Shankar Savala Gurav vs Shri Bala Govinda Patil
2003 Latest Caselaw 1018 Bom

JUDGMENT

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception of the judgment and order dated 30/8/1990 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur in Revision Application No. MRT/KP/77/86.

2. The sole question that arises for consideration in the present case is whether the tenant could have instituted an application under Section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 for restoration of his possession or was obliged to file application under Section 29 of the Act for such a relief.

3. Briefly stated, the land in question is R.S. No. 512/3 at Village Shiroli, Taluka Hatkanangale admeasuring 27 gunthas only. The predecessor of respondent - Mr. Bala Govinda Patil was lawfully cultivating the suit land as a tenant on the tillers day i.e. 1/4/1957. However, according to the petitioner-landlord, possession of the suit land was obtained from the tenant sometime in 1965 as the tenant surrendered the suit land. The tenant, however, disputed the factum that it was voluntarily surrendered. However, according to them, it was a forcible dispossession. The tenant, on the other hand, filed an application purported to be under Section 32G of the Act for determining the purchase price of the suit land on the assumption that he has become deemed purchaser of the suit land on the tillers day i.e. on 1/4/1957. That application was allowed in favour of the tenant by the Tahsildar vide judgment and order dated 31/5/1981. That order has become final as no appeal was preferred by the petitioner-landlord against that decision. Thereafter, the tenant initiated proceedings under Section 84 of the Act in view of the observations made by the Tahsildar by order dated 31/5/1981. That application is filed for possession of the suit land on the ground that the petitioner was in unauthorised possession as had forcibly dispossessed the respondent-tenant in the year 1965. The First Authority allowed that application by judgment and order dated 5/8/1985. Against that decision, the matter was carried in Revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which came to be dismissed by the impugned order and judgment. This concurrent decisions are the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the fact situation of the present case, the only remedy is to file an application under Section 29 of the Act and, instead, the tenant has filed application under Section 84 of the Act, which was obviously unavailable to him. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vallabbhai Nathabhai v. Bai Jivi and Ors. and another decision of this Court reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 49 in the case of Vishnu Sitaram Patil v. Gopal Avaba Asurlekar.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contends that in the present case, it is common ground that the tenant was in lawful cultivation on the tillers day i.e. 1/4/1957. Accordingly, by operation of law, on that day, the tenant became deemed purchaser of the suit land and on account of which even the relationship between the parties i.e. landlord and tenant came to an end. In such a situation, the only course open to the tenant was to institute an application under Section 84 of the Act for recovering possession of the land in question from persons, who were in unauthorised occupation including the landlord. To buttress the contentions, reliance has been placed on the decision of our High Court reported in 1993 Mh.L.J. 419 in the case of Vithoba Ram Rahane and Anr. v. Bhalchandra Sadashiv Joshi since deceased by heir and others. It is rightly brought to my notice that this decision has been affirmed by the Apex Court in the judgment in the case of Rangnath Vishnu Mulluck and Anr. v. Vithoba Rama Rahane and Ors. Reliance is also placed on another decision of this Court reported in 1990 Mh.L.J. 44 in the case of Gulab Abdul Fakir since deceased through LR. Rehman Gulab v. Satyabhamabai G. Deshpande and Anr.

6. Having considered the rival submissions, I have no hesitation in accepting the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent. The argument advanced is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Vithoba Ram Rahane (supra), which decision has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rangnath Vishnu Mulluck (supra). In that case, the question was squarely answered by this Court that once the tenant was found to be in lawful cultivation of the agricultural land on the tillers day i.e. 1/4/1957, he would become deemed purchaser thereof by operation of law and on that day, the relationship between the parties, i.e. landlord and tenant would cease to operate and, as a consequence of which, the only remedy available to such a tenant is to invoke Section 84 of the Act whereas, Section 29 of the Act is unavailable to such tenants. Even in the present case, the situation is same as in the above noted case. Therefore, I have no hesitation in following the decision in Rahane's case as affirmed by the Apex Court in Rangnath Vishnu Mulluck's case (supra) and to uphold the view taken by the two Courts below in this behalf.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, had placed emphasis on the decision of the Apex Court in Vallabbhai Nathabhai's case (supra). That decision has been considered by this Court in Vithoba Ram Rahane's case (supra) and distinguished. It is seen that in Vallabbhai's case, which was before the Apex Court, the tenant's case was that the tenant had voluntarily handed over the possession of the land on 15/5/1956 which is prior to the tillers day. If that is so, then obviously the ratio of the decision in Vithoba Rahane's case and of Rangnath Vishnu Mulluck's case (supra) would govern the field and will have to be applied to the present case. The view expressed by the two Courts below in granting the application preferred by the respondent-tenant and rejecting the objection taken on behalf of the petitioner-landlord about non-maintainability of that application will have to be affirmed. Understood thus, this Writ Petition will fail and the same is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.