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Housing Society Bearing ... vs Society Ltd.
2011 Latest Caselaw 240 Bom

Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 240 Bom
Judgement Date : 19 December, 2011

Bombay High Court
Housing Society Bearing ... vs Society Ltd. on 19 December, 2011
Bench: R. M. Borde
                                               1                                  978.11-ao


                IN THE HIGH COURT OF  JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY.
                          APPELLATE JURISDICTION.




                                                                            
                                                    
                      APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.  978  OF  2011


     M/s.Nandanvan Co-operative Housing 
     Society Ltd., a registered Cooperative




                                                   
     Housing Society bearing Registration No. 
     BOM/WKE/HSG/TC/11265/2001-02                            ...      Appellant.

              V/s.




                                        
     Nandanvan Co-operative Housing 
                         
     Society Ltd.,  a registered Cooperative
     Housing Society under Registration No. 
     BOM/WKE/HSG/TC/1'1636/2002-03
                        
     and others.                                             ...      Respondents.
      

     N.V.Walawalkar, Senior Advocate with R.D.Soni i/b.
     Ram & Co. for the appellant.
   



     S.S.Kanetkar i/b. Yogini Bharade for respondent No.1.

     Nitin G. Thakkar, Senior Advocate with Gobindo C. Mohanty 





     i/b. Mohanty & Associate for respondent No.2.

     Ms.K.K.Soran for respondent No.3.

                                        CORAM:      R.M.BORDE,  J.
                                        DATED  :    19th December 2011.


     P.C. :

In this appeal from order, the appellant is taking exception to the order passed by the Judge, City Civil Court, Borivali Division, Dindoshi on 28th July 2011 in L.C.Suit No.733/2009. The trial Court

2 978.11-ao

has directed return of plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court on the ground that the the prayers made in the plaint are

beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court and that the

valuation of the suit is not correctly recorded in the plaint.

2. The respondent/ plaintiff presented suit claiming the

declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a deed of conveyance in respect of plot of land admeasuring 3,250 sq.yards equivalent to 2,717 sq.meters bearing Survey No.27, Hissa No.1 corresponding to C.T.S.No.

287, 287/1 to 35 of village- Vile-Parle (East) together with the building

known as Nandanvan-A consisting of ground plus three upper floors and building known as Nandanvan-B consisting of ground plus sixth

floor and part seventh floor. The substantial reliefs claimed in the suit are to be found in prayer clauses (a) to (d), which read thus:

(a) That it be declared by this Honourable Court that sub-division of C.T.S. No. 287 into C.T.S. No.

287A and 287B being Final Plot Nos. A-1 and A-2 in respect of the plot of land admeasuring 3250 sq. yards equivalent to 2712 sq.mts. bearing Survey No. 27 Hissa No. 1 corresponding to C.T.S.No. 287,

287/1 to 35 of Village Vile Parle (East) and situated near Bhuta High School, Shahaji Raje Marg, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai - 400 057 together with the building- A knows as Nandanvan-A consisting of ground and three

upper floors and Building -B consisting of ground plus six floors and part seventh floor known as Nandanvan -B, is bad-in0law, illegal and inoperative as contrary to the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963;

(b)That it be declared by this Honourable Court hat a Deed of Conveyance dated 3rd March, 2008 executed by the Defendants No. 2 in favour of the

3 978.11-ao

Defendants No. 1 in respect of Sub-Plot No. A-1 bearing C.T.S. No. 287A admeasuring 772.67 sq.

mts. out of the Plot of land admeasuring 3250 sq. yards equivalent to 2717 sq.mts. bearing Survey

No. 27 Hissa No. 1 corresponding to C.T.S.No. 287, 287/1 to 35 of Village Vile Parle (East) and situated near Bhuta High School, Shahaji Raje Marg, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai - 400 057 together with the building- A knows as

Nandanvan-A consisting of ground and three upper floors and Building -B consisting of ground plus six floors and part seventh floor known as Nandanvan -B, is bad-in0law, illegal and

inoperative as contrary to the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963;

(c) that it be declared by this Honourable Court that the Agreement of Development dated 5th

September, 2007 executed by the Defendants No. 1 in favour of the Defendants No. 2 for redevelopment of Sub-Plot No. A-1 bearing C.T.S. No. 287A admeasuring 772.67 sq. mts. out of the

Plot of land admeasuring 3250 sq. yards equivalent to 2717 sq.mts. bearing Survey No. 27

Hissa No. 1 corresponding to C.T.S.No. 287, 287/1 to 35 of Village Vile Parle (East) and situated near Bhuta High School, Shahaji Raje Marg, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai - 400 057 together with the

building- A knows as Nandanvan-A consisting of ground and three upper floors and Building -B consisting of ground plus six floors and part seventh floor known as Nandanvan -B, is bad-

in0law, illegal and inoperative as contrary to the

provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963;

(d) That it be declared by this Honourable Court that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a Deed of Conveyance being executed in their favour by the Defendants No. 2 in respect of land admeasuring 3250 sq. yards equivalent to 2717 sq.mts. bearing Survey No. 27 Hissa No. 1 corresponding to

4 978.11-ao

C.T.S.No. 287, 287/1 to 35 of Village Vile Parle (East) and situated near Bhuta High School,

Shahaji Raje Marg, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai -

400 057 together with the building- A knows as

Nandanvan-A consisting of ground and three upper floors and Building -B consisting of ground plus six floors and part seventh floor known as Nandanvan -B in pursuance of the representations made by the Defendants No. 2 to the members of

the Plaintiffs while executing the Agreements of Sale of Flats in the building of the Plaintiffs and as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 196;"

3.

An objection was raised by the defendants to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the suit is not valued

properly and prayer clauses (a) to (c) are not within the competence of the trial Court. According to the defendants, the deeds in respect of which relief of declaration is sought for are required to be valued in

crores of rupees and the valuation put by the plaintiff in respect of

prayer clauses (a) to (c) is incorrect and the suit is beyond the pecuniary limits of the trial court.

4. Considering the objection raised by the defendants, the trial Court framed two preliminary issues reading as under:

1. Whether the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under section 164 of the Maharashtra Co- operative Societies Act and also under section 91 of the said Act?

2. Whether the subject matter of the suit is under valued and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit?

5 978.11-ao

5. The trial Court has given affirmative finding on issue No.2 holding that the suit is undervalued and the Court has no pecuniary

jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit, as such, plaint was

directed to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court.

6. I have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties.

7. It is vehemently contended by leaned counsel for the

appellant that the reliefs claimed in the suit are required to be valued under the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act,

1959 as those reliefs relate to the obligations to be performed by the defendants under the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA). Pointing out prayer clauses contained in the plaint, more

specifically prayer clauses (a) to (c), it is contended that the reliefs

claimed in pursuance to the obligations cast on the defendants under the MOFA and are required to be valued under section 6(iv)(j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act. Reference is made to the judgment in the

case of of Maria Philomina Pereira v. Rodrigues Construction, 1990 Mh.L.J. 445 = AIR 1991 Bom. 27 and Vrindavan (Borivali) Co- operative Housing Society Limited v. Karmarkar Bros., 1982

Mh.L.J. 607. It is, thus, contended that since the prayers relate to the obligations cast under the provisions of the MOFA the valuation for the jurisdiction as well as valuation of court fees would be governed by the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act and the suit has been properly valued.

6 978.11-ao

8. On perusal of the prayer clauses contained in the plaint, it is evident that the prayer clause (b) relates to the declaration that the

deed of conveyance dated 3rd March 2008 executed by defendant No.2

in favour of defendant No.1 is bad in law, illegal and inoperative, whereas prayer clause (c) relates to the declaration that the agreement of development dated 5th September 2007 executed by defendant No.1

in favour of defendant No.2 is bad in law, illegal and inoperative. The declarations sought, I am afraid, would not be covered by the provisions of the MOFA as the reliefs sought do not relate to the

obligations arising out of the said Act. A reference can be made to the

judgment in the case of Chandrika Chunilal Shah v. Orbit Finances Pvt.Ltd., 2011 (1) Mh.L.J. 898. In the reported matter, initially, the

suit was presented for mandatory order of performance of the statutory obligation under the MOFA and relief was property valued under section 6(iv)(j) of the Court Fees Act. However, the additional prayer

made in the plaint seeking declaration that the agreement executed by

respondent No.1 therein in favour of other respondents in respect of property was invalid and bad in law was held to be not covered by the provisions of the MOFA and the relief was required to be valued in

consonance with the provisions of section 6(iv)(ha) of the Bombay Court Fees Act. The relevant observations are to be found in paragraph-6 of the judgment which read thus:

"6. Sub Clause (ha) of clause (iv) of section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act relates to the computation of the Court fee in a suit for avoidance of a sale or a contract for sale. It says, in suits for a declaration that any sale or a contract for sale or termination of a contract for sale of any movable or immovable property is void; the Court fee would be one half of advoleram fee leviable on

7 978.11-ao

the value of the property. In my view, the prayer (bi) squarely falls under sub clause (ha) of clause

(iv) of section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act inasmuch as the appellant has claimed a relief that

the contract for sale executed by Respondent No.1 in favor of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 on 7th August 2006 was invalid and bad in law (void) and non est. The appellant was therefore required to value the relief claimed under prayer (bi) under section 6(iv)

(ha) of the Bombay Court Fees Act."

It is also observed by this Court in paragraph-9 of the judgment that after amendment, the suit contains not only the prayer for performance

of a statutory obligations under the MOFA but also contains a prayer for cancellation of an agreement of sale executed by respondent No.1 in

favour of respondent No.2 therein prior to filing of the suit and, for such prayer, the suit is required to be valued under section 6(iv)(ha) of the Bombay Court Fees Act. Similar parallel can be drawn in the

instant matter so far as the relief of declaration sought for in respect of

documents stated to have been executed between defendant No.1 and defendant No.2. The said documents are required to be valued under section 6(iv)(ha) of the Bombay Court Fees Act.

9. It is contended by learned counsel appearing for the appellant that even if the prayers are required to be valued under

section 6(iv)(ha) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, there would be no change in the valuation of the plaint as well as court fees for the reason that the documents which are subject matter of prayer clauses (b) and

(c) do not refer to the value of the property. The suit property has not been valued at all in the said documents and that the transaction made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is without any

8 978.11-ao

monetary consideration. It is, thus, contended that since the monetary consideration has not been mentioned in the documents, the valuation

put by the plaintiff in respect of prayer clauses (b) and (c) is correct

and need not be revised. It is also urged that the term `value' appearing in section 6(iv)(ha) is distinguishable from the `market value' appearing in section 6(iv)(j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act. It is

contended that section 6(v) makes reference to the value of the subject matter whereas section 6(iii) makes reference to the market value of the property whereas section 6(iv)(ha) refers to the value of the

property. Since the documents do not disclose monetary valuation of

the property, the suit presented by the plaintiff cannot be stated to have been undervalued. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Asha Sopan

Maithane v. Ramkrushna Punaji Wanare, CDJ 2010 BHC 1747. In paragraphs-11 and 12 of the judgment, it is observed thus:

11. The respondents have tried to show its market value of the suit property on the date of institution

of suit on which court fee ought to have been computed. The trial Court has referred to provisions of Section 6(iv)(ha) of the Act to uphold this contention. The perusal of said provision shows

that when suit is for declaration, any ale or contract for sale of any immovable property is vo8d, one half of ad valorem fee leviable on the value of the property is required tobe paid. The trial Court has accepted that this value of th property has to be its

market value on the date of the institution of the suit.

12. The provisions of section 6 which deal with computation of fees payable in certain suits, the words used are "value of property" and "market value". For the present purposes, it needs to be noticed that Section 6(v) prescribes Court fee in suits for possession of land, house and gardens.

9 978.11-ao

This clause (v) itself shows that such court fee is payable according to the value of the subject matter.

It also stipulates that in case of houses or gardens, its market value is deemed to be value of subject

matter and where subject matter is land, a sum equal to 40 times or 80 times the survey assessment, it deemed to be its value. The Scheme, therefore, is apparent and Legislature has specifically used the word market value whenever it wanted to employ

that work and wanted the plaintiff to pay court fee on such market value. S.6(iii) can also be referred to for this purpose and it prescribes court fee on suits for other moveable properties having market

value. Its reading shows that court fee is to be paid on its market value that too at the date of

presentation of Suit. Hence, the Legislature has given different meaning to word "value" and "market value" and has not used one or the other to

imply same thing. In case of agricultural land, the value is deemed to be at either 40 times or 80 times its survey assessment. Hence, language of Section 6(iv)(ha) assumes importance & it does not use the

word "market value" but it only uses the word value of the property. It is not in dispute that sale deed

dated 25.06.1998 is for Rs.4,60,000/- and accordingly the petitioner - plaintiff valued his suit at Rs.4,60,000/-. He is not party to that sale deed.

10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents invited by attention to the documents in respect of which relief of declaration

is sought by the plaintiff and pointed out that subject matter of the suit is susceptible for monetary evaluation and monetary evaluation has already been made in respect property while executing the documents. The first document is an agreement dated 5th September 2007. The property has been valued, while executing the document, at Rs.3,38,16,000/- and stamp duty of Rs.3,38,160 has been paid. The

10 978.11-ao

document has been valued for the purpose of payment of stamp duty in respect of property transacted under the document dated 5th September

2007. Similar is the case in respect of deed of conveyance dated 3rd

March 2008. The property transacted under the document has been valued at Rs.1,17,01,000/- and stamp duty of Rs.4,46,000/- has been paid while executing the document. Thus, it is contended that the

property in respect of which transaction has been entered into is evaluated and proper stamp duty has been paid while executing the documents. The valuation of the property at Rs.3,38,16,000/- and Rs.

1,17,01,000/- is surely beyond the pecuniary limits of the City Civil

Court. Thus, it is contended that the neither the suit claim has been valued properly nor the proper court fees have been paid. The property

in respect which reliefs are claimed is surely susceptible to the monetary valuation and the valuation of the property as appearing from the transaction appears to be more than one crore and is surely

beyond the pecuniary limits of the City Civil Court. My attention is

invited to the judgment of Satheedevi v. Prasanna, (2010) 5 SCC 622 which is relied upon by learned single Judge dealing with the matter Sau.Asha Sopan Maithane (supra). So also reliance is placed on the

judgment of this Court in the case of Madhorao v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 45. Placing reliance on the said judgments, it is contended that if the Court cannot ascertain whether

the suit can be valued in terms of sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 6(i)(v) of the Bombay Court Fees Act it would be for the trial Court to decide under which provisions the court fees are to be paid and the appellant shall be required to pay that amount of fee which is payable under the appropriate provision. In the instant matter, such contingency may not arise since the suit claim is susceptible to the

11 978.11-ao

monetary evaluation and the same has been evaluated under the documents and that the provisions of section 4(iv)(ha) would be

attracted to the facts of the case.

11. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that if the suit is held maintainable for part of the reliefs, it is not open for

the forum to shut out its doors to the suitor. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ishar Singh v. National Fertilizers, AIR 1991 SC 1546. In paragraph-5 of the judgment, it is

observed thus:

........... Law is equally settled that if for part of the reliefs the suit is maintainable in the forum where it has been laid, it is not open to the forum to

shut out its doors to the suitor............"

In the matter before the Apex Court, the relief in respect of declaration

of correctness of date of birth was sought so also claim in respect of back wages which is required to be dealt with under the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Apex Court observed that so far as relief claimed in respect of payment of back wages is concerned the

same shall have to be presented before the forum prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act whereas so far as prayer in respect of declaration of correctness of date of birth is concerned, the said dispute is triable by the civil Court. In the instant matter, it is not the case of

either of the parties that some of the reliefs claimed in the plaint are triable by any of the forum except civil Court. If, for certain reliefs, higher court is required to be approached, the higher court can surely take into consideration and decide the claim which can be lodged before the lower court. Even if some of the reliefs can be considered by the City Civil Court, for claiming reliefs in respect of declaration as

12 978.11-ao

claimed under the prayer clauses (b) and (c) suit would be beyond the pecuniary limits of the City Civil Court and the claim has to be lodged

before the forum which is competent to deal with those reliefs and such

forum can also deal with other prayers contained in the plaint. Reference can be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Nilima S. Navalkar v. Nipun I. Thakkar, 2010 ALL MR (Supp.) 297;

wherein it has been observed that the valuation of the suit made by the plaintiff is ordinarily liable to be accepted in view of the judgment of the Apex court in the case of Smt.Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha

Krishna Maharaj, AIR 1987 SC 2085. It is, however, held that when

the Court finds on a consideration of the facts and circumstances that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable and the plaint has been

demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and revise the same. Similar observation is made by the Apex Court in the case of Abdul Hamid Shamsi v. Abdul Majid, (1988) 2 SCC 575

wherein it has been observed that when the valuation of relief by the

plaintiff is arbitrary and whimsical, it would be liable to be rejected. In this context, a reference can be made to the provision of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 which reads thus:

8. Court-fee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suits.- Where in suits other than those referred to in paragraphs (v), (vi) and

(x) and clause (d) of paragraph (xi) in section 6 of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959 court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959 the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.

13 978.11-ao

The value as determinable for the computation of court fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same in respect of

suits except those referred to in section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. In

the instant matter, the valuation for the reliefs in respect of prayer clauses (b) and (c) have been grossly undervalued by the plaintiff and the same needs to be corrected and the plaintiffs needs to pay proper

court fees in respect of reliefs claimed by him. In my view, the trial Court has adopted a correct approach in the matter and has rightly directed return of plaint. There is no reason to cause interference in

the order passed by the trial Court. The appeal is devoid of any merits.

12.

In the result, appeal from order stands dismissed. In view

of dismissal of appeal from order, pending civil application does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.

(R.M.BORDE, J.)

 
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