Suman Arjun Shegokar vs Prasad Gopalrao Chirkuri And Ors.
2004 Latest Caselaw 687 Bom

JUDGMENT

Mohta Anoop V., J.

1. Heard.

The present appeal has been filed by the original claimant No. 1/appellant herein, against the driver/original N.A. No. I/respondent No. 1 herein, owner/original N.A. No. 2/respondent No. 2 herein, original N.A. No. 3/ respondent No. 3 herein/(Insurance Company) and made formal party to the original claimant No. 2/respondent No. 4 herein and thereby, challenged the judgment dated 29th March, 1986 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Akola (for short "Tribunal") in Motor Vehicle Case No. 45 of 1983, whereby the claim of the appellant was rejected on the ground of limitation.

However, the claim of the original claimant No. 2 respondent No. 4 minor daughter of the deceased Arjun Shegokar was allowed.

2. One Arjun Ukarda Shegokar, husband of the appellant and father of the respondent No. 4, died on 2nd July, 1980 in motor accident at Akola. The vehicle was owned by respondent No. 2 and driven by respondent No. 1. The vehicle was admittedly, insured with respondent No. 3. An application was filed under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1938 (for short "the Act") by the appellant and respondent No. 4 on 02-01-1981 initially, only against the respondent No. 1. This application was filed within limitation. Later on, by an amendment dated 18th April, 1983 the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were added as a party. The respondent No. 3 resisted the claim by filing its written statement. The basis objection was raised about the maintainability of such application as it was beyond limitation, as prescribed by, then existing provisions of the law, under Section 110-A of the Act. The evidence was led by the parties. After considering the material as well as, evidence on the record the Tribunal by its judgment dated 29th March, 1986, awarded compensation in favour of the respondent No. 4 and rejected the claim of the appellant in toto. Admittedly, the basis application against the original non-applicant No. 1 was within limitation. The other contesting respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were added as party on 18-4-1982. However, it was held that the appellant was not entitled for the claim, as it was filed beyond prescribed limitation.

3. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant relies on 1996 A.C.J. 880, Sadh Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr., 1995 A.C.J. 739 Radha Bai and Ors. v. Suresh Pal and Anr., 1995 A.C.J. 673, Wilfred v. N.A. Maniyar and Anr., 1995 A.C.J. 784, Hanja and Ors. v. Ram Kishan Ahir and Ors., and contended that rejection of the plaint by the learned Judge against the appellant is totally incorrect and cannot be said to be within the framework of law, as well as, fact itself.

4. The Motor Vehicles Act is undisputedly a welfare legislation. The purpose and object of the Act is always to extend all possible benefits available within the framework of the law to the victim, sufferer or injured person. The provisions of insurance policy under the Act, as well as, other connected Acts, cannot be overlooked. The respondent No. 3 Insurance Company have a definite role to pay in such matters. They are definitely entitled to raise their defence within the framework of the law. The Apex Court recently in A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 3884 : 2004 J.T. (Supp.) 483, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kiran Singh and Ors., in reference to the Insurance Companies are concerned, observed as under:

Insurance company must bear in mind that they are the trustee of the public. Keeper of the public, coffer. Often, even genuine claims are being hotly contested in a routine manner by dragging the parties to courts, wasting enormous time and money for the claimants to get their claims settled. The Act like Motor Vehicles Act being a beneficial legislation aimed at quick redressal of the victims of accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles, the attitude routinely adopted by the insurance company would render the object of the Act frustrated."

5. There is 110 dispute that the original Section 110-A provides limitation of 6 months from the date of accident for filing such claim petition before the appropriate authorities. At the relevant time the appellant was governed by the Act of 1939 as the accident took place on 2nd July, 1980. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the M.V. Act, 1988) replaced the old Act of 1939. The main purpose of the Act remains same. The limitation for filing such application was also provided under the M.V. Act, 1988 ie. under Section 166 Sub-clause (3). Later on by Amendment Act No. 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994, the said Sub-clause (3) of the Section 166 was also deleted. In the result, now there is no limitation prescribed or provided for filing such a claim application by the victim, sufferer or legal representative of the said victim or any other such person. The scheme of this section and object of the Act must be respected at this stage. In view of this now, there is no limitation prescribed on the statute for claiming compensation against be owner, driver or Insurance Company or such other person.

6. One additional facet which needs to be mentioned here that under the old provisions itself, there had been a proviso which gave powers to the tribunals to condone delay, if case was made out by the parties and/or there was a delay in filing such application for claiming compensation. This proviso itself gave powers to the concerned authorities to condone the delay.

7. The fact that there is a death or in a given case even serious injury to the person or victim, definitely, need to consider while condoning the delay, if any, in filing such application. The victims or sufferers cannot be benefited by not filing such an applications within time or limitation. There may be various reasons which may restrain them or compel them not to file such an application within limitation as prescribed. The legislation therefore, rightly considered and accordingly deleted such technical provisions, so far as filing of such a claim petitions by the victims under M.V. Act.

8. In present case, admittedly, the amendment was allowed and contesting respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were added as a party, by an order dated 18-4-1983. The effect of such amendment order is well settled. Once the amendment is allowed it goes to the inception of such application itself. Therefore, the Tribunal, according to me, should not have rejected the claim of the applicants, as done in the present matter, specially when on the same facts, material and evidence on the record, original claimant No. 2/daughter of the deceased was awarded compensation, against all the respondents.

9. Even if we go to basic principle of retrospective of prospective effect of such amendments it is difficult to overlook the basic principle of law. It is well settled that the appeal is a continuation of the suit and change in the social or beneficial or procedural laws during pendency of the appeal needs, to be taken into account to govern the rights of the parties. The Court is also bound to take into consideration the subsequent events in a particular case, in such matters. This is settled in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 111, Laxmi Narayan v. Niranjan, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 89, Mula v. Godhu, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 553, Ramswarup v. Munshi, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 49, Ramesh v. Jyotram, 1985(1) S.C.C. 436, Kanhaiyalal v. Rajendra. The Law of Limitation is a procedural law A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 240, Deepa v. Yella. An appeal is a continuation of the suit A.I.R. 1990 S.C.(sic.) The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation (Halsbury Law of England 44 page 570). Procedural law can be made applicable prospectively.

10. Once the above foundation is clear then it need no further explanation and/or discussion. I am of the view that as admittedly, the present appeal is pending and on this date there is no provision or bar of limitation available on the statute for claiming or raising such contention and the fact that there was an accident and the husband of the appellant died on 2nd July, 1980, according to me, she is entitled for the compensation under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. Even otherwise such delay, if any, cannot be the reason to reject her application on that count itself, when admittedly the application was filed within limitation. However, whatever may be the reason the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. owner and the Insurance Company couldn't be made party to the proceedings initially, but admittedly, those respondents are party from 18th April, 1983. If this was so, there was no reason to discard her application. The authorities cited by the appellant supports the case and reasoning as referred above. Therefore, considering the material as available on the record, instead of remanding the matter back for retrial after lapse of more than 24 years and as contended by the Counsel for the appellant, as they are restricting their claim to the tune of Rs. 25,000/-, as observed and allowed by the Tribunal, but only against the non-applicant No. 1. I am of the view, that all respondents are jointly and severally liable for the claim, as prayed by the appellants. 11. The appellant's Counsel, based on the evidence and material on the record, without challenging the merits of the matter, restricted his claim as awarded and as observed in the judgment for Rs. 25,000/- with interest @ 6% per annum, on the said amount, from the date of the claim petition i.e. 2nd January, 1981 till the date of the award dated 29-3-1986, and interest @ 12% per annum from the date of the award i.e. 29-3-1986 till recovery.

The respondents are directed to make payment to the appellant accordingly, within two months with interest as awarded already.

The appellant and respondent No. 4 are at liberty to withdraw the same if they have not already withdrawn.

The appeal is accordingly allowed.

12. No order as to costs.