Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
N.Kamala Kumari vs P.L.Ssuryanarayanamma Anr on 14 October, 2024
1
APHC010382742003
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T
T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEALNO: 560/2003
Between:
N.kamala Kumari ...APPELLANT
AND
P L Ssuryanarayanamma Anr ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. K SUBRAHMANYAM
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. NARASIMHA RAO DAVULURI
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellant/Appellant/
Appellant/Appellant/Plaintiff
against the Decree and Judgment dated 19.02.1999, in A.S.No.75 of 1991 on
the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur (for short, 'the 1st Appellate Court')
confirming the decree and Judgment dated 15.02.1991,, in O.S.
O.S.No.725 of
1985 on the file of I Additional District Munsif, Kovvur (for short, 'the trial
Court').
2. The Appellant/Appellant
Appellant is the Plaintiff,, who filed the suit in O.S.
O.S.No.725
of 1985 seeking specific performance of a contract of sale dated 06.03.1982
executed by the 1st Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff.
2
3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit in O.S.
No.725 of 1985 is expedient to mitigate any potential confusion and better
comprehend the case.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the
contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
The 1st Defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to
Plaintiff for Rs.7,800/-. An earnest payment of Rs.400/- was received
by the 1st Defendant, who then executed an agreement of sale in
favour of the Plaintiff on 5.3.1984. Subsequently, Plaintiff paid
Rs.1,100/-, which the 1st Defendant acknowledged on a separate
stamped paper. The Plaintiff consistently demonstrated readiness
and willingness to fulfill her part of the contract, including paying the
remaining balance of sale consideration. However, the 1 st Defendant
failed to cooperate and did not execute a registered sale deed after
receiving the balance of the sale consideration. Despite multiple
attempts by the Plaintiff and her husband to request the execution of
the sale deed including issuing a legal notice, the 1st Defendant
responded with false claims. The time is not an essence contract.
Plaintiff learned through this response that the 1st Defendant had
sold the plaint schedule property to the 2nd Defendant under a sale
deed dated 16.06.1985. This sale deed is alleged to be a sham,
nominal, and collusive, created to undermine the Plaintiff's rights.
The Plaintiff, having already deposited the balance of the sale
consideration in Andhra Bank, Koyyalagadam (S.B.Account
No.4478), is now filing suit against both Defendants, seeking specific
performance of the agreement of sale or a refund of the earnest
money with interest.
5. In the written statement, the 1st Defendant admitted to entering an
agreement of sale with Plaintiff on 06.08.1984 and acknowledged receiving
Rs.400/- as earnest money on that day. The 1st Defendant claimed the
3
remaining balance of sale consideration was to be paid within three months
from the date of the agreement, failing which the agreement would be
automatically cancelled. The Plaintiff lacked the funds to pay the balance
within the stipulated period and afterwards. Consequently, since the Plaintiff
failed to pay the balance of the sale consideration within three months, she
became liable to pay double the advance amount. The Plaintiff was not ready
and willing to fulfill her part of the contract, and that time was of the essence in
the agreement. On 20.11.1984, the 1st Defendant sent a personal notice, but
the Plaintiff knowingly refused to receive it. The 1st Defendant explained that
she urgently needed money to perform her daughter's marriage, which led her
to enter into a second agreement with the Plaintiff's husband. At that time, an
additional sum of Rs.1100/- was paid, and the time for payment of the
remaining balance was set for 01.09.1984. It was agreed that if the Plaintiff
failed to pay by this date, the earnest money, totaling Rs. 1500/-, would be
forfeited. The 1st Defendant emphasized that time was also made essential in
this second agreement. Due to the Plaintiff's failure to meet the conditions of
both agreements, the 1st Defendant could not perform her daughter's
marriage, as she lacked the necessary funds. Despite waiting a considerable
amount of time, Plaintiff was still unwilling or unable to fulfill her contractual
obligations. After the expiration of the second agreement, the 1 st Defendant
sent another personal notice on 20.11.1984, but the Plaintiff again failed to
comply. As a result, the 1st Defendant, needing the money urgently, sold the
plaint schedule property to the 2nd Defendant to finance her daughter's
wedding. Under these circumstances, the earnest money was forfeited, the
sale agreement was cancelled, and the Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to any
relief.
6. The 2nd Defendant filed a separate written statement, asserting that he
was unaware of any sale agreement in favour of Plaintiff and denying
Plaintiff's claim of part payment. He explained that he owns property adjacent
to the plaint schedule property, and upon learning that the 1st Defendant
intended to sell the property, he approached her and purchased it for
4
Rs.10,000/-. A registered sale deed was executed by the 1st Defendant on
16.06.1985. The 2nd Defendant also stated that he spent Rs.4,000/- to fill a pit
and improve the plaint schedule property. He asserts that the present suit was
filed solely to cause him trouble and believes that the alleged second
agreement of sale and the Plaintiff's claimed payments are fabrications.
Therefore, he contends that the suit should be dismissed.
7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following
issues:
i. Whether the agreement dt.6.3.1984 is true and valid? If
so, whether it defeat the bonafide sale in favour of 2nd
Defendant?
ii. To what relief?
8. During the trial, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5
on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, D.Ws.1 to 3
were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.3.
9. After the conclusion of the trial and considering the arguments
presented by both parties, the trial Court dismissed the suit in O.S.No.725 of
1985. However, the trial Court decided that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
Rs.1,500/- from the 1st Defendant, with interest at 6% per annum from the date
of payments until its realization.
10. Aggrieved by the same, the Plaintiff filed an Appeal in A.S. No.75 of
1991 on file of the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, after
scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides,
dismissed the Appeal with costs by its Judgment and Decree dated
19.02.1999. Assailing the same, the Plaintiff preferred the present Second
Appeal.
11. I heard Sri K. Subrahmanyam, learned Counsel representing the
Appellant/Plaintiff, but none represented the Respondents/Defendants.
5
12. Although notice was sent to the Respondents, it could not be served
due to the absence of a door number. It appears that the notice was sent to
the same address provided during the trial court proceedings; however, it was
returned un-served. Despite being granted several adjournments, no
representation has been made on behalf of the Respondents. Therefore, the
matter is deemed to have been heard on behalf of the Respondents.
13. Based on the Appellant's contentions, the following substantial question
of law is involved in this Second Appeal:
Whether the finding of readiness and willingness to perform the
contract of sale of immovable property, ignoring material evidence
of the deposit of the balance amount of Rs.6,325/- and without
considering her capacity valid and correct?
14. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100
CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C.
15. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others 1, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that:
Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of
the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions
of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is
not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see
Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC
713) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar
Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438)......
16. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C., arise only when there is a
substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based
on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of
law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the
documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in
Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in nature in
terms of law.
1
2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC)
6
17. In the Second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of
the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial questions of law
involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and
interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below
recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary
evidence. Further, the substantial questions of law are the sine qua non for
the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless
the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the
evidence on record.
18. In a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, a heavy
burden lies upon Plaintiff to prove not only the execution of the sale
agreement but also his entitlement to the relief thereunder. Mere proof of the
agreement does not, by itself, entail a grant of relief. The Court is not bound to
grant specific relief merely because it is lawful. The discretion conferred upon
the courts is not arbitrary but must be exercised reasonably and soundly,
guided by judicial principles. While exercising discretion, the Court is required
to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case meticulously.
19. There is no dispute concerning the proposition that a suit for a specific
performance burden is always on the Plaintiff to prove and aver that he is
always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract throughout. Mere
taking a plea in the plaint is not sufficient; the Plaintiff should prove, with
cogent evidence, his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract at all material times, i.e. from the date of the contract till the date of
the suit. It is also settled law that the grant of decree for specific performance
is a discretionary relief. Undoubtedly, discretion has to be exercised judicially
and not arbitrarily.
20. As previously mentioned, the trial Court declined to grant the relief of
specific performance pertaining to the agreement of sale dated 06.03.1984.
However, it awarded an alternative relief of refund of the advance amount with
7
interest to the Plaintiff. The 1st Appellate Court subsequently upheld the trial
Court's findings, resulting in the dismissal of the Appeal Suit.
21. Before considering the rival contentions raised on behalf of both sides, it
is relevant to refer to the admitted facts born out from the record.
22. The 1st Defendant was the owner of the plaint schedule property. The
Plaintiff agreed to purchase the plaint schedule property for a total
consideration of Rs.7,800/-, formalized in Ex.A.1 on 06.03.1984. According to
the terms outlined in Ex.A.1, the Plaintiff was obligated to pay the balance of
sale consideration by 30.06.1984. Furthermore, it stipulated that should the 1 st
Defendant fail to execute the sale deed, she would be liable to pay the Plaintiff
double the amount of earnest money. Conversely, if the Plaintiff could not pay
the sale consideration balance within the specified timeframe, the agreement
would be deemed cancelled, and the earnest money paid would be forfeited. It
is acknowledged that Plaintiff later made a payment of Rs.1100/- to the 1st
Defendant on 17.09.1984. Subsequently, the Plaintiff executed Ex.A.2
agreement, which extended the time for the Plaintiff to pay the balance of sale
consideration until 18.10.1984.
23. The record indicates that the 1st Defendant did not contest the Appeal
Suit; however, the 2nd Defendant, who acquired the schedule property through
Ex.B.2 sale deed dated 16.04.1985, did contest the Appeal Suit. Furthermore,
the Plaintiff sent Ex.A.3, a registered notice, to the 1st Defendant through his
advocate. In response, the 1st Defendant issued Ex.A.4, a reply notice dated
04.06.1985, to the Plaintiff's advocate. The correspondence between the
parties reveals that both parties maintained remarkably similar stand
throughout the litigation.
24. It is canvassed on behalf of the Plaintiff before the trial Court and the 1 st
Appellate Court that time should not be regarded as the essence of the
contract, particularly in light of the execution of Ex.A.2 agreement. As
discerned from the trial Court's judgment, it concluded that Ex.A.2, the second
agreement of sale, exhibited material alterations. The Defendants contend
8
that the portion struck off in Ex.A.2 constitutes a material alteration. However,
the 1st Appellate Court noted that neither the 1st Defendant nor the 2nd
Defendant asserted in their written statements that Ex.A.2 had been materially
altered. Consequently, it was deemed untenable for the 2nd Defendant to claim
that Ex.A.2 is materially altered. Furthermore, the 1 st Defendant, as a party to
Ex.A.2, did not raise such contention; thus, the 2 nd Defendant, who is not a
party to Ex.A.2, lacks the standing to argue that there has been a material
alteration. By articulating cogent reasons, the 1st Appellate Court upheld
Plaintiff's contention that Ex.A.2 was not materially altered.
25. Regarding the Plaintiff's assertion that the 1st Defendant failed to issue a
notice under Section 64 of the Indian Contract Act before rescinding the
contract, both courts noted that the 1st Defendant had indeed sent a letter to
the Plaintiff, as evidenced by Ex.B.1, dated 28.11.1985. However, it was not
delivered to the Plaintiff due to an endorsement indicating that the Plaintiff was
absent from the residence. Upon reviewing the evidence, the 1st Appellate
Court concluded that the Plaintiff intentionally evaded receipt of the notice,
thereby establishing valid compliance with Section 64 of the Indian Contract
Act.
26. Admittedly, the schedule property is agricultural land. Furthermore, the
Appellant's Counsel argues that the Hon'ble Apex Court has consistently held
in various judgments that time should not be considered the essence of a
contract in transactions involving immovable property. Nevertheless, both the
trial Court as well as 1st Appellate Court, after consideration of the oral and
documentary evidence presented, determined that time is indeed of the
essence in the contract.
27. In Chunduru Padmavati V. Chunduru Narasimha Rao 2 , the
Combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, held as under:
"7. It is well settled that in the case of contracts relating to the sale of
immovable property, generally, time is not regarded as the essence of
2
2000(1) ALT 613
9
the contract. It is, however, open to the parties to make time the
essence of the contract by making express provisions on that behalf
in the contract. It can also be inferred from the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. Even though time was not made initially
the essence of the contract, it can be made by subsequent notice. In
Chandi Rani v. Kamal Rani, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court held that even where time is not of the essence of the contract,
the Plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable
time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the
surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the
contract, nature of the property and the object of making the contract.
This principle was reiterated in the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, 1997 (2) Supreme 597, where
the Apex Court, in keeping with the changing times, has made a bold
departure from the traditional rule that time is not of the essence of
the contract in the case of immovable properties in the following
words:
"Indeed we are inclined to think that the rigour of the rule evolved
by Courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case
of immoveable properties evolved in times when prices and values
were stable and inflation was unknown-requires to be relaxed if not
modified, particularly in the case of urban immoveable properties. It
is high time we do so."
28. In Smt. Chand Rani (dead) by L.R.S. V. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead)3,
the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
It is a well-settled principle of law that in the case of the sale of
immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract.
However, if the parties agree to a specified time to perform their
part of the contract, then time is the essence of the contract, and
the parties shall adhere to the same.
29. In Nalamathu Venkaiya (deceased by L.R.) & Another V.
B.S.Neelakanta4, this Court observed as follows:
26. ............though there is no express term in the agreement, the
conditions stipulated for payment would go to show that time is the
essence of the contract, and the plaintiffs failed to comply with the
3
(1993) 1 SCC 519
4
2005 SCC Online AP 578
10
condition by paying or depositing the first instalment within the
stipulated time.
30. In Saradamani Kandappan V. S.Rajalakshmi and others 5 , the
Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:
28. The intention to make time stipulated for payment of balance
consideration will be considered to be the essence of the contract
where such intention is evident from the express terms or the
circumstances necessitating the sale set out in the agreement. If,
for example, the vendor discloses in the agreement of sale, the
reason for the sale and the reason for stipulating that time
prescribed for payment be the essence of the contract, that is, say,
the need to repay a particular loan before a particular date, or to
meet an urgent time-bound need (say medical or educational
expenses of a family member) time stipulated for payment will be
considered to be the essence. Even if the urgent need for the
money within the specified time is not set out, if the words used
clearly show an intention of the parties to make time the essence of
the contract, with reference to payment, time will be held to be the
essence of the contract.
...........................
37.......A purchaser can no longer take shelter under the principle
that time is not of the essence in the performance of contracts
relating to immovable property to cover his delays, laches,
breaches and "non-readiness". .......In these days of galloping
increases in prices of immovable properties, to hold that a vendor
who took earnest money of, say, about 10% of the sale price and
agreed for three months or four months as the period for
performance did not intend that time should be the essence, will be
a cruel joke on him, and will result in injustice.....
The precedents from an era when high inflation was unknown,
holding that time is not of the essence of the contract in regard to
immovable properties, may no longer apply, not because the
principle laid down therein is unsound or erroneous, but the
circumstances that existed when the said principle was evolved, no
longer exist. Adding to the misery is the delay in the disposal of
cases relating to specific performance, as suits and appeals
therefrom routinely take two to three decades to attain finality. As a
result, an owner agreeing to sell a property for rupees one lakh and
receiving rupees ten thousand as advance may be required to
(2011) 12 SCC 18
execute a sale deed a quarter century later by receiving the
remaining rupees ninety thousand when the property value has
risen to a crore of rupees.
31. The trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court have considered the oral and
documentary evidence to conclude that time is the essence of the contract.
Both the Courts, concerning Ex.A.1 and A.2, observed that a time limit is
specified in the Ex.A.1 agreement. Both parties agreed that if Plaintiff failed to
pay the balance of the sale consideration amount by 30.06.1984, the earnest
money would be forfeited, and the agreement would be treated as cancelled.
Suppose the 1st Defendant fails to perform her part of the contract by
receiving the balance sale consideration and executing the registered sale
deed. In that case, the 1st Defendant shall pay to double the earnest money.
Thus, both parties intended to pay the sale price by the stipulated date.
32. The record shows that the 1st Defendant accepted a partial payment of
Rs.1100/- on 17.09.1984, and subsequently executed a fresh sale agreement.
As both the Courts correctly noted, Ex.A.2 stipulated a new deadline for the
payment of the sale consideration by 18.10.1984. Upon thorough examination
of Exs.A.1 and A.2, both the Courts reached a concurrent conclusion that the
conditions outlined in Ex.A.1 remain binding on both parties; however, the
timeframe for payment was extended by Ex.A.2. Based on the recitals in
Ex.A.1 and A.2, along with the oral evidence presented, both courts
determined that this extension indicates the parties' intention for the contract
to be performed within the extended timeframe, rather than merely serving as
a stipulation for the payment of the remaining sale consideration. Plaintiff
should have remitted the balance within the original timeline stipulated in
Ex.A.1, leading to the extension until 18.10.1984, to pay the remaining
consideration. The evidence presented indicates that the Plaintiff did not
possess the funds necessary to meet the balance consideration within the
periods specified in Exs.A.1 and A.2. Furthermore, the Plaintiff issued Ex.A.3,
a legal notice dated 06.03.1985, demanding that the 1st Defendant execute a
sale deed. Upon consideration of Ex.A.3, both Courts observed a lack of
evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff was ready and willing to fulfill her
contractual obligations by 18.10.1984. Moreover, no evidence indicates that
the Plaintiff made any efforts to pay the remaining amount before sending
Ex.A.3 on 06.03.1985. Consequently, no material was presented to show that
the Plaintiff had the necessary funds for the balance sale consideration within
the stipulated time under Ex.A.2.
33. The intention to make time stipulated for payment of balance
consideration will be considered the essence of the contract where such
intention is evident from the express terms or the circumstances necessitating
the sale set out in the agreement. Even if the urgent need for the money within
the specified time is not set out if the words used clearly show an intention of
the parties to make time the essence of the contract regarding payment, time
will be held to be the essence of the contract.
34. The Plaintiff has to prove that he has the money or has alternatively
made necessary arrangements to get the money. The continuous readiness
and willingness on the part of the Plaintiff is a precedent for granting the relief
of specific performance; this circumstance is material and relevant and is
required to be considered by the Court while granting an order refusing to
grant the relief. In U.N. Krishnamurthy (since deceased) Thr. L.Rs. V.
A.M.Krishnamurthy6, the Apex Court also held that:
There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to perform
the contract, and both ingredients are necessary for the relief of
Specific Performance. In His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh
Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar7 Cited by Mr Venugopal, this Court said
that there was a difference between readiness and willingness to
perform a contract. While readiness means the capacity of the
Plaintiff to perform the contract, which would include his financial
position, willingness relates to the conduct of the Plaintiff. The same
view was taken by this Court in Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar 8.
(2022) SCC Online 840
(1996) 4 SCC 526
(2018) 3 SCC 658
35. In N.P.Thirugnanam Vs. Dr R.Jagan Mohan Rao 9, the Apex Court
held that:
It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable
remedy and is at the discretion of the Court, which discretion
requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and
not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 (for short "the Act"). Under Section 20, the Court is not
bound to grant the relief just because there was a valid agreement
of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that the Plaintiff must
plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready
and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are
to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of
which has been prevented or waived by the Defendant. The
continuous readiness and willingness on the part of Plaintiff is a
condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This
circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be
considered by the Court while granting or refusing to grant the
relief. If the Plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must
fail. To adjudge whether the Plaintiff is ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the
conduct of the Plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the
suit, along with other attending circumstances. The amount of
consideration which he has to pay to the Defendant must, of
necessity, be proved to be available. Right from the date of the
execution till the date of the decree, he must prove that he is ready
and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As
stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his
part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct
of the party and the attending circumstances. The Court may infer
from the facts and circumstances whether the Plaintiff was ready
and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
36. In Sukhwinder Singh Vs. Jagroop Singh10, the Apex Court held that:
The suit being the one for specific performance of the contract on
payment of the balance sale consideration, the readiness and
willingness were required to be proved by the Plaintiff and was to
be considered by the Courts below as a basic requirement if a
decree for specific performance is to be granted.
(1995) 5 SCC 115
(2020) SCC Online SC 86
37. Both Courts have concurrently held that the agreement stipulates a
timeframe for paying the balance amount alongside a default clause for non-
payment. The evidence indicates that the Plaintiff was unable to remit the
balance sale consideration within the timeframe outlined in Ex.A.1, as well as
within the extended period granted by Ex.A.2. Upon careful consideration of
the evidence, both Courts determined that the parties intended for time to be
of the essence in the contract. Additionally, both Courts noted that Plaintiff
delayed six months before issuing a legal notice to the 1 st Defendant
demanding the execution of the sale deed. The Plaintiff also failed to provide
evidence demonstrating readiness and willingness to fulfill her contractual
obligations. Although the Plaintiff presented Ex.A.5, an Andhra Bank
passbook bearing Account No.4478, which was opened in September 1985,
the 1st Appellate Court aptly observed that it did not substantiate the Plaintiff's
claim of being ready and willing to perform her part of the contract by
18.10.1984.
38. At the cost of repetition, whether time is an essence of the contract
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, after
considering the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and other
material placed before the Court, this Court views that, as per the terms of the
agreement, time is the essence of the contract. In light of the well-established
principles of law referenced above, this Court is of the opinion that both the
trial court and the 1st Appellate Court appropriately analysed the evidence on
record. They concluded that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was
consistently ready and willing to perform her obligations under the contract.
39. The findings of the trial court, which the 1st Appellate Court has
affirmed, are neither perverse nor the result of misinterpretation of documents
or misreading of evidence. Upon carefully reviewing the materials on record,
this Court concludes that both the trial court and the 1st Appellate Court
concurrently dismissed the Plaintiff's suit for specific performance, thoroughly
recording all relevant factual findings. These findings do not contradict the
pleadings, evidence, or law provisions. Consequently, this Court holds that the
conclusions drawn by the trial and 1st Appellate courts are not subject to
interference under Section 100 of the C.P.C. No question of law, let alone a
substantial question of law, is pertinent to this Second Appeal; therefore, the
Appeal must be dismissed.
40. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. The
judgment and decree dated 19.02.1999 of learned Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur
in A.S.No.75 of 1991 stands confirmed.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this Second Appeal, shall
stand closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 14.10.2024
SAK
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO. 560 OF 2003
Date:14.10.2024
SAK
