M/S. Venkatesh Trading Company vs The State Of Maharashtra
2010 Latest Caselaw 131 Bom

                                      1

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                  NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.




                                                                                
     




                                                        
                       Writ Petition No.4039/2010


         M/s. Venkatesh Trading Company, 




                                                       
         through its Partner Shri Kamalkishor 
         Harakchand Lahoti, 
         Aged about 50 Yrs.,
         R/o Ram Mandir Lane, 




                                          
         Main Road, Bhandara.                                         ..Petitioner

                .. V/s..
                           
         1.      The State of Maharashtra, 
                          
                 through Secretary, 
                 Food, Civil Supplies & Consumer Protection 
                 Department, Mumbai. 
          


         2.      The Hon'ble Minister, 
       



                 Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer
                 Protection Department, 
                 Mantralaya, Mumbai - 32. 





         3.      The Additional Collector, 
                 Collectorate, Nagpur. 

         4.      The District Supply Officer, 
                 Collectorate, Nagpur. 





         5.      M/s. Maharashtra Trading Company, 
                 Grain General Merchant & Commission Agent, 
                 Sancheti Layout, Main Road, Katol,
                 Dist. Nagpur. 




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     6.      M/s. Prabhu Transport Company, 




                                                                                 
             Khan Talab, Khat Road, 
             Bhandara - 441 904.                              ..Respondents




                                                         
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Shri M.G. Bhangde, Sr. Adv. with Shri V.V. Bhangde, Adv. for petitioner.
     Smt. B.H. Dangre, Addl. G.P. for respondent nos.1 to 4. 




                                                        
     Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, Sr. Adv. with Shri M.P. Khajanchi, Adv. for 
     Caveator/respondent no.5.
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------




                                          
            CORAM :- S.A. BOBDE & MRS. MRIDULA BHATKAR, JJ.
                        
              Date of Reserving judgment  :  14 th
                                                   September 2010.
                                                th
                                                                  

              Date of Pronouncing Judgment : 29
                                                   October 2010.
                                                                
                       
      JUDGMENT (S.A. Bobde, J.)

1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Heard by consent

of the parties.

2. By this petition, the petitioner has prayed for

setting aside the order dated 16/8/2010 passed by the

Minster, Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Protection

Department, Mantralaya - Mumbai thereby setting aside

the award of the contract to the petitioner by the

respondent no.3 - Additional Collector, Nagpur directing

that the price bids of respondent nos.5 and 6 be opened

consequent to the letter dated 17/8/2010 issued by the

respondent no.3 directing that the price bid envelopes of

the respondent nos.5 and 6 will be opened on 21/8/2010

at 12'0 clock sharp.

3.

The facts, in brief, are as follows -

The respondent no.3 - Additional Collector,

Nagpur floated a tender for transportation of sugar from

sugar factories to the Government godowns or to persons

known as nominees. The contract was to be for a period

of three years from 1/6/2010 to 31/5/2013. On 30th of

June 2010, the petitioner alone was adjudged to have

qualified for the technical bid. The other three tenderers

were found to have been disqualified. The Additional

Collector, therefore, exercised the powers conferred on

him by the Government Resolution dated 2nd of June 2010

and issued a notification dated 1st of July 2010 stating that

in order to extend the time by a period of 15 days a

re-tender is ordered i.e. tenders are invited again. This

was done in purported exercise of a clause 2.2.E in the

Government Resolution dated 2/6/2010 which reads as

follows -

" E) After opening the "technical" envelope of

bid, if less than 3 valid bids are received, then instead of opening envelope of "transport rate",

due to poor response, (instead of re-tendering) first 15 days extension of time be given to tenders. If 3 valid bids are not received even after that, then

again for second time, 15 days extension of time be

given and even thereafter if less than 3 valid bids are received, the officer opening the bids i.e.

Additional Collector should open the "Transport rate" envelope before his superior officer (Collector) and obtain signature of the senior

officer on the same."

In pursuance thereof, five more tenders were

received, out of these two were disqualified as not

complied with the technical formalities. Thus there were

four tenders in fray i.e. the petitioner's and the three

tenders which were received latter. On evaluation of these

four tenders, the contract was awarded to the petitioner.

4. The unsuccessful tenderers i.e. respondent nos.5

and 6 made a representation to the respondent

no.2 - Minster and the minster thereupon passed an order,

which does not refer to any specific power said to have

been vested in him by any law or Government Resolution

to hear an appeal, revision or a representation and held

that the Additional Collector should not have invalidated

the technical bid of three persons as ineligible and should

not have issued re-tender but should have extended the

time as required by the Government Resolution. In the

result, the Minister invalidated the entire tender process

and the award of tender to the petitioner which was

un-disputedly made after an evaluation of all the bids.

The Minister by the said order has observed that it appears

that the respondents nos.5 and 6 had attached all the

documents necessary for the technical envelope and

therefore, should not have been adjudged to be ineligible

tenderers. In pursuance of the order of the Minister, the

Additional Collector in compliance with the order of the

Minister opened the price bid of the respondent nos.5 and

6 and upon a comparison of the bids found respondent

no.5's bid to be legible and granted the contract to the

respondent no.5. The Additional Collector, Nagpur

simultaneously cancelled the contract awarded to the

petitioner and allotted the same to respondent no.5.

These orders are challenged before this Court.

5. Shri Bhangde, the learned counsel for the

petitioner, submitted that the respondent no.3 having

entered into a valid and binding contract with the

petitioner in pursuance of a valid tender after evaluating

the bids of other tenderers, it was not open for the Minster

to pass any order interfering with the award of contract.

According to him the Minister had no power to interfere in

the matter since there is no law invested in the form of

revisional or appellate powers on him to do so. The order

of the Additional Collector cancelling the contract awarded

to the petitioner and granting it to the respondent no.5 is

illegal.

6. Shri Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for

respondent no.5, submitted that the Minister is invested

with the powers of the State Government which has

delegated its powers of entering into a contract to the

Additional Collector and was therefore, entitled as the

Delegator to interfere with the act of the delegatee if the

act has been done contrary to the procedure prescribed by

the Government Resolution which conferred powers upon

him to issue a tender and award the contract in question.

It is the submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that a delegator has power not only to revoke

the grant made by the delegatee but also to act

concurrently on the matter within the area of delegated

authority except in so far as it may had already become

bound by an act of its delegation. According to the

learned counsel there was no question of the Government

having became bound by an act of his delegatee, namely

the Additional Collector, since the Additional Collector has

acted illegally in disqualifying the tenderers in the first

round and wrongly excluded the respondent nos.5 and 6

in the second round. In support of his submissions he

relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Ishwar Singh V/s. State of Maharashtra and

others 1.

7. Smt. Dangre, learned Addl. G.P. for respondent

1. (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 334.

nos.1 to 4 - including the Minister and the Additional

Collector Nagpur, submitted that in addition to the reason

given by the learned counsel for respondent no.5, the

Minister was entitled to interfere in the award of contract

and set aside the contract awarded by the Additional

Collector because the Additional Collector in stead of

extending the time by 15 days, as required by the

Government Resolution, has re-tendered the whole

contract and thereby committed an illegality. According

to the learned counsel the State being the Delegator of the

power to the Additional Collector, the delegatee - Minister

had the power to interfere and set aside the contract

awarded by the Additional Collector because the

Additional Collector exercised the power to award the

contract contrary to the terms of the delegation by

re-tendering the contract even though he could have only

extended the time by 15 days since less than three valid

bids were received (instead of re-tender).

8. Before we consider the questions of law, it is

necessary to deal with the factual and procedural aspects

involved. Firstly, what needs to be decided is whether in

fact the Additional Collector 'extended the time' or 're-

tendered' the contract. The order dated 9th June 2010 bear

the title "re-tender". However, the notice makes a clear

recital that since three valid tenders have not been

received in pursuance of the earlier notice inviting the

tenders dated 10th of June 2010, the time is being

extended by a period of 15 days and tenders are being

invited again. It appears that the Additional Collector has

used the words "re-tender" while really intending to

extend the time. As a matter of fact what happened is as

follows -

The petitioner who had already submitted his

technical and price bid did not furnish a fresh tender. He

submitted his price bid and his technical bid had already

been opened. He did not furnish a fresh tender. In the

extended period five more tenders were received. Out of

these tenders, the tenders of respondent nos.5 and 6 were

disqualified. Admittedly, the Additional Collector asked all

the parties if they had any objection if the petitioner's bid,

submitted earlier (in which the technical bid had already

been opened), is evaluated along with the new bids

received from the other parties. It is not in dispute that

none of the parties objected to this procedure. It

therefore, appears that for all purposes and intent the

Additional Collector had merely extended the time in

which fresh tenders could be invited and did not re-tender

the whole contract. It would have been possible to infer a

're-tender' if the petitioner's bid made earlier had been

returned and he was also asked to submit an entirely fresh

tender.

9. Thus the question that arises here for

determination is whether the State Government or the

Minister as the delegator has the power to interfere with

and set aside a contract awarded by its delegatee in

exercise of the powers conferred on the delegatee under

the Government Resolution dated 2nd of June 2010 ?

10. Shri Bhangde, learned counsel for petitioner,

submitted that the Minister, invested with the powers of

the State Government had no authority in law to interfere

with and set aside a contract awarded by the Additional

Collector in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the

Government Resolution dated 2nd of June 2010. No

power was conferred on the Minister by any law

authorizing him to hear an appeal or a revision from the

order of the Additional Collector and there was no

inherent power vested in the Minister to 'undo' and 'set

aside' the act of the Additional Collector. It was further

contended on behalf of the petitioner that it is well settled

that the acts of a delegation in exercise of power conferred

administratively on an Officer cannot be interfered with by

the State Government unless a power to do so is

specifically conferred on or retained by the State

Government or the Minister by law.

11. The learned counsel for respondent no.5

submitted that though there was no law which conferred

appellate or revisional powers on the Minister, the Minister

being invested with the powers of the State Government

had full authority to entertain a representation against the

grant of a contract contrary to the Government Resolution

under which the Additional Collector was empowered to

award the contract and was entitled to set aside the

contract, if it was found that the contract had been

awarded contrary to the terms of the Government

Resolution empowering the Additional Collector to grant

such contract and set it aside. In short, the contention is

that if the delegatee acts wrongly, the delegator can set

aside his acts. According to the learned counsel in the

present case the Minister found it as a fact that the

respondent nos.5 and 6 were wrongly found to be

ineligible though they had attached all the documents and

affidavits in the technical bid and that it is not proper not

to consider their tenders due to technical reasons.

12.

Smt. Dangre, learned Addl. G.P. for respondents

including the Minister and the Additional Collector,

submitted that the Minister as the delegator was entitled

to interfere with the contract awarded by the Additional

Collector because the Additional Collector had not adhered

to the terms of the grant of power and had wrongly

re-tendered the contract because three valid bids had not

been received in the first instance when he was only

required to extend the time by fifteen days of receiving

additional bids. According to the learned Addl. G.P. a

delegatee can only act according to the terms of the

delegation and if he fails to act as such, the delegator has

inherent power to cancel the act of the delegatee.

13. The term 'delegate' does not imply a parting

with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but

points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things

which otherwise that person would have to himself vide

Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.26 in Huth V/s. Clarke2. In

Ishwar Singh V/s. State of Rajasthan1 the Supreme Court

has observed as follows -

"8. It is an accepted position in law that to

"delegate" to another is not to denude yourself.

As was observed by Wills, J. in Huth v. Clarke 2 :

"In my opinion the word, in its general

sense and as generally used, does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring of authority upon someone else."

As observed by Lord Coleridge, C.J. In 25 QBD 304, the

word "delegation" implies that powers are committed to

2.(1890) 25 QBD 391 : 63 LT 348, 1.(2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 334

another persons or body which are as a rule, always

subject to resumption by the authority delegating it. (Per

Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976 Reprint Edn. At p.316.)

Delegation also implies also the power to withdraw

delegation. As indicated in Wharton's Law Lexicon,

delegation is a sending away; a putting into commission;

the assignment of a debt to another; the entrusting

another with a general power to act for the good of those

who depute him. The word "delegate" means little more

than an agent. An agent exercises no power of his own but

only the powers of his principal. The observation in Huth

Case 2 was referred to in Roop Chand case1. In general, a

delegation of power does not imply parting with authority.

The delegating body will retain not only power to revoke

the grant, but also power to act concurrently on matters

within the area of delegated authority except insofar as it

may already have become bound by an act of its delegate.

2. (1890) 25 QBD 391 : 63 LT 348,

1. 1963 Supp (1) SCR 539 :AIR 1963 SC 1503.

(see Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council 3."

It flows from the above namely that the

delegatee exercises powers conferred on him to do things

which the delegator otherwise would have to do himself

and that the act of the delegatee must be taken to be an

act of the delegator. It has been held in a series of

decisions by the Supreme Court that if an authority

delegates the power to act, the act shall be deemed to be

an act of the delegator and that there was no scope for

revision of the order of the delegatee by the delegator.

Vide State of Orissa V/s. Commr. of Land Records &

Settlement4 and OCL India Ltd. V/s. State of Orissa 5 where

it is held that the delegator cannot review an order of the

delegatee. This position has been accepted and reiterated

by the Supreme Court in Ishwar Singh V/s. State of

Rajasthan1. It must follow therefore, that when a delegatee

takes an action in pursuance of the authority - delegation

3. 1958 LGR 165. 4. (1998) 7 SCC 162, 5. (2003) 2 SCC 101,

1. (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 334

of power in that behalf, his action must be deemed in law

to be the action of the delegator and cannot be interfered

with by the delegator either by way of revision or review.

In the present case the act of awarding the contract by the

Additional Collector was one such act by a delegatee.

14. Shri Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for

respondent nos.5 and 6, relied on the following

observations of the Supreme Court in Ishwar Singh's case

for justifying the act of the Minister -

"....The delegating body will retain not only power

to revoke the grant, but also power to act

concurrently on matters within the area of delegated authority except insofar as it may

already have become bound by an act of its delegate. (see Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council 3 ."

It is not possible to see how the observation

relied affects or supports the case of the respondent no.5.

3.1958 LGR 165

The observation relied on sets the limit of the power of the

delegator to revoke the grant and even act concurrently on

matters within the area delegated authority. The

delegator may undoubtedly do so except in so far as it may

already have became bound by the act of its delegatee.

Applying the limit to the present case it must be held that

even if the Minister had the power as the Delegator to

interfere with the act of the Additional Collector who is the

delegatee, the Minister could not have have done so after

the delegatee had awarded the contract to the petitioner

i.e. after the evaluation of all the tenders that were

received. When contract was awarded to the petitioner

the delegator became bound by the act of its delegatee.

Thereafter the contract could have only been invalidated

by a competent court of law.

15. Shri Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for

respondent no.5, also submitted that the fraud vitiates

everything in law and that a delegator cannot be

considered to be bound by any act of fraud of its

delegatee. This argument need not be considered any

further in the present case since the Minister has not set

aside the contract awarded by the Additional Collector on

the ground of fraud at all. The learned counsel for the

respondent no.5 also relied on the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Avinder Singh and others V/s. State of

Punjab and other1 and Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of

Defence and others V/s. S. Daniel and others2. Avinder

Singh's case considered the question whether a notification

issued by the State Government imposing a tax under the

Punjab Municipal Corporation Act was valid after the State

Government had directed the various Municipal Bodies in

the State to impose the same tax. After considering the

power of the delegator to exercise the power even after it

was conferred on the delegatee the court upheld the right

1. (1979) 1 Supreme Court Cases 137.

2. 1990 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 374

of the delegator to exercise such power subject of course

to certain limits. The Supreme Court upheld the power of

the State Government to impose the tax even though the

Government could exercise its power under section 90

sub-section 5 without any procedure i.e. of inviting

objections from the residence which the Municipal

Corporation was bound to do if it were to impose the tax

in the exercise of its delegated power. The circumstances

of that case are different from the circumstances of the

present case and it does not uphold the exercise of the

power by the delegator in the present case even after the

delegatee has entered into a binding contract with the

third party i.e. petitioner because of the broad

observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 11

while justifying the practice of delegated Legislation as

follows -

"Thus, we reach the second constitutional rule that the essentials of legislative functions shall not be delegated but the inessentials, however numerous

and significant they be, may well be made over to

appropriate agencies. Of course, every delegate is subject to the authority and control of the principal

and exercise of delegated power can always be directed, corrected or cancelled by the principal.

Therefore, the third principle emerges that even if there be delegation, parliamentary control over delegated legislation should be a living continuity as

a constitutional necessity. Within these tripe

principles, Operation Delegation is at once expedient, exigent and even essential if the legislative process is

not to get stuck up or bogged down or come to a grinding halt with a few complicated bills."

16. The learned Addl. G.P. for respondent nos.1 to 4

and Shri Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for respondent

no.5, can derive no support from the case of Scientific

Adviser to the Ministry of Defence and others V/s. S.

Daniel and others 2 where the Supreme Court observed in

the context of that case as follows -

2. 1990 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 374.

" The rule in Roop Chand 10 as to the nature

and character of the power exercised by a delegate was enunciated in a particular context. It cannot

be treated as a general principle applicable to all situations."

The learned counsel for the respondent no.5 also

relied on the observations of the Supreme Court where the

Supreme Court observed as follows -

"This leads us to the question whether the appointing authority specified in the schedule

can exercise his powers of appointment to a post, cadre or service even after he has

delegated that power to a subordinate authority under the proviso. An answer to this question in

the affirmative is contended for on the strength of certain authorities which may now be

considered. In Godawari S. Parulekar v. State of Maharashtra 13 the appellant had been detained by an order passed by the State Government under

Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules. It was contended on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, that the State Government had earlier issued a

10. 1963 Supp 1 SCR 539 : AIR 1963 SC 1503.,

13. (1966) 3 SCR 314 : AIR 1966 SC 1404 : 1966 Cri. LJ 1067

notification delegating its powers under Rule 30

to the District Magistrate and was so not competent to make the order of detention in

question. Reliance was placed for this argument on the observations of the Judicial Committee in

King Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji14. These observations were distinguished and the above contention was repelled. It was held that by

issuing the notification in question, the State

Government had not denuded itself of the power to act under Rule 30 (vide Willis J. in Huth v.

Clarke15). Learned counsel also referred to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in D.V. Rama Chandra Rao v. State of Karnataka16. This

case does hod that a power which is delegated can

be exercised both by the delegator and the delegatee, though the Supreme Court decisions

cited therein as deciding this issue do not seem to help. Halsbury (4th edn., para 32), citing Huth v. Clarke15 summarises the English Law on the

subject thus :

"In general, a delegation of power does not imply parting with authority. The delegating

14. 72 IA 241 : AIR 1945 PC 156, 15. (1890) 25 QBD 391 : 63 LT 348,

16. (1984) 3 SLR 768 (Kant HC)

body will retain not only the power to revoke the

grant but also power to act concurrently on matters within the area of delegated authority

except insofar as it may already have become bound by an act of its delegate".

17. There is no doubt that the power which is

delegated can be exercised by the delegator hence it is

equally true that such a power can be exercised only

before the delegator becomes bound by an act of its

delegatee. It would indeed be contrary to both, public

policy and sound administration if the delegator by use of

the concurrent power, transferred to the delegatee was

allowed to set at naught the act of the delegatee with a

third party entered into with all solemnity by the third

party. The situation would be entirely different where the

law provided an appeal or a revision against the act of the

delegatee. It is not possible to accept that the delegator

has an unguided, un-canalized and arbitrary power vested

in him and retained by him to set aside the act of its

delegatee such as solemnly entering into a contract, merely

because the delegator notices some illegalities or

irregularities. We do not intend to say that the

irregularities and illegalities may be committed but we do

intend to say that these may gone into only by a competent

court of law when rights and obligations of a third party

have come into existence. In this view of the matter, the

impugned order dated 16/8/2010 of respondent no.2 and

letter dated 17/8/2010 issued by respondent no.3 are

liable to be set aside and are accordingly set aside. The

contract awarded to the petitioner under work order dated

20/7/2010 is hereby restored. Rule is made absolute in

above terms.

C.A.W. No.2414/2010.

In view of the above order, the civil application does

not survive. Hence civil application stands disposed of.

                                      JUDGE                               JUDGE
    Tambaskar.