position set out by us

above.

21. In the result, we make the following order:-

O R D E R

[a] Writ Petition No. 3253 of 2014 is allowed.

[b] Rule is made absolute in terms of Prayer Clause [i].

[c] The petitioner shall be appointed to the

post of Assistant Electrician within a period of one-and-half-month from today.

[d] In case the petitioner is not appointed as above, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 shall pay regular salary to the petitioner with

Writ Petition No.3253.14

st effect from 01 February, 2014.

[e] Copy of this Judgment be sent to the Chief

Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra, Mantralaya, Mumbai, with reference to Paragraphs 19 to 20 above.

                                     
           JUDGE
                     ig                                       JUDGE

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