Adivasi Vikas Eklavya Amrut ... vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors.
2007 Latest Caselaw 816 Bom

JUDGMENT

R.M. Borde, J.

1. Petitioner-institution has approached this Court seeking a relief of quashment of communication dated 22-6-2006, whereby petitioner-Institution has been directed to close down five schools run by it, branding said schools as unauthorised, issued by the Project Officer, Integrated Tribal Development Project, Nandurbar. Petitioner-Institution also seeks further relief in the nature of directions to respondent No. 1-State to release grants payable to the petitioner-Institution. Petitioner-Institution, by way of an interim relief, seeks a direction to release grant of Rs. 25,51,140/- payable to the petitioner, which the petitioner claims have been recommended by the Commissioner for Tribal Development, by letter dated 24-3-2004.

2. Petitioner is a society registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is also registered as Public Trust under the provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The area of operation of the petitioner-Institution's activities is Nandurbar district, which consists of sizable population of tribals. Petitioner-Institution operates in the field of education and renders services to the tribal population in the district.

3. Petitioner contends that the State has formulated a scheme titled as "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana". The scheme was aimed to provide education to tribal children. It is contended by the petitioner that proposals were called for from voluntary organizations in furtherance of implementation of the scheme to open schools for rendering educational facilities to tribal students. Petitioner contends that petitioner-Institution has submitted a proposal to run five residential schools for rendering educational facilities to tribal community students. Petitioner also started two schools, one at Dudhale, Tq. and District Nandurbar and another at Thanepada, Tq. and District Nandurbar, in the year 2003. According to the petitioner, the Project Officer has forwarded the proposal with positive recommendation for granting approval to the schools for the academic year 2002-2003 and also for releasing grant to the tune of Rs. 6,20,400/-. The Project Officer also recommended that the petitioner-Institution be permitted to start three more schools from the academic year 2003-2004. It is contended that the schools, which were in existence, were inspected by the Project Officer. It is contended by the petitioner that the proposals, which were submitted for starting five residential schools on 2-10-2001, were recommended by the Project Officer vide his communication dated 5-10-2001. Petitioner claims that the Institution is entitled to get salary grants amounting to Rs. 7,34,000/- up to 31-5-2004 and non-salary grants to the tune of Rs. 18,17,140/- for the said period. According to the petitioner, the Commissioner for Tribal Development had recommended for release of the grants in favour of the petitioner-Institution. According to the petitioner, even though the Project Officer had inspected the schools and the Commissioner of Tribal Development had recommended release of grants, at a later point of time, respondent No. 1 took a complete summersault and denied to have taken any decision in respect of implementation of the scheme, namely "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana" and suggested that the students admitted in Ashram schools be accommodated elsewhere. The Project Officer also issued directives vide letter dated 26-2-2005 branding the schools, run by the petitioner-Institution, as unauthorised schools and directed closure of such schools. Petitioner-Institution was also directed, vide letter dated 22-6-2006 by the Project Officer, not to start schools without permission from the Government and the petitioner-Institution is supposed to close down the schools, which they have already started or else, appropriate action shall be taken against the Institution. Aggrieved by the directives issued by the Project Officer, petitioner-Institution has approached this Court seeking reliefs, as stated above.

4. Petitioner contends that having accepted the proposals to run the schools and having inspected the schools on yearly basis. Respondent-authorities cannot be permitted to take diametrically opposite stance and contend that the schools, being run by the Institution, are unauthorised. Petitioner contends that there is a promise, which is evident from the conduct of the authorities and they cannot be permitted to resile from their promise. Petitioner, as such, invokes doctrine of principle of 'promissory estoppel'.

5. Respondents have filed return and controverted the contentions raised by the petitioner. According to the respondents, petitioner-Institution was never permitted, specifically by issuing any letter of permission, to run schools. Proposals tendered by petitioner were forwarded by respondent No. 3 vide letter dated 28-8-2003. It is further contended that respondent No. 3 had inspected the schools started by petitioner-Institution, it does not mean that the respondent has accepted entitlement of salary grants and non-salary grants payable to the petitioner-Institution. It is further contended that the competent authority, for permitting to start schools, was respondent No. 1 and it was the responsibility of the petitioner-Institution to obtain sanction order before opening of new schools. As no sanction has been accorded by respondent No. 1, no question arises for releasing grants in favour of the petitioner-Institution. It is further contended that the scheme, namely "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana" was not put to implementation at all. The Government did not call for applications or proposals for opening of schools under said scheme. The fact that only the proposal of petitioner-Institution was received and no other proposal from whole of the State is received by the Government itself justifies stand of the State that the scheme was never put to implementation. The State Government had only called for comments and suggestions from the Commissioner and other authorities in respect of proposed scheme.

6. An additional affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of respondents by the Assistant Project Officer (Education), Integrated Tribal Development Project, Nandurbar and in paragraph 2, stand of the State Government has been clarified as below:

I say and submit that the Tribal Development Department has not implemented the "Eklavya Special Education Scheme" in State of Maharashtra. The Government Tribal Development Department in Maharashtra vide letter dated 16-4-2001 has sent the proposal to Commissioner, Tribal Development, Maharashtra State, Nashik for their remarks. Hence it will be convenient to say that the said scheme was under consideration at that time.

In para 6, it is stated that:

I say and submit that the Tribal Development Department has not received any proposal like 'Adivasi Vikas Eklavya Thanepada'. In Tribal Development Department, there are 547 Government Ashram Schools and 556 aided Ashram Schools in the State of Maharashtra, wherein free education, residence and other facilities are provided to the students from 5 to 14 years. The students of Adiwasi Vikas Eklavya, Amrut Sanjiwani Samaj Sanstha, Thanepada School can be absorbed in nearby Government or aided Ashram Schools.

Respondents, therefore, contend that there was no promise extended on behalf of the State Government in the matter of opening of schools under the scheme "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana" and as such, question of acting upon so called promise or applicability of principle of promissory estoppel does not arise at all.

7. Petitioner-Institution itself has placed on record text of the scheme along with covering letter dated 16th April, 2001 at Exhibit-A. English translation of covering letter dated 16th April, 2001, reads as below:

To The Commissioner, Tribal Development, Nasik.

Sub : Regarding Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana.

(1) In order to extend right of education to all the children below 14 years of age, the Government has taken a decision to introduce Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana. A detailed note regarding nature of the scheme is enclosed herewith.

(2) It is requested that your detailed comments about this be submitted to the Government immediately.

Sd/-

(J.L. Pawara) Section Officer

It appears from the above communication that the State had only proposed the scheme and had called for comments/opinion from the Commissioner, Tribal Development, Nasik.

8. There is also a communication received from the State Government dated 16th October, 2002 in respect of the scheme. It appears that proposals tendered by the petitioner-Institution were scanned by the State authorities and certain questions were raised. In paragraph 3 of communication, the authorities were directed to suggest the norms in respect of locations of residential schools, number of such schools and as to how many residential schools need to be permitted every year, if at all the proposed scheme is to be implemented. In paragraph 5 of the said communication, suggestions were invited in respect of implementation of the scheme through the School Education Department and the authorities were called upon to explain as to how provision for funds to be made, if at all residential schools are to be permitted under the scheme during the year 2002-2003. In paragraph 8, it was directed to the authorities to take review in respect of locations, where the residential schools under the scheme, are required to be opened. An impression is gathered, on perusal of communication dated 16th October, 2002, that the scheme, as proposed by the State Government, was at the formative stage and was not put to implementation.

9. The petitioner has strenuously urged that the scheme was put to implementation and the proposals tendered by the petitioner-Institution were forwarded with positive recommendation. It is further contended that after receipt of the proposals, it was incumbent upon the Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development, to take a decision within fifteen days. It is contended that the petitioner was led to believe that the scheme was put to implementation and the schools started by the petitioner were inspected by the Project Officer. The Project Officer had also recommended release of salary as well as non-salary grants in favour of the petitioner-Institution. It is further contended that the Commissioner had also forwarded positive recommendation in respect of release of grants and as such it is not open for the State authorities to contend that the scheme was not put to implementation at all.

10. On the other hand, the authorities of the State Government had taken a positive stand that the scheme was never put to implementation and merely suggestions were invited in respect of the proposed scheme. It is also evident from communication dated 9th April, 2004, issued by the State Government to the Commissioner, Tribal Development, Nasik, whereby it has been proposed to accommodate students taking education in residential schools of petitioner-Institution in other Ashram Schools. Explanation was also called for as to what was the need to propose establishment of separate schools for tribal students through the office of Commissioner, Tribal Development. The Commissioner, by communication dated 18-6-2004, has justified the stand of his office in respect of opening schools for tribal students. It was also made clear by communication dated 27-8-2004, issued by Additional Secretary, Tribal Development Department that the State has never taken a decision to put the scheme, namely "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana" for implementation and only application's of the Institutions were directed to be forwarded to the State. It was further communicated that a decision has also been taken with a view to extend facilities of education to tribal students to accord sanction for 70 Ashram Schools, out of which, five Ashram schools, be commenced as converted Ashram Schools for tribal population.

11. The State has further made clear its stand in its communication dated 22-6-2006 addressed to the petitioner-Institution that the State had never accorded permission to open five schools at different places in favour of the petitioner-Institution. It was informed that as the schools are being run without proper permission, those are unauthorised and are required to be closed down. An affidavit-in-reply has also been filed to explain the stand of the State Government in respect of the project, namely - "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana" and it has been specifically contended that the said scheme was never put to implementation.

12. The petitioner has urged that there was a promise by the State authorities in respect of opening of the schools. The petitioner has acted in pursuant to the promise and forwarded proposals for opening five different schools at different places for the benefit of tribal students. The schools, which were opened, were inspected by the Project Officer and the Project Officer as well as the Commissioner for Tribal Development had recommended for release of grants in favour of the petitioner-Institution. The petitioner, as such, taken shelter by invocation of doctrine of principle of promissory estoppel and has contended that the respondent-authorities are now estopped from contending that the scheme was never put to implementation. In support of its contention, the petitioner has placed reliance on following judgments.

(i) In the case of Tapti Oil Industries and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. ; (ii) In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Anglo Afghan Agencies reported in AIR 1968 SC 718; (iii) In the case of Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of City of Bombay and Ors. ; (iv) In the case of N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Anr. ; (v) In the case of R.K. Rama Rao and Anr. v. State of A.P. and Ors. ; and (vi) In the case of Vij Resins Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors. .

13. Petitioner contends that there was a promise on behalf of the State Government in respect of implementation of 'Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana" and the petitioner was made to alter its position and was led to believe that the scheme is put to implementation and as such the petitioner-Institution has in fact opened five schools under the scheme. A direction, as such, is necessary to be issued to the respondents to accord approval to the schools as well as further directions to respondent-State to release grants in favour of the petitioner-Institution. The petitioner placed reliance on the following text from the Full Bench decision in the case of Tapti Oil Industries and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. :

If the petitioners acting on the representations made in the scheme incur expenditure, set up a manufacturing unit in the hope that the State Government will abide by its word and act according to its representations, there is no reason why even while acting in its executive capacity and not under any legislative powers, the State Government cannot be compelled to abide by the representations made by it. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not restricted only to review of the actions of the State Government under statutory enactments. With the ever widening field of judicial review of administrative actions and executive decisions of the State and in the light of the extended applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, of which the whole object is to see that the Government sticks to its promise and abides by it, it is now too late in the day to contend that such a scheme does not vest any right in a person who acted upon those representations and changed his position. The mere fact that the scheme is of an executive nature is by itself not conclusive of the determination as to whether a right is created in favour of a person who acts upon the representations made by the State. It will be too broad a principle to lay down that no executive action of the State Government confers any right on any individual.

14. The petitioner also relied upon the proposition laid down in the case of Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies reported in AIR 1968 SC 718, and contended that even though the case did not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, it was still open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution." The petitioner, therefore, contends that the communication branding the schools, run by the petitioner-Institution, as unauthorised, is contrary to the promise/representation made by the Government regarding implementation of the scheme. It is contended that the said communication is, therefore, liable to be quashed.

15. That so far as the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner, based on promissory estoppel, is concerned, it is necessary to refer to the doctrine as has been elaborately explained in the judicial pronouncements by the Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. , wherein it is held that:

Doctrine of promissory estoppel has been variously called 'promissory estoppel', 'requisite estoppel', 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel'. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named 'promissory estoppel', it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promises, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment we mean injustice to the promises which would result if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise. If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, if would necessarily be present in every case of promissory estoppel, because it is on account of such detriment which the promisee would suffer if the promisor were to act differently from his promise, that the Court would consider it inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon his promise. In India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has, been recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned; the former is equally bound as the latter. The Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter it's future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. But since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency, nor can the Government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances. If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability: the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise "on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position" provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If, however, the pronisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. Where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner - and here obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law - the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. It may also be noted that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

16. The Apex Court, in the matter of State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Ganesh Wood Products and Ors. , has laid down that:

The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them.

It is further observed that:

The doctrine should not be reduced to a rule of thumb. Being an equitable doctrine it should be kept elastic enough in the hands of the Court to do complete justice between the parties.

17. In the case of Shrijee Sales Corporation v. Union of India , it was observed that:

The principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by this word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that would be acted upon by the other party, the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have been taken place between the parties.

'Estoppel' in Black's Law Dictionary, is indicated to mean that a party is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to the detriment of other party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly.

'Promissory Estoppel' is defined as in Black's Law Dictionary as 'an estoppel which arises when there is a promise which promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of promise, and which does induce such action or forbearance, and such promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only.... (Black's Law Dictionary)

18. Rule of 'promissory estoppel' can be invoked, when it is demonstrated that there was a declaration or promise made which induced the party to whom the promise was made to alter its position to its disadvantage. This principle has been reiterated by Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. 1947 KB 130, as under:

A promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and in fact acted upon is binding.

It would be appropriate to refer to the observations made in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India :

The concept of detriment as we now understand is whether it appears unjust, unreasonable or unequitable that the promisor should be allowed to resile from his assurance or representation, having regard to what the promisee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the assurance or representation.

It is, however, quite fundamental that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the public bodies or the Government to carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power. Secondly, the estoppel stems from equitable doctrine. It, therefore, requires that he who seeks equity must do equity. The doctrine, therefore, cannot also be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement.

19. That while considering the argument based on the proposition of doctrine of legitimate expectations, the Apex Court, in the matter of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation , has observed that:

The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest where doctrine of legitimate expectation can be applied. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the Courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case where there are such facts and circumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question of fact.

20. The Apex Court, in the matter of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. , has observed that:

In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present in the mind of the Court.

21. In the instant case, neither we find any material placed on record by the petitioner nor any foundation led in the petition in respect of invoking doctrine of promissory estoppel. In the absence of specific pleadings, contentions raised by the petitioner, founded on the invocation of doctrine of promissory estoppel, cannot be accepted.

22. In order to invoke principle of 'promissory estoppel', it is necessary to look into the whole of the representation made. The representation must be clear and unambiguous and not tainted or uncertain. What is necessary to be established is:

(a) There has to be a clear unequivocal promise;

(b) The party asserting estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment or must have acted upon the assurance given to him, must have relied upon the representation made to him, which means that the party must have changed or altered position by relying upon the assurance or representation. Alteration of position by the party is only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. The entire doctrine proceeds on the promise that it is reliance based and nothing more.

23. In view of this proposition, therefore, in the instant case, we have to examine whether there was any promise extended by the State or the State authorities in respect of implementation of "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana". The State, in its affidavits-in-reply, adopted a categorical stand that the scheme was not at all put to implementation. It is evident from the covering letter of the scheme, annexed at Exhibit-A, that the scheme was a "proposed scheme" and only opinions/suggestions/comments were invited from the Commissioner, Tribal Development, Nasik. The State has consistently taken up a stand, which is evident from the communication dated 16th October, 2002, in response to the proposals sent by the petitioner, that the scheme has not been put to implementation and it is merely a "proposed scheme". The stand of the State Government has been reiterated in its communications issued on 9-6-2004 (Exhibit-N) as well as 27th August, 2004, that the State had not taken a decision to implement the scheme.

24. It is also surprising to note that through out the State of Maharashtra, only one proposal was received and that too of the petitioner-Institution. It is also quite surprising to note that the petitioner-Institution, without waiting for according approval to run schools, initially started two schools and has raised its number up to five. It is clear from the conduct of the petitioner that the petitioner-Institution has started running schools unauthorised^ without there being any prior permission from the State Government. The contention raised by petitioner-Institution that the schools were inspected and at some point of time, the authorities of the State Government recommended sanction of grants, can never be substituted for according approval to run schools. The stand taken by the State appears to be consistent and logical if tested on the touchstone of "probabilities and reasons". The fact that only one proposal, from whole of the State, was received and no other Institution in the State was called upon or had actually tendered the proposal for opening a school, itself fortifies the stand of the State Government that the scheme was never commenced or put to implementation. The petitioner, under the belief that it would be successful in securing the permission, without waiting for accord of approval to run schools, went forward and opened new schools and admitted students and has put career of tribal students in jeopardy. The act of running of unauthorised schools, without permission from the State Government, calls for appropriate action by the State authorities.

25. The other contention raised by the petitioner, so far as release of grants is concerned, it is to be borne in mind that demand for release of grants can never be asserted as a matter of right and more so when the petitioner-Institution has not secured even approval to run the schools. In fact, it was not expected of the petitioner-Institution to continue to run the schools without there being proper approval. It was made known as back as in the year 2002 itself that the scheme is merely a proposed one and has not been put to implementation. The petitioner ran the risk by opening schools without securing proper approval. Therefore, in the facts, which are borne out from the record, it is more than clear that there is no clear and unequivocal promise held by the State in respect of implementation of "Eklavya Vishesh Shikshan Yojana". Therefore, there was no question of petitioner acting upon the promise which was in fact not extended. If the petitioner has altered its position, the petitioner itself has taken a risk for which the petitioner has to hold itself responsible.

26. For the reasons set out above, we do not find that this is a fit case for invocation of principle of 'promissory estoppel'. There is no merit in the petition and same deserves to be rejected. Petition stands rejected.

27. At this stage, Shri Barlinge, learned Counsel for petitioner-Institution, prays for continuing the order of interim relief for a further period of six weeks so as to enable the petitioner to approach the Apex Court. We find that while issuing notice before admission, this Court, by order dated 31-7-2006, granted interim relief thereby directing that "in the meanwhile, no punitive action to be taken against the petitioner". We find it appropriate, in order to meet ends of justice, to continue the said interim order passed on 31-7-2006 for a further period of six weeks from today.