Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Atiuri Venkata Satya Vara Prasad, vs Reddimi Ganesh, on 11 September, 2024

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CRP No.1685 of 2024 & Batch

APHC010316132024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3462] (Special Original Jurisdiction)

WEDNESDAY ,THE ELEVENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.NARENDAR CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.1685, 1686, 1688 and 1689 of 2024 CRP No.1685 of 2024 Between:

Atiuri Venkata Satya Vara Prasad, ...PETITIONER AND Reddimi Ganesh ...RESPONDENT Counsel for the Petitioner:

1. N SAI PHANINDRA KUMAR Counsel for the Respondent:

1.

The Court made the following:

Since the issue involved in all these Civil Revision Petitions is one

and the same, they are being heard together.

2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned

Counsel for the Respondent.

3. These revision petitions are directed against the orders whereby

the trial Court has been pleased to reject the applications preferred

under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("C.P.C.")

requesting to return the plaint as the Court has no jurisdiction, as the

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claim in the Suits arises out of a commercial transaction and is a

commercial dispute as defined under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the

Commercial Courts Act, 2015, (for short, "the Act").

4. The facts are not in dispute. The premises that were let out to the

petitioner were convention halls used for commercial purposes. The

other aspect of the matter i.e., the value of the claim also not being less

than Rs.3.00 Lakhs and satisfying the pecuniary jurisdiction also, the

applications came to be preferred. The said applications came to be

resisted on the ground, that to attract the provisions of the Act, the claim

value ought to be more than One Crore rupees.

5. In para.9 of the impugned orders, it is concluded that the rental

agreement does not come within the purview of any of the clauses

under Section 2(1)(c) of the Act. Further, regarding the pecuniary value,

the trial Court appears to have followed the order of the Division Bench

rendered in the case of Bellam Balakrishna v. Greenmount

Developers1.

6. The objections are reiterated before this Court and the attention of

this Court is drawn to the observations of the Division Bench in paras.6,

7 and 8 of the order in Bellam Balakrishna's1 case. The facts involved

in the said case were that of the plaint being returned by the

Commercial Court on the ground that the pecuniary jurisdiction

stipulated under Section 2(i) of the Act has not been notified by the

2023 (5) ALD 783 = 2023 (6) ALT 246

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State Government. In support of this reasoning, reliance is placed on

the provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 3 of the Act. Section 3

deals with the constitution of Commercial Courts and, more particularly,

with the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts

that were required to be established. In that direction, the Parliament

deemed it fit to vest a liberty in the State Government to consult the

High Court before notifying the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction of

any Commercial Court at District Level. That apart, by the second

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3, the Parliament has also enabled

the State Government to specify a pecuniary value which shall not been

less than three lakhs, as stipulated under clause (i) to the Explanation to

Section 2(1).

7. While the Parliament was pleased to stipulate the minimum

pecuniary limits, the State was not denuded of the powers to specify a

pecuniary limit above the minimum limit. It also empowered the State

Legislature to enact a law specifying a pecuniary value in excess of

Rupees Three Lakhs. At the same time, a further restriction or caveat

has been placed whereby the right of the State Government to notify a

higher value over and above the pecuniary jurisdiction exercisable by

the District or Local Court has also been taken away. Thereby implying

that, where the Court is not a designated Commercial District Court, the

pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court not so designated, cannot be over

and above the pecuniary limit already conferred on it.

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8. A plain reading of the first and second provisos to sub-section (1)

of Section 3 obviates and clearly demonstrates the interpretation placed

above. Sub-section (1A) of Section 3 came to be inserted by

Amendment Act 28 of 2018 whereby, yet again, power has been vested

with the State Government to notify a pecuniary value which shall not be

less than Rupees Three Lakhs, but, could be of such higher value for

whole or part of the State as it may consider necessary.

9. It is not common that every Civil Court is not only assigned a

territorial limit, but also a pecuniary limit. The second proviso places a

restriction on the State while exercising the power to re-fix the pecuniary

jurisdiction, in cases where the power of the State Government in

consultation with the High Court, deems it necessary to bestow the

jurisdiction under the Act in a Court with limited pecuniary jurisdiction.

In such a scenario, the second proviso places an embargo on the right

of the State Government to enhance the pecuniary jurisdiction of such a

District Court to limits beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction assigned under

the relevant Act.

10. Sub-section (1A) of Section 3 of the Act reads as under:

"(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the State Government may, after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, specify such pecuniary value which shall not be less than three lakh rupees or such higher value, for whole or part of the State, as it may consider necessary."

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11. On a plain reading of sub-section (1A) of Section 3, it is apparent

that the Parliament has deemed it fit to bestow an additional power on

the State to bestow a higher pecuniary jurisdiction over and above the

minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of three lakh rupees stipulated under the

Act i.e., where the Courts conferred jurisdiction under the Act do not

suffer from the limitation of Statute imposed pecuniary jurisdiction as is

provided under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3.

12. The provision of sub-section (1A) has been read in a manner as to

render otiose not only the provisions of clause (1) to the explanation to

sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act, but also, would render otiose the

provisions of the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3. Thus,

rendering dysfunctional all the Commercial Courts in the State.

13. An attempt is made by the learned Counsel for the respondent to

contend that since the sum of Rupees One Crore was originally fixed,

and if the same is considered in conjunction with enactment of sub-

section (1A), then the interpretation placed by the Division Bench in the

case of Bellam Balakrishna1 becomes applicable. In the considered

opinion of this Court, the interpretation has virtually rendered

dysfunctional the Commercial Courts, as neither a notification notifying

One Crore rupees as the pecuniary jurisdiction nor is a notification

specifying three lakh rupees as the pecuniary jurisdiction, is placed

before this Court.

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14. If the arguments as canvassed by the respondent are accepted, it

would render the entire enactment unworkable in the State of Andhra

Pradesh in the absence of a notification, notifying the pecuniary

jurisdiction. The reading makes it clear that liberty to the State

Government to fix a pecuniary value or a pecuniary jurisdiction is for a

sum higher than three lakh rupees only and the State Government is not

entitled to fix a pecuniary value even equivalent to three lakh rupees.

The language deployed leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that

the pecuniary value "which shall not be less than three lakhs" cannot be

interpreted to mean even three lakhs.

15. In the considered opinion of this Court, an interpretation which

renders a statute inoperative or otiose is impermissible in terms of the

law settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case State of Gujrat v. Justice

R.A. Mehata (Retired) [(2013) 3 SCC 1], in the Apex Court while

dealing with the issue of primacy of opinion in the appointment of the

Lokayukta who was please to hold as follows:--

"96. In the process of statutory construction, the court must construe the Act before it, bearing in mind the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat-which mean-it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void, i.e., a statute must be construed in such a manner, so as to make it workable. Viscount Simon, L.C. in the case of Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., (1940) 3 All E.R. 549, stated as follows:

"........ if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, they should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the

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view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result."

"97. Similarly in Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, 1926 AC 37, it was observed as under:

"A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable."

"98. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction, which carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred, looking into the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. "The courts strongly lean against any construction which stands to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so construed so as to make it effective and operative." The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted, as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus, legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not become a dead letter, and the obvious intention of the legislature does not stand defeated, unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy and "to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico".

The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed have enacted a reasonable statute. (Vide: M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107; S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta, (1987) 1 SCC 191 : AIR 1987 SC 222; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023; Tinsuhhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123; UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2008) 5 SCC 257; and Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys, (2011) 11 SCC 334)."

17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tata Power Company

Limited v. Reliance Energy Limited : [(2009) 16 SCC 659], observe

as follows:

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"67. A statute, as is well known, must be construed having regard to Parliamentary intent. For the said purpose it is open to a court not only to take into consideration the history of the legislation including the mischief sought to be remedied but also the objects and purpose it seeks to achieve."

"79. For the purpose of deciphering the object and purport of the Act, it is well known, the Court can look to the statement of objects and reasons thereof."

"97. However, when the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context. The legal principle is that all statutory definitions have to be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clause which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have some what different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words „unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context‟. [See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, ((1998) 8 SCC 1); Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Krishna Travel Agency, ((2008) 6 SCC 732) and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi ."

"99. To assign the same meaning to the word "supply" in Section 23 of the Act, as is assigned in the interpretation section, it is, in our opinion, necessary to take recourse to the doctrine of harmonious construction and read the statute as a whole. Interpretation of Section indisputably must be premised on the scheme of the statute. For the purpose of construction of a statute and in particular for ascertaining the purpose thereof, the entire Act has to be read as a whole and then chapter by chapter, section by section and word by word.

(See Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., [(1987) 1 SCC 424]; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India, [(1992) 2 SCC 343] and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh ."

"100. Thus, in a case where interpretation of a Section vis-a-vis the scheme of the Act, the purport and object of the legislation, particularly having regard to the mischief it seeks to remedy; the chapter heading as also the marginal note, in our opinion, are relevant."

"101.-PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION

"Legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn like nitrogen, out of air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other

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external manifestations of purpose. [See Justice Frankfurtir, Some Reflextions on the reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia LR 527, at page 538 (1947); Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.; ((2008) 7 SACC 502) and D. Purushotam Reddy v. K. Sateesh ".

18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shailesh Dhairyawan v.

Mohan Balakrishna Lulla : [(2016) 3 SCC 619), has been pleased to

observe as follows:--

"31. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother, would clearly demonstrate that provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The principle of „purposive interpretation‟ or „purposive construction‟ is based on the understanding that the Court is supposed to attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the „purpose‟ behind such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the Court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As Aharan Barak puts it:

"Purposive interpretation is based on three components: language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language."

"32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose and discretion „of the Court‟, insofar as purposive component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to actualize. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil."

"33. We may also emphasize that the statutory interpretation of a provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the „golden rule‟, it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered

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purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the Courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as well."

19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary

v. Gujarat Co-Operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited : [(2015)

8 SCC 1], has observed as under:--

"46. In the background of the constitutional mandate, the question is not what the statute does say but what the statute must say. If the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws do not say what they should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to read the constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts. "Insofar as in its Act Parliament does not convey its intention clearly, expressly and completely, it is taken to require the enforcement agencies who are charged with the duty of applying legislation to spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may be done either-(a) by finding and declaring implications in the words used by the legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning in accordance with pubic policy (including legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation."

"47. The conventional view is that the legislature alone makes the law. But as Bennion puts it:

"The truth is that courts are inescapably possessed of some degree of legislative power. Enacted legislation lays down rules in advance. The commands of Parliament are deliberate prospective commands. The very concept of enacted legislation postulates an authoritative interpreter who operates ex post facto. No such interpreter can avoid legislating in the course of exercising that function. It can be done by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning in accordance with public policy (including legal policy)."

"48. According to Donaldson, J:

"The duty of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments. In the performance of this duty the Judges do not act as computers into which are fed the statutes and the rules for the construction of statutes and from whom issue forth the mathematically correct answer. The interpretation of statutes is a craft as much as a silence and the Judges, as craftsmen, select and apply the appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. They are not legislators, but finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing."

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"49. In the celebrated case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, Lord Denning has succinctly summarised the principle on the role of the Court. To quote: (QB writ petition. 498-99)

".... Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity ...a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give force and life‟ to the intention of the legislature. ...Put into homely metaphor it is this: A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases."

"50. In Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung (Dead) By Lrs (supra), at para 17 of the Judgment, has also dealt with the principles in the following words: (SCC p. 77)

"17. ... The legislature often fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor is it realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is therefore, not only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step into fill the lacuna. When courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the object of the legislation and to promote the goals of the society. Or to put it negatively, to prevent the frustration of the legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society. So long as the courts keep themselves tethered to the ethos of the society and do not travel off its course so long as they attempt to furnish the felt necessities of the time and do not refurbish them, their role in this respect has to be welcomed."

20. As the judgment of the Division Bench in Bellam Balakrishna's1

case appears to be contrary to the provisions of Section 3 of the Act,

Registry is directed to place these revision petitions before the Hon'ble

the Chief Justice for placing these matters before a Division Bench for

consideration of the issue.

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21. In the meanwhile, all further proceedings in O.S.Nos.500, 501, 525

and 526 of 2021 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division),

Vijayawada, shall remain stayed.

22. That apart, the conduct of the respondents also cannot be

appreciated. On an earlier occasion, when it was contended by the