Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd vs Malladi Laxminarayana, Krishna ... on 3 October, 2024
Author: R. Raghunandan Rao
Bench: R. Raghunandan Rao
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
***
W.A.Nos.1753 of 2008, 522 of 2009, 125, 1161 & 1162 of 2010
W.A.No.1753 of 2008
Between:
The Automobile Technicians Association.
... Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.522 of 2009
Between:
The District Collector, Krishna,
Machilipatnam & others. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.125 of 2010
Between:
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others. ... Respondents
W.A.No.1161 of 2010
Between:
Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, Hyderabad & 4 others ... Appellants
2
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
And
$ The State of A.P Rep. by District Collector,
Machilipatnam and others. ...Respondents
W.A.No.1162 of 2010
Between:
Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi,
Vijayawada and 5 others. ... Appellants
And
$ The District Collector,
Krishna District & 3 others. ...Respondents
Date of Judgment pronounced on : 03-10-2024
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No
May be allowed to see the judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : Yes/No
to Law Reporters/Journals:
3. Whether the Lordship wishes to see the fair copy : Yes/No
Of the Judgment?
3
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
+ W.A.Nos.1753 of 2008, 522 of 2009, 125, 1161 & 1162 of 2010
% Dated: 03-10-2024
W.A.No.1753 of 2008
Between:
The Automobile Technicians Association.
... Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.522 of 2009
Between:
The District Collector, Krishna,
Machilipatnam & others. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.125 of 2010
Between:
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others. ... Respondents
4
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
W.A.No.1161 of 2010
Between:
Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, Hyderabad & 4 others ... Appellants
And
$ The State of A.P Rep. by District Collector,
Machilipatnam and others. ...Respondents
W.A.No.1162 of 2010
Between:
Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi,
Vijayawada and 5 others. ... Appellants
And
$ The District Collector,
Krishna District & 3 others. ...Respondents
! Heard Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant
in W.A.No.1753 of 2008.
Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant in
W.A.No.1161 of 2010
Smt. Iswarya Nagula, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
W.A.No.1162 of 2010
Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana, the respondent in W.A.No.1753 of 2008
W.A.No.522 of 2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010, who is appearing as party-in-
person.
^Counsel for Respondents : Sri P. Raj Gopal Rao, Sri P.R. Prasad, Sri J.
Ugranarasimha, G.P. for Land Acquisition, G.P for Revenue
5
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
<GIST :
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1
(2019) 10 SCC 229
2
AIR 2023 SC 2518
3
(2019) 10 SCC 229
4
.(2000) 4 SCC 322
5
1998 (3) Karnataka Law Journal 304 (Full Bench)
6
(2006) (2) SCC 416
7
(1994) 5 SCC 686
8
2009 (1) ALD 188
1
9 (2010) 4 SCC 17 (para.72)
10
(2019) 8 SCC 552 (para 6 and 6.3)
11
(2018) 7 SCC 763 (para 14)
12
(1994) 4 SCC 145 (para 2)
13
(2020) 8 SCC 129
14AIR 1987 Del 239
15
(2010) 4 SCC 17
16
(2018) 7 SCC 763
17
(2019) 8 SCC 552
6
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
APHC010053852008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3488]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY ,THE THIRD DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
WRIT APPEAL NO: 1753/2008
Between:
The Automobile Technicians Association. ...APPELLANT
AND
Malladi Laxmi Narayana 2 Others and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
2. P R PRASAD
3. VIVEK CHANDRA SEKHAR S
4. P ROY REDDY
WRIT APPEAL NO: 522/2009
Between:
The Dist. Collector, Krishna, Machilipatnam & ...APPELLANT(S)
Others
AND
Malladi Laxminarayana Vijayawada and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
7
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2. P R PRASAD
3. P RAJAGOPAL REDDY
WRIT APPEAL NO: 125/2010
Between:
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd. ...APPELLANT
AND
Malladi Laxmi Narayana Krishna District and ...RESPONDENT(S)
Others
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P ROY REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
3. P R PRASAD
WRIT APPEAL NO: 1161/2010
Between:
Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, Hyderabad & 4 Otrs. ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
The State Of A P Rep By Dist Collector ...RESPONDENT(S)
Machilipatnam and Others
8
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. V V SATISH
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2.
3. GP FOR REVENUE
4. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
5. J UGRANARASIMHA
WRIT APPEAL NO: 1162/2010
Between:
Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi, Vijayawada & 5 ...APPELLANT(S)
Others
AND
Dist. Collector, Krishna Dist and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. AISHWARYA NAGULA
2. .
3. V V N NARAYANA RAO
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2.
3. GP FOR REVENUE
4. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
5. J UGRANARASIMHA
COMMON JUDGMENT
Dt: 03.10.2024
(per Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao)
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Heard Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the
appellant in W.A.No.1753 of 2008, Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for appellant in W.A.No.1161 of 2010, Smt.
Iswarya Nagula, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
W.A.No.1162 of 2010, Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana, the respondent in
W.A.No.1753 of 2008, W.A.No.522 of 2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010,
who is appearing as party-in-person. Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana has
submitted written arguments which have been perused by us.
2. All these Writ Appeals are being disposed of, by way of a
common Judgment, as they arise out of two separate orders of the
erstwhile High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh and raise
essentially the same facts and questions of law.
3. The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation
had intended to establish an automobile industrial estate at Kanuru
Village, near Vijayawada, and had sought the assistance of the
Government for acquiring necessary land for this purpose. The
government had initiated acquisition proceedings for approximately 148
acres of land situated in Sy.Nos.181 to 184 of Kanuru Village,
Penamaluru Mandal. The said acquisition process was challenged, by
way of W.P.No.2370 of 1988, and the same came to be quashed by a
Judgment of this Court. Subsequently, a fresh notification for acquiring
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
an extent of Ac.152.08 cents in Sy.No.60/2 and 61 to 63 of Kanuru
Village was issued. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as „the 1894 Act‟) was
published in the Gazette of 21.04.1995. The enquiry, under Section 5-A
of the Act, was dispensed with and the declaration under Section 6 of
the Act was published on 28.04.1995. The last publication of the
declaration, under Section 6, was carried out in the local newspapers,
on 23.05.1995. Thereafter, initially, two writ petitions came to be filed,
questioning the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration
under Section 6, by way of W.P.No.10651 of 1995 and W.P.No.10652
of 1995. The said W.P.No.10652 of 1995 came to be filed by the
petitioners in W.P.No.3957 of 2006. Similarly W.P.No.10651 of 1995
came to be filed by one Malladi Krishna Mohan, who subsequently
passed away and his legal heirs were brought on record as petitioners
2 to 4 in that writ petition. The said writ petitions were filed and interim
directions of stay of further proceedings was granted, in both writ
petitions, on 30.05.1995. On 28.06.1995 and 04.07.1995, these orders,
in both writ petitions, were modified and the stay was restricted to stay
of dispossession, with liberty being granted to the respondent
authorities to complete all other formalities. Subsequently, both these
writ petitions came to be dismissed on 12.08.2003. The writ appeals
filed against the order of dismissal also came to be dismissed. After the
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
dismissal of the writ petitions and the Writ Appeals, an award, dated
05.08.2005, is said to have been passed by the Collector. The said
award was challenged, by the writ petitioners in W.P.No.10651 of
1995, by way of W.P.No.24105 of 2006. It may also be noted that Writ
petitioners 4 to 6 in W.P. No. 24105 of 2006 are said to be persons
who had purchased the land from the Petitioners 1 to 3 in this writ
petition. The writ petitioners in W.P.No.10652 of 1995 filed
W.P.No.3957 of 2006 challenging the award of 05.08.2005. Apart from
this another writ petition bearing No. 13970 of 1995 was filed by
another land owner, who was affected by the same notification. Interim
orders of stay of dispossession were obtained and remained in force till
the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 16.04.2004.
4. Apart from this, Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana, who had
not filed any writ petition, earlier, assailed the award dated 05.08.2005,
by way of W.P.No.2647 of 2006.
5. The petitioners in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 claimed
ownership over Ac.8.37 cents of land in Sy.No.61 and 63 and
challenged the award to that extent. The petitioners in W.P.No.3957 of
2006 claimed ownership of Ac.15.59 cents in Sy.No.60/2 and
challenged the award of 05.08.2005 to that extent. The petitioner in
W.P.No.2647 of 2006 claimed ownership over Ac.8.37 ½ cents in
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Sy.Nos.61 and 63 and challenged the award of 05.08.2005 to that
extent.
6. The petitioners, in W.P.No.24105 and 3957 of 2006
contended that the award dated 05.08.2005 had been passed beyond
the two year period permitted under Section 11- A of the 1894 Act, in
as much as the last date of publication of the notification, under Section
6, was 23.05.1995, while the award was passed on 05.08.2005. They
contended that the stay granted in W.P.No.10651 and 10652 of 1995
was only a stay of dispossession and the said period of stay could not
be taken into account for calculating the two years within which the
award has to be passed. Apart from this, they also contended that,
even if the period of stay is to be excluded, the award had been passed
beyond the period of two years. Apart from this, various other grounds
had also been raised. A learned single judge of the erstwhile High
Court of Andhra Pradesh, by a common order dated 26.10.2010
dismissed both the petitions holding that the award was within time and
negatived all the other contentions raised in the writ petitions.
Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the petitioners in
W.P.No.3957 of 2006 filed W.A.No.1161 of 2010 and the petitioners in
W.P.No.24105 of 2006 filed W.A.No.1162 of 2010.
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
7. The writ petitioner in W.P.No.2647 of 2006 took the stand
that he was not party to any of the writ petitions and as such, the period
between the publication of declaration under Section 6 in May, 1995
would be the starting point for calculating the period of two years
prescribed under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. This
contention was accepted by a learned Single Judge who allowed the
writ petition, by way of an order dated 15.10.2008, holding that the
award dated 05.08.2005 was beyond the time stipulated under Section
11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
8. The respondents in W.P.No.2647 of 2006, namely the
Collector, the Land Acquisition Officer, M/s APIIC and Automobile
Technicians Association filed W.A. No.1753 of 2008, W.A.No.522 of
2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010, assailing the judgment in W.P. No.
2647 of 2006.
9. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants in Writ Appeal No. 1161 of 2010 contends
as follows:
"Section 11 A, of the Act of 1894, prescribes a time period
within which an award can be passed. This time period is 2
years from the date of publication of the declaration under
section 6 of the Act. While computing this two year period,
the period for which any stay of proceedings granted by a
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
court, was subsisting is to be excluded. Any further delay
beyond the two years period would result in the entire land
acquisition process lapsing. The last date of publication of
the declaration, under Section 6 of the 1894 Act, was 23rd
May 1995. The erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh had
granted stay of proceedings on 30th May 1995 and modified
it to a stay of dispossession alone. The Writ Petitions were
dismissed on 12.08.2003. The award was passed on
5/8/2005. However, the prior consent of the Government
required under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act was
obtained only on 15/8/2005. The notice of the award was
received by the appellants in September 2005. The passing
of an award is complete only upon service of the award on
the affected party. This would be September 2005, which is
clearly beyond the period of 2 years, stipulated under
Section 11 A of the 1894 Act. Even if the date of the passing
of the award is to be taken as the relevant date, the said
date would be 15.08.2005, as that was the date on which
the government or the specified officer had given approval,
as required under section 11 of the Act. This would also be
beyond the period of 2 years stipulated under Section 11 A.
The provisions of section 11A have to be construed strictly.
Consequently, the award and the Land acquisition
proceedings would have to fail. The Learned Senior
Counsel relies upon various judgments, which shall be
considered presently.
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
10. Sri V. V. Narayana, appearing for appellants 4 to 6 in Writ
Appeal No. 1162 of 2010, while reiterating the contentions of Sri O.
Manohar Reddy, further contends that the provisions of section 24 (2)
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as the 2013 Act) would be applicable as compensation
was not paid before the 2013 Act came into force and no possession
was taken at all and that possession was also not taken in September,
2005, as claimed by the respondent authorities.
11. Sri K.S. Murthy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for
the appellants 1 to 3, in W.A. No. 1162 of 2010, contends that the last
publication of the Declaration under section 6 of the Act of 1894 was on
20th May, 1995; the award said to have been passed on 5/8/2003 was
only a draft award and cannot be treated as an award passed under
section 11 of the Act. Even otherwise, the notice of the said award was
dispatched on 9/9/2005 and received by the appellants on 14/9/2005
which is beyond the period of 2 years stipulated under section 11A of
the Act of 1894; While Section 4 of the Act of 1894, stipulates the last
date of publication of the notification, there is no such clarification in
section 6 of the Act of 1894. In such circumstances, the first date of
publication should be treated as the starting point for computation of
the two year period set out in Section 11 of the 1894 Act. Since the
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
publication of the declaration was done in the newspaper on 20th May
1995, the said date should be taken into account.
12. Ms. Aishwarya Nagula, supplementing the contentions of
Sri K.S. Murthy, would submit that the grant of approval on 15.8.2005,
is highly doubtful as government offices would not be working on that
day. She would also contend that the mandatory notices under section
9 of the 1894 Act were never served on the land owners as they were
not residing in the addresses to which the notices were sent. She
would also draw the attention of this court to the counters wherein it
was stated that the land owners were not residing in those addresses.
She assailed the action of the land acquisition officer in publishing the
notification and declaration in a newspaper like "Pledge" which has no
circulation.
13. Sri P. Rajagopal Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for
the Automobile Technicians Association, which is the appellant in W.A.
No. 1753 of 2008, disputes the above contentions on the following
grounds: Where more than one challenge, to a Land acquisition
proceeding, is raised before the courts and stay of dispossession or
stay of proceedings is obtained, It is the date on which the last stay had
been vacated, that would be the starting point for computing the two
year period under Section 11 A of the 1894 Act. In the present case,
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
stay of further proceedings had also been given, in W.P. No. 13970 of
1995, which had been filed by another land owner. This writ petition
came to be dismissed on 16/9/2004. This would extend the time
available for passing an award to 15.09.2006. Since the award was
passed on 5.08.2005, prior approval obtained on 15.08.2005 and
served on the affected persons on 14.09.2005, the entire process had
been completed within the stipulated two year period; the appellants 4
to 6 in W.A. No. 1162 of 2010 have no locus to file the present writ
appeal. He submits that the purchase of the land, by way of deeds of
sale, dated 12.07.2004, 30.08. 2004 and 26.04.2004 from the
Appellants 1 to 3 is void as any purchase of land after the Notification
under Section 4 of the 1894 Act has been published is null and void.
They can have no further interest in the land and they cannot challenge
the acquisition proceedings; the acquisition was for an extent of 152
Acres, while the acquisition was challenged by persons interested in
about 30 acres. Such a challenge, by a minority of owners, cannot be
maintained, when a majority of the owners have accepted the
proceedings and have not challenged the same. The learned counsel
relied upon a catena of judgements to support his contentions. They
shall be considered presently.
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT:
14. Before going into the issues that arise in this set of
appeals, it is necessary to resolve the disputes around the facts of the
case. The disputes arise on the dates of publication, the date of
payment of compensation and the date on which possession of the
land had been taken and whether possession has been taken at all or
not.
15. To obviate any further controversy, on the dates of
publication, passing of the award, grant of approval of the award by the
concerned authority and service of notice of award, this court proposes
to accept the dates set out in the award of 05.08.2005 and the dates
set out in the pleadings and documents filed by the official respondents
as well as the appellant in W.A. No. 1753 of 2008.
16. The relevant dates according to the award of 05.08.2005
are as follows:
1. D.N U/s.4(1) of the L.A. Act approved by the Collector,
Krishna in Rc.G2/3962/94 dated 16.4.95.
In the A.P Gazette issue No :5/KST/1995, dt.24.4.1995.
Andhra Jyothi News paper on : 11/05/1995
Prajashakti News Paper on :10/05/1995
In the locality on :12/05/1995
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
2. D.D U/s.6 of the L.A Act approved by the Collector, Krishna
in Rc.G2/3962/94 dated 16.04.95.
In the AP Gazette issue No :6/KST/1995, dt:28.4.1995.
Udayam News Paper on :20/5/1995
Pledge News Paper on : 23/5/1995
In the Locality on :20/5/1995
The relevant dates, after the passing of the award, are as
follows:
Date of Award : 05/08/2005
Date of prior Approval : 15/08/2005
Notice of Award : 09/09/2005
Notice of Award received : 14/09/2005
Possession taken : 13/09/2005
17. There is a challenge to the locus of appellants 4 to 6 in
W.A.No.1162 of 2010 in filing W.P.No.24105 of 2006. These appellants
are said to have purchased the land under acquisition, from the
appellants 1 to 3, under three deeds of sale dated 12.07.2004,
30.08.2004 and 26.04.2004. All these deeds of sale were executed
after publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and the
declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. The Hon‟ble Supreme
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Court in Shiv Kumar vs. Union of India1 had held that any person
who purchases land, after the notification of Section 4(1) and
declaration under Section 6 does not get title to the land and has no
locus to challenge any of the acquisition proceedings. This Judgment
was also followed by another bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Ravinder Kumar Jain and Ors2.
The relevant paragraph in Shiv Kumar vs. Union of India3 is
extracted below:
20. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after
Section 4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the
land, such incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of
Section 24. As the sale transaction did not clothe them with
the title when the purchase was made; they cannot claim
"possession" and challenge the acquisition as having
lapsed under Section 24 by questioning the legality or
regularity of proceedings of taking over of possession under
the 1894 Act. It would be unfair and profoundly unjust and
against the policy of the law to permit such a person to
claim resettlement or claim the land back as envisaged
under the 2013 Act. When he has not been deprived of his
livelihood but is a purchaser under a void transaction, the
outcome of exploitative tactics played upon poor farmers
who were unable to defend themselves.
18. In view of the above principle laid down by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, the appellants 4 to 6 in W.A.No.1162 of 2010 have no
locus to file either W.P.No.24105 of 2006 or W.A.No.1162 of 2010.
However, these transactions, in view of the principle laid down by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, would not take away the right or locus of
(2019) 10 SCC 229
AIR 2023 SC 2518
(2019) 10 SCC 229
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
appellants 1 to 3 to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Accordingly,
W.A.No.1162 of 2010 is maintainable by Writ Appellants 1 to 3.
19. The primary dispute in the present set of cases is whether
the award, dated 05.08.2005, is beyond the time stipulated in Section
11-A of the 1894 Act and whether the period of stay, which is to be
excluded under the proviso, would save limitation for passing the
award.
20. The provisions of Section 11 and 11-A of the 1894 Act,
which are relevant, are extracted below:
11. Enquiry and award by Collector. -
[(1)] On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry
has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the
objection (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant
to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made
under section 8, and into the value of the land [at the date of the
publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1)], and
into the respective interests of the persons claiming the
compensation and shall make an award under his hand of-
(i) the true area of the land;
(ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed
for the land; and
(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all
the persons known or believed to be interested in the land,
or whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or
not they have respectively appeared before him :
[Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector
under this sub-section without the previous approval of the
appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate
Government may authorize in this behalf: Provided further
that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to
direct that the Collector may make such award without such
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
approval in such class of cases as the appropriate
Government may specify in this behalf.
[(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any
stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the
persons interested in the land who appeared before him have
agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the
Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate
Government, he may, without making further enquiry, make an
award according to the terms of such agreement.
(3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-
section (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of
compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or
elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act,
1908 (16 of 1908), no agreement made under subsection (2) shall
be liable to registration under that Act.]
[11A. Period shall be which an award within made. - The
Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of
two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if
no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the
acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been
published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made
within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in
this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be
taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of
a court shall be excluded.
21. Section 11-A mandates that an award, under Section 11 of
the 1894 Act, would have to be passed within two years from the date
of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. The last
date of such declaration, according to the award, is 23.05.1995. The
award was passed on 05.03.2005, approved on 15.08.2005 and notice
of such award was sent on 09.09.2005. The two year period, de hors
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
the period to be excluded under the explanation to the proviso in
Section 11-A, had obviously lapsed before any of the above dates had
occurred.
22. The explanation to the proviso in Section 11-A of the 1984
Act provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or
proceedings, under the 1894 Act is stayed by a Court.
23. In the present case, the appellants in W.A.No.1161 and
1162 of 2010 had approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, by
way of Writ Petition Nos.10651 and 10652 of 1995 challenging the
notifications issued under Section 4(1) and Section 6. On 30.05.1995
the erstwhile High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh had granted
stay of all further proceedings pursuant to these notifications.
Subsequently, on 28.06.1995, the order granted in W.P.No.10651 of
1995 was modified wherein the stay was restricted to stay of
dispossession while giving liberty to the respondents to complete other
formalities. An identical modification was made in W.P.No.10652 of
1995 on 04.07.1995. There was earlier some ambiguity as to whether
stay of dispossession was sufficient to exclude the period for which the
stay persists. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in M. Ramalinga Thevar vs.
State of T.N4 had held that even an order of stay of dispossession was
.(2000) 4 SCC 322
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
sufficient for exclusion of the said period, under the explanation to the
proviso, while computing the two year period set out under Section 11-
A of the 1894 Act. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
6. As per the Explanation the period of exclusion from the time is
the period during which "any action or proceedings" to be taken
in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed. We have no doubt
that one of the actions contemplated pursuant to the declaration
is taking possession of the land, though such action is a post-
award step in normal circumstances and in emergent
circumstances it can as well be a pre-award step. Nonetheless,
taking possession is one of the actions to be adopted as a follow-
up measure pursuant to the declaration envisaged in Section 6 of
the Act. The consequence mentioned in Section 11-A is a self-
operating statutory process and, therefore, it can operate only
when the conditions specified therein conjoin together. The
consequence would step in only when there is fusion of all the
conditions stipulated therein. If there is any stay regarding any of
the actions to be taken pursuant to the declaration then the
consequence of lapse would not happen.
10. Thus, the position is now well settled that even when
dispossession alone is stayed by the Court the period during
which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time
fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would render the
acquisition proceedings lapsed. In the light of the said
interpretation it is now idle to contend that the Government is
debarred from proceeding with the acquisition. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed.
24. Both writ petitions namely W.P.No.10652 of 1995
and 10651 of 1995 were dismissed on 12.08.2003. It may also be
noticed that there was no stay between 23.05.1995 and 30.05.1995
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
against the land acquisition proceedings. The last date by which the
award would have to be passed, after taking in to account the aforesaid
period of seven days, would be on or before 04.08.2005. The award is
said to have been passed on 05.08.2005. Even if 05.08.2005 is treated
as the last date on which the award can be passed, there is a further
development that would have to be noticed by this Court. The first
proviso to Section 11(1) stipulates that no award can be made by the
Collector without the previous approval of the appropriate government
or the authorized officer. In this case, the said prior approval is said to
have been obtained on 15.08.2005 and notice of this award is said to
have been served on the appellants in W.A.No.1161 and 1162 of 2010
on 14.09.2005.
25. The appellants contend that the award would have to be
treated to have been passed on 15.08.2005 and in any event the
award should be treated as lapsed since the prior approval had not
been given on or before 04.08.2005 at the latest. The 4th respondent
and the acquisition authorities contend that where prior approval is
given without any modification, the said approval would date back to
the date of the award and consequently it is within time.
26. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, the learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.4 relies upon a Full Bench Judgment of the Hon‟ble
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
High Court of Karnataka in Poornaprajna House Building Co-
operative Society vs. Bailamma 5and more specifically paragraph
No.29 of the said Judgment. The relevant provision is extracted below:
29. Where the award is approved without, any modification it
would relate back to the date on which the award was made by the
Land Acquisition Officer. Different considerations may arise where
the award is not accepted in its entirety by the Government and
the Government thinks it necessary to make certain modification in
the award.
27. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao would also contend that this
Judgment has been confirmed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
Bailamma vs. Poornaprajna House Building Coop. Society6 and
would be binding on this Court.
28. A perusal of the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in Bailamma (Smt) Alias Doddabailamma (Dead) and Ors vs.
Poornaprajna House Building Cooperative Society and Ors., does
not reveal any confirmation of the principle, set out by the full bench of
the Hon‟ble High Court of Karnataka, which has been extracted above.
In this case, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on
05.11.1988 and the award of the Collector was made on 13.03.1990.
However, the prior approval of the government was granted on
16.11.1992. Since, this was beyond 05.11.1990 which was the last
1998 (3) Karnataka Law Journal 304 (Full Bench)
(2006) (2) SCC 416
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
date on which the two year period would elapse, a challenge was
raised to the acquisition proceedings.
29. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court noticed that a writ petition had
been filed earlier, for certain directions to be granted, and an interim
order dated 29.06.1990 was granted staying operation of the
declaration dated 13.06.1988 for two weeks. Thereafter, the stay was
extended till further orders. Subsequently, on 17.02.1991 the order of
stay was modified by clarifying that the order of stay would not prevent
the government from granting approval of the award. The stay was
finally vacated on 18.11.1992. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court after
noticing these facts had held that the prior approval granted by the
government was within the period of two years, after excluding the
period of stay. There is no finding by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that
the prior approval, without modification, would date back to the date of
the award itself. The following extracts would make this clear:
22. At this stage, we may observe that having regard to the
controversy raised before us, we required the State to produce
before us the original file. Shri Sanjay Hegde, counsel for the
State, produced before us the original file, from which it appears
that after the award was signed by the Collector on 13-3-1990, the
Society had moved the High Court by way of writ petition for a
mandamus directing the State Government to approve the award.
However, after the order of the High Court dated 7-2-1991,
modifying the earlier interim order of stay and permitting the
Government to take a decision with regard to the approval of the
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
award, the Divisional Commissioner sent the award to the
Government for approval on 10-6-1991. The Government granted
its approval on 16-11-1992 and the record was returned to the
office of the Collector. On 20-11-1992, notice under Section 12(2)
was issued after the file was received by the Deputy
Commissioner. He also pointed out the agreements in Form „D‟
signed by the person authorised under Article 229 of the
Constitution, namely, the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
25. The award which has already been signed by the Collector
becomes an award as soon as it is approved by the Government
without any alteration. At best the appellants can contend that it
becomes an award when notice is given to the parties interested.
Viewed from any angle, having regard to the fact that there is no
dispute that the Government granted its approval on 16-11-1992
and notices were issued under Section 12(2) of the Act on 20-11-
1992, it must be held that the award was made within the period
prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act. There was really no
necessity for the Collector to sign the award again, nor does
Section 11 requires that for the purpose of pronouncing the
award notice should be given by the Collector to the persons
interested. Section 11 requires notice to be given for the purpose
of hearing objections. After the objections are heard, the
Collector has to apply his mind to all the relevant facts and
circumstances and prepare an award whereafter he is required to
send it to the Government for approval. There is nothing in
Section 11 which requires him to give notice to the persons
interested of the date for pronouncement of the award, though,
as we have observed earlier, there is also nothing which prevents
him from giving such notice. We agree with the finding of the
High Court that once it is shown that the award was made and
signed and approved by the Government within the period
prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act an award is validly made.
In the instant case, we have satisfied ourselves that the award
was received by the Deputy Commissioner after approval, and
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
notice was thereafter issued under Section 12(2) of the Act on
20-11-1992.
30. A similar issue had come up before the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in State of U.P vs. Rajiv Gupta7. In this case, declaration under
Section 6 of 1894 Act was published on 22.12.1990 and the award
would have to be passed on or before 21.12.1992. The award, passed
by the Land Acquisition Officer, was dated 20.12.1992. However, no
prior approval was granted before 21.12.1992, which was the last date
for passing the award. Para 6, which is relevant is extracted below:
6. Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making
the award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that "no
award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section without
the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such
officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this
behalf". It is common knowledge that exercising the power
under the first proviso, the appropriate Government made rules
or statutory orders or instructions whatever be the
nomenclature, they have statutory operation giving
authorisation to the Land Acquisition Collector to make an
award up to a particular pecuniary limit without prior approval
either of the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by
the appropriate Government in that behalf. If the award exceeds
the limit, prior approval of the State Governments or authorised
officer is mandatory. Any award made in violation thereof,
renders the award non est and void as it hinges upon the
jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector or Officer. No
doubt, Mr Markandeya is right that the State had not produced
before us rules or orders issued under the first proviso to
Section 11 that the Land Acquisition Officer shall not make an
award exceeding one crore of rupees without prior approval of
the Commissioner, namely, Commissioner, Board of Revenue.
But nonetheless, there is a statutory inhibition by first proviso to
Section 11 that the prior approval either of the appropriate
Government or of an officer which the appropriate Government
authorises in that behalf, is mandatory for making an award. It is
(1994) 5 SCC 686
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
a condition precedent. Obviously, for this reason, the Collector
in his letter dated 20-12-1992, addressed to the Commissioner,
seeking prior approval thus:
"Proposed award
***
Thus the proposed lands are disputed lands, and therefore, it
has been mentioned in the proposed award that payment of
compensation shall be made after obtaining the final report of
the enquiry officer and the final judgment passed in the cases
pending in different courts. Since, in the present case, the
award is to be made up to 21-12-1992 only, it is to request you
to kindly give your prior approval on the proposed award."
Its bare reading clearly indicates that the conscience that he is
required to make the award on or before 21-12-1992 and to
seek prior approval and accordingly he requested the
Commissioner to grant him prior approval as is enjoined in the
first proviso to Section 11 to make the proposed award. The
heading of the award itself clearly indicates working of his mind
that it is only a proposed award and after prior approval is
given, he is enjoined to make the award under Section 11 of the
Act. Since prior approval was not given before the expiry of 21-
12-1992, there is no award made by the Land Acquisition
Officer. In the eye of law the proposed award of the Collector
under Section 11 of the Act is not the award. As seen, Section
11-A is mandatory and on expiry of two years from the date of
publication of declaration, i.e., on 21-12-1992, the entire
proceedings under the Act stood lapsed. We are not concerned
in this case with the proviso to Section 11-A. The High Court
was, therefore, not right in its construction that there was an
award made by the Collector on 20-12-1992 and the direction to
take further steps in that behalf are clearly illegal. The review
petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated 10-12-1993 of
the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The writ
petition stands dismissed but in the circumstances parties are
directed to bear their own costs.
31. This Judgment was followed by a Division Bench of the
erstwhile High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Mohd. Javeed vs.
Union of India8.
32. As prior approval has been granted on 15.08.2005,
beyond the stipulated period ending on 04.08.2005, the award, is
beyond the period stipulated under the proviso to Section 11-A of the
1894 Act. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, learned counsel for the 4th
respondent, would raise another contention to support the award. He
submits that where more than one challenge is made to any acquisition
proceeding and stay of proceedings are obtained in different petitions,
the period to be excluded on account of such orders of stay, would be
the period commencing from the first order of stay till the vacation of all
the orders of stay. He would submit that in such batch cases, the
existence of a stay in any one case, even if the effected persons are
not party to the said writ petition, would act as an order which excludes
time till the order is vacated. This issue was considered by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in various cases. It would suffice to mention Om
Parkash vs. Union of India9, State of Maharashtra vs. Moti Ratan
Estate10, Raj Kumar Gandhi vs. State (UT of Chandigarh)11,
2009 (1) ALD 188
(2010) 4 SCC 17 (para.72)
(2019) 8 SCC 552 (para 6 and 6.3)
(2018) 7 SCC 763 (para 14)
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan vs. State of Karnataka12. The
consistent principle set out in all these Judgments is that the period of
stay starting from the grant of first order of stay till all the orders of stay
are vacated would have to be excluded. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao draws
the attention of this Court to W.P.No.13970 of 1995 which had been
filed by one of the affected persons in the earlier round of litigation. In
this case, interim direction of stay of dispossession had been granted
and the same came to be vacated only upon withdrawal of the said
case on 16.09.2004. He submits that the time available for passing of
the award would be 15.09.2006. Even if the period of seven days,
between 23.05.1995 to 30.05.1995, is excluded, the time available for
passing the award would be 07.09.2006.
33. The consistent principle, set out by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in the aforesaid cases can be summarized by noticing the
following extract in State of Maharashtra v. Moti Ratan Estate,
(2019) 8 SCC 552 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 182 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC
1149 at page 560:
6.3. In the recent decision in Raj Kumar Gandhi [Raj Kumar
Gandhi v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2018) 7 SCC 763 : (2018)
3 SCC (Civ) 738] , this Court had an occasion to consider the
applicability of Section 11-A of the Act. After considering a
catena of decisions of this Court on the applicability of Section
11-A of the Act, this Court observed and held that where
(1994) 4 SCC 145 (para 2)
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
scheme of the acquisition is one, interim stay granted in respect
of one pocket of land would operate even in respect of other
pockets of land and therefore the authorities were justified in
not proceeding with the acquisition proceedings and
consequently the acquisition proceedings would not lapse. In
the same decision, this Court has considered the earlier
decisions of this Court in G. Narayanaswamy Reddy [G.
Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC
261] ; Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya [Yusufbhai
Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531]
; Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. [Gandhi Grah Nirman
Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC 662]
; Hansraj H. Jain [Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra,
(1993) 3 SCC 634] ; Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan [Sangappa
Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145]
; Abhey Ram [Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 421]
; and Om Parkash [Om Parkash v. Union of India, (2010) 4 SCC
17 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] . In Raj Kumar Gandhi [Raj Kumar
Gandhi v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2018) 7 SCC 763 : (2018)
3 SCC (Civ) 738] , in which one of us (Brother Arun Mishra, J.
was a member), this Court has dealt with and considered the
earlier decisions of this Court with respect to applicability of
Section 11-A of the Act in paras 11, 12, 15 and 16 as under :
(Raj Kumar Gandhi case [Raj Kumar Gandhi v. State (UT of
Chandigarh), (2018) 7 SCC 763 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 738] ,
SCC pp. 771-75)
"11. In Abhey Ram [Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC
421] this Court has considered the extended meaning of the
words "stay of the action or proceedings" and referring to
various decisions, observed that any type of the orders passed
by the court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the
authorities to proceed further. This Court has observed thus :
(SCC pp. 428-29, para 9)
'9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. Union of
India [B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 :
(1989) 37 DLT 150] are obvious with reference to the quashing
of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 vis-à-vis
the writ petitioners therein. The question that arises for
consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the
persons who prohibited the respondents from publication of the
declaration under Section 6 would equally be extendible to the
cases relating to the appellants. We proceed on the premise
that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication
of the declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases
has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from
publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the court has
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support
of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their
hands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has
given extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in
various cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed
Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai Noormohmed
Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] ; Hansraj H.
Jain v. State of Maharashtra [Hansraj H. Jain v. State of
Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC 634] ; Sangappa Gurulingappa
Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [Sangappa Gurulingappa
Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] ; Gandhi Grah
Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [Gandhi Grah
Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC
662] ; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka [G.
Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC
261] and Roshanara Begum v. Union of India [Roshanara
Begum v. Union of India, (1986) 1 Apex Dec 6 (SC)] . The
words "stay of the action or proceeding" have been widely
interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of the orders
passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of
the authorities to proceed further. When the action of
conducting an enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and
the declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily
unless the court holds that enquiry under Section 5-A was
properly conducted and the declaration published under Section
6 was valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed
further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted in
respect of some would be applicable to others also who had not
obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the
correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Section 5-A
enquiry and consideration of objections as it was not challenged
by the respondent Union. We express no opinion on its
correctness, though it is open to doubt.‟
12. In Om Parkash v. Union of India [Om Parkash v. Union of
India, (2010) 4 SCC 17 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] , this Court as to
the effect of interim stay has observed thus : (SCC p. 44, para
72)
'72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted
in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete
restraint on the respondents to have proceeded further to
issue notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued
the said notification during the period when the stay was
operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for
committing contempt of court. The language employed in the
interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely
restrained the respondents from proceeding further in the
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
matter by issuing declaration/notification under Section 6 of
the Act.‟
***
15. The learned counsel has also relied upon Yusufbhai
Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai
Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC
531] in which this Court has opined that the Explanation to
Section 11-A is in the widest possible terms and there is no
warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the
Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of
the award under Section 11. Therefore, the period of an
injunction obtained by the landholder from the High Court
restraining the land acquisition authorities from taking
possession of the land has to be excluded in computing the
period of two years. The decision is of no help to the
submission espoused on behalf of the appellant. This Court
in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya [Yusufbhai
Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC
531] observed : (SCC p. 535, para 8)
'8. The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms
and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or
proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or
proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section
11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned
Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section
17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and
we see no reason why the aforesaid expression in the
Explanation should be given a different meaning depending
upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise.
On the other hand, it appears to us that Section 11-A is
intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is
acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in
cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the
award must be made within a period of two years of the
declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would
lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to
get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that
the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained
any order from a court restraining any action or proceeding in
pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act
so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those
landholders who do not obtain any order from a court which
would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking
possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat
High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned
judgment.‟
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
16. Reliance has also been placed on Sangappa
Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [Sangappa
Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145]
.........
In the light of these principles it would have to be held that the
award dated 05.08.2005 has been passed within the period of two
years stipulated under Section 11-A of 1894 Act.
34. Sri V.V. Narayana, the learned counsel appearing for
appellants 4 to 6 and Ms. Aiswarya Nagula, learned counsel appearing
for respondents 1 to 3 in W.A.No.1162 of 2010, had contended that the
entire acquisition process has to be set aside, in view of the Section 24
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
Section 24 reads as follows:
24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be
deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of
land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894,-
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land
Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act
relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made,
then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the
said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case
of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been
made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but
the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the
compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be
deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so
chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in
respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the
account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land
Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.
35. Section 24(2) of 2013 Act has been interpreted by a
Constitution Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore
Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others13. After an
exhaustive review of the law, the Constitution Bench had held that the
acquisitions, initiated under the 1894 Act, would lapse if an award had
been passed five years prior to 01.01.2024 and possession of the land
had not been taken and compensation had not been paid. The
Constitution Bench clarified that both conditions should be fulfilled
before it can be held that the earlier acquisition has lapsed, under
Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
(2020) 8 SCC 129
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
36. The case of the appellants, in W.A.No.1162 of 2020, is
that both conditions have been fulfilled as compensation was not paid
and possession of the land has not been taken.
37. On account of this submission, the acquisition authorities
were called upon to show that compensation had been paid and
possession of the land had been taken. The learned Government
Pleader for land Acquisition filed a memo, on 27.09.2024, annexing the
proceedings of the Sub Collector, Vijayawada, dated 08.09.2005, the
panchanama of taking possession of the land, dated 13.09.2005 and
the handing over of possession proceedings, dated 13.09.2005. The
papers relating to payment of compensation were also annexed to this
memo.
38. The memo gives the details of the references sent to the
Court of II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada in the following
manner:
A) An amount of Rs.97,02,000/- is ordered to be deposited
before the Hon‟ble II Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada vide
cheques bearing 075056, 075057 and 075058 belonging to
Kanakadurga Grameena Bank, Vijayawada (Governorpet)
Branch for amounts of Rs.15,99,000/-, Rs.34,26,000/- and
Rs.46,77,000/- in total Rs.97,02,000/- for the subject lands
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
i.e., an extent of Ac.32.34 cents. However, the same were
returned due to objections.
B) Thereafter, Revised Cheques bearing 075059, 075060 and
075061 were submitted for amounts Rs.46,77,000/- in
L.G.O.P.No.773/2007, Rs.34,26,000/- in
L.G.O.P.No.772/2007 and Rs.15,99,000/- in
L.G.O.P.No.771/2007 and the same were filed but the same
were cancelled for want of revalidation. The letter dated
16.10.2007 issued by Ld.II Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada is
filed herewith.
C) Thereafter, the fresh revalidated Cheques bearing 075062,
075063 and 075062 for the aforesaid amounts respectively
were directed to be filed before the Ld.II Addl. District Judge,
Vijayawada. However, the status regarding as to whether said
cheques were credited shall be ascertained and reported after
verifying the concerned Court records.
39. The statement in this memo is inconclusive on the
question of whether compensation had been deposited or not. It may
also be noted that compensation was sought to be deposited in the
Court because the land holders are said to have refused to receive the
said compensation.
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
40. In the circumstances, this Court cannot come to a finding
that compensation had been paid as the details of the actual payment
of compensation are not available. The learned Government Pleader
for Land Acquisition however contends that compensation had been
deposited but further time is needed to give out these details.
41. On the question of possession, the appellants contend that
the panchanamas, mentioned above, are mere paper transactions and
physical possession of the land was not taken from the appellants. In
support of this contention, the appellants have produced photographs
of the land along with google pictures which show that the land of the
appellants remains untouched and there is no development on that
land.
42. Ms. Aiswarya Nagula, learned counsel for the appellants 1
to 3 in W.A.No.1162 of 2010 would also contend that the Deputy Zonal
Manager, APIIC had filed a counter affidavit on behalf of M/s. APIIC in
the writ petition filed by the appellants. In this counter affidavit it was
stated in paragraph 23 that the land had been handed over to M/s.
APIIC and awaits future development. However, the Revenue
Divisional Officer, in his counter affidavit, at paragraph 16 in page 104
of the paper book had stated that possession of the land was taken
and handed over to APIIC which had developed the land with basic
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infrastructure facilities and different small scale entrepreneurs had
been allotted plots and are conducting business in the land. She would
contend that the present state of the land makes it amply clear that no
development has taken place on the land and consequently the entire
contention of the respondent authorities of having taken possession of
the land having developed the land would have to be rejected.
43. The question of how possession of land, under the 1894
Act, is to be taken has been the subject matter of pronouncements by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. All these pronouncements were reviewed
by the Constitution Bench, in Indore Development Authority vs.
Manoharlal and Others, at paragraphs 261 to 276. After a review of
these judgments, the Constitution Bench in paragraph 366.7 had set
out the mode of taking possession in the following manner.
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest
report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking
possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in
State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse
under Section 24(2).
44. It may also be noted that one of the Judgments referred by
the Constitution Bench is the case of Velaxan Kumar Vs. Union of
India, (2015) 4 SCC 325 where, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, on the
basis of photographs, produced by the land holders, had held that the
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
possession of the land had not been taken, though panchanama
proceedings that such possession was taken, were available. The
Constitution Bench in, Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal
and Others, however, held in the following manner:
272. The decision in Velaxan Kumar [Velaxan Kumar v. Union of India,
(2015) 4 SCC 325 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 599] cannot be said to be laying
down the law correctly. The Court considered the photographs also to hold
that the possession was not taken. Photographs cannot evidence as to
whether possession was taken or not. Drawing of a panchnama is an
accepted mode of taking possession. Even after re-entry, a photograph
can be taken; equally, it can be taken after committing trespass. Such
documents cannot prevail over the established mode of proving whether
possession is taken, of lands. Photographs can be of little use, much less
can they be a proof of possession. A person may re-enter for a short
period or only to have photograph. That would not impinge adversely on
the proceedings of taking possession by drawing panchnama, which has
been a rarely recognised and settled mode of taking possession.
45. In view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench,
this Court, which is bound by the said authoritative pronouncement,
would have to hold that the possession taken under the panchanama
dated 13.09.2005 would have to be accepted as taking over of
possession for the purpose of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
46. As this Court would have to hold that possession has been
taken, under the 1894 Act, the benefit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act
is not available to the appellants.
47. However, the facts relating to W.A.Nos.1753 of 2008,
W.A.No.522 of 2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010 have certain significant
differences.
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
48. In this case, the land owner Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana had
never challenged the acquisition proceedings. However, his brother
had challenged the same in W.P.No.10652 of 1995 and after his
demise, his children were brought on record as petitioners. The learned
counsel for the appellants, in these appeals, contend that the aforesaid
principles laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court would be applicable
to the present case also. They contend that even if the land owner, in
these set of appeals, had not challenged the acquisition proceedings,
he would not be entitled to contend that the award had been passed
beyond the stipulated period of two years. They contend that the stay
granted in other cases would apply to him also. In addition to this
contention, it is also contended that the land owner in these appeals
and Sri M. Krishna Mohan, who was the petitioner in W.P.No.10652 of
1995, are brothers and had equal undivided interest in the land
admeasuring Ac.5.33 cents in Sy.No.61 and Ac.11.42 cents in
Sy.No.63, as they had not separated and divided the land between
themselves. The order of stay, obtained by Late Sri M. Krishna Mohan
in W.P.No.10652 of 1995, would enure against the land owner in this
set of appeals.
49. The material papers filed in W.A.No.1753 of 2008 show
that the land owner in these appeals and late Sri M. Krishna Mohan
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
along with their father had partitioned their property, whereby each of
them was allotted certain shares of land and were put in exclusive
possession of their respective shares. This partition was by way of a
deed of partition, dated 27.09.1957, registered as document No.3559
of 1957 in the office of the Sub Registrar, Vijayawada. This deed of
partition shows that Ac.5.33 cents of land in Sy.No.61 was split into two
parts of Ac.2.66 ½ cents each and the extent of 11.42 cents of land in
Sy.No.63 was split into two parts of Ac.5.71 cents each and fell to the
respective shares of Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana and Sri M. Krishna
Mohan. The schedules attached to the partition deed show that the
boundaries of these extents of land had also been fixed and described
in the deed of partition.
50. The common order dated 12.08.2003, in W.P.No.10651
and 10652 of 1995 would show that late Sri M. Krishna Mohan had
challenged the land acquisition proceedings in relation to Sy.Nos.61
and 63 to the extent of Ac.8.32 cents which fell to his share under the
deed of partition of 1957. There was no challenge to the remaining
Ac.8.32 cents in Sy.Nos.61 and 63 falling to the share of Sri M.
Lakshmi Narayana, the owner of the land in these appeals. The stay
granted in W.P.No.10651 of 1995 did not pertain to or apply to the land
of Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana, the owner of the lands in these appeals.
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
51. Though, there was no order of stay relating to the land
owned by Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana, the question of whether the stay
granted in W.P.Nos.10651 and 10652 of 1995 and in W.P.No.13970 of
1995, would be applicable to Sri M. Lakshminarayana, remains to be
seen.
52. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in the Judgments stated
above, had held that an order of stay available in any one of the cases
was sufficient to extend time for passing of award or for publication of
declaration under Section 6 on the ground that such orders raise
confusion for the acquiring authorities and the forbearance of the
acquiring authorities in proceeding with further steps, in relation to
acquisition of a large area of land belonging to different people, due to
the stay obtained by even one person, would have to be condoned and
it should be treated that such forbearance would extend time against all
the persons affected in that scheme of acquisition.
53. Another issue raised, in this case, was the principle that, in
cases of acquisition of large parcels of land, the objections of a minority
of the land holders, even if well founded, can be ignored if the majority
of the land holders accept the acquisition proceedings. The ratio
behind this principle, as can be abstracted from the following
judgments, is that where a large extent of land is being acquired for
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
execution of a comprehensive project and the majority of the land
holders accept the scheme, it would not be permissible to stall the
entire scheme for the sake of a few landholders who are holding very
little land. This is because, the entire land is needed to implement the
object of the acquisition and deletion of a small part of the land would
render the scheme unimplementable. Such a course of action should
not be taken, even if the objections of the minority of the land holders
are tenable and well founded.
54. This initial consideration of this issue appears to be by a
Full Bench of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi, in the case of Balak
Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India, 14, in the following manner:
27. We, therefore, think that, in proceeding to interpret the scope of the
Explanation, we should keep in mind the nature of the proceedings
under the Land Acquisition Act and the nature of the proceedings in
which stay orders are obtained. So far as the first of these aspects is
concerned, while it is possible for the Government to issue notifications
under Section 4 in respect of each plot of land sought to be acquired, it
is not feasible or practicable to do so, particularly in the context of the
purpose of many of the acquisitions at the present day. It is common
knowledge that in Delhi, as well as many other capital cities, vast
extents are being acquired for „planned development‟ or public projects.
The acquisition is generally part of an integrated scheme or plan and,
though, technically speaking, there can be no objection to individual
plots being processed under Sections 5-A, 6, 9, 12, etc., particularly
after the amendment of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands that
at least substantial blocks of land should be dealt with together at least
up to the stage of the declaration under Section 6. To give an example,
if a large extent of land is to be acquired for the excavation of a canal,
the scheme itself cannot be put into operation unless the whole land
can be eventually made available. If even one of the landowners
anywhere along the line applies to court and gets a stay of the
operation of the notification under Section 4, in practical terms, the
whole scheme of acquisition will fall through. It is of no consolation to
say that there was no stay regarding other lands covered by the
AIR 1987 Del 239
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
scheme. To compel the Government to proceed against the other lands
(by refusing the benefit of the Explanation in such a case on the ground
that there is no stay order in respect thereof) would only result in waste
of public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single owner
succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the Section 4 notification
and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding
of acquisition will fail and the Government will have to retrace the steps
they may have taken in respect of other lands (see Shenoy &
Co. v. CTO [(1985) 2 SCC 512 : AIR 1985 SC 621] and A.S.
Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur [(1986) 2 SCC 709 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 249 : AIR
1986 SC 1440] ). Assuming that where such final order is by a High
Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in
law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party
who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the
moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the
others, they would come up with similar petitions which cannot but be
allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the
acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or quashing of any
part thereof is a stay or quashing of the whole. This aspect should not
be lost sight of.
28. It is true that the object of having contiguity of all plots sought to be
acquired may fail for various reasons. For instance, there may be items
of properties exempt from acquisition in between. Again, it may happen
that a particular person may have been able to stave off acquisition of
his land for one reason or other, particularly since dates of declarations
under Section 6, awards and taking of possession may vary from plot to
plot. Moreover, it is not in all cases that the object of acquisition needs
a number of contiguous plots and may be workable even without some
of the intervening lands. However, in considering a question of
interpretation, one should not go only by one particular situation but
must consider all eventualities to the extent possible. It is only on a
broad perspective of the scheme of present day acquisitions in large
measure that we say that any hurdle in regard to any one plot of land
can hold up an entire acquisition, all promptness and expedition on the
part of the Government notwithstanding.
55. The ratio of the judgment of the Full bench, was
approved by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Om Parkash v. Union of
India, 15, after extracting the above passage and other parts of the
judgment, in the following manner:
(2010) 4 SCC 17
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
70. Perusal of the opinion of the Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I [Balak Ram
Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Del 239] would clearly indicate with
regard to interpretation of the word "any" in Explanation 1 to the first
proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order
granted in one case of landowners to be automatically extended to all
those landowners, whose lands are covered under the notifications
issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there
was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic
assigned by the Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof have been
reproduced hereinabove, appear to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper.
72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one of the
matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on the
respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification under
Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification during the
period when the stay was operative, then obviously they may have been
hauled up for committing contempt of court. The language employed in
the interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely restrained
the respondents from proceeding further in the matter by issuing
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act.
56. This judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Om
Parkash v. Union of India, was followed in Raj Kumar Gandhi Vs.
State (UT OF CHANDIGARH) 16and State Of Maharashtra Vs. Moti
Ram Estate17, essentially approving the ratio of the Full Bench
decision of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi.
57. In the present case, there is one significant departure which
needs to be considered. The acquisition proceedings had been initiated
for acquisition of Ac.152.00 cents of land in various survey numbers of
Kanuru Village. The said acquisition was initiated by way of a common
notification issued under Section 4(1) of 1894 of the Act. Thereafter,
some of the land owners had approached the Court and obtained
(2018) 7 SCC 763
(2019) 8 SCC 552
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
orders of stay on 30.05.1995. After receipt of these orders, the
acquisition authorities had not stopped acquisition proceedings, in
relation to all the land, under the said notification. They went ahead
with acquisition of those lands which were not the subject matter of
W.P.Nos.13970 of 1995, W.P.No.10651 of 1995 and W.P.No.10652 of
1995. The Acquisition Authority had acquired all the remaining land by
passing an award dated 12.05.1996. Thereafter, possession of the land
was taken and handed over to M/s. APIIC. The said land was utilized
for creating an automobile industrial area. The sketch plan of the land
under acquisition shows that the land of the land owners, covered
under the present cases were to one side and in a corner. It appears
that the authorities, went ahead with the acquisition of the remaining
115.94 acres as they were able to make a layout, even without the
remaining land of 32.34 Acres, which is the subject matter of the
present cases. The google pictures, filed by the parties to this litigation,
including the acquisition authorities, show that the land, admeasuring
115.94 acres, has been fully developed and built up while the land of
32.34 acres remains untouched.
58. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that the
authorities had held their hands, on account of the orders of stay
obtained in the three writ petitions mentioned above, in relation to land
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
belonging to persons who had not moved these writ petitions. Having
acquired all the other lands, it would not be open to the acquisition
authorities to contend that they had not acquired the land of Sri M.
Lakshmi Narayana on account of the orders passed in the above three
writ petitions. Further, the purpose of acquisition was not affected by
the stay of dispossession, given to the land holders of these lands, as
M/s APIIC went ahead with the development of the layout and
establishment of the Automobile industrial area because the remaining
land was to one side of the entire extent and the industrial area could
be developed even without the remaining land. Consequently, the ratio
of the judgments cited by Sri Rajagopal Rao would not be applicable.
59. The learned Single Judge had, after taking into
consideration the Judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court which
stipulated that period of stay in any one matter was sufficient to extend
period of exclusion, held that the said Judgments would not be relevant
for the present case in as much as other lands, which had been notified
under the same notification had been acquired.
60. We are in agreement with this view of the learned Single
Judge and do not find any reason to uphold the award, dated
05.08.2005, as it has been passed beyond the time stipulated under
Section 11 A of the 1894 Act.
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61. For all the aforesaid reasons, all the Writ Appeals are
hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand
closed.
________________________
R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J
______________
HARINATH.N,J
RJS
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
WRIT APPEAL Nos.1753 of 2008, 522 of 2009, 125 of 2010, 1161 of
2010 and 1162 of 2010
Dt: 03.10.2024
RJS
