Doddamani Anil Kumar, Karnataka State. vs The State Of A.P.,Home,Hyd., 3 Otrs.
2024 Latest Caselaw 4413 AP

Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Doddamani Anil Kumar, Karnataka State. vs The State Of A.P.,Home,Hyd., 3 Otrs. on 18 June, 2024

APHC010484442015
                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
                                    AT AMARAVATI             [3310]
                             (Special Original Jurisdiction)


               TUESDAY ,THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF JUNE
                 TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

                                  PRESENT

           THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO

                      WRIT PETITION NO: 27038/2015

Between:

Doddamani Anil Kumar, Karnataka State.                          ...PETITIONER

                                     AND

The State Of A P Home Hyd 3 Otrs and Others               ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:

   1. G R SUDHAKAR

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

   1. GP FOR HOME (AP)

   2. P SAI PRASAD

The Court made the following:



ORDER :

This writ petition is filed declaring the action of the respondents herein

in registering, investigating the FIR No.66/2013 culminated into the PRC

No.90/2014 pending on the file of the Addl. Judicial First Class Magistrate,

Ananthapuram as being illegal and arbitrary and consequently quash same.

2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner's marriage with

the 4th respondent was solemnized on 23.5.2012 at CSI Church, Ananthapur.

Later, due to disputes between the petitioner and the 4th respondent, the

petitioner filed MC No.12 of 2013 on the file of Senior civil Judge, Yadgiri for

restitution of conjugal rights. As a counter blast to the said case, the 4th

respondent lodged a false and frivolous complaint against the petitioner by

concocting a false story before the 2nd respondent who in turn endorsed the

same to the 3rd respondent to take action as per law vide FIR No.66 of 2013

and after competition of investigation the respondent police filed charge sheet

and the same was numbered as PRC No.90/2014 pending on the file of

Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthapuram. It is main

grievance of the petitioner that the respondents NO.2 and 3 without looking at

the allegations in the complaint lodged by the 4th respondent, registered FIR

and took up the investigation even though they haveno jurisdiction to

investigate into the alleged offence. Therefore, in view of the above

circumstances, the PRC No.90/2014 pending on the file of Additional Judicial

First Class Magistrate, Ananthapuram arising out of crime in FIR No.66/2013

is liable to be quashed.

3. This Court vide order dated 25.08.2015 while issuing Rule Nisi, had

granted interim direction as prayed for and the same is extended from time to

time.

4. The respondent No.3 has filed counter affidavit and denied all the

allegations made in the petition. It is contended that the allegation that the 4 th respondent gave a report to police as a counter blast to the case filed by the

petitioner in MC No.12 of 2013 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Yadgiri is not

correct and that can be decided by the trial Court. Any how, as it is for the trial

Court, to consider the defence of the petitioner in criminal case. The

allegations mentioned in the affidavit that this respondent is having no

jurisdiction in registering and investigating the case is not correct and the said

allegation is only a created one. Further the investigation reveals that there is

prima facie case against the accuse for the offence punishable under Sections

498(A), 307, 403 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of D.P. Act against the

accused in PRC No.90/2014 on the file of AJFCM, Ananthapuramu.

5. Heard Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel

representing Sri G.R. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri

P.Sai Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents.

6. On hearing, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner submits that the complaint lodged by the 4th respondent vide FIR

No.66/2013 and the consequential investigation resulting in filing of charge

sheet taking of cognizance by the learned Magistrate, thereafter culminating

into PRC No.90 of 2014 pending on the file of AJFCM, Ananthapuram are

totally counter blast to the case filed by the petitioner herein vide MC No.12 of

2013 which is filed for restitution of conjugal rights against the 4th respondent.

The act of 4th respondent clearly indicates in lodging the criminal complaint.

On this ground alone the complaint is liable to be quashed. He further

contended that the complaint and consequential investigation is liable to be quashed for the reason that the entire allegations contained in the complaint

dated 17.08.2013 discloses alleged incidents happened in Yadagiri District

and at Bangalore of Karnataka State. The complaint does not whisper about

any incident on cause of action to invoke the criminal jurisdiction of

Ananthapuram police. Respondents no.2 and 3 without verifying the same

investigated into the matter in which they have no jurisdiction at all. He further

submits that under Section 177 of Cr.P.C. every offence shall ordinarily be

inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was

committee, whereas Section 178 of Cr.PC deals with jurisdiction in case of

continuing offence. Even such an allegation is absent in the complaint dated

17.8.2013 lodged by the 4th respondent. Learned Senior counsel mainly

contended that the allegations in the complaint are false, baseless and

frivolous and further in terms of Section 177 of Cr.P.C., the Court does not

have any jurisdiction to entertain the said case and as such the present writ

petition may be allowed quashing the PRC No.90/2014 on the file of Additional

Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthapuram. He also submits that on

similar set of facts and allegations, the 4threspondent/wife filed DVC No.4 of

2014 on the file of Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Mobile) for Trial

of Cases under PCR Act-cum-II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ananthapuram.

The allegations in the said applications are almost verbatim the same and the

said DVC case on a detailed enquiry was dismissed by the Court on

15.04.2024. Further the respondent wife has also filed an application under

Section 125 Cr.P.C in FCOP No.207/2018 beforethe Family Court-cum-VII Additional District Judge, Ananthapuram seeking monthly maintenance of

Rs.30,000/- and the same was also dismissed by the trial Court vide order

dated 21.12.2022. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent wife has filed

Crl.R.CNo.753/2023 before this Court and the same is pending adjudication.

Learned Senior counsel mainly contended that the allegations raised before

the DVC Court and the FCOP and in the present 498-A case are the same

and the same are invented by the petitioner without any basis and the entire

incident took place in Karnataka State and as such this Hon'ble Court has no

jurisdiction to try the offence in view of Section 177 of Cr.P.C. therefore,

learned counsel requests this Court to allow the present writ petition.

7. To support his contentions, learned Senior Counsel has placed

reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Rupali Devi

versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others1, wherein it was held that :

Section 178 creates an exception to the "ordinary rule" engrafted in Section 177 by permitting the courts in another local area where the offence is partly committed to take cognizance. Also if the offence omitted in one local area continues in another local area, the courts in the latter place would be competent to take congnizance of the matter. Under Section 179, if by reason of the consequences emanating froma criminal act an offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, the court in that jurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance. Thus, if an offence is committed partly in one plae and partly in another; or if the offence is a continuing offence or where the consequences of a criminalact result in an offence being committed at another place, the exception to the "ordinary rule" would be attracted and the courts within whose jurisdiction the criminal act is committed will cease to have exclusive jurisdiction to try the offence."

(2019) 5 SCC 384

8. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has also placed another

reliance reported in Manish Ratan and others versus State of M.P and

another2, wherein the Apex Court held that:

"It is interesting to note that while arriving at the decision the High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [(1997) 5 SCC 30], stating:

"The High Court held that excepting against the husband, the complaint against other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh and as such, the criminal case on the basis of complaint made by the appellant was not maintainable against the said other respondents at Raipur but it was maintainable so far as the husband of the appellant was concerned. On these facts, the Apex Court took the view that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of the mal- treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents, and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. It was, therefore, held that in view of clause (c) of Section 178 of Cr.P.C., the High Court was not right. The order passed by the High Court was set aside and the learned CJM, Raipur had jurisdiction to try the case. The facts of the present case are different. There is nothing in the complaint to show that any mal-treatment was given to the complainant at Datia. The allegations, which I may repeat here, are that the mal-treatment was given within a specific period at Jabalpur. There is nothing to show that any mal- treatment was given by any of the petitioners at Datia and under these circumstances, this case of Sujata Mukherjee does not help the learned counsel for the complainant in this case."

In another case reported in Preeti Gupta and another versus State of

Jharkahand and another3, wherein the Apex Court held that :

The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real

(2007) 1 SCC 262

(2010) 7 SCC 667 truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents while denying the

allegations made in the petition contended that the investigation reveals that

there is prima facie case against the accused for the offence punishable under

Section 498(A), 307, 403 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3 an 4 of D.P act against

the accused in PRC No.90/2014 on the file of Hon'ble AJFCM,

Ananthapuramu. He submits that the allegations mentioned against the

officials and 3rd respondent are false and baseless and the same is invented

for the purpose of the case. The petitioner has no ground to quash the PRC

warranting interference of this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

10. To support his contentions, learned counsel for the respondents

has relied upon a catena of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (i)

J.P. Sharma v. Vinod Kumar Jain and others4, wherein the Hon'ble Apex

Court held that:

AIR 1986 Supreme Court 833 "....We are not concerned with the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint, that would be investigated at the time of the trial. In that view of the matter we are unable to sustain the order under appeal. We make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merit of the charge and the complaint would be investigated in accordance with law and the accused persons would be entitled to prove before the court that no charge has been made out against them and they should be acquitted of the charges. But at this stage under inherent power of section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, in our opinion, in the background and circumstances of this case the court should not have used the extraordinary power. In the premises, the appeal is allowed. The order and judgment quashing the proceedings are set aside."

(ii) In a case of Pramod R.S versus State of Karnataka through

Lakshmipuram Police Station, Ref. by State Public Prosecutor5, wherein

the High Court of Karnataka held that :

It is no doubt true that there are cases after cases where members of the family are dragged into the web of crime by the wife while registering the complaint invoking Section 498A of the IPC. The offences are justified, in some cases and offences are in abuse of the process of law, in some cases. Therefore, it is to be considered on a case to case basis. There cannot be a declaration of law as is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that once the divorce notice is sent by the husband, the complaint registered by the wife thereafter loses its significance. If this contention is accepted, it would have a chilling effect on all the complaints. Therefore, this submission is noted only to be rejected, as it is fundamentally flawed.

The decision of the co-ordinate Bench holding that criminal case filed by the wife in respect of cruelty and dowry harassment against the husband and in-laws would lose any significance in case the complaint is made after receiving the divorce notice from the husband, defeats the very object of Section 498A of the IPC, or even complaints made under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The purpose in introducing chapter XX-A bringing in Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was with the objective to prevent torture to a women by her husband or by the relatives of the husband. It was added with a view to punish such people aforesaid, who would meet out

2023 SCC OnLine Kar 26 harassment or torture to the wife to satisfy their unlawful demands of dowry.

11. If the aforesaid hyper-technical contention is accepted, it would act against the interests of women and the object for which the provision was added. The enactment of the legislature with the aforesaid purpose cannot be rendered illusory by a declaration that the complaint would lose its significance for the reason that it is registered immediately after the receipt of a notice of divorce from the hands of the husband. Therefore, the declaration of law made by the co-ordinate Bench can at best be held to be applicable and restrictable, to the facts obtaining in the said case. The submission of the learned counsel that it is universally made applicable in terms of the order is unacceptable, particularly qua the facts obtaining in the case at hand. Though the proceedings therein were quashed at the FIR stage, I deem it appropriate not to accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said judgment should be followed and the present proceedings obliterated against the petitioner.

(iii) In another case reported in Rupali Devi versus State of Uttar

Pradesh and others6, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:

The above two views which the learned referring bench had considered while making the present reference, as already noticed, were founded on the peculiar facts of the two sets of cases before the Court. It may be possible to sustain both the views in the light of the facts of the cases in which such view was rendered by this court. What confronts the court in the present case is WWW.LIVELAW.IN 4 however different. Whether in a case where cruelty had been committed in a matrimonial home by the husband or the relatives of the husband and the wife leaves the matrimonial home and takes shelter in the parental home located at a different place, would the courts situated at the place of the parental home of the wife have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 498A. This is in a situation where no overt act of cruelty or harassment is alleged to have been committed by the husband at the parental home where the wife had taken shelter. 6. A look at the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) dealing with the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court in inquires and trials will now be required. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates that "every offence shall ordinarily be

(2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 384 inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed". It is, therefore, clear that in the normal course, it is the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed that would have the power and authority to take cognizance of the offence in question.

Section 178 creates an exception to the "ordinary rule" engrafted in Section 177 by permitting the courts in another local area where the offence is partly committed to take cognizance. Also if the offence committed in one local area continues in another local area, the courts in the latter place would be competent to take cognizance of the matter. Under Section 179, if by reason of the consequences emanating from a criminal act an offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, the court in that jurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance. Thus, if an offence is committed partly in one place and partly in another; or if the offence is a continuing offence or where the consequences of a criminal act result in an offence being committed at another place, the exception to the "ordinary rule" would be attracted and the courts within whose jurisdiction the criminal act is committed will cease to have exclusive jurisdiction to try the offence. 9. At this stage it may also be useful to take note of what can be understood to a continuing offence. The issue is no longer res integra having been answered by this court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972) 2 SCC 890. Para 5 may be usefully noticed in this regard. "5. A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or WWW.LIVELAW.IN 6 complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." 10. The question that has posed for an answer has nothing to do with the provisions of Section 178 (b) or (c). What has to be really determined is whether the exception carved out by Section 179 would have any application to confer jurisdiction in the courts situated in the local area where the parental house of the wife is located.

Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was introduced by the Criminal Law (second amendment) Act, 1983. In addition to the aforesaid amendment in the Indian Penal Code, the provisions of Sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to inquiries by police in case of death by suicides and inquiries by magistrates into cause of such deaths were also amended. Section 198A was also inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to prosecution of offences under Section 498A. Further by an amendment in the first schedule to the Cr.PC the offence under Section 498A was made cognizable and non-bailable. Of considerable significance is the introduction of Section 113A in the Indian Evidence Act by the Criminal Law (second amendment) Act, 1983 providing for presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman to be drawn if such suicide had been committed within a period of seven years from the date of marriage of the married woman and she had been subjected to cruelty. Section 113A is in the following term: "113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 13. The object behind the aforesaid amendment, undoubtedly, was to combat the increasing cases of cruelty by the husband and the relatives of the husband on the wife which leads to commission of suicides or grave injury to the wife besides seeking to deal with harassment of the wife so as to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property, etc. The above stated object of the amendment cannot be overlooked while answering the question arising in the present case. The WWW.LIVELAW.IN 8 judicial endeavour must, therefore, always be to make the provision of the laws introduced and inserted by the Criminal Laws (second amendment) Act, 1983 more efficacious and effective in view of the clear purpose behind the introduction of the provisions in question, as already noticed. 14.

"Cruelty" which is the crux of the offence under Section 498A IPC is defined in Black's Law Dictionary to mean "The intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage (Abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)". Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of the husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of being driven away from the matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to the same home for fear of being illtreated are aspects that cannot be ignored while understanding the meaning of the expression "cruelty" appearing in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The emotional distress or psychological effect on the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatize the wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that the mental trauma and the psychological distress cause by the acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents would continue to persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the parental home even though there may not be any overt act of physical cruelty at such place.

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, as the object behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is what is provided under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The definition of the Domestic Violence in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety, life, limb or wellbeing, whether mental or physical, as well as emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly, for reasons stated above, have a close connection with Explanation A & B to Section 498A, Indian Penal Code which defines cruelty. The provisions contained in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, undoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physical well- being of the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parental home though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. Such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at the parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at the parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial home results in repeated offences being committed at the parental home. This is the kind of offences contemplated under Section 179 Cr.P.C which would squarely be applicable to the present case as an answer to the question raised. WWW.LIVELAW.IN 10 16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code."

iv) In another case reported in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of

N.C.T of Delhi) and another7, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that :

In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable for criminal trial. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegation made by the parties that the S.H.O., Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the F.I.R. lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C

It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under sub- sec- tion (1) to the extent that the Officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case

AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3596 shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the Officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then F.I.R. can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it.

11. On perusing the entire material on record, this Court observed that,

it is an admitted fact that, basing on the complaint given by 4th respondent

herein, the then Inspector of Police by name B.Chalapati Rao registered a

case in Crime No.66 of 2013 under Sections 498(A), 307 IPC and Sections 3

and 4 of D.P Act and he investigated the case and examined nine (9)

witnesses and arrested A4 and sent him for remand and the other accused

released on anticipatory bail. A1 was released on bail i.e., petitioner herein.

After completion of investigation, the respondent police have filed charge

sheet and the same was numbered as PRC No.90 of 2014 on the file of

Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Anantpuramu and the same is

pending.

12. It is the main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner

that, due to disputes between the petitioner and the 4th respondent, the

petitioner filed Maintenance Case vide MC No.12 of 2013 on the file of Senior

civil Judge, Yadgiri for restitution of conjugal rights. Later, the 4th

respondent/wife has filed DVC No.4 of 2014 before the Special Judicial

Magistrate of First Class (Mobile) for Trial of Cases under PCR Act-cum-II

Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ananthapuram, but the same was dismissed by

the learned Magistrate. Consequently, the 4threspondent wife has also filed

FCOP No.207 of 2018 before the Family Court seeking monthly maintenance

and the same was also dismissed. So in view of the above, the allegations

raised before the DVC Court and FCOP are without any basis.

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, on perusing the entire material

on record and on considering the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred

to above, this Court is of the opinion that, whatever the disputes between the

petitioner and the 4th respondent/wife and the cases DVC and Maintenance

Case, all these facts have to be decided by the trial court only.Therefore,

having regard to facts and circumstances, this Court finds that there are no

grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings and devoid of merits in the

present writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.

14. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the

observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of

consideration of the case of the petitioner under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the

same shall not bind or influence the trial against him in Crime No.66 of 2013 culminated into PRC No.90 of 2014 on the file of JMFC, Ananthapuramu or

any other proceedings. There shall be no order as to costs.

15. It is also made clear that the interim order passed by this Court is

hereby vacated.

16. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand

closed.

______________________________

DR. K. MANMADHA RAO, J.

Date : 18 -06-2024

Gvl HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

WRIT PETITION No.27038 of 2015

Date : 18.06.2024

Gvl