Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Chittajallu Padma Padmavathi vs Nukala Ram Kumar on 23 August, 2024

APHC010315812024
                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
                               PRADESH
                                                       [3365]
                           AT AMARAVATI
                     (Special Original Jurisdiction)

        FRIDAY ,THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF AUGUST
            TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

                           PRESENT

   THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE DR V R K KRUPA SAGAR

             CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 658/2024

Between:

Chittajallu Padma @ Padmavathi                  ...PETITIONER

                              AND

Nukala Ram Kumar and Others                ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:

   1. CH NAGA MEHAR BABA

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

   1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

   2.

The Court made the following:
                                    2
                                                     Dr. VRKS, J
                                             Crl.R.C.No.658 of 2024




        THE HON'BLE JUSTICE Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR

           CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.658 OF 2024


ORDER:

This Criminal Revision Case filed under Sections 397 and

401 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) impugns the order

dated 15.07.2024 of learned Sessions Judge, Krishna Division,

Machilipatnam in Crl.M.P.No.330 of 2024 in Crl.A.No.54 of 2024.

2. Heard the learned counsel for revision petitioner and the

learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for respondent No.2-State.

Notice was served on respondent No.1/complainant but none

entered appearance.

3. On a complaint lodged by respondent No.1 herein alleging

the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881 (for short, 'the N.I. Act') said to have been committed by the

present revision petitioner, learned Special Judicial Magistrate of

First Class for trying Prohibition and Excise Offences,

Machilipatnam tried the case in C.C.No.262 of 2020 and finally by

judgment dated 19.06.2024 found the accused guilty and

convicted and sentenced her in the following terms:

Dr. VRKS, J

"Accordingly, accused is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of six months apart from paying a compensation of Rs.12,00,000/- (Rupees twelve lakhs only) being the cheque amount covered by Ex.P.1 under Section 357 of Cr.P.C. within three months from the date of this judgment, and in default of payment of compensation, as was ordered, she shall undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of three months."

4. Aggrieved by that, the convict preferred Crl.A.No.54 of

2024 before the learned Sessions Judge. The convict also

preferred an application under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. in

Crl.M.P.No.330 of 2024. After due hearing by a detailed order

dated 15.07.2024 the learned appellate Court allowed that

petition in the following terms:

"In the result, the petition is allowed suspending the sentence imposed for the offence under Sec.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioner/accused by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for trying Prohibition and Excise Offences, Machilipatnam in C.C.No.262 of 2020, dt.19.06.2024 till disposal of the main Crl.A.No.54 of 2024 on condition of depositing 20% (twenty percent) of awarded compensation amount in the trial Court within one month from the date of this order and also on execution of personal bond by the petitioner/appellant for an amount of Rs.10,000/- with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for trying Prohibition

Dr. VRKS, J

and Excise Offences, Machilipatnam. On failure to comply the conditions this order stands revoked and the trial Court shall take steps to serve out the sentence imposed by it."

5. Aggrieved by that, the convict preferred this revision.

6. Learned counsel submits that the direction of the learned

appellate Court to the extent of directing this revision petitioner to

deposit 20% of the amount is incorrect and illegal and requires

interference. In support of his contention, learned counsel cites

Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development

Corporation Ltd.1

7. Learned counsel further submits that a learned Judge of

this Court in Engamuri Ramya v. Smt. Pandiri Sarada Kamal2

set aside such orders which are akin to the order impugned here

and remanded the petition to the appellate Court for consideration

and disposal in accordance with law. The further submission of

the learned counsel is with reference to certain financial

difficulties and ill-health of petitioner's son which is not made part

of the grounds in the revision.

2023 LiveLaw (SC) 776

Crl.P.No.4324 of 2024 order dated 11.07.2024

Dr. VRKS, J

8. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction this Court could only

address as to whether the order impugned is illegal or improper.

On considering the material on record and the ruling cited by the

petitioner and the submissions of the learned counsel for

petitioner, the following aspects are to be stated:

The revision petitioner was found guilty and was convicted

by the trial Court and she impugned the same before the learned

Sessions Judge by way of an appeal. She prayed for suspension

of execution of sentence pending hearing of first appeal and the

prayer was granted by the learned Sessions Judge. One of the

conditions imposed is a direction to this revision petitioner to

deposit 20% of the compensation amount. It is undisputed that

such an order would be passed in terms of Section 148 of the N.I.

Act. Thus, what was done by the learned appellate Court is one

that is provided by the statute. Therefore, there is no apparent

illegality or impropriety in the impugned order. However, the

forceful submission of the learned counsel is that incorporating

such a condition directing the convict to deposit 20% of the

compensation amount is not mandatory and the learned appellate

Court could have omitted such term in its order and failing to do

Dr. VRKS, J

so resulted in illegality in the light of the rulings cited. Therefore,

these rulings are to be considered now.

9. In Jamboo Bhandari's case (supra 1), paragraph Nos.6

and 7 read as below:

"6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Hence, normally, Appellate Court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.

7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. of an accused who has been convicted for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded."

What happened in that case before their Lordships was that

the Courts below ordered deposit of 20% on the premise that it

Dr. VRKS, J

was an absolute legal obligation to impose such a condition by

virtue of Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Such assumption was found

to be erroneous by their Lordships and it was in those

circumstances their Lordships laid down the law as mentioned in

the above extracted paragraphs.

10. What is seen from the above ratio makes it very clear that

every appellate Court while suspending the sentence is justified

in imposing condition of deposit as provided in Section 148 of the

N.I. Act. However, such a stipulation is not an absolute legal

mandate, and it is stated that in those cases where the facts

make it clear to the appellate judge that imposition of such a

condition would amount to deprivation of the right of appeal then

an exception could be made and such a condition could be

omitted. In the impugned order before this Court the learned

Sessions Judge found the same question argued before her and

at page No.4 a specific observation was recorded that from the

material on record she could not see any financial distress or

other cause on part of the appellant therein to persuade her to

omit the condition of deposit of 20% of amount. Thus, the case

before me is a case where the question was raised before the

Dr. VRKS, J

appellate Court and the question was answered by the appellate

Court and while answering the question necessary reasons were

incorporated by the learned appellate Court. Simply because

another view could be taken is no reason to interfere with a

discretion that was properly exercised by the appellate Court.

11. In Engamuri Ramya's case (supra 2) at paragraph No.8,

the learned Judge made a record of the reasons which read as

below:

"08. Considering the rival submissions and in view of the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 9 & 10 of the above judgment, the condition imposed by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order without any finding whether the case falls in exception or not, to "deposit of 20% of the compensation amount before the trial Court within sixty (60) days from the date of this order" is not in accordance with the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred above. In the said circumstances the condition imposed by the learned Sessions Judge is setting aside. The matter is remitted to the Sessions Judge to consider the matter afresh in accordance with the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court paras 9 & 10 of the above judgment in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., and others."

Dr. VRKS, J

12. That is a case where this Court ruled as above on the

premise that in the impugned order therein there was no requisite

finding or observation as to why deposit was ordered. This ruling

does not assist the petitioner since in the case at hand, as

mentioned earlier, the impugned order made a specific record of

its observations on this specific aspect of the matter. It should be

made clear that their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India in the above cited ruling made it crystal clear that

incorporation of condition of deposit of 20% is the usual condition

that shall be incorporated in the orders granting suspension of

execution of sentence and the need for recording special reasons