Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Allaboyina Appanna, vs Chelluboyina Appa Rao, Died Per Lrs on 13 November, 2024
1
APHC010534942010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE THIRTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY
TWENTY-FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 1124/2010
Between:
Allaboyina Appanna and Others ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
Chelluboyina Appa Rao Died Per Lrs and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. .
2. VENKATESWARA RAO GUDAPATI
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. V SUBRAHMANYAM
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellants / Appellants /
Defendants against the Decree and Judgment dated 08.07.2010, in A.S.No.44
of 2006 on the file of Judge, Family Court - cum - Additional District and
ions Judge at Vizianagaram (for short, 'the 1st Appellate Court')
Sessions
confirming the decree and Judgment dated 22.03.2006,, in O.S.No.
O.S.No.286 of
2000 on the file of Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram (for short, 'the
trial Court').
2. The Respondent/Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in
O.S.No.286 of 2000 seeking a Declaration of title that the Plaintiff is the
absolute owner and for consequential relief of permanent injunction in respect
of plaint 'A' schedule property, and for permanent injunction restraining the
Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiff's peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the plaint 'B' schedule properties.
3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is
expedient to mitigate any potential confusion and better comprehend the case.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the
contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
The Plaintiff is the rightful owner of the plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule
properties, which are ancestral lands. After the death of the
Plaintiff's father, Bangarayya, about 20 years back, the Plaintiff and
his brothers, Narisimhulu, Gurayya and Ramulu, divided properties,
with the Plaintiff getting the plaint schedule properties. Since then,
Plaintiff has had exclusive possession, is paying land revenue, and
is holding the title deed and pattadar passbook in his name. The
Plaintiff's brothers sold their respective shares to third parties, and
they no longer have any claim or right over the plaint 'A' and 'B'
schedule properties. The Plaintiff has also been harvesting palmyra
trees from Plaint B's schedule lands. The Defendants 1 to 5 are
siblings, residents of a nearby village, and have no legal right or
interest in the properties. They attempted to buy the land at a low
price, which the Plaintiff refused. Afterwards, the Defendants
harassed the Plaintiff, allowing their livestock to damage his crops
and attempting to cut palmyra leaves in April 2000, but were
prevented by the Plaintiff's timely intervention. Any actions by the
Plaintiff's brothers to transfer rights to the Defendants are void. The
Plaintiff has enjoyed the land and trees openly, with the knowledge
of the Defendants, who have no legal claim to the properties.
5. The 1st Defendant, whose written statement has been adopted by the
Defendants 2 to 5, refutes the material averments in the plaint and contends
that on 28.07.1982, the Plaintiff, along with his brothers, agreed to sell Ac.0.43
cents out of Ac.0.88 cents comprised in patta No.60, in survey No.103/2 of
Modavalasa, Denkada Mandal, to the Defendants 1 and 3. They were put in
possession of the same on the date of the Agreement dated 28.7.1982, which
corresponds to Item No.2 of the plaint 'A' schedule properties. Since then,
they have been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the same, including
paying the cist to the Government. Plaintiff was never in possession and
enjoyment of item No.2 of the plaint 'A' schedule property, and he, being a
party to the sale agreement, filed the suit with mala fide intention to gain
unlawfully. The plaint 'A' and 'B' schedules are inaccurate, with incorrect
boundaries, and the Plaintiff's claims are based on surmise and hypothetical
data. The title deed issued by the M.R.O., Denkada, does not confer legal
ownership to the Plaintiff, and if the Plaintiff was truly in possession of the
property, he would have paid the cist and filed the payment receipts with the
plaint. The Plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands and seeks
dismissal of the suit, with costs.
6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following
issues:
i. Whether the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint A
schedule properties having the right, title, if so, entitled to
Declaration and consequential injunction in respect of the
plaint A schedule property?
Ii. Whether the Plaintiff is in lawful possession of the pliant B
schedule property by the date of filing of the suit, if so, entitled
for a permanent injunction against the Defendants?
iii. To what relief?
7. During the trial, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.6
& Exs.X.1 and X.2 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the
Defendants, DWs.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 and B.2.
8. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the
trial Court decreed the suit with costs.
9. Aggrieved by the same, the Defendants filed an Appeal in A.S.No.44 of
2006 on file of the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, being the final
fact-finding Court, framed the following points for consideration:
i. Whether the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint
schedule property?
ii. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction?
iii. To what relief?
10. The 1st Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary
evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, dismissed the Appeal without costs
by its Judgment and Decree dated 08.07.2010. Assailing the same, the
Defendants preferred the present Second Appeal.
11. Heard Sri. Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, learned Counsel representing
the Appellants / Defendants and Sri. V. Subrahmanyam, learned Counsel for
the Respondent / Plaintiff.
12. The learned Counsel for the Appellants/Defendants contends that the
Plaintiff has failed to establish his title to the schedule properties and has not
discharged the burden of proof required in a declaratory suit, as per settled
legal principles. Despite asserting this in the plaint, the Plaintiff has not proven
the fact of partition or the allotment of the property to his share. The Courts
below erred in granting the Declaration, as the Plaintiff failed to produce
convincing documentary and oral evidence. Furthermore, the Courts below
should have drawn an adverse inference against the Plaintiff, given his failure
to present probable evidence of partition, especially when his brothers, who
could testify, are still alive. Additionally, the Plaintiff did not provide sufficient
evidence to identify the property, particularly its boundaries, thereby failing to
justify the grant of declaratory decree.
13. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent / Plaintiff contends that
both the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court correctly evaluated the facts of
the case and reached the correct conclusions. The reasons given by both the
Courts do not require any modifications.
14. By the orders dated 01.04.2024 in I.A.No.3 of 2023, Respondents 2 to 6
have been brought on record as the legal representatives of the deceased 1 st
Respondent. Further, according to the orders dated 21.10.2024 in I.A.No.3 of
2024, the 6th Appellant has been brought on record as the legal
representative of the deceased 1st Appellant. Additionally, Appellants 7 to 9
have been brought on record as the legal representatives of the deceased 3rd
Appellant, following the orders dated 21.10.2024 in I.A.No.6 of 2024.
15. Based on the Appellants' contentions, the following substantial question
of law is involved in this Second Appeal:
i. Whether the Courts below were correct in appreciating the
chief evidence alone of the Respondent and neglecting the
cross-examination led by the Appellants is sustainable
under law or not.
ii. Whether the Courts below ought to have seen that the
burden of proof for a particular fact has to be proved by
the Plaintiff as required under sections 101, 102 and 103 of
the Evidence Act, 1872.
iii. Whether the Courts below are correct in discarding the
cross-examination led by the Appellants in disproving the
title of the Respondent as required under section 110 of
the Evidence Act, 1872.
iv. Whether the Courts below are correct in granting
Declaration without producing any title documents by the
Respondent.
v. The trial Court misconstrued the impact of Section 6 of the
R.O.R. Act when the Appellants herein produced the title
deed book for the property, and the same is accepted by
PW.3 and ought to have dismissed the suit given the
settled case law.
vi. The trial Court ought to have observed that the Plaintiff
cannot rest on the weakness of the Defendant's evidence
as per the decided legal proposition and should have
dismissed the suit.
16. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100
of C.P.C., this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C.
17. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others 1 , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of
the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions
of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is
not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see
Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC
713) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar
Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438)......
18. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C. arise only when there is a
substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based
on facts. The learned Counsel for Respondent is right in placing reliance on
these rulings. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of
misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence on record,
particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High
Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are
substantial in terms of law.
19. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of
the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial question of law
involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and
interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below
recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary
evidence. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine
qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own
2006 (3) A.L.T. 41 (S.C.)
opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and
contrary to the evidence on record.
20. Plaintiff instituted the suit seeking a declaration of title concerning the
properties shown in Schedule 'A' of the plaint and consequential relief of
injunction. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has sought a permanent injunction to
restrain the Defendants from interfering with the properties shown in schedule
'B' of the plaint.
21. As outlined in the plaint schedule, it comprises four distinct items. Item
No. 1 pertains to the extent of Ac.0.25 cents of dry land in Survey No.204/15,
while Item No. 2 pertains to Ac.0.45 cents of dry land in Survey No.103/14.
Item Nos.1 and 2 are included under the 'A' schedule of the plaint properties.
Items Nos.3 and 4 are listed under the 'B' schedule. Item No.3 pertains to the
extent of Ac.0.35 cents of dry land in Survey No.103/17, and Item No.4
pertains to the extent of Ac.0.23 cents of dry land in Survey No.103/12.
22. It is undisputed that Defendants 1 to 5 are siblings. Given that Plaintiff
has filed the suit seeking a declaration of title and an injunction, the onus is on
Plaintiff to prove his ownership rights and possession of the plaint schedule
properties.
23. It is trite law that, in a suit for Declaration of title, the burden is always
on the Plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a
declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the Defendants
would not be a ground to grant relief to the Plaintiff. In this regard, the reliance
can be made on a decision in Union of India and others V. Vasavi
Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others 2.
24. In Mohammed Ibrahim and another V. Mohammed Abdul Razak 3,
the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
2014 LawSuit SC (3)
2007(5) ALT 510 (D.B.)
It is a settled proposition of law that the burden of proof is
generally on the Plaintiff. The decision should rest on the rule as to
the burden of proof under the law and the case's admitted or
proved circumstances. The strict meaning of Onus Probandi is that
if no evidence is given by the party on whom the burden is cast,
the issue must be found against him, and only then does the other
party have the onus of rebuttal. The first principle of the Evidence
Act is that a party who is to prove an allegation must do so. The
Court cannot imagine evidence in the absence of it. The Plaintiff
must succeed on the strength of his own case and is not assisted
by any weakness, real or apparent in the case of the Defendant.
The defect in evidence of the party on whom the onus of proof lies
cannot be cured by criticism of the other party's evidence.
25. To substantiate his case, the Plaintiff examined himself as PW.1, in
addition to PW.2 (Baditaboina Bangarayya) and PW.3 (P. Pentayya, Mandal
Revenue Officer). In support of his claims, the Plaintiff relied on Exs.A.1 to
A.6, as well as Exs.X.1 and X.2, which were marked through PW.3. The
Plaintiff's contention is that the plaint schedule properties were originally their
ancestral properties. Following his father's death, Bangarayya, approximately
20 years ago, the Plaintiff and his brothers, Narasimhulu, Gurayya, and
Ramulu, partitioned their ancestral properties. The properties shown in the
plaint schedule were allotted to the Plaintiff's share in this division. To further
support his claim of ownership, Plaintiff produced various revenue records,
including the pattadar passbook and title deed issued in his name. Ex.A.1 is
the title deed issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer (M.R.O) of Denkada
concerning the plaint schedule properties. Exs.A.2 to A.4 are land revenue
receipts issued in the Plaintiff's favor. Ex.A.5 is a certified copy of the
settlement adangal, and Ex.A.6 is a certified copy of the 10(1) account.
26. PW.2 corroborated PW.1's testimony in all material aspects. As evident
from the record, Plaintiff also examined PW.3, the Mandal Revenue Officer
(M.R.O.), who, upon receiving the summons, produced the 1-B register and
settlement adangal. Item No.4 of the plaint schedule pertains to the extent of
Ac.0.23 cents of dry land in Survey No.103/12. PW.3, the M.R.O., confirmed
that this land corresponds to the old Survey No.103/8 and stands in the name
of Chelluboina Bangarayya, the Plaintiff's father. The total extent of the land is
shown as Ac.0.23 cents. Similarly, in Survey No.103/14, which corresponds to
Item No.2 of the plaint 'A' schedule, Ac.0.45 cents of dry land is recorded in
the name of Chelluboina Bangarayya, the Plaintiff's father. PW.3's evidence
further supports Plaintiff's claim by confirming that the pattadar passbook for
the land in Survey No.103/12 (Item No.4) was issued in the name of PW.1,
with the extent shown as Ac.0.22 cents. PW.3 also testified that Ex.X.1, an
attested copy of the settlement adangal for Modavalasa village, and Ex.A.2, a
true attested copy of the 1-B register, were produced. According to PW.3,
Ac.0.13 cents of land in Survey No.103/2 is recorded in the name of Badiboina
Chinnaya, and Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/1 stands in the name of
Sanyasi. Ex.B.1, the pattadar passbook relied upon by the Defendants,
pertains to land in Survey No.103/1 (with an extent of Ac.0.43 cents) but not to
Survey No.103/12. As noted by the trial Court, the Defendants have not
seriously disputed the Plaintiff's assertion that the schedule properties are
their ancestral, nor have they contested that these properties were allotted to
the Plaintiff's share in the family partition, except with respect to the
aforementioned Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/2.
27. As observed by both the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court, the
Defendants have claimed that the Plaintiff, along with his brothers, consented
to sell an extent of Ac.0.43 cents out of Ac.0.88 cents in Patta No.60, Survey
No.103/2, situated in the village of Modavalasa, to Defendants 1 and 3. The
Defendants further assert that they took possession of the property and
entered into an agreement dated 28.07.1982. However, the evidence adduced
by the Defendants suggests that PW.1 and his brothers sold the property to
the 1st Defendant. Still, this evidence pertains to land under Survey
No.103/12, not the land described in their pleadings. As the trial Court and the
1st Appellate Court noted, the Defendants did not plead that the land covered
by Survey No.103/12 was sold by PW.1 and his brothers. It is a well-
established legal principle that evidence cannot be introduced contrary to the
pleadings, and therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to adduce such
evidence in the absence of a specific plea, as noticed by the trial Court.
Despite being cross-examined on this inconsistency, the Defendants failed to
amend their pleadings to substitute Survey No.103/12 in place of Survey
No.103/2, further undermining their evidence's validity.
28. In Ram Sarup Gupta V. Bishun Narain Inter College4, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:
"It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any,
produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled
that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that
all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in
support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to
enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to
have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential
material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise."
"Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry
should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead; the
Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and
the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of
deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to
trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be
open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in Appeal."
29. Item No. 2 of the plaint 'A' schedule property pertains to the extent of
Ac.0.45 cents of dry land in Survey No.103/14. In their written statement, the
Defendants assert that the Plaintiff and his brothers agreed to sell an extent of
Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/2 and that they were put in possession of the
property on the date of the Agreement, dated 28.07.1982, which the
Defendants claim corresponds to Item No.2 of the plaint 'A' schedule property.
By raising such a plea in the written statement, the Defendants have claimed
that an extent of Ac.0.43 cents of land, purportedly purchased, is located in
Survey Nos.103/14 and 103/2. This contradictory assertion reveals a lack of
clarity on the part of the Defendants regarding the precise location of the land
in question, creating an ambiguity as to whether the Ac.0.43 cents is situated
(1987) 2 SCC 555
in Survey No.103/14 or Survey No.103/2 or both. Such inconsistency
undermines the credibility of the Defendants' claim.
30. PW.3, the Mandal Revenue Officer from Denkada, testified that a
pattadar passbook was issued in the name of PW.1 for an extent of Ac.0.22
cents in Survey No.103/12. He further stated that Ac.0.13 cents of land in
Survey No.103/2 is recorded in the name of Badiboyina Chinnayya, son of
Paidaiah. In contrast, DW.1, during cross-examination, acknowledged that his
Counsel filed a document which was not registered. He also confirmed in his
written statement that he purchased Ac.0.43 cents of land in Survey No.103/2,
but denied the suggestion that he had altered the survey number from 103/2
to 103/12. As per the plaint 'B' schedule, item No.4 pertains to land in Survey
No.103/12, with an extent of Ac.0.23 cents of dry land. As rightly noted by the
1st Appellate Court, the Defendants have asserted that Defendants 1 and 3
purchased Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/2, a claim that is not supported by
the plaint schedule.
31. As correctly noted by both the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court, the
property covered under Survey No.103/2 was not included in the plaint
schedule. The 1st Appellate Court further observed that the Plaintiff's Counsel
had filed a Xerox copy of a sale agreement dated 28.07.1982, along with a
memo indicating that the Agreement had been executed in favour of the
Defendants on that date. This document, which was sought to be marked by
the Plaintiff, was provided to him by the Defendants during the hearing of the
injunction petition. The schedule in the document only mentioned Survey
No.103/2. However, the Defendants filed a document with a request to have it
admitted, in which the digit '1' had been added before the '2' in Survey
No.103/2, changing the number to 103/12. The 1st Appellate Court, upon
careful examination of the documents, observed that it was evident to the
naked eye that the digit '1' had been inserted before the '2' in the document
submitted by the Defendants. Based on this finding, and after recording its
reasons, the 1st Appellate Court declined to admit the document as additional
evidence at the appeal stage.
32. A reading of the Judgment of the 1st Appellate Court reveals that, while
the Defendants initially asserted that Defendants 1 and 3 purchased an extent
of Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/2, corresponding to Item No.2 of the plaint
'A' schedule (which details Ac.0.45 cents of dry land in Survey No.103/14), the
Defendants later sought to introduce evidence suggesting that they had
purchased Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/12. It is crucial to note that item
No.4 of the plaint 'B' schedule specifically mentions Ac.0.23 cents of dry land
in Survey No.103/12. From the record, it is established that neither DW.1 nor
his brothers filed a suit for specific performance concerning the sale
agreement executed by Plaintiff and his brothers for the land in Survey
No.103/2, amounting to Ac.0.43 cents. According to Ex.B.1, a government-
issued title deed, Ac.0.43 cents of land is recorded in the name of DW.1.
Furthermore, the evidence of PW.3 establishes that, based on official records,
a pattadar passbook for Ac.0.43 cents was issued in the name of the 1 st
Defendant for Survey No.103/1, not Survey No.103/12. Additionally, the
evidence from PWs.1 and 3 indicates that the land in Survey No.103/12,
comprising Ac.0.23 cents as per the plaint 'B' schedule, is registered in the
name of PW.1. As previously observed, the total extent of land in Survey
No.103/12 is shown as Ac.0.23 cents. Given these facts, the Defendants must
explain how they acquired Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/12, a survey
number that does not correspond to the claimed extent of land according to
the revenue records and PW.3's testimony. In light of the documentary
evidence and the revenue records, DW.1's contention of owning Ac.0.43 cents
in Survey No.103/12 is contradicted and cannot be sustained.
33. In S. Saraswathi V. Y. Laxminarayana5, the composite High Court of
Andhra Pradesh held that:
2004 (6) ALT 95
The settled principle of law is that entries in revenue or municipal or
other records are not conclusive to prove title.
34. It is well-established that entries in revenue or municipal records are not
conclusive proof of title, although, in the absence of contrary evidence, such
entries are generally given primacy. Plaintiff has produced revenue records
relating to the properties in the plaint schedule, and Defendant has failed to
disprove or challenge the authenticity of the documents submitted by Plaintiff.
It appears that the Defendants, by relying on Ex.B.1, a title deed showing an
extent of Ac.0.43 cents in Survey No.103/1, have sought to assert a claim
over land in Survey No.103/12. This is even though Survey No.103/12 is
referenced explicitly in the written statement only in relation to Item No.2,
which actually pertains to land in Survey No.103/14. Such a discrepancy
indicates an attempt by the Defendants to assert rights over land that is not
substantiated by their pleadings or the relevant revenue records.
35. As previously noted, the Defendants have not contested the Plaintiff's
ownership of the schedule properties; instead, they have asserted a claim
over Ac.0.43 cents of land. The evidence adduced, including Ex.B.1 (the title
deed) and the testimony of PW.3, the Mandal Revenue Officer, clearly
establishes that the Ac.0.43 cents in question is located in Survey No.103/1.
Both the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court correctly observed that the
property in Survey No.103/1 is not part of the plaint schedule properties, and
thus, the Defendants' claim over this land by relying on Ex.B.1 document
without merit in relation to the present suit.
36. Despite acquiring certain land in Survey No.103/1, the Defendants have
asserted a claim over the Plaintiff's properties, as shown in Item Nos.2 and 4
of the plaint schedules 'A' and 'B'. In their written statement, the Defendants
specifically pleaded that Defendants 1 and 3 purchased Ac.0.43 cents of land
from Plaintiff and his brothers in Survey No.103/2. However, for reasons
unexplained, the Defendants failed to produce a copy of the sale agreement
before the trial Court, although they attempted to submit a Xerox copy before
the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, after recording valid reasons,
declined to admit the said document. The material on record demonstrates
that the Defendants attempted to interfere with the plaint schedule properties
without any legitimate right. They have failed to provide any credible evidence
to substantiate their claim that Defendants 1 and 3 purchased the properties
from Plaintiff and his brothers, as alleged. In contrast, Plaintiff has produced
revenue records clearly showing that the plaint schedule properties are
ancestral in nature and were allotted to him during the partition among his
brothers. Significantly, Plaintiff's brothers have not disputed this contention.
Although the Defendants claim that Defendants 1 and 3 purchased some of
the properties shown in the schedule from the Plaintiff or his brothers, they
have, for reasons unknown, refrained from examining the Plaintiff's brothers to
support their case. The evidence on record firmly establishes that, without any
legal right or possession, the Defendants sought to dispute the Plaintiff's
rightful ownership and possession of the schedule properties.
37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in several cases, has held that the
exercise of powers under Section 100 of C.P.C. can interfere with the findings
of fact only if the same is shown to be perverse and based on no evidence.
Some of these judgments are Hajazat Hussain V. Abdul Majeed & others. 6,
Union of India V. Ibrahim Uddin 7 , and Vishwanath Agrawal V. Sarla
Vishwanath Agrawal8.
38. In view of the foregoing, the findings of the trial court and the 1st
Appellate Court, which affirm that Plaintiff has successfully established his
case, are neither perverse nor a result of misinterpretation of documents or
misreading of evidence. After careful reading of the material on record, this
Court finds that the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court concurrently
decreed the Plaintiff's suit by recording all the findings of facts against the
Defendants enumerated above, and the findings were neither against the
2011 (7) SCC 189
2012 (8) SCC 148
2012 (7) SCC 288
pleadings nor evidence nor against any provisions of law. This Court
considers that the conclusions of the trial Court and the 1 st Appellate court are
not subject to interference under Section 100 of C.P.C. There is no question of
law, let alone a substantial question of law, involved in this Second Appeal,
and therefore, the Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
39. In conclusion, this Second Appeal is dismissed without costs.
Consequently, the Judgment dated 08.07.2010 of the learned Judge, Family
Court - cum - Additional District and Sessions Judge at Vizianagaram, in
A.S.No.44 of 2006, is hereby affirmed.
Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal shall stand closed.
______________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 13.11.2024
SAK
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 1124/2010
Date: 13.11.2024
SAK
