Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
R Padmaja Rani vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 6 August, 2024
APHC010302212023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3331]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
TUESDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
WRIT PETITION NO: 15492/2023
Between:
R Padmaja Rani ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. CHANDRA SEKHAR ILAPAKURTI
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. SITA RAM CHAPARLA
2. GP FOR SERVICES I
3.
The Court made the following:
ORDER
This writ petition is filed seeking the following relief:
"... to issue a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the
nature of Writ of Mandamus to declare the action of the 3rd
respondent in issuing Proceedings Roc.No.65-c(1)/A1/2023-24
dated 23-06-2023 transferring the petitioner from the Post of
Assistant Audit Officer in the O/O the District Audit Officer, State
Audit, Rajamahendravaram to the post of Assistant Audit
Officer(AMRUT) Municipal Council Gudivada as illegal, arbitrary,
unconstitutional and contrary to G.O.Ms.No.71 Finance (H.R.I-
PLG. & Policy) Department dated 17-05-2023 and consequently
set aside the Proceedings Roc.No.65-c(1)/A1/2023-24 dated 23-
06-2023 issued by the 3rd respondent ..."
2. a) The averments in the writ affidavit, in brief, are that the
petitioner was initially appointed as Junior Auditor in the office of the
District Audit Office, Kakinada, on 06.07.1997, through the selection
process. In the year, 2002, the petitioner was promoted to Senior
Auditor and further promoted to Assistant Audit Officer, in the year,
2018. Petitioner worked in the capacity of Assistant Audit Officer in
State Audit (ZP), Kakinada, from January 2020. Later petitioner was
transferred to Rajamahendravaram and on 30.06.2022, she was also
made in-charge District Audit Officer, to the East Godavari District.
b) The petitioner's husband, who is physically challenged, is
also an employee of State Audit and he was working as Examiner of
accounts, in the Municipal Corporation, Vizianagaram. Petitioner's
husband was later transferred to Municipal Corporation, Rajahmundry,
in terms of G.O.Ms.No.71 dated 17.05.2023.
c) While the matter stood thus, the petitioner was transferred to
Gudivada Municipal Council vide proceedings in Roc.No.65-
C/a1/2023-24 dated 31.05.2023 and the same was kept in abeyance
by proceedings dated 01.06.2023. However, by proceedings in
Roc.No.30802/15-1/C1/2023 dated 22.06.2023 petitioner was
removed from the in-charge post of District Audit Officer and was
transferred to Gudivada Municipal Council by proceedings dated
23.06.2023, before completion of one year in Rajamahendravaram,
where she joined on 30.06.2022. The said transfer is contrary to the
guidelines issued in G.O.Ms.No.71 dated 17.05.2023. Hence, the writ
petition.
3. A counter affidavit is filed on behalf of respondent No.3. It was
contended, inter alia, that the transfer orders were issued as per the
Rules. The time limit of two years and five years as indicated in
G.O.Ms.No.71 are applicable only for request transfers and mandatory
transfers respectively. In the case of the petitioner, the transfer was
made under administrative grounds, based on the complaints received
from the staff regarding the harassment made by the petitioner.
b) The transfer was affected in accordance with the guidelines of
the Government and the Head of the Department and thus, it does not
suffer from any infirmity and arbitrariness. The transfer order dated
31.05.2023 was initially kept under abeyance on the ground that an
Inquiry was going on against the petitioner, based on the
representations submitted by agitated employees. The Inquiry officer
proposed to conduct an Inquiry on 10.05.2023. In the meanwhile
petitioner went on leave from 06.05.2023. The inquiry was conducted
on 10.05.2023 and the report is awaited.
c) Subsequently, the abeyance order was revoked vide memo
dated 01.06.2023. Therefore, the petitioner was relieved vide
proceedings dated 23.06.2023. The petitioner refused to receive the
orders issued on 31.05.2023. The petitioner, by securing the copies of
relieving orders from the staff approached this Court by
misrepresenting the facts. Respondent No.3, after assessing the
prevailing situation transferred the petitioner and the same was
endorsed by respondent No.2. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the writ
petition.
4. Respondents 5 to 19 also filed a counter affidavit with similar
averments as pleaded by respondent No.3.
5. Heard Sri Chandra Sekhar Ilapakurti, learned counsel for the
petitioner; Sri S. Raju, learned Assistant Government Pleader for
respondents 1 to 4 and Sri Sita Ram Chaparla, learned counsel for
respondents 5 to 19.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the contentions as
per the averments made in the affidavit. Learned Assistant
Government Pleader and learned counsel appearing for the unofficial
respondents reiterated the contentions as per the averments made in
the counter-affidavits.
7. Now, the points for consideration are:
1) Whether the impugned proceedings i.e., transferring
the petitioner, is legally sustainable?
2) Whether the petitioner approached the Court with
clean hands?
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following
judgments:
1) P.S.Reddy and others Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation, Hyderabad and others1.
2) S.Ramulu, S/o S.Chandraiah Vs. State of Telangana and
others2.
3) Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. The Chief Election
Commissioner, New Delhi and others3.
4) Bank of India Vs. Jagjit Singh Mehta4.
9. Learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents 1 to 4
relied upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in
W.A.No.325 of 2019 dated 15.10.2019.
10. After forming new revenue Districts in the State of Andhra
Pradesh, the petitioner, who was working as Assistant Audit Officer,
State Audit (ZP), Kakinada was allotted to East Godavari District vide
Govt.Memo No.Fin01-HODSOADSA(ESM)/47/2022-ADMN-III dated
30.06.2022 and further directed to act as District Audit Officer of the
newly formed district of East Godavari.
11. The Government issued G.O.Ms.No.71 Finance (HR.I-PLG. &
POLICY) Department, dated 17.05.2023, setting out guidelines/
instructions regarding transfers and posting of the employees. The
petitioner's husband was transferred and posted as an Examiner in the
Municipal Corporation, Rajahmahendravaram on 30.06.2022. Nothing
is discernable from the record, regarding his transfer on spouse
ground. However, he was transferred from Vizianagaram to
2008 (5) ALD 742
2008 (5) ALD 553
AIR 1978 SC 851
(1992) 1 SCC 306
Rajahmundry and the petitioner was allotted to Rajahmundry on the
same day.
12. After the petitioner assumed charge and while discharging
duties, the staff made complaints against the petitioner. In fact, they
also made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, East Godavari,
Rajamahendravaram on 04.05.2023. An inquiry against the petitioner
was also initiated. Later the petitioner was transferred on
administrative grounds, and 3rd respondent issued proceedings vide
Prodgs. Roc.No.65-C/A1/2023-24 dated 31.05.2023, transferring the
petitioner from the post of Assistant Audit Officer, office of the District
Audit Officer, State Audit, Rajahmahendravaram to Assistant Audit
Officer (AMRUT) in the office of the Commissioner, Municipal Council,
Gudiwada. Later on the instructions of the 2nd respondent on
01.06.2023, mail received on 02.06.2023, the transfer orders were
kept in abeyance. However, the petitioner refused to receive the
orders issued on 31.05.2023 and made an endorsement "refused due
to I have no option exercised to transfer".
13. Based upon the representations of the employees, the 2nd
respondent, because of the circumstances ordered to an Inquiry by
appointing the Joint Director as Inquiry officer. The Inquiry officer
proposed to conduct the Inquiry on 10.05.2023. Meanwhile, the
petitioner went on leave from 06.05.2023. The enquiry was conducted
on 10.05.2023 and the report is awaited.
14. The 2nd respondent issued proceedings vide memo dated
07.05.2023 placing the 4th respondent-District Audit Officer, State
Audit, Kakinada as in charge District Audit Officer, State Audit,
Rajahamendravaram. The 2nd respondent revoked the abeyance order
vide Progs. Roc.No.30802/15-1/C1/2023 dated 22.06.2023. Orders
are issued appointing one Y.Suresh Babu, District Audit Officer, State
Audit, Kakinada as the incharge to the post of District Audit Officer,
State Audit, Rajahamendravaram. Petitioner was relieved as Assistant
Audit Officer, State Audit, Rajamahendravaram on the forenoon of
24.06.2023 and instructed to join in the new post.
15. The attempts made by the junior auditors to issue transfer
orders and relieving orders, as seen from the material on record,
though reached the petitioner, she did not acknowledge the same.
These instances make the thing more than discernable that the
transfer of the petitioner is on administrative grounds only. No malice
was attributed by the petitioner qua the transfer.
16. High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India normally will not act as appellate authority. While
explaining the scope of judicial review, the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel Vs. Anilbhai Nathubhai Patel5, held
thus:
"12. Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to ensure that
each and every authority in the State, including the State, acts
bona fide and within the limits of its power. However, the scope
of judicial review in administrative matters has always been a
subject-matter of debate despite a plethora of case-law on the
issue. Time and again attempts have been made by the courts to
devise or craft some norms, which may be employed to assess
whether an administrative action is justiciable or not. But no
uniform rule has been or can be evolved to test the validity of an
(2006) 8 SCC 200 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 937
administrative action or decision because the extent and scope
of judicial scrutiny depends upon a host of factors, like the nature
of the subject matter, the nature of the right affected, the
character of the legal and constitutional provisions applicable,
etc. While appreciating the inherent limitations in exercise of the
power of judicial review, the judicial quest has been to find and
maintain a right and delicate balance between the administrative
discretion and the need to remedy alleged unfairness in the
exercise of such discretion.
18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of
judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative
decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it
shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in
defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula,
universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case
has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the
authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or
scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the
operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though
judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day,
yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly
irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from
consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no
reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material,
may be struck down. In other words, when a court is satisfied
that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is
invoked, it is incumbent on the court to intervene. It is
nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to
the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the
decision." (Emphasis is mine)
17. In Asha Sharma Vs. Chandigarh Administration and others6,
the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:
(2011) 10 SCC 86 : 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1176
"12. Arbitrariness in State action can be demonstrated by
existence of different circumstances. Whenever both the
decision-making process and the decision taken are based on
irrelevant facts, while ignoring relevant considerations, such an
action can normally be termed as "arbitrary". Where the process
of decision-making is followed but proper reasoning is not
recorded for arriving at a conclusion, the action may still fall in
the category of arbitrariness. Of course, the sufficiency or
otherwise of the reasoning may not be a valid ground for
consideration within the scope of judicial review. Rationality,
reasonableness, objectivity, and application of mind are some of
the prerequisites of proper decision-making. The concept of
transparency in the decision-making process of the State has
also become an essential part of our administrative law.
14. Action by the State, whether administrative or executive,
has to be fair and in consonance with the statutory provisions
and rules. Even if no rules are in force to govern executive action
still such action, especially if it could potentially affect the rights
of the parties, should be just, fair and transparent. Arbitrariness
in State action, even where the rules vest discretion in an
authority, has to be impermissible. The exercise of discretion, in
line with principles of fairness and good governance, is an
implied obligation upon the authorities when vested with the
powers to pass orders of a determinative nature. The standard of
fairness is also dependent upon certainty in State action, that is,
the class of persons, subject to regulation by the Allotment
Rules, must be able to reasonably anticipate the order for the
action that the State is likely to take in a given situation.
Arbitrariness and discrimination have inbuilt elements of
uncertainty as the decisions of the State would then differ from
person to person and from situation to situation, even if the
determinative factors of the situations in question were identical.
This uncertainty must be avoided."
18. Thus as seen from the expressions of the Hon'ble Apex Court,
arbitrariness in State action even where the rules vest discretion in an
authority, is impermissible. In such cases, the Courts can exercise
jurisdiction vested with it by exercising powers under Art 226 of the
Constitution of India.
19. In Shilpi Bose (Mrs) Vs. State of Bihar7, the Apex Court while
dealing with a transfer of an employee, where the High Court
interfered and set aside the transfer order, set aside the order of the
High Court and observed thus:
"4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a
transfer order which is made in public interest and for
administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in
violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala
fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no
vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is
liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer
orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his
legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of
executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not
interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the
higher authorities in the department. If the courts continue to
interfere with day-to-day transfer orders issued by the government
and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the
administration which would not be conducive to public interest."
20. The Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.325 of 2019 dated
15.10.2019 held thus:
"In cases of transfer, assigning a reason by the department is not
necessary. It is further to observe that interference in the matter of
transfer can be made if it is in violation of the statutory provisions
of law, or tainted with mala fides or when it is passed affecting
service condition or by way of penalty."
AIR 1991 SC 532
21. In the case at hand, the petitioner, as discussed supra, after the
bifurcation of districts, was allotted to East Godavari and further
ordered to act as the District Audit Officer in the newly formed district
of East Godavari by proceedings dated 30.06.2022. The employees of
the department made several complaints against the petitioner to the
higher officials. In fact, the employees made a complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, East Godavari on 04.05.2023, alleging
harassment by the petitioner. The 2nd respondent ordered to inquire
into the issue by appointing the Joint Director as an inquiry officer.
The inquiry was conducted on 10.05.2023 and the report is awaited.
22. The petitioner is aware of all these incidents including initiation
of inquiry, however, for the reasons best known to her, did not disclose
the same in the affidavit. Thus, the petitioner suppressed the material
fact and approached this Court. Persons approaching court by
suppressing material facts is not entitled to equitable relief.
23. In K.D. Sharma Vs. SAIL8, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable,
and discretionary and the petitioner approaching the writ court must
come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court
without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate
relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or
the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be
dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
It was held thus:
(2008) 12 SCC 481
"38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal
system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to
be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts
without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot
be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the
facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to
disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ
jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct)
facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very
functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible.
The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the
relief sought without any qualification. This is because "the court
knows law but not facts".
39. ... Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an
advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or
misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and
prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the
material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted
manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in
order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to
discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the
examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the
petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In
fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of
court for abusing the process of the court."
24. When the transfer order was issued by the 3rd respondent on
31.05.2023, the petitioner made an endorsement "refused due to I
have no option exercised to transfer". After revoking abeyance
proceedings, when the junior officers tried to serve the proceedings, as
seen from the material papers, the petitioner despite receipt of the
same, failed to acknowledge the same. Thus, the conduct of the
petitioner in not receiving the transfer order speaks volumes. The
transfer of the petitioner was made on administrative grounds. The
contention of the petitioner that the transfer was made in violation of
G.O.Ms.No.71 dated 17.05.2023, falls to the ground. The post held by
the petitioner is a transferable one. The authority exercised the
discretion vested with it for the smooth functioning of the office.
Nothing was improved by filing a counter affidavit and hence the ratio
in Gill's case doesn't apply to the facts of this case. No reasons need
to be assigned in the transfer order. The spouse ground pleaded by
the petitioner will not apply to the facts of this case.
24. Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any merit in
the writ petition and hence, it is liable to be dismissed.
25. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. However, no order
as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand
closed.
___________________________
JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
PVD
