Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 118 Bom
Judgement Date : 28 October, 2010
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.228 OF 2004.
Ramesh s/o Madhavrao Shelke,
age 39 years, occu. Business,
R/o Nava Navyavak Colony,
Plot No.2/B,
Bhimnagar, Bhavsingpura,
Aurangabad,
(Prop.of the firm M/s Swati Kirana
and General Stores).
..PETITIONER.
( ORI. PLAINTIFF )
VERSUS
Bhaskar s/o Seetaram Pradhan,
age 30 yrs., Occu. Service,
r/o H. No.160/NS/48,
Bhimnagar,
Bhausingpura,
Aurangabad. ..RESPONDENTS.
( ORI. DEFENDANT )
...
Shri H.M. Karwa, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri A.P. Bhandari, Advocate for Respondent.
...
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:35:19 :::
2
CORAM: S.S. SHINDE,J.
RESERVED ON: 20th OCTOBER, 2010.
PRONOUNCED ON : 28th OCTOBER, 2010.
JUDGMENT:
1. This revision application has been filed by
the petitioner - plaintiff against the judgment
and decree dated 14th October, 2004 passed by the
5th Joint C.J.J.D., ig Aurangabad in R.C.S. NO.
774/2003.
2. The revision petitioner (hereinafter
referred to as the petitioner) filed R.C.S. NO.
774 of 2003 before the Joint C.J.J.D.,
Aurangabad. The said suit was filed for recovery
of possession of the shop-cum-room, of which
description in detail has been given in paragraph
1 of the plaint. It is the contention o the
petitioner that the petitioner was forcefully
dispossessed from the suit premises. According
to the petitioner, he had obtained plot on which
the suit property is situated from the defendant
on lease @ Rs.600/- per month since 9.9.1998 and
constructed the structure thereon converting it
into the shop and he was running a grocery shop
under the name and style of "M/s Swati Kirana and
General Store" since 27th September, 1999 and for
construction of the premises, he incurred
expenses of Rs.65,000/- and as per agreed terms,
he has been paying the rent regularly up till
September, 2003. It is his contention that the
original defendant - respondent herein, in
collusion with the relatives of the defendant,
with an intention to evict the petitioner from
the suit property, started extending threats to
the plaintiff - petitioner to vacate the suit
shop from 20th August, 2003. It is further case
of the petitioner that he filed complaint before
the Police Commissioner on 20th August, 2003 and
also at Police Station, Cantonment, Aurangabad
but, no action was taken on the said complaints.
Finally on 7.10.2003 at about 9.30 a.m. whilst
the plaintiff was present in the suit shop, the
defendant with the aid of the police person and
other relatives of the defendant started throwing
the general and kirana goods on the street and
locked the shop by defendant and dispossessed the
plaintiff illegally from the suit property
without following due course of law. Therefore,
the petitioner filed civil suit with the
following prayer:
"The suit of the plaintiff may be decreed
with costs and plaintiff be put in possession of the suit shop from the defendant and oblige/"
According to the plaintiff / petitioner, the
said suit was filed under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act.
3. The 5th Joint C.J.J.D., Aurangabad by
judgment and order dated 14th October, 2004
dismissed the suit with costs. Aggrieved by the
said judgment and order, this civil revision
application has been filed by the petitioner /
plaintiff.
4. The learned Counsel appearing for the
petitioner invited my attention to paragraphs 1-
(a), 1(b), 2, 3 and 4 of the revision memo and
submitted that the revision petitioner and
respondents are close relatives and respondent
inducted the petitioner in possession on the oral
tenancy basis on the suit land with the monthly
rent of Rs.600/- from 9.9.1998. It is further
submitted that the rent was paid till September,
2003. It is further submitted that the
respondents have admitted that the petitioner is
tenant and it is evident from the para 4 of the
written statement of the respondent that "rent is
not paid after 2001 by the revision petitioner."
It is further argued that the defendant is police
constable and the same has been admitted in para
no.7 of the written statement of the respondent.
The learned Counsel invited my attention to the
complaint (Exh.46) dated 20th August, 2003 to the
Police Commissioner and submitted that since the
respondent was giving threats to the petitioner
asking him to vacate the suit premises, the said
complaint came to be filed. In pursuant to the
strained relations, the respondent was abusing
his position in police department and certain
other persons forcefully dispossessed the
petitioner from the suit premises and he forcibly
locked the suit premises. It is further
submitted that on 7.10.2003 i.e. on the date of
the incident itself, the petitioner had filed
complaint with the police station and the
panchanama vide Exh.33 was completed in between
3.30 to 4.30 p.m. whereas, the complaint which
had been received on 7.10.2003 has been
exhibited at Exh.39. According to the learned
Counsel for the petitioner, P.W.4 Dhanraj Namdeo
Pawar, police constable, Police Station, Chhawani
deposed that the police station officer received
the complaint on 7.10.2003 for investigation.
The said deposition remained unchallenged by the
defendant in cross-examination. The learned
Counsel further submitted that the contention of
the respondent that the petitioner vacated the
premises voluntarily and no taba pawati or
panchanama were done in the said matter, is
required to be rejected. It is further submitted
that under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 what is required to inquire by summary
proceeding is whether the person is dispossessed
without his consent of the immovable property
otherwise than in due course of law. There is no
appeal and review permitted against the decision
of the trial Court and the revision is not
prohibited by the legislation after the disposal
of the suit in trial Court. It is further
submitted that the trial Court committed
material irregularities and also exceeded its
jurisdiction while dismissing the suit of the
plaintiff / petitioner. The trial Court while
admitting on record that there is complaint dated
7th October, 2003, misguided itself that no
complaint was filed by the revision petitioner on
7.10.2003 and the said finding is perverse and
required to be interfered with. The further
observations of the trial Court that the articles
which have been thrown out from the shop, are not
thrown but kept to display in the shop is also
perverse finding. It is the case of the
petitioner that while forcefully dispossessing
the petitioner, the shop was locked by the
respondent at 9 a.m. and in ordinary course of
business no shopkeeper will display the goods on
the road out side the shop and nobody would
invite the panchanama for displaying the thrown
article. The fact that in pursuance of the
complaint on 7.10.2003, the panchanama was drawn
itself shows that there was no consent for
vacating the premises. The trial Court ought to
have held that there is no Taba Pawati /
possession receipt produced by the defence to
substantiate the contention that the petitioner
has voluntarily given possession of the suit
premises to the respondent. In certain
circumstances of the case when the relations are
strained, the better and most reliable evidence
would be ig to execute documentary evidence of
possession of the suit premises. In absence of
documentary evidence of the receipt of
possession, it is clear case of the adverse
inference against the defendant and it is
confirmed that forcefully petitioner has been
dispossessed on 7.10.2003. The learned Counsel,
in support of his contention, placed heavy
reliance on the reported judgment of the Supreme
Court in case of S.R. Ejaz v. The Tamil Nadu
Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd.,
reported in AIR 2002 SC 1152 and submitted that
the Supreme Court has clearly opined the nature
of evidence required in such a case. The facts
were eloquent and no further evidence was
necessary not anything was required to be re-
appreciated. It is to be stated that admittedly
there is no document to indicate that petitioner
willingly handed over the possession of the suit
premises. According to the Counsel for the
petitioner, if the petitioner had willingly
handed over the possession, he would not have
immediately lodged the criminal complaint and
made representation to the higher authorities for
taking action ig nor he would have filed a writ
petition for appropriate directions. The
learned Counsel further submitted that in view of
the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, the
civil revision application deserves to be
allowed. He further invited my attention to the
pleadings in the plaint, the impugned judgment
and order, and other documents on the record and
submitted that the trial Court has travelled
beyond the prayers and pleadings and the issue
fallen for consideration and thereby recorded the
findings which were unwarranted and also some of
the findings are perverse and contrary to the
record. The trial Court has committed
irregularity and exceeded its jurisdiction while
entertaining the suit. He, therefore, submitted
that the civil revision application deserves to
be allowed.
5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for
the respondent / defendant submitted that it is
the plaintiff who has claimed ownership of the
construction, though he has admitted ownership of
the defendant over the land. The Counsel for
respondent invited my attention to the paragraphs
3 to 6 of the plaint and submitted that such a
claim is beyond the scope of section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act and, therefore, the plaintiff
has prayed and pleaded beyond the scope of
section 6 of the said Act and the Court being a
competent court to try other issues, was not left
with any alternative but to give findings on the
issues raised by the petitioner and, therefore,
the stand of the petitioner that the trial Court
has travelled beyond the scope and pleadings is
required to be rejected. The petitioner has
failed to prove the contents and execution of the
complaint dated 20.8.2003 and has led contrary
evidence, showing the complaint was made on
7.10.2003. There is no averment in the plaint
that, on 7.10.2003, complaint was filed. The
learned Counsel invited my attention to the
written statement filed by the defendant and
submitted that the defendant has specifically
denied the forceful dispossession. It has been
stated in the written statement that as the
defendant was in arrears of rent and as the
parties are relatives, it was mutually agreed
that the plaintiff would vacate the premises and
defendant ig would not claim any rent. It is
pertinent to note that the parties to the
proceeding are relatives. Even, as per the
plaint there is no written agreement of tenancy,
no rent receipts are on record so as to establish
payment of the rent. The fact that rent was not
paid and it was mutually agreed to relinquish the
possession and arrears of rent has been stated.
The petitioner has not established payment of
rent on record.
The learned Counsel invited my attention to
the evidence of P.W.1 Ramesh s/o Madhavrao Shelke
and submitted that the petitioner has admitted
that the defendant is owner of the suit premises.
Though the petitioner has claimed ownership of
construction, no evidence in that regard was
produced on the record. If the petitioner claims
or desires to claim ownership, he is at liberty
to file separate suit for establishing title, if
so advised, in view of section 6(4) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. In para 6 of the
revision application, though it is stated that
the complaint was made on 20.8.2003 to Chhawani
Police Station, however, in plaint it is stated
that it was also made to the Commissioner. But,
the same is not established on record. In cross-
examination, P.W.1 has admitted that the parties
are relatives. The ownership of construction is
further agitated. However, the same is beyond the
scope of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
The learned Counsel further invited my attention
to the evidence of P.W.4 Dhanraj Namdeo Pawar.
According to the learned Counsel for respndent,
this witness has proved the panchanama (Exh.35).
In cross-examination, this witness has admitted
that he did not find any damages to the articles
of the complainant as alleged by him. He further
deposed that he did not find truth in the
allegations of the complainant in the complaint
dated 7.10.2003. He further invited my attention
to the evidence of P.W.5 Kacharu Chavan and P.W.6
Kailas Khambat. It is stated that the
plaintiff's witness Kacharu Ambadas Thorat
stepped in the witness box and he has stated
that, on 20.8.2003 no complaint was filed by the
plaintiff in the police station. He further
admitted that as the said document was not there,
the same could not be produced.
ig The learned
Counsel also invited my attention to the evidence
of P.W.8 Digambar Shamrao Pagare and submitted
that this witness stated that the original of
complaint dated 20.8.2003 was not found. Digambar
stated that only the receipt of the same i.e.
endorsement was identified and it was the same
endorsement which was exhibited. The learned
Counsel further invited my attention to the
witnesses of the defendant and submitted that
they have established that the possession was
voluntarily delivered. The learned Counsel
further invited my attention to alleged
complaints at Exh.33 and 46, panchanama below
Exh.35 and submitted that these documents have
been considered properly by the trial Court and
the Court has arrived at the correct conclusion.
The learned Counsel referring to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
S.R. Ejaz (supra), submitted that there are
distinguishable factors in the case in hand and
in that case. In the case of S.R. Ejaz (supra),
the parties were not relatives, as is the case in
the present ig case. There the proceedings for
eviction were lodged and the evidence was
collected. Even writ petition was filed before
the High Court seeking directions for enquiry. In
the present case, no criminal case is pending. No
record was produced before the trial Court,
regarding such complaint. In that case, plea of
surrender on one hand and relinquishment of right
to claim arrears of rent was not taken and
established on record, as is done in the present
case. In the said case, on considering the facts
and circumstances of case, the High Court has
quashed impugned order and remitted the
proceedings back to the trial Court. It is
further submitted that it is settled position of
law that it is the plaintiff who has to prove his
case as per his evidence. He cannot rely upon
the alleged weakness in the defence. Here the
plaintiff himself has failed to prove the
forceful dispossession. The learned Counsel
invited my attention to para 4 of the reported
judgment in the case of Ramdas vs. Salim Ahmed,
reported in 1998(9) SCC 719. He further
submitted that the trial Court had the advantage
to see the conduct of the witnesses and normally
even the Court of Appeal would not interfere in
the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court.
The scope of revisional jurisdiction is further
limited. He placed reliance on the reported
judgment in the case of Madhusudandas Vs.
Narayanibai & others, reported in 1983 Mh.L.J.
402, wherein it is held that if there is a
conflict of oral evidence on the matter in issue
and its resolution turns upon the credibility of
the witnesses, the general rule is that, the
appellate Court should permit the finding of fact
of the trial Court to prevail. The learned
Counsel in order to support his contention that
there is very limited scope for exercising
revisional jurisdiction, relied on various
judgments of the Supreme Court as well as this
Court. He invited my attention to the
observations of the Apex Court in case of
Madhusudandas (supra) that, `the High Court
should also have reminded itself that the
witnesses had given their evidence before the
trial court which had the opportunity of seeing
their demeanour in the witness box and tho
appreciation of their evidence by the trial court
had to be given due consideration in the light of
that fact.' The learned Counsel invited my
attention to the reported judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Ramdas (supra) and more
particularly, para 4 of the said judgment. The
learned Counsel for the respondent, therefore,
would submit that once the finding of fact is
recorded by the Court below that there is no
forceful dispossession of the petitioner, this
Court may not interfere in revisional
jurisdiction in the findings of fact arrived at
by the Court below.
8. I have given due consideration to the
submissions of the learned Counsel for the
parties, perused the entire record made available
and also the civil revision application,
annexures thereto and various judgments cited on
behalf of the parties.
7. At the outset, it would be relevant to refer
some of the findings of facts recorded by the
trial Court. In para 4, trial Court framed the
following ig issues for its consideration /
determination:
" ISSUES FINDINGS.
I. Whether defendant proves
the surrender of possession and tenancy right by plaintiff in his favour? In affirmative.
II. Whether the plaintiff
proves that he has been illegally dispossessed by the defendant? In negative.
III. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
of possession? In negative.
IV. What order and decree? Suit is dismissed."
While answering Issue No.I, the trial Court
held that the defendant proves surrender of
possession and tenancy rights by the plaintiff in
his favour. While answering Issues No.II & III,
the Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove
that he has been illegally dispossessed by the
defendant and plaintiff is not entitled to the
relief of possession. In para 7, the trial Court
has recorded ig admitted facts; firstly, the
plaintiff and defendant are relatives; secondly,
description of the suit property, boundaries and
area thereof are not disputed by both parties;
thirdly, the existence of tenancy between
plaintiff and landlord and defendant qua-tenant
in the suit property as plaintiff in his
examination-in-chief has deposed that he is doing
business in the shop which is owned by the
defendant. Therefore, the petitioner - plaintiff
has admitted ownership of the defendant over the
suit property. In para 7, the Court has reached
to the conclusion that the petitioner - plaintiff
was monthly tenant of defendant in suit property
@ Rs.600/- per month. In the same para, the
Court has also reached to the conclusion that the
agreement of tenancy between plaintiff and
defendant was an oral one. The trial Court has
referred to Exhs.36, 39, 20 and reached to the
conclusion that the defendant has never issued
any rent receipt at all at any point of time in
favour of the plaintiff. The trial Court has
observed that the contention of the defendant
that there was mutual confidence and trust and
everything between the parties to the suit being
oral one and without complaint until the alleged
suit incident dated 7.10.2003. In such
circumstances, the trial Court agreed with the
defence submission that the facts and
circumstances are to be viewed with preponderance
of probability as it is a civil dispute and not
for strict proof as all the conduct of plaintiff
supports the defence theory. The trial Court, in
para 8 has dealt with Issues No.I and II after
appreciating the evidence brought on record by
the respective parties. The trial Court has
referred the evidence of plaintiff and observed
that in the deposition of plaintiff he has added
name of other persons along with defendant and
also referred to the assault by the defendant and
others to him. However, he has not stated that
the defendant / accompanying persons had put lock
to his said shop, though he has stated in his
plaint. The trial Court has also taken note that
no where in the plaint the plaintiff has
mentioned that he lodged complaint on 7.10.2003
itself. The trial Court has referred to the
evidence of P.W.4 Dhanraj from Chhawani Police
Station, ig who has deposed about receiving the
complaint of the petitioner on 7.10.2003. He in
his evidence has stated that he visited the spot
and drew spot panchanama in the presence of two
panchas i.e. Eknath Dnyandeo Wakhare and Shivaji
Gire. However, the panchanama prepared by the
P.W.4 in presence of two panchas, does not
support the case of the plaintiff that the
articles from the shop were thrown out by the
defendant and other persons. The defence
examined panch witness namely Eknath who stated
that the plaintiff voluntarily removed all
articles and put the defendant in possession of
the suit shop. The trial Court has extracted the
passage from the evidence of defence witness
Eknath Dnyandeo Wakhare D.W.2. He has fully
supported the case of the defendant that the
plaintiff has voluntarily removed his own
articles from the grocery shop and kept outside,
waited for transportation and thus, voluntarily
handed over possession of the suit premises
because of his inability to pay rent since
January, 2002. The trial Court has observed that
the evidence of D.W.2 remained un-shattered, both
in his cross-examination and that of defendant as
well. The Court has also observed about the
evidence of D.W.3 Santosh Paraji Lokhande, who
has stated, "I have correctly stated in my
affidavit (Ex.18) that on 7/10/2003 plaintiff
told to the defendant that he is in arrears of
rent and could not pay it. Not true to say that
myself and defendant have forcibly dispossessed
the suit property by throwing plaintiff's
articles outside it. Not true to say that out of
friendly relations I helped defendant for
illegally dispossessing the plaintiff from suit
property." The trial Court has also referred to
the evidence of other witnesses. The trial
Court, while appreciating the arguments of the
Counsel for the defence, observed that the case
in hand is required to be considered from the
angle that the parties were relatives, tenancy
was oral, payment of rent oral, mutual confidence
and trust, there was no rule of law, or a
straight jacket formula that pavti/possession was
just and necessary to be executed, and therefore,
this case stands on different footings than the
cases in which there is a written agreement, rent
is paid and receipts are given.
ig The trial Court,
ultimately, reached to the conclusion that D.W.2
Eknath Dnyandeo Vakhre and D.W.3 Santosh Paraji
Lokhande reside and carry business in same suit
locality and their presence in said locality is
very natural, probable and trustworthy and
knowing both plaintiff and defendant (all traders
are of same community), have not supported the
case of the plaintiff and deposed in favour of
the defendant. They are independent witnesses of
the locality whose presence is very natural,
probable and proved, whereas, P.W.4 Dhanraj who
is witness of plaintiff has not brought anything
on record to show that D.Ws.2 and 3 are not
trustworthy witnesses. The trial Court has also
referred to the examination-in-chief and cross-
examination of the P.W.4 Dhanraj and observed
that in his examination-in-chief (Exh.32), page
1, last two lines, he deposed, "I had observed
the spot of the incident as well as place
surrounding to the place of incident and also
interrogated the neighbourer of the place of the
incident." In his cross-examination Exh.32, page
2, para no.2, admitted that, "I did not find
truth in the allegations of the complainant (here
present plaintiff) as alleged by him. I did not
find any truth in the allegations of the
complaint in the complaint dtd. 7-10-2003." P.W.4
was witness called by the plaintiff and hence his
evidence has to be acted and relied upon since
the report / complaint was lodged with him at
Exh.33 and recording of spot panchanama was done
by him.
8. The relevant facts, which are required to be
mentioned, are that the plaintiff has pleaded and
tried to establish that the ownership of the
construction lies with him. However, he has not
produced any evidence on record and it was not
within the scope of section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act. On perusal of the entire material on
record, it clearly emerges that the parties are
relatives, there is no written agreement of
tenancy, no written rent receipts. It also
emerges from the judgment of the trial Court and
from the evidence brought on record that the
plaintiff has failed to prove his complaint dated
20th August, 2003 which he claims to have been
filed with ig the Commissioner of Police. It
further emerges that the plaintiff has failed to
prove forcible dispossession through witnesses,
panchanama or any other evidence. The trial
Court, after appreciating the entire evidence
brought on record, has reached to the findings of
fact that there was no forcible dispossession of
the plaintiff from the suit premises by the
respondent and other persons. As discussed herein
above, the trial Court has elaborately discussed
the evidence of the witnesses of both sides and
found that the P.W.4 who was examined on behalf
of the plaintiff did not support the case of the
plaintiff, inasmuch as, while recording the
pancnahama the P.W.4 has categorically stated
that he did not find that the articles from the
suit shop were forcibly thrown out. Rather, those
were displayed outside the shop properly. The
D.Ws.2 and 3, who are panch witnesses and natural
witnesses at the spot since they are from the
same vicinity, have deposed against the
plaintiff. Therefore, the trial Court, after
framing necessary issues, has reached to definite
finding of fact that there was no forcible
dispossession of the plaintiff by respondent and
others, as alleged by the plaintiff.
9. As far as the contention of the learned
Counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court
has travelled beyond the issue involved in the
suit is concerned, on perusal of the pleadings in
the plaint, it appears that the plaintiff claimed
that he is owner of the suit premises since he
has spent money for construction of the suit
premises. Therefore, the plaintiff has invited
the findings on the said issues and for that, he
cannot blame the defendant or the court. While
exercising revisional jurisdiction, this Court
has to keep in mind the scope of Section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
In case of M.L. Sethi v/s Shri R.P. Kapoor,
reported in A.I.R. 1972 SC 2379, the Supreme
Court has observed that even gross errors of
facts and law cannot be gone into in revisional
jurisdiction. Yet, in another judgment in case
of DLF Housing & Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v/s
Saroopsing and others, reported in AIR 1971 SC
2324, the ig Supreme Court held that while
exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section
115, it is not competent to the High Court to
correct errors of fact however gross or even
errors of law unless the errors have relation to
the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute
itself. Yet in another judgment in the case of
Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd., Balanagar Hyderabad and another v/s Ajit
Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores)
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar Hyderabad,
reported in AIR 1973 SC 76, the Honourable
Supreme Court held that revisional Court can only
see whether the Court below had jurisdiction. If
it had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings,
the High Court cannot interfere. In the case of
Harishankar and others vs. Rao Giridhari Lal
Chowdhary, reported in AIR 1963 SC 698, the
Supreme Court has distinguished between right of
appeal and right of revision and held that, scope
of revisional jurisdiction is limited. Yet in
another judgment in the case of Faijulbee Hajeel
& others vs. Yadali Amir Shaikh Ansari, reported
in 1984(2) Bom.C.R. 253, the Division Bench of
this Court held that the decision on question of
facts is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction
of the High Court. In the judgment in case of
Sanjay Kumar Pandey and others v/s Gulabhar
Sheikh and others, reported in AIR 2004 SC 3354,
the Supreme Court held that the revisional court
cannot refer to part of the evidence and reverse
the findings of the fact. In paragraphs 4 and 5
, the Court has clarified that the revisional
jurisdiction would be exercised in exceptional
circumstances and normally the party should file
independent suit to establish title.
10. In the important judgment of the Honourable
Supreme Court in case of Madhusudandas (supra),
in para 18, it is observed, thus:
"18 The High Court disagreed with the trial court and held that the adoption
had not been established. In doing so, it adopted an approach which, to our mind, is plainly erroneous. It
proceeded to judge the credibility of the witnesses mainly with reference to their relationship with the parties
without placing adequate weight on the nature ig of the evidence and the probability of its truth in the context of the surrounding circumstances. It
rejected the testimony of the appellant's witnesses substantially on the ground that they were related to
the appellant or out of favour with Narsinghdas. This consideration, in our
opinion, cannot by itself constitute a sufficient basis for discrediting the witnesses. We think the proper rule to
be that when a witness holds a position of relationship favouring the party producing him or of possible prejudice against the contesting party, it is
incumbent on the court to exercise appropriate caution when appraising his evidence and to examine its probative value with reference to the entire mosaic of facts appearing from the record. It is not open to the court to reject the evidence without anything
more on the mere ground of relationship
or favour or possible prejudice. The judgment under appeal indicates that
the High Court commenced with that mistaken approach, and we see its influence working throughout its
appraisal of the testimony of the several witnesses. It is only logical that with its approach so oriented even the most 862 significant material
adduced by the appellant should, in the
eyes negative of the hue.
High The Court, High take Court on should a
also have reminded itself that these
same witnesses had given their evidence before the trial court, which had the opportunity of seeing their demeanour
in the witness box, and the
appreciation of their evidence by the trial court should have been given due consideration in the light of that
fact."
11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has
placed heavy reliance on the reported judgment of
the Supreme Court in case of S.R. Ejaz v. The
Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society
Ltd., reported in AIR 2002 SC 1152. According to
the learned Counsel for the petitioner, since
there was a forceful dispossession of the
plaintiff and on the very same day i.e. on
7.10.2003 he did file complaint with the Police
authorities, that itself was sufficient to hold
that there was forceful dispossession of the
plaintiff. According to the learned Counsel for
the petitioner, if there is a case of voluntary
handing over possession of the premises by the
plaintiff to the defendant, there is no question
of filing complaint immediately on the very same
day, stating therein the forceful dispossession
of the plaintiff by the defendant. Therefore,
relying on the the judgments of the Supreme Court
in case of S.R. Ejaz (supra), the Counsel for the
petitioner was at pains to argue that the civil
revision application deserves to be allowed and
the case of the plaintiff that there was forceful
dispossession of the plaintiff by the defendant
is required to be accepted. According to him,
the scope of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act
is limited, the Court has to look into whether
there was forceful dispossession or not, relying
on the evidence brought before it. In the
instant case, according to the learned Counsel
for the petitioner, complaint was lodged with the
police on the very same day and, there was no
receipt produced by the defendant on record that
the plaintiff has handed over possession
voluntarily to the defendant and to that effect,
there is no document in writing.
The distinguishing factors in the case S.R.
Ejaz (supra) and the case in hand are required to
be mentioned at this stage.
ig It is an admitted
position that in the present case parties are
relatives unlike in the case cited supra. In
that case, the proceedings for eviction were
pending before the competent court and the
landlord tried to dispossess the tenant by
forceful means. In that case, criminal
proceedings were lodged and evidence was also
collected. Even writ petition was filed seeking
enquiry. In the instant case, there are no any
criminal proceedings lodged by the plaintiff
before the competent court or there is no
directions seeking enquiry. In the present case,
admittedly, there is no document showing
agreement between the parties, document showing
fixed rent per month, rent receipts issued by the
defendant in favour of the plaintiff. In absence
of any documentary proof and everything being on
oral understanding as understood by the parties
and accepted by the trial Court that there was
oral tenancy, there is force in the contention of
the learned Counsel for the defendant as to why
there cannot be voluntary handing over of
possession by the plaintiff to the defendant
without having the same thing in writing.
ig This
contention of the defendant has been accepted by
the trial Court. As stated herein above while
exercising revisional jurisdiction, the scope is
very limited and once the finding of fact is
recorded by the trial Court that there was no
forceful dispossession of the plaintiff from the
suit premises by the defendant and rather, there
was voluntary handing over possession by the
plaintiff to the defendant and in absence of
anything brought to the notice of this court that
this finding recorded by the trial Court is
perverse, in my opinion, interference in the
revisional jurisdiction is not permissible. The
trial Court has dealt with in detail, referred
extensively to the evidence of plaintiff's
witnesses, panch witnesses and defence witnesses.
The trial Court has minutely scanned the evidence
and has reached to the definite finding of fact.
It is also relevant to mention that the plaintiff
and defendant are relatives. Admittedly, the
property belongs to defendant - present
respondent. Therefore, in my considered opinion,
in the revisional jurisdiction, no interference
is warranted.
12. In the result, civil revision application
stands rejected. Civil Application, if any, also
stands rejected.
[ S.S. SHINDE, J ]
.....
Kadam.
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.228 OF 2004.
28th OCTOBER, 2010.
For approval and signature.
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE S.S. SHINDE.
1. Whether Reporters of Local Papers } may be allowed to see the judgment? } Yes.
2.
3.
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
Whether Their Lordships wish to see } Yes
the fair copy of the judgment? } No.
4. Whether this case involves a substantial } question of law as to the interpretation } of the Constitution of India, 1950 or } any Order made thereunder? } No.
5. Whether it is to be circulated to the } Civil Judges? } No.
6. Whether the case involves an important } question of law and whether a copy of } the judgment should be sent to Mumbai, } Nagpur and Panaji offices? } No.
[Prakash Kadam] Private Secretary to the Honourable Judge.
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!