Assistant Commissioner vs Mr.A.Y.Sakhare
2013 Latest Caselaw 418 Bom

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            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                                                        
                   WRIT PETITION NO.10622 OF 2013

    Rajan Ramchandra Bhogale




                                                
    Assistant Commissioner
    of Police, Wanawadi Division,
    Pune                                             .. Petitioner




                                               
          Versus

    1]    State of Maharashtra




                                      
    2]    The Commissioner of Police,
          Pune Commissionerate, Pune,

    3]
                        
          Annasaheb Babu Bandgar,
          flat No.28, Payal Society,
          Opp.Karishma Society,
                       
          Erandawane, Pune 411038


    Mr.Y.S.Jahagirdar, Senior Advocate with Mr.N.V.Bandivadekar for
      

    petitioner
   



    Mr.A.Y.Sakhare, Senior Advocate with Sagar Kumbhar for respondent

No.3

Mr.Samir Patil, AGP for respondent No.2.

CORAM : S.C.DHARMADHIKARI, & MRS. REVATI MOHITE DERE, JJ

RESERVED: 5th December 2013

PRONOUNCED: 24th December 2013.

ORAL ORDER (Per Dharmadhikari, J.):-

1] Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent rule made

returnable forthwith. Heard parties.

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2] The petitioner states that on 1st April 1983, he was appointed as

Police Sub-Inspector by direct recruitment. He received further

promotions. He was promoted as Assistant Commissioner of Police

(ACP) and presently working in that post. Third respondent before this

court is also an officer working in the same cadre namely ACP.

3] By an order dated 23rd May 2013, the State of Maharashtra

effected transfers of about 38 officers working in the cadre of ACP/

Sub-Divisonal Police Officer/ Deputy Superintendent of Police across

State of Maharashtra.

4] The petitioner at that time was working as Assistant

Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch and reporting to the

Commissioner of Police. One Mr.Vitthal Tikaram Pawar, working as

ACP Pune came to be transferred as ACP Thane. Respondent No.3

then working as Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Karmala came

to be transferred as ACP Pune in the post which has fallen vacant due

to transfer of Vitthal Pawar. Annexure A is a copy of the order of

transfers.

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5] By order dated 31st May 2013, second respondent relieved the

said Vitthal Pawar to enable him to join the place of transfer i.e. ACP

Thane City. By the very order and internal transfer the petitioner came

to be shifted from the post of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Traffic

to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Wanavadi, Pune. The

petitioner states that he was relieved from this post of ACP, Traffic and

he assumed charge of post of ACP Wanavadi, Pune on 1st July 2013.

On 7th June 2013 third respondent came to be relieved from his post of

SDPO Karmala by Additional Superintendent of Police Solapur, Rural

to enable him to join the place of transfer as ACP Pune. The

respondent No.3 accepted that order, according to the petitioner, and

reported to respondent No.2. The respondent No.2 posted the third

respondent as ACP, Control Room, Pune City. The petitioner states

that no grievance was made by third respondent and he continued to

work at the posted place. Reliance is placed upon a further order

dated 10th June 2013 which has been issued by the second respondent

by way of internal transfer whereunder the third respondent was

transferred from the post of ACP, Control Room, Pune city to the post

of ACP, Special Branch.

6] It is at this stage and not satisfied with this arrangement that the

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third respondent filed an Original Application being O.A. 492 of 2013

against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The petitioner before us was

impleaded as respondent No.3. The challenge in this application was

to the order, a copy of which is at Annexure B insamuch as the

petitioner's posting was put in issue and in the forefront. That is how

the third respondent pressed the original application. A copy of the

original application is marked as Annexure "E" and a copy of the

Government Resolution dated 25th July 2008 on the subject of

constitution of the Police Establishment Board is annexed as Annexure

"F".

7] The Tribunal, on this application directed filing of replies and

accordingly replies were filed and served. There were rejoinder

affidavits filed. There was an application made for amendment seeking

to incorporate the prayer to allow third respondent to work as ACP

Wanawadi Division, Pune.

8] After the pleadings were complete the parties were heard and

the tribunal passed the impugned order dated 11th November 2013

under which it set aside the order of transfer in relation to the petitioner

as well as respondent No.3 and granted the relief as prayed in para

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9(a) of the original application. Petitioner's Advocate sought stay of

this order, since he was already working at the posted place for near

about seven months. Annexure Q is a copy of that order dated 11th

November 2013. However, the stay was refused on the very day.

9] It is the order dated 11th November 2013 which is challenged in

this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10]

Mr.Y.S.Jahagirdar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

petitioner firstly submitted that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in

granting a relief and which had no basis in law. The Tribunal ought to

have considered as to whether the application of the third respondent

challenging his order of transfer deserves to be allowed or not. It is the

basic order of transferring him from Solapur to Pune which could have

been at best challenged. The respondent No.3 could not have made

any grievance with regard to his posting within Pune City. The tribunal

mistook the grievance of posting within the Pune city as transfer and

proceeded to pass the impugned order. In doing that the tribunal has

ignored the fundamental distinction between a transfer from one station

to another and after reporting at that station, internal transfer or posting

within that station. The latter aspect is falling within the province of

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posting of officers who are transferred and that is the sole prerogative

of the authority / administrator. In that no interference is permissible.

11] Mr.Jahagirdar submits that the respondent No.3 was aware of

the fact that Mr.Vitthal Pawar was transferred from senior ACP,

Wanawadi to ACP Thane City. This was the general transfer/ relieving

order. Thereafter, there are two internal orders and in one it has been

very clearly stated that the petitioner Rajan Bhogale who was then

working as ACP, Traffic was transferred from his present posting as

ACP Traffic to ACP, Wanawadi. Further, it is evident that the

respondent No.3 was relieved on 7th June 2013 as SDPO, Solapur

Rural so as to enable him to report for work at the transfer places.

12] The petitioner has also invited the attention of the tribunal to the

order passed in relation to the respondent No.3 whereunder he was

removed from the ACP Control Room and posted to the post of ACP

Special Branch. All these orders have been duly implemented

because there was no grievance or protest.

13] Therefore, when the respondent No.3 is not aggrieved by his

transfer from Solapur to Pune but his posting within Pune city, then, his

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grievance should not have been entertained by the tribunal. The

tribunal erred in entertaining it and by relying upon the initial orders of

24th May 2013 and the chart annexed thereto. In that chart merely

because the transferred place is indicated as a vacant seat or vacant

post does not mean that the officer can lay a claim or assert any right

to a particular posting after transfer. Once he complies with the transfer

order upon unconditionally accepting it, then, where he should be

posted is not a matter of his choice, leave alone any right. For all

these reasons, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

14] After noting these arguments of Mr.Jahagirdar, we had passed

an order on 20th November 2013 in the following terms:-

"1. We have heard Mr.Jahagirdar, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr.Sakhare, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondent No.3.

2.With their assistance we have perused the order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, copy of which is annexed to this Writ Petition at AnnexureQ page 130.

3.The principal contention of the Petitioner is that there is distinction in law between an order of transfer and an

order posting an officer pursuant to the transfer. Later is within the exclusive domain of the administrative head under whom an individual employee who is transferred must work and to whom he must report. In the present case, the Tribunal has interdicted with that authority and power of the administrative head of posting an officer after his transfer and that is how the entire order is vitiated in

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law.

4. Mr.Sakhare, on the other hand, submits that there is an order whereby the Respondent No.3 (Applicant before the Tribunal) has been posted on the vacant post and that

vacant post was held by the earlier officer at particular Police Station and the Respondent No.3 before us can be posted there at.

5. We are afraid that the order of the Tribunal would have serious consequences in law and particularly the authority and power vested in the higher officials to post individual employees and officers working under them at a

particular office or police station. The Tribunal's order would amount to holding that even in such matters an employee who may not be aggrieved by the transfer has a

vested right and can question his posting in the garb of invoking the provisions of the Maharashtra Regulations of Transfers and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official

Duties Act, 2005.

6. In these circumstances we would highly appreciate if the learned AGP takes instructions from the Respondent

No.2 and informs the Court as to how the Respondent No. 2 wants the transferred officers working under him to be

posted and whether he has, at any time, agreed to the position that the Respondent No.3 ought to be posted at a particular Police Station, namely, Wanwadi or that it is his power to post each of the officers under him including the

Petitioner and the Respondent No.3 at particular police stations or offices which are controlled by him. Let the Respondent No.2 inform us by Friday (22.11.2013). Stand over to 22.11.2013."

15] Pursuant to that order, the Commissioner of Police, Pune filed

his affidavit and in that affidavit which has been affirmed by the Joint

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Commissioner of Police and holding Additional charge of

Commissioner of Police Pune, he stated as under:-

"2. I say that in accordance with the observations made by the High Court in the order passed on 20th November 2013, I wish to submit as under:-

(a) The respondent No.3 Shri Annasaheb Babu Bandgar was original posted as Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO) Karmala Division, Solapur Rural, Dist.

Solapur. By order issued by the Home Department, Government of Maharashtra bearing No.RPS-1713/P.K. 183/Pol-1(A) dated 23/5/2013 Shri Annasaheb Babu

Bandgar came to be transferred as Assistant Commissioner of Police Pune City, Pune.

(b) Thereafter, by order issued by respondent No. 2 - Commissioner of Police, Pune City bearing No.Est-1/ACP/G.T-13/2013 dated 10/6/2013 Shri Annasaheb Babu Bandgar - Respondent No.3 was posted

as Assistant Commissioner of Police, Special Branch, Pune City, Pune. I say that respondent No.2 wants Shri

Annasaheb Babu Bandgar - respondent No.3 to continue in the said post as ACP, Special Branch Pune City.

(c) The petitioner Shri Rajan Ramchandra

Bhogale is posted as Assistant Commissioner of Plice, Wanwadi Division, Pune City, vide order issued by Respondent No.2 bearing No.Est-1/ACP/G.T-13/2013 dated 31/5/2013. I say that accordingly from 1/6/2013 the petitioner Shri Rajan R. Bhogale is continuously working in the said post and respondent No.2 wants him to continue

the said position as it is.

(d) Respondent No.2 has never intended or agreed to the position that the respondent No.3 Shri Annasaheb Babu Bandgar should be posted at any particular police station or at Wanwadi Police Station/ Division.

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(e) I say that in accordance with the provisions of

Section 6 of the Maharashtra Government Servants Regulation of Transfer and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Act, 2005 read with the

Government Resolution, Home Department, hearing No.RPS-3306/P.K.615/Pol-1A dated 30/4/2007, the Commissioner of Police, Pune City is empowered to make internal postings/ transfers of the officers in the cadre of

Assistant Commissioners of Police, Group-A. It is in exercise of the said powers respondent No.2 has issued the aforesaid orders giving posting to the petitioner as ACP, Wanwadi Division, Pune City and to the respondent No.3

as ACP, Special Branch, Pune."

16] It is in that light and after this affidavit that the respondent No.3

chose to place his affidavit and controvert the stand of respondent No.

2. It is his case that respondent No.2 has no power of transfer or to

post the officer of the rank of ACP, Group A Vide G.R.dated 30th April

2007. This Resolution was withdrawn by Government by a notification

dated 29th March 2011. The power to post the officers within the

Commissionerate is only till the rank of police inspector. In the case of

posting of a superior officer, it is mandatory to place the matters before

the police establishment board and particularly in case of an officer of

the rank of ACP. The second respondent never placed these papers of

posting or proposals either of the petitioner or the third respondent

before this board and consequently there is an illegality committed by

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him. The third respondent justified filing of O.A. before the tribunal also

because the second respondent in his opinion interfered with the order

of the Tribunal. In his submission, therefore, the order of tribunal

requires no interference in our writ jurisdiction and the petition be

dismissed.

17] The Petitioner has filed a rejoinder affidavit dealing with all these

statements and submitting that several police inspectors were

promoted to the post of ACP and allotted posting to different

Commissionerates, including Pune. Therefore, it is apparent that the

State only transfers ACP to different commissionerates. Thereafter, the

concerned Commissioner gives specific posting to the said ACPs.

That is how in this case as well, the second respondent issued posting

order and there was nothing illegal or irregular in the same.

18] It is on this material that we have heard the learned AGP and

Mr.Sakhare, learned Senior Counsel opposing the petition.

Mr.Sakhare submits that the first resolution is of the year 2007 and

relying upon it makes it evident that by para 6(d) it is clarified that the

payscale higher than what is prescribed therein and the officer drawing

such pay scale is not therefore under the control of the Commissioner

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of Police. This second resolution has been withdrawn and our

attention has been invited to page 159 of the paperbook by

Mr.Sakhare. He submits that now the power with regard to transfer and

posting of ACP vests in the State Government.

19] Assuming without admitting that the posting orders could have

been made by the police commissioner, yet, in this case, if the posting

is a transfer, then, that ought to have been effected by an authority

competent to do so and in terms of the Maharashtra Government

Servants Regulation of Transfers and Prevention of Delay in Discharge

of Official Duties Act, 2005. In such circumstances, the exercise of

power by anybody other than the Principal is vitiated in law.

Mr.Sakhare heavily relied upon the observations of the tribunal in this

case and particularly in para 9. He, therefore, submits that the petition

be dismissed.

20] With the assistance of all the learned Counsel appearing for

parties, we have perused the petition and the annexures thereto,

including the impugned order. We have perused all affidavits filed on

record. We have equally perused the legal provisions.

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21] That there is a distinction in law between transfer and posting is

apparent. In an order dated 22.11.2013 passed in Writ Petition No.

7554 of 2013 (Pradip Balkrushna Lonandkar v/s State of

Maharashtra) and connected matters, a Division Bench of this Court

emphasised this difference. The elementary and basic distinction has

been noted in the following paras:-

"18 To appreciate the contention that every single

posting or asking a person for taking up a job or seat of duty or assignment attached a particular post, even within the Head Quarter would amount to transfer that we have

carefully perused the Transfer Act, 2005. The Transfer Act, 2005 suggests that it is an Act to provide for regulation of transfers of Government servants and prevention of delay

in discharge of official duties. The settled canon of interpretation of statutes and particularly the definitions of terms therein, would demonstrate that every single definition is required to be construed in the context. If the

context requires otherwise, then, the construction of a definition would depend upon that context. So seen we do

not find any confusion. The term "post" is defined so as to indicate the job or seat of duty to which the Government servant is assigned or posted. The term "transfer" definitely means "posting". Therefore, it is posting of the

Government servant made, may be, from one post, office or department to another post, office or department. However, in individual cases and orders would have to be scrutinised and construed. The concept cannot be generalized as is sought by the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. One cannot say that every order

entrusting duties other than one which are presently performed or other than a job presently held or seat to which the presently Government servant is assigned or posted, would amount to transfer necessarily. Everything would depend upon the facts and circumstances in each case.

No general rule can be laid down. True it is that the

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Division Bench of this Court in one of the orders expressed an opinion that such definition of the word

"Transfer" would present difficulty. In the ultimate analysis, it is for the Court to construe an order in individual case and if it amounts to transfer, then, to apply the provisions

of the Transfer Act, 2005 so as to ensure that its object and purpose is fulfilled. That is plainly to protect the officers against frequent and in discriminate transfers. That is not creating a right to hold on to a particular post or job

or seat. Therefore, even if the Division Bench has rightly expressed some reservations with regard to the definition of the term "transfer" as as appearing in the Transfer Act, 2005 and held that it could be in a given case presenting

some difficulty, we do not find that by expressing such opinion the Division Bench meant that in all cases if the words "entrustment", posting, assignment are used that

would be a transfer. To repeat in each case, the peculiar facts and circumstances would have to be seen. It is not that every order using the term "entrustment" would

necessarily mean a transfer. It is not necessary to clarify the legal concept in this case. In the present case, the order impugned before the MAT and before us cannot be termed as a Transfer at all. The fact that the post held by

the petitioners has Executive (Police Station duty) and nonExecutive duties attached to it is

undisputed. That posting and assignment from one to other is common in the police force. That a police officer must be acquainted with administrative and managerial functions so also active policing is the intent in issuing

routine posting orders. By such orders no prejudice is caused because there is no change of station and Headquarter. That remains within Mumbai. The Pay, status, emoluments and perquisites remain the same. The person concerned suffers no loss. All that happens is that he reports to different superiors at the offices within the

city/ suburban limits. If promoted the promotional duties at a different office within these limits have to be discharged. The Act never intended such routine administrative matters being termed as Transfers."

"19. There are two authoritative pronouncements directly on this point. A Government employee or any

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servant of a public undertaking leave alone a disciplined police force has no choice in the matter of posting. He has

no legal right to insist for being posted at any particular place. The assignment of work and duty is a prerogative of his superiors. The legal connotation and meaning of the

term, transfer, deputation have been interpreted and construed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court repeatedly. In V.Jagannatha Rao and Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., reported in (2001) 10 SCC 401 the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held as under:"

"13. It is to be noted that para 5(1) of the Presidential Order is in terms of para 3(3) thereof.

Para 3(3) postulates that each department in each zone shall be organised into a separate cadre. Para 5(1) speaks of separate unit for purposes of

recruitment, appointment, discharge, seniority, promotion and transfer and such other matters as may be specified by the State Government in

respect of the category of posts and each part of the State for which local cadre has been organised in respect of any category of posts is required to have a separate unit for the aforesaid purposes. Para

5(2) is in the nature of an enabling provision which authorizes the State Government to make

provisions for transfer in certain specified circumstances. The present dispute relates to para 5(2) ©. It speaks of a transfer. Attempt of the appellants is to give enlarged meaning to the

expression to include promotional aspects. It has been contended in that context that though para 5(1) treats promotion and transfer separately, yet that distinction would not be applicable to cases covered by para 5(2). The contention is clearly untenable."

"14. Transfer in relation to service reduced to simple terms means a change of place of employment within an organization, as stated in New Oxford English Dictionary , 1993 Edition, Vol.2, p.3367. It is an incidence of public service and generally does not require the consent of the employee. In most

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service rules, there are express provisions relating to transfer. For example, Fundamental Rule 15

provides:

F.R.15(a) The President may transfer a

Government servant from one post to another;

      provided that except

                 (1) on account of           inefficiency      or




                                        
      misbehaviour, or

                   (2) on his written request, a

Government servant shall not be transferred

substantively to, or, except in a case covered by Rule 49, appointed to officiate in a post carrying less pay than the pay of the permanent post on which he

holds a lien, or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended under Rule 14.

(b) Nothing contained in clause (a) of this Rule or in clause (13) of Rule 9 shall operate to prevent the retransfer of a Government servant to the post on which he

would hold a lien, had it not been suspended in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of Rule

14."

"15. Service rules sometimes define transfer. For example, supplementary Rule 2(18) of the

Fundamental Rules governing Central Government servants defines transfer in the following terms:

"Rule 2(18): Transfer means the movement of a Government servant from one headquarter station in which he is employed to another such station,

either (a) to take up the duties of a new post, or (b) in consequence of change of his headquarter."

Though, definitions may differ and in many cases transfer is conceived in wider terms as a movement to any other place or branch of the organization, transfer essentially is to a similar post in the same

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cadre as observed by this Court in B. Varadha Rao vs. State of Karnataka (AIR 1987 SC 287). It is now

well settled that a government servant is liable to be transferred to a similar post in the same cadre which is a normal feature and incidence of government

service and no government servant can claim to remain in a particular place or in a particular post unless, of course, his appointment itself is to a specified nontransferable post. No transfer is made

to a post higher than what a Government servant is holding. In other words, it is generally a lateral and not vertical movement within the employers organization."

"18. We find that para 5(2) of the Presidential Order speaks of transfer and not of promotion. It would be

hazardous to accept the contention of the appellants that promotion is included in the expression transfer and no assistance can be availed from the

distinction made in para 5(1) of the Order. No provisions or word in a statute has to be read in isolation. In fact, the statute has to be read as a whole. A statute is an edict of the legislature. It

cannot be said that without any purpose the distinction was made in para 5(1) between transfer

and promotion and such distinction was not intended to be operative in para 5(2). The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should

be paid as to what has been said as also to what has not been said. See Mohd. Ali Khan vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, New Delhi (AIR 1997 SC 1165) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. M/s. Price Water House (AIR 1998 SC 74). As a conseuence a construction which requires for

its support addition or substitution of words or which resorts for rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Robert Wigram Crawford vs. Richard Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1) We cannot aid the Legislatures defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make

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deficiencies which are left there. The aforesaid decision was referred to by this Court in

State of Gujarat and Ors. vs. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel & Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act

unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock vs. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 [1] All.ER 948 (HL). Similarly, it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words

of the statute. (See Pinner Vs. Everett (1969 [3] All.ER 257). In other words, there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to

what is necessary for deciding a particular case. Much trouble is made by substituting other phrases assumed to be equivalent, which then are reasoned

from as if they were in the Act. In Union of India vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), it was observed that the Court cannot refrain the

legislature for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. It is incumbent on the Court to avoid the construction if reasonably permissible on the language which would render a part of the

statute devoid of any meaning or application. In the interpretation of statutes, the Courts always

presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have an effect."

"19. We, therefore, find no reasons to accept this stand of the appellant that the expression transfer takes within its scope a promotion."

Again in Prasar Bharati and Others Vs. Amarjeet Singh

and Ors., reported in (2007) 9 SCC 539, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the conceptual difference between transfer and deputation in the following manner:"

"13. There exists a distinction between 'transfer' and 'deputation'. 'Deputation' connotes service outside the cadre or outside the parent department in which

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an employee is serving. 'Transfer', however, is limited to equivalent post in the same cadre and in

the same department. Whereas deputation would be a temporary phenomenon, transfer being antithesis must exhibit the opposite indications."

"14. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that ordinarily no employee can be transferred without his consent from one employer to another. [See

Jawaharlal Nehru University v. Dr. K.S. Jawatkar and Ors. [(1989) Supp. (1) SCC 679]. But, the said principle has no application in the instant case."

"15. A transfer of an employee may be governed by the provisions of a statute or the terms and conditions of a contract of service."

"16. The situation as obtaining in the present case, however, in our opinion, would amount to be a case

of deemed deputation. It is true that no order has been passed by the Central Government on this behalf, but the respondents acted in the manner as if such an order had been passed. The respondents

have been working with the Corporation for a long time without any demur whatsoever. They are

undoubtedly under the control and supervision of the officers of the Corporation. There exists a hierarchy of the officers in the Corporation. There are a large number of departments. Each

department has separate functions. Work of one department, however, would be related to another."

"17. It has not been disputed that the functions of the Central Government has been taken over by the Corporation in terms of Section 12 of the Act, when

the Corporation has started functioning on and from the appointed day. It requires manpower for managing its affairs. It has been doing so with the existing staff. They are being paid their salaries or other remunerations by the Corporation. They are subjected to effective control by its officers. The respondents, for all intent and purposes, are

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therefore, under the control of the Corporation."

"21. The Corporation has not framed its own rules. In absence of any rules, however, an employer, it is wellknown, would have an inherent power to deal

with its employees. In a situation of this nature, we have no doubt that the same would include a power of transfer. It is one thing to say that an employer does not possess of any power to transfer in terms

of the extant rules or conditions of service or the nature thereof; but the same does not mean that the employer must have the power to transfer its employees only in terms of a statute."

"22. The position of an industrial workman, however, would stand on a different footing. The terms and

conditions of industrial employees are governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the certified standing orders framed under the Industrial

Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946."

"23. An establishment like the Corporation, moreover, in absence of the rules may have an

implied power of transfer. Transfer is an ordinary incident of service. It does not result in alteration of

any condition of service to its disadvantage. [See B. Vandana Rao v. State of Karnataka and Anr. (1986) 4 SCC 624], Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa [(1995) Supp. (4) SCC 169]; and Kendriya

Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Damodar Prasad Pandey and Others [(2004) 12 SCC 299]."

"24. In Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and Another [(2003) 4 SCC 104], this Court observed :

"37. Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the courts. This Court consistently has been taking a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been

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made in a vindictive manner."

"25. In Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Others [(2002) 2 SCC 333], this Court opined that in case of policy, the employees may

suffer to certain extent, but such sufferings should be taken to be incidence of service. Therein, the court observed :

"48. Merely because the workmen may have protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, by regarding BALCO as a State, it does not mean that the erstwhile sole shareholder viz. Government

had to give the workers prior notice of hearing before deciding to disinvest. There is no principle of natural justice which requires prior notice and

hearing to persons who are generally affected as a class by an economic policy decision of the Government. If the abolition of a post pursuant to a

policy decision does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution as held in State of Haryana v. Des Raj Sangar on the same parity of reasoning, the policy of disinvestment cannot be

faulted if as a result thereof the employees lose their rights or protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution. In other words, the existence of rights of protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot possibly have the effect of vetoing the Governments right to disinvest."

We feel so much is enough as far as this aspect is concerned. The attention of the Division Bench possibly was not invited to these judgements or else they would not have expressed any view."

22] In the present case, the tribunal treating the grievance of the

respondent No.3 has complaining about a transfer, has proceeded to

allow the original application in terms of reliefs sought vide para 9(a).

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That was to quash an order dated 10th June 2013. The respondent No.

3 alleged that he has been transferred from the post of SDPO Karmala

as ACP Pune in place of Vitthal Pawar. He then states that, Vitthal

Pawar was relieved from Wanawadi Division in pursuance of transfer

order dated 23rd May 2013. The present petitioner has been

transferred and posted from Traffic branch to Wanawadi Division even

though he has not completed three years in traffic branch and not due

for transfer. Thus the projected grievance was that Mr.Vitthal Pawar

was relieved from Wanawadi Division and the present petitioner

original respondent No.3 was transferred and posted from traffic

branch to Wanawadi division vide the same order. At the same time,

the Respondent No.3 does not dispute that he was relieved on 7th June

2013 from Karmala Sub-Division, Solapur but a posting order was

issued by respondent No.2 transferring and posting him to special

branch. Thus, the grievance is of posting at a particular place upon

transfer.

23] We do not see how such a grievance could have been dealt with

and decided by the Tribunal. The Tribunal completely misdirected itself

in law in observing that the affidavit filed by the State did not answer

the specific query as to whether the respondent No.3 original applicant

{23} wp10622-13.doc

in Original application was posted as ACP, Wanawadi. Merely because

transfer order indicates that the respondent No.3 has been transferred

to the post falling vacant after shifting of Mr.Vitthal Pawar does not

mean that the respondent No.3 has a vested right to be posted at

Wanawadi police station. The transfer order must be understood as

transferring the respondent No.3 from the post of SDPO Karmala to

Pune Commissionerate, Pune. Thereafter, it is for the Pune

Commissioner to post him within his jurisdiction at any branch or police

station. The Tribunal could not have interfered with this authority of the

State and the Superior of the present petitioner as also the respondent

No.3. That the transfer order indicates that the respondent No.3 to this

petition is transferred to vacant post of Vitthal Pawar, by no stretch of

imagination can be construed as giving or conferring any right in the

respondent No.3 to be posted at Wanawadi police station. The

observations in para 7 of the impugned orders are pure conjectures

and surmises on the part of the Tribunal. The tribunal completely

misunderstood the controversy before it. The respondent No.3 as also

the petitioner were not aggrieved and were not challenging the transfer

order at all. The applicant - original respondent No.3 before us may

have termed the posting order as transfer but the fact remains that he

had not challenged his transfer from Solapur to Pune. He willingly got

{24} wp10622-13.doc

himself relieved and reported to the transferred place. It is, thereafter,

that he thought there is some injustice done to him by not posting him

at Wanawadi. Such a matter was clearly beyond the purview of the

Tribunal. The tribunal unnecessarily went into the matter raised before

it by placing reliance upon the G.R. dated 25th July 2008. Once the

transfer order was not under challenge, then, it was not necessary to

have referred to any of these matters.

24]

In para 9 of the impugned order, the Tribunal has held as

under:-

"9. The issue which remains to be decided is

whether the action of the respondent No.2 in posting the respondent No.3 as A.C.P. Wanwadi and consequent

posting of the applicant, Special branch is correct. Learned counsel for the respondent No.3 has supported the action of the respondent No.2 on two grounds, viz., (I) the respondent No.2 as the Commissioner of Police has

powers to post A.C.P. level officers within the Commissionerate by virtue of powers delegated to him by G.R. dated 30.4.2007 and (ii) the applicant has accepted his posting as A.C.P., Special Branch without protest and he cannot now challenge the said order dated 10.6.2013. The second ground cited by the learned Counsel for the

respondent No.3 cannot be accepted. If the respondent No.2 ordered the applicant to join as A.C.P. Special Branch, there was no alternative available to the applicant but to comply with the order. Any other action would have made the applicant liable for disciplinary action. The applicant has chosen very properly to challenge the order by filing the present original application. As regards

{25} wp10622-13.doc

powers of the respondent No.2 to post the applicant in any post in the commissionerate, such powers cannot be

untrammeled. In the present case, foremost fact to be considered is that the respondent No.1 has ordered posting of the applicant as A.C.P. Wanwadi on 23.5.2013.

By posting the respondent No.3 on 31.5.2013 as A.C.P. Wanawadi, the respondent No.2 made the order of the State Government infructuous. Though the respondent No. 2 may have power of internal postings of A.C.P. by virtue of

G.R. dated 30.4.2007, which according to the respondent No.2 is still valid, an authority delegating power to a subordinate authority can always exercise the power itself. In the present case, it is seen that in some cases, including

that of the applicant, respondent No.1 has given specific posting and exercised powers of posting of A.C.Ps. itself. The respondent No.2 could not have changed that order

without the permission of the respondent No.1. The order of the respondent No.2, posting the respondent No.3 on 31.5.2013 as A.C.P. Wanawadi is clearly in contravention

of the order dated 23.5.2013 passed by the respondent No.

1. Similarly, the respondent No.2 did not have power to modify posting of the applicant decided by the respondent No.1. The order dated 10.6.2013 qua the applicant cannot

be sustained."

25] The Tribunal in this para is fully aware of the fact that firstly the

matter of posting is the prerogative of respondent No.2. That he has

been so empowered to post any of the officers under him is not

disputed by the Tribunal. However, the tribunal being aware that the

respondent No.3 accepted the posting without protest, still questioned

it, then, held that had the respondent No.3 protested, he would had to

face disciplinary action. Therefore, he is not protesting is of no

consequence. Yet, in the same para the Tribunal observes that the

{26} wp10622-13.doc

power of respondent No.2 to post the respondent No.3 in the

commissionerate cannot be said to be untrammeled. By this, the

Tribunal implies that there is a power to post any subordinate officer

and which vests in the Commissioner.

26] To our mind, the observations in the Tribunal's order that even

the posting orders have to be issued by Police Commissioner with the

permission of the State has no basis in law. The Tribunal is aware that

power of internal posting vests in the superior, in this case, the Police

Commissioner of Pune and he can exercise all such powers as are

conferred in the police commissioner by law. In such circumstances, in

matters of posting, the interference by the tribunal was totally uncalled

for and wholly unwarranted.

27] The Tribunal completely lost sight of the fact that the documents

produced before it would show that the respondent No.3 reported to

the Commissioner, Pune and was firstly appointed as ACP Control

Room. Thereafter, he was brought to the post of ACP Special Branch

from ACP Control Room. In such circumstances, to urge that he had a

vested right to be posted at Wanawadi cannot be accepted. The

present petitioner was also ACP Traffic and was transferred as ACP

{27} wp10622-13.doc

Wanawadi Division. Therefore, such issues are beyond the purview of

the Tribunal dealing with service matters. More so, when the transfer

was as ACP, Pune city and in the post of Vitthal Pawar, is an

arrangement which confers some rights, yet, the respondent No.3 did

not bring in any material to show that he was transferred and/or posted

as ACP Wanawadi. He just relied upon the wording of transfer order

and claimed the right. If that right could be claimed by such persons,

then, the whole concept of transfer and posting would turn upside

down and it would mean that transfer and posting are both matters

within the exclusive domain of the State Government. That they are

not so and posting can be done by the Pune Police Commissioner is

apparent and clarified all through out and even before us.

28] In the above circumstances, we do not find that the Tribunal was

justified in allowing the original application and interfering with matters

of posting of the officers in the Pune Commissionerate. That has

caused grave prejudice not only to the individual officers but results in

total miscarriage of justice. The Government Resolutions do not in any

manner indicate that posting of Government officers within the division

or the commissionerate is a power not vesting with the police

commissioner of city but exclusively in the State Government. In such

{28} wp10622-13.doc

circumstances, by some circuitous reasoning the Tribunal has taken

away that power from the commissionerate and vested it exclusively in

the Government.

29] It is therefore that we hold that the impugned order cannot be

sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. We proceed to

allow the petition and quash the order passed by the Tribunal dated

11th November 2013 in O.A. 492 of 2013. The O.A. stands dismissed.

30] In the light of the above conclusions we are of the opinion that it

is not necessary to decide any wider controversy and particularly as

raised by Mr.Sakhare. It is apparent that the Government Resolution

relied upon by him cannot be read in the manner held by the Tribunal.

Beyond that we do not express any opinion on this issue. Rule is

made absolute accordingly. No costs.

(MRS.REVATI MOHITE DERE,J) (S.C.DHARMADHIKARI, J)

{29} wp10622-13.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIDCTION

WRIT PETITION NO.10622 OF 2013

RESERVED ON : 05th December, 2013.

    PRONOUNCED ON                : 24th December, 2013




                                   
    FOR APPROVAL:     
                     

HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.C.DHARMADHIKARI :

AND

HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE REVATI MOHITE DERE:

1] Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgement?

    2]     To be referred to the Reporters or Not?

    3]     To be circulated to Aurangabad, Nagpur





           and Goa benches?