Rutu Enclave vs Standard Chartered Bank Ltd.
2010 Latest Caselaw 95 Bom

    APP/ 67/10                          1                                          SSK/

                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                   ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION




                                                                         
                           APPEAL NO. 67 OF 2010
                                     IN
                        WRIT PETITION NO.975 OF 2009




                                                 
    Vandana Joshi                        )
    D/O. Mr. K. D. Joshi                 )
    R/O. Flat No.102/A-11                )




                                                
    Rutu Enclave,                        )
    G. B. Road, Thane (West).            )                     ....Appellant

    Versus




                                     
    Standard Chartered Bank Ltd.         )
    23-25, Mahatma Gandhi Road,
                         ig              )
    Fort, Mumbai.                        )                   ....Respondent.
                       
    Ms. Vandana Joshi, Appellant in person.
    Mr. J. P. Cama, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Ashok Shetty for respondent.
      


          CORAM                                : SMT. RANJANA DESAI &
   



                                                  RANJIT MORE, JJ.

DATE OF RESERVING THE JUDGMENT : 29TH SEPTEMBER, 2010.

DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 26TH OCTOBER, 2010.

ORAL JUDGMENT : (Per: Justice Ranjit More)

The appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated

17th December, 2009 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ

Petition No.975 of 2009 whereby, the respondent's petition was allowed by

APP/ 67/10 2 SSK/

setting-aside the Industrial Tribunal's award dated 22nd January, 2009.

Consequently, the reference CGIT 2/37 of 2007 came to be dismissed.

2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

The appellant in pursuance of the personal interview conducted by a

Panel of office-bearers of the respondent was offered appointment as

Personal Financial Consultant by letter dated 27th April, 2006. The appellant

accepted the assignment and communicated her acceptance to the

respondent on 28th April, 2006 and accordingly she was appointed vide

letter of appointment dated 2nd May, 2006 on a permanent post on a

guaranteed Pay of Rs.2,80,000/- per annum. The letter of appointment

stipulated that the appellant was being placed in the management cadre of

the respondent at Band 8-B. The addendum to the letter of appointment

contained a declaration that the appellant had read and accepted the terms

and conditions of the appointment. The service of the appellant, however,

was terminated by letter dated 23rd June, 2006 issued under the signature

of Associate Manager, Human Resources on account of improper

behaviour and conduct with the customer, Line Manager and fellow

colleagues.

The appellant, thereafter, filed an appeal before the Executive

APP/ 67/10 3 SSK/

Committee of the respondent. Since, there was no response from the

respondent, the appellant sent legal notice to the respondent on 22nd July,

2006. The respondent gave reply to the said notice on 9th August, 2006

thereby denying the appellant's allegations. The appellant, thereafter,

approached the Ministry of Labour, New Delhi and filed conciliation

proceedings vide representation dated 30th August, 2008. The Ministry

initiated proceedings for conciliation in which the respondent filed its written

statement. The Ministry after considering the appellants representation

and respondent's reply by its order dated 19th April, 2007 refused to make

reference on the ground that the appellant has not completed 240 days of

service and hence, no dispute subsists. The appellant challenged this

order by filing Writ Petition No. 4529 of 2007. The High Court allowed the

writ petition holding that mere non-completion of 240 days of service would

not be a ground for refusal to make a reference. The High Court directed

the Ministry of Labour to refer the matter and accordingly reference has

been forwarded to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute i.e.

"Whether the action of the respondent in terminating the services of the

appellant w.e.f. 24th June, 2006 is legal and justified? If not, what relief the

workman concerned is entitled to?"

The appellant filed a statement of claim at exhibit "3". The appellant

stated that the appointment related to management of Personal Banking

APP/ 67/10 4 SSK/

Customers which forms part and parcel of the business activity of the Bank.

The appellant has further stated that she was answerable to the Branch

Manager and was required to work under the instructions and control of

the Branch Manager. The statement of claim which was originally filed did

not contain averments that the duties of the appellant were clerical in

nature. However, in rejoinder filed before the Industrial Tribunal the

appellant set up the case that the work which was being rendered was

"basically clerical in nature". The appellant stated that being a Personal

Financial Consultant, she had no authority or power to authorize or take

any decision to complete a transaction. The Personal Financial Consultant

and the Regional Head were separated in hierarchy by a Line Manager,

Branch Manager and Cluster Head. The appellant claimed that all the

Personal Financial Consultants reported to the Line Manager and were not

involved in any of the decision making processes or in the discharge of

supervisory functions. The appellants case was that she was doing work

of a clerical nature and not that of managerial or supervisory nature.

A written statement was filed by the respondent at Exhibit "6"

challenging the maintainability of the reference contending that it is illegal,

bad in law, without jurisdiction and liable to be dismissed. The respondent

also raised preliminary objections on the maintainability of the reference on

the ground that the second party is not a workman within the meaning of

APP/ 67/10 5 SSK/

Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was stated that the

appellant was appointed as a Personal Financial Consultant and was

placed in Band 8 of the management cadre. The key responsibilities of the

said portfolio involved that the appellant achieves allocated business

targets and actively cross-sells Consumer Banking products and third party

products, generates new business via sales promotions, out-marketing

calls and presentations and in-branch contacts, participates actively in

branch sales planning to generate action plans for meeting targets, ensures

high level of customer service in the branch, manages difficult customer

situations, ensures compliance with internal and external guidelines and

ensures minimal comments in audits and other inspections, ensures that

transactions are processed with a high level of accuracy and commitment

in order to satisfy customer needs, ensures validity and completeness of

transactions processed and ensures concessions relative to exchange rate,

fees, charges etc. are authorized/overriden by appropriate authorities,

takes responsibility for general reconciliation and control activities, finds

ways to improve operational efficacy and controls costs to meet cost

budgets, gathers/prepares statistics for service quality and productivity

indicators, responsible for general reconciliation and control activities, be

multi-skilled to handle all kinds of transactions and services in the bank and

manage attrition of the base. It is further contended by the respondent that

the said duties are assigned to the appellant and performed by her and

APP/ 67/10 6 SSK/

therefore, did not bring her within the ambit of the defination of workman

under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus, the

appellant is not entitled to raise an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of

the said Act and as such the Tribunal has no right to entertain, hear and

decide the reference.

The appellant adduced evidence of herself. The respondent

examined two witnesses viz. Ms. Pooja Banerjee, Associate

Manager(Human Resources) and Ms. Tripti Shrivastava, Branch Manager.

The Tribunal after appreciating the evidence on the record and after

hearing the concerned parties held that the appellant is a workman. The

Tribunal further held that the appellant proved that in the absence of

completion of 240 days, she is entitled for protection. The Tribunal also

held that the respondent failed to justify its action of termination of services

of the appellant. The Tribunal accordingly allowed the reference and

directed the respondent to reinstate the appellant by giving the benefit of

full back wages and continuity of service from the date of her termination till

she is reinstated.

The respondent challenged the above judgment and award of the

Tribunal by filing Writ Petition No. 975 of 2009 in this Court. The learned

Single Judge who disposed of this writ petition by judgment and order

APP/ 67/10 7 SSK/

dated 17th December, 2009 after hearing the appellant in person and the

respondent, came to the conclusion that the Tribunal has failed to consider

material aspects of the evidence on the record and to apply tests which are

now settled in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court. The learned

Single Judge concluded that appellant is not a workman within the meaning

of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the

Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference which ought to have

been rejected. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed and the award

of the Industrial Tribunal was set-aside. This order is impugned in the

present appeal.

3. The appellant took us through her statement of claim, written

statement of the respondent and evidence of herself as well as that of the

witnesses of the respondent. She submitted that the nature of her duties

was not related either to marketing or sales and that she was not doing any

work of managerial nature. She further submitted that the work which was

being rendered by her was related to customer service. The work involved

data entry which fell within the description of clerical nature within the

meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. She invited

our attention to the admissions of the witnesses of the respondent during

their cross-examination to substantiate her case that she is a workman

within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. She

APP/ 67/10 8 SSK/

also submitted that the duties and key responsibilities of the employees

appointed in Bands 8-A and 8-B, 9-A and 9B are similar and therefore, on

the basis of these duties, she cannot be said to have been working in the

management cadre. She submitted that the burden of proof that she is not

a workman lies on the respondent and the said burden is not satisfactorily

discharged by them. She further submitted that the learned Single Judge

of this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India could not have disturbed the finding of the fact

recorded by the Tribunal after appreciating the evidence on the record. In

order to substantiate the above contentions, the appellant relied upon a

decision of the Supreme Court in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd.

Vs. State of Saurashtra 1957 AIR 264, decision dated 5th January, 2010

in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 6966/2009 in Harjinder Singh

Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corp, decision of the Supreme Court

in Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. R. S. Bhatia (dead) through

L.Rs. AIR 1975 SC 1898, a decision of Supreme Court dated 5th June,

1985 in Civil Appeal No.2638 of 1980 in Arkal Govind Raj Rao Vs. M/s.

Ciba Geigy of India Ltd., Bombay, decision of a Division Bench of this

Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd. Vs. Sunita B. Vatsaraj(Smt.) 2007 2 CLR

650 and decision of the learned Single Judge in Aloysius Nunes Vs.

M/s. Thomas Cook India Ltd., 2000(3) Mh.L.J. 404.

APP/ 67/10 9 SSK/

4. Mr. Cama, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of

respondent contested the appeal. He submitted that the letter of

appointment and the addendum to it set out the conditions of appointment

and the nature of duties of the appellant. He submitted that during the

course of evidence, the appellant admitted the document that reflected the

nature of her duties. He further submitted that the appellant during the

course of her evidence had admitted that her appointment was on the basis

of sales and service and that as a sales person, she had to sell the

products of the bank. Mr. Cama contends that the nature of the duties that

were performed by the appellant will rule out the appellant's assertion that

the work which was rendered by her was of a clerical nature. He states

that it is for the appellant to discharge burden that she falls within the

defination of workman as given in section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947. Mr. Cama contends that the appellant failed to discharge the

said burden and the Tribunal failed to apply its mind in proper perspective

to the evidence on the record. The Tribunal failed to apply tests which are

now settled in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court and therefore,

the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the Tribunal's

award. Mr. Cama also submitted that in order to fall within the defination of

a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the said Act, the

appellant must establish that she was employed to do work which falls

within one of the stipulated categories in the first part of Section 2(s) and it

APP/ 67/10 10 SSK/

is not enough to show that she is not covered by either of the four

exceptions to the defination. He submitted that though the Tribunal

erroneously held that the appellant was not employed in managerial or

supervisory capacity, there is no finding by the Tribunal that the appellant

was working in any of the categories stipulated in the first part of Section

2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He asserted that the appellant is

working in lower managerial category and therefore, she is not a workman

within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In

the above circumstances, he submitted that the learned Single Judge was

justified in interfering with the judgment and award of the Tribunal. In order

to substantiate his contentions, he relied upon a Constitution Bench

judgment in H. R. Adyanthaya Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. 1994 II CLR 552,

decision of the Supreme Court in Management of M/s. Sonepat Co-

operative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Ajit Singh 2005 II CLR 66, decision of

the Supreme Court in Mukesh K. Tripathi Vs. Senior Divisional

Manager, LIC & Ors. 2004 III CLR 534, judgment of the learned Single

Judge of this Court in Dhruba Kumar Changkokoti Vs. Travel

Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. 2000 II CLR 644, judgment of the

learned Single Judge of this Court in Inthru Noronha Vs. Colgate

Palmolive (India) Ltd. & Ors. 2005-III LL.J. 95, judgment of the learned

Single Judge of this Court in M. G. Bhide Vs. Britannia Industries Ltd.

& Ors. 2005 III CLR 307 and judgment passed by a Division Bench of

APP/ 67/10 11 SSK/

this Court in C. Gupta Vs. Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceutical Ltd. 2004-

I LL.J. 952.

5. We have extensively heard the appellant in person and Mr. Cama,

learned senior counsel for the respondent. We have gone through the

award passed by the Tribunal as well as the impugned judgment and order

along with the statement of claim of the appellant and written statement of

the respondent. We have also gone through the evidence on the record

and relevant documents relied upon by respective parties and the

judgments cited at the Bar. The only issue which is required to be

considered in this appeal is whether the appellant was a workman within

the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A

Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in H. R. Adyanthaya Vs.

Sandoz (India) Ltd.'s case (supra) held that in order that a person can

be designated as a workman under Section 2(s) he/she must be employed

to do work which falls within one of the stipulated categories viz. manual,

unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory and it is not

enough that a person is not covered by either of the four exceptions to the

defination. Thus, in order to succeed, the appellant is not only required to

prove that she is not covered by either of the four exceptions to the

defination, but she falls within one of the stipulated categories in the first

part of the defination.

APP/ 67/10 12 SSK/

6. The appellant has relied upon the judgment of the learned Single

Judge in Aloysius Nunes's case (supra) to contend that the burden of

proof that the person was a workman is on the person who disputes

character of the person in industrial reference. The decision of the learned

Single Judge, however, cannot come to the rescue of the appellant in view

of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mukesh K. Tripathi's case

(supra) and Ganga Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Vs. Jaivir Singh

2007 III CLR 840. The Supreme Court in Mukesh K. Tripathi's case

(supra) in Paragraph 37 observed as follows:

37. In case any person raises a contention that his status

has been changed from apprentice to a workman, he must

plead and prove the requisite facts. In absence of any

pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or

by reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has

been brought about, an apprentice cannot be held to be

workman.

The Supreme Court in Ganga Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd.'s

case (supra) held that the conclusion of the High Court that the burden of

proof lies on the employer to establish the nature of appointment is contrary

to law. The ratio of the above decisions of the Supreme Court makes it

APP/ 67/10 13 SSK/

abundantly clear that it is for the appellant to prove that she is a workman

within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with

reference to the dominant nature of her duties.

7. In the background of the settled principles of law stated hereinabove,

now let us consider whether the appellant is a workman within the

meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question

as to whether the appellant is a workman or not must be decided with

reference to the nature of the duties that were performed by her.

ig The

nomenclature in this area of law, as in others, is not decisive. Therefore,

the fact that the appellant's letter of appointment dated 2nd May, 2006

refers to the appointment being made in the management cadre of the

bank is not decisive of whether the appellant was in fact doing duties which

predominantly were those of a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. The letter of appointment and the addendum to it set

out the conditions of appointment and nature of duties of the appellant.

The appellant in her evidence admitted having signed and accepted the

document and that it reflected the nature of her duties. During the course

of evidence before the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant produced

documents at Exhibit "18" viz. the letter of appointment, addendum and a

document showing job description and key responsibilities. Under the

head "Job Role" the duties expected of the appellant included "achieving

APP/ 67/10 14 SSK/

allocated business targets, ensuring high quality customer service,

ensuring external and internal compliance on all branch transactions,

handling difficult customer situations and contributing to the overall

achievement of business growth". The "Key responsibilities" were the

following:

● Achieve allocated business targets and actively cross-sell Consumer

Banking products and third party products.

Generate new business via sales promotions, out-marketing calls

●

and presentations and in-branch contacts.

● Participate actively in branch sales planning to generate action plans

for meeting targets.

● Ensure high level of customer service in the Branch, Manage difficult

customer situations.

● Ensure compliance with internal and external guidelines and ensure

minimal comments in audits and other inspections.

● Ensure transactions are processed with a high level of accuracy and

commitment in order to satisfy customer needs.

● Ensure validity and completeness of transactions processed and

ensure concessions relative to exchange rate, fees, charges etc. are

authorized/overridden by appropriate authorities.

● Take responsibility for general reconciliation and control activities.

● Find ways to improve operational efficiency and control costs to meet

APP/ 67/10 15 SSK/

cost budgets.

● Gather/prepare statistics for service quality and productivity

indicators.

● Active participation in branch sales planning to generate action plans

for meeting targets.

● Responsible for general reconciliation and control activities.

● Be multi-skilled to handle all kinds of transactions and services in

bank.

● Manage attrition of the base.

Perusal of the key responsibilities assigned to the appellant broadly

included area of generating new business, participation in branch sales,

planning to generate action plans for meeting targets and ensuring high

level of customer service. The appellant was required to ensure

compliance with internal and external guidelines, ensure the processing of

transactions with accuracy and to ensure the validity of transactions. The

appellant was further required to improve operational efficiency and

controlling of costs, responsibility for general reconciliation and control

activities and to manage the attrition of the customer base. The appellant

was also required to be multi skilled to handle all kinds of transactions and

services in the bank.

APP/ 67/10 16 SSK/

8. The appellant submitted that the responsibilities which were

assigned to her and which were accepted by her were not necessarily

those which she had performed. This submission is without any merit, in

view of the appellant's admission in Paragraph 15 of the cross-examination

in the following words " It is true that at that time, I was served with

documents produced with Ex-18 page 7 to 15. It is true that page 8 of

Ex-18 shows the nature of my duties. It was signed by me on 4th May,

2006 and was handed over CPU, Chennai. . My appointment was on

the basis of Sales and Service".

ig In Paragraph 16 of the cross-

examination, the appellant also admitted that she had to attend walk-in-

customers, get application forms from them and to attend the work as

mentioned in the examination-in-chief. She also admitted that as a sales

person, she had to sell the products of the Bank like current account,

savings account, term deposit.

9. The appellant heavily relied upon the cross-examination of two

witnesses viz. Ms.Pooja Banerjee-MW-1 and Ms. Tripti Srivastava - MW-2

who deposed on behalf of the respondent-Bank. During the cross

examination, they admitted that the appellant did not have power to

sanction leave, she was not supervising anyone's work, nobody was

reporting to the appellant and she was not having power to initiate any

disciplinary proceedings against any of the employees. They even

APP/ 67/10 17 SSK/

admitted that the appellant was participating in the meetings where policy

decisions were taken. The Tribunal during the course of its award placed

a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the appellant could not

recommend leave nor could she initiate disciplinary action against other

employees. In our opinion, the fact that an employee is not vested with the

power to sanction leave or to initiate disciplinary proceedings is not

conclusive of the question as to whether the work that is performed by the

employee is of managerial or supervisory category. Whether leave can be

sanctioned and whether disciplinary proceedings can be initiated is one of

the circumstances which may be considered in the balance. The balance,

however, has to be drawn on the basis of the overall nature of the duties

and responsibilities performed and the dominant nature of the work that is

performed by an employee. In this regard, the assertion of the respondent

that the appellant was working in Managerial Category No.III is also

important. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Inthru Noronha's

case (supra) in Paragraph No.25 has taken note of swift evolution of

technology which led to a change in business environment in the following

words:

"25. In deciding a case such as the present, the Court must

be careful not to place its construction of legal categories into a

strait-jacket. Business in recent years has been marked by

APP/ 67/10 18 SSK/

rapid organisational changes. The swift evolution of technology

has led to a quantum change in the business environment.

         Modern    managements       have     to   alter   the     structure      of




                                                     
         organisation in order to meet the exigencies              of the time.

Every employee in the managerial cadre may not necessarily

have the power to appoint or dismiss personnel nor indeed

would an employee engaged mainly in a managerial or

administrative capacity always have the power to sanction

leave applications. Similarly, the rest of the existence of control

over subordinates may be applicable in certain factual

situations, but not necessarily in every conceivable case. In

others, control over subordinates may not necessarily be by all

personnel in the managerial cadre. The number and strength

of the subordinate staff depends upon the nature of the

business that is being conducted. It would, for instance, be

wholly inappropriate to apply the same test which would govern

the organisation of a traditional form of manufacturing

business to a business founded on software, bio-genetics or a

business at the cutting edge of technology. The interpretation

of Section 2(s) must be such as would not lead to stultifying

innovation, development and change in managerial practice.

Business managers should have a high degree of latitude to

APP/ 67/10 19 SSK/

promote efficiency in a competitive business environment.

Courts are ofcourse vigilant to deal with subterfuge. The

important thing for the Court is to evaluate the position of an

employee with reference to the nature of his duties in the

context of the business where those duties are performed.

While traditional tests are undoubtedly of relevance, the

weightage which is to be ascribed to each factor must

necessarily vary having regard to the nature of business.

Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not

possible to accede to the submission that the work which was

being done by the petitioner was essentially of a clerical or

operational nature. The nature of his work would show that the

functions of the petitioner, going by what he himself described

as his functions in his performance appraisal form, was

anything but clerical. In the circumstances, the finding which

was arrived at by the Industrial Court to the effect that the

petitioner was not a workman does not warrant interference

under Article 226."

We are in agreement with the above observations. The power to

sanction leave or initiate disciplinary proceedings is not decisive factor in

arriving at a conclusion whether the employee is a workman under

APP/ 67/10 20 SSK/

Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or not. Looking into the

dominant nature of the duties and responsibilities performed by the

appellant, we are of the opinion that the appellant was appointed in the

Bank's lower management cadre.

10. The Tribunal on the basis of admission of respondent's witnesses

that the appellant had no authority to sanction leave or initiate disciplinary

proceedings held that she is not covered by either of the four exceptions to

the defination under section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and

thereafter, proceeded to conclude that the appellant is a workman. In our

considered view, the approach is totally erroneous. In terms of the

judgment of a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in H. R.

Adyanthaya's case (supra) , it is not enough that the person is not

covered by either of the four exceptions to the defination under Section 2(s)

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but in addition to this, it is required to

show that the employee falls within one of the stipulated categories viz.

manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory.

There is no finding by the Tribunal, whether the appellant falls within one of

these categories. In fact there is no averment in the statement of claim of

the appellant that her duties were of clerical nature. However, she

improved her case in the rejoinder in which she set up a case that the work

which she was rendering was basically clerical in nature. The Supreme

APP/ 67/10 21 SSK/

Court in Management of M/s. Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd.'s

case (supra) laid down test to determine the job of a clerk. The Supreme

Court in this case held that the job of a clerk ordinarily implies stereotype

work without power of control or dignity or initiative or creativeness. The

Supreme Court further held that the question as to whether the employee

has been performing a clerical work or not is required to be determined

upon arriving at a finding as regards the dominant nature thereof. The

duties assigned to the appellant in the present case show that she was

intrinsically associated with the provision of a high level of customer

service to the customers of the bank. The dominant nature of work and the

duties for which the appellant was engaged, in our opinion, cannot be

regarded as stereotype work without an element of initiative or

creativeness. Mr. Cama, learned senior counsel in this regard, rightly kept

reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mukesh K. Tripathi's

case (supra) to contend that in the absence of appellant's pleading in her

statement of claim regarding her nature of work being clerical, she could

not be allowed to contend that she was discharging duties clerical in nature

on the basis of rejoinder subsequently filed before the Tribunal. Even

assuming that the appellant has pleaded about nature of clerical duties, we

find that she could not prove the same in the light of the Supreme Court

judgment in Management of M/s. Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills

Ltd.'s case (supra).

APP/ 67/10 22 SSK/

11. The appellant heavily relied upon the judgments of the Supreme

Court in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. Vs. State of Saurashtra'

case and Harjinder Singh's case (supra), to contend that the learned

Single Judge was not justified in disturbing the finding of facts recorded by

the Tribunal after appreciating the evidence on the record in exercise of

jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. We find that the

submission is without any merit. The Supreme Court in Dharangadhara

Chemical Works Ltd. Vs. State of Saurashtra' case held that the

question whether the relation between the parties was one as between an

employer and employee or master and servant was a pure question of fact

and where the Industrial Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide that question

came to a finding, such finding of fact was not open to question in a

proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution unless it could be shown to be

wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Similar view is reiterated by the

Supreme Court in latter judgment in Harjinder Singh's case (supra). The

facts of the present case, however, are distinguishable. In the present

case, the Tribunal has failed to consider the material aspects of the

evidence on the record and to apply tests which are now settled in view of

the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in H. R.

Adyanthaya's case (supra). In order to fall within the defination of

workman under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was not

only necessary to show that the appellant is covered in any of the

APP/ 67/10 23 SSK/

exceptions under section 2(s) but it was obligatory on her to prove that she

falls in one of the categories mentioned in the first part of Section 2(s) of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal not only erroneously

recorded the finding that the appellant is not covered under the exceptions

of Section 2(s) but failed to give any categorical finding on the issue

whether the appellant falls in any one of the categories mentioned in the

first part of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal

thus, in our view, committed an error apparent on the face of the record

and the learned Single Judge was justified in reversing the finding of the

Tribunal.

12. Now, let us consider the judgments cited by the appellant but not

referred hereinabove. The reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court

in Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd.'s case is misplaced. The Supreme

Court in the above case was considering the question as to whether the

First Respondent was a workman was concluded by the principle of res-

judicata since it had been decided in an earlier proceeding between the

same parties. The evidence on the record showed that the employee in his

capacity as an accountant used to sign the salary bills of the staff, including

himself, even while performing the duties of a clerk. The Supreme Court

held that this did not render the employee being one employed mainly in a

managerial or administrative capacity.

APP/ 67/10 24 SSK/

In Arkal Govind Raj Rao's case (supra), the Supreme Court held

that the reconciliation of bank statement is one of the most mechanical

types of clerical work. However, in the present case on the basis of the

dominant nature of the duties of the appellant, we have already concluded

that the appellant was employed in the lower managerial cadre. This

judgment has, therefore, no application to the facts and circumstances of

the present case.

A Division Bench of this Court in Karnataka Bank's case (supra)

held that mere designation or nomenclature on the post is not determinative

of the duties performed by employee. It was further held that the view

taken by the Tribunal on the basis of evidence before it cannot be set-aside

by the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226, 227 of the

Constitution of India. There is no dispute about the first proposition as we

have proceeded on the basis of nature of duties that were performed by the

appellant and not on the designation or nomenclature of her post.

Regarding second proposition, we have already held that the Tribunal's

award was contrary to the tests laid down by the Constitution Bench of the

Supreme Court and therefore, the learned Single Judge was right in

interfering with the same.

APP/ 67/10 25 SSK/

13. Before parting the judgment, a reference must be made to the

authorities cited by Mr. Cama, learned senior counsel, which are not

referred earlier.

In C. Gupta's case (supra), the appellant was engaged to provide

advice and guidance in industrial matters of the company. A Division Bench

of this Court after taking into account the duties and functions performed by

the appellant held that he was clearly a part of the managerial process of

the company insofar as his work was used as tool and aid by the

management for a proper conduct of the business of the company.

In Dhruba Kumar Changkokoti's case, a learned Single Judge of

this Court after considering the duties performed by the petitioner and the

fact that he was discharging a part of the function on behalf of his

employees namely looking after the business and promoting the same in

Eastern Europe held that the petitioner is not a workman. The Single

Judge further held that though the petitioner had no power to hire or fire

and/or control over the employees, he was discharging the function namely

looking after the business and promoting the same in Eastern Europe and

therefore, he was not held to be a workman.

APP/ 67/10 26 SSK/

Another Single Judge of this Court in M. G. Bhide's case (supra)

held that the petitioner who claims to be employee of Respondent No.1 as

Saleman is not included in any of the categories like manual, clerical,

technical and supervisory and therefore, out of the perview of 'employee'

under Section 3(5) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and

Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 and therefore, was not

eligible to move complaint under Section 28 of the Act.

In our view all the above judgments support the respondent's

contention that the appellant is not covered by the defination of a workman

within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

14. Taking overall circumstances into consideration, we find that the

learned Single Judge has approached the matter from correct point of view.

After re-appreciating the evidence on the record, we do not find any error

in the impugned judgment and order, warranting our interference with it.

The appeal accordingly fails and same is dismissed as such.

    (RANJIT MORE, J.)                            (SMT. RANJANA DESAI, J.)